The Devil We Know

When Robert Baer wrote "The Devil We Know", a book on the emergence of a modern Iranian "superpower", the Iran he spoke of was seemingly unshakable; the reformists had been shoved out, ending their decade long tenuous hold on power, and in their place had emerged a new breed of conservative. President Ahmadinejad, allied with the traditional clerical elites led the charge and Iran became Public Enemy No. 1 for much of the Western world (irrespective of which side deserves the blame for that belief).

However today, this same conservative bastion is being shaken. Ahmadinejad has split from the traditional conservatives and even challenged the supreme leader, a previously unquestionable authority who sat above the everyday fray of day-to-day politics. Ahmadinejad and his allies are proposing a fundamentally revolutionary change in the nature of the Islamic Republic, shifting true power from the clerics and the 'old guard' to entities that are far more secular and belong to his band of 'new guard' conservatives who haven't earned their credentials studying in seminaries in Qom, but on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war and modern-day business world.

Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival, has recently written an article for Foreign Policy Magazine where he explores this further and examines the risks should Ahmadinejad triumph and his vision for a future Iran take hold.

Showdown in Tehran - Vali Nasr - Foreign Policy

At the basic level, Vali Nasr is posing us the question: "Which would be better, the devil we know - an Islamic theocracy or a more secular, possibly more militant Iran - the devil we don't?

Nasr concludes that the international community, as well as the Iranian people should hope for a continuance of the status quo and the political death of the "Deviationists" as Ahmadinejad's political faction has come to be known. He bases his conclusions on two main points.

1) An empowered Ahmadinejad means increasing power of the IRGC in political life which would correspond to greater militarization and increased authoritarian characteristics.

2) The demise of the traditional clerical theocracy is inevitable absent a shake-up by the Deviationists because of of the will of the people who desire a more liberal system.

These are both flawed assumptions, (though both do have a kernel of truth) but to understand why we have to understand how the Iranian political arena functions. Contrary to many peoples initial perceptions of Iran as an authoritarian state, the politics of the Islamic Republic is actually characterized by extreme competition between different groups. (1) In fact, the best way to describe the political sphere is to say that it is comprised of an always shifting web of factions, persons, and revolves around their attempt to gain power and influence within the constraints of the framework of the Islamic Republic. (2) Each move made by a politician is made with the primary understanding that it will have domestic repercussions. In this manner, they are not unlike the US which frequently uses matters of foreign policy to drive tactical political gains (ex: New START and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars).

Politics with the Islamic Republic has largely followed a cyclical trend, first in power were the Khomeneist clergy who were swept up by the revolution where they held on until the early '90s when the moderates and pragmatists replaced them. But this camp was hamstrung by the institutional nature of the government which was organized to make change extremely difficult, but obstruction very easy. After the turn of the century a new breed of conservatives emerged who were younger and more-often-then-not came from the IRGC, not Qom. This group however is by no means monolithic and includes a wide range of figures from Ahmadinejad to Larijani to Rezai.

This brings us to the nature of the Deviationists and what their vision of Iran might look like. For the most part, I agree with Vali Nasser's description of Ahmadinejad and his close allies when he says their defining feature was: "...combining religious fundamentalism with Iranian nationalism and economic populism" (3) The Deviationists see a reduced role of the clergy in national government which isn't surprising given that the political movement is largely independent of the traditional religious hierarchies. While Ahmadinejad is manoeuvring to bring the religious aspects of the government more firmly under control of the state, it is almost inevitable that undercutting traditional hierarchies will result in a decentralization of religious power, no matter how much Ahmadinejad would try and retain for himself.

However Vali Nasr ignores a critical fact about the Iranian political system, which is that Ahmadinejad overturning the fundamental make-up of the system doesn't necessarily mean that Ahmadinejad will be the end state in the post-Supreme Leader world. I mentioned earlier that Iran is best described as factions competing within a framework; the impact of the secularization of the state is that that this framework is removed. The competition continues without the presence of the supreme leader to exercise his will which has been so often the impediment to legitimate change (as happened to Khatami). While it doesn't guarantee this outcome by any means, in fact it could result in even worse scenarios playing out, it does create a space for a more productive political solution to arise, space that would be completely absent otherwise.


But let's be honest, Ahmadinejad and his political allies are in a very bad place right now. Much of the influential leaders in the IRGC have sided with Khamenei along with many pragmatic conservatives who Ahmadinejad would have counted as allies. Meanwhile, the supreme leader has beaten the president in many of the recent battles over ministry appointments which serve as focal points for their struggle. It's unlikely as of this writing that Ahmadinejad will be able to manage a total victory.

So what does this mean for the Islamic Republic? Vali Nasr asserts that the establishment is a ticking time bomb which will soon crumble under it's own weight. While he doesn't directly write it, he insinuates that the successor to the system will be the liberal reformist camp which gained notoriety in the challenging of the 2009 presidential election.

As a firm believer in liberal realism, free-trade and democratic governance I must confess to be attracted by this notion that Iran could be a modern nation-state no longer at the peripheries in isolation. But like all good dreams, the fantasy has to end sometime and the truth is that for good or bad the majority of Iranians just don't support this vision, at least if public polls taken after the 2009 elections are any indicator.

According to the most recent Charney Research poll taken in 2010: (4)
- The majority of the populace supported Ahmadinejad (~60% of the electorate)
- The majority (59%) approved of the post-election crackdown
- A minority (32%) say that Iran needs more freedoms and democracy while a majority (51%) says Iran needs more controls to protect Islam.
- 47% believe the Supreme leader should make the final decisions in government as opposed to 32% who favor elected bodies. 
- The population is split relatively evenly on the performance of the government

Assuming the results are representative of the Iranian populace at large, (it appears that they are) this at best indicates that there is no clear consensus over the future of the Islamic Republic while at worst indicates that there's strong support for the status quo. The bottom line here is that while we in the west might be attracted by the idea of liberal revolutions, we can't forget that these are often quite often illusions designed to appeal to just this attraction. (5)

As this piece winds to a close, I would normally attempt to draw some conclusions about which path Americans should hope Iran takes in the continuing struggle but I'll refrain from doing so here because, quite frankly, no one knows. That's the core conundrum with the question "which is better, the devil you know, or the devil you don't?" In this case the answer is no more clear. The devil we know has unquestionably played a key role the 30 years of hostile relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. There's no question that it's an undesirable scenario because it engenders conflict and hostility. But then again, it is the devil we know; we've managed to live with Iran for 30 years and there is evidence that they are slowly moving incrementaly toward reform and normalization. The devil we don't know presents the real risks and opportunities but as always, we'll never truly know which should have happened or should happen because there will always be the opportunity cost that precludes the other. 

Here's to hoping for a good ending whatever it is. 

Footers and Works Cited
(1) Whether or not these processes are always entirely transparent and legitimate is another matter, but for our purposes irrelevant to the question of the competition between different groups for political power.
(2) Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads. Thaler et al. RAND. 2010.
(3) Showdown in Tehran. Vali Nasr. FP Magazine. June 2011.Link above.
(4) http://www.docstoc.com/docs/65872019/Iran-Public-Opinion-2010
(5) A good anologue is the counter-culture movement in the US during the 1960s. They dominated national discourse but were only represented a minority opinion.