Ruminations on the "Diary of a Revolutionary Guard Conscript"

PBS's Tehran Bureau is always a good place to go to get the viewpoint of the liberal-secular-democratic bloc (incl. "the greens) in and out of Iran and last week they published the account of an unnamed correspondent in Tehran who was conscripted into the military and ended up as a soldier in the IRGC. Interestingly enough, his account delves into the training process and provides ample material for us military enthusiests to pick through. Here are my observations on reading the article.


Link - Drafted: Diary of a Revolutionary Guard Conscript

General thoughts on Training: The entire process takes about 2 months (62 days) which is comparable to most nations basic training, such as the US's 8 week program. However it appears that for most conscripts, this is the end of the line and they do not go on to advanced speciality training schools (such as the armoured warfare or artillery schools within the Artesh). Most of the specific day-to-day training techniques he describes are standard throughout the world although he frames them, perhaps unfairly, as being particularly brutal.

The author makes a note of saying that he only fired a "mere 64 bullets from my old and rusty kalishnikov" - only two magazines worth of live ammunition. While this might not be considered to out of the ordinary for basic training (for example, the USAF doesn't begin live weapons training until week five), it must be remembered that these soldiers don't continue onto infantry or other specialization schools; the two magazines are it. This calls into question the competency of these recruits at a very fundamental level.

In the final weeks they undergo a series of mock exercises in the field as a finale to their training. Afterwords, they spend the remainder of their service "in garrison" at bases across the nation. In this particular case, the author is sent to the Kurdistan region in western Iran.


Omnipresence of Cronyism: The authors story validates much of the common wisdom held about Iran and corruption. In 2010 Iran scored 2.2 out of 10 in a report by Transparency international ranking it 146 out of 178 countries; this account of the behaviour of the IRGC gives plenty of examples to support this ranking. Before training even begins, the choice of which service a conscript is inducted into depends on a number of factors. The air force is reported to be the cushiest, but the is difficult to get into without the right connections. Counter-intuitively, the police force is said to be the most reviled because it has the most hardest training and requires dangerous postings. The IRGC, unlike the Artesh has strict standards of Islamic behaviour but has much easier training and relaxed discipline. This leads many well-connected individuals  serving in the IRGC. According to the author, a Basij connection never hurts either.

This trend would inevitably lead to a decrease in readiness since the IRGC would lose what makes them an "elite" force - their high morale gained through ideological unity. The IRGC can't function as a vanguard to the Islamic Republic if it's soldiers only viewed service as a way to avoid work, or as a fast-track to political/social success. Although, to the IRGC's credit, the author does mention that this criticism doesn't necessarily extend beyond the pure "conscript" cadre. 

Corruption also appears to impact unit readiness on another level.  Within the IRGC itself, cronyism is still a feature as soldiers buy the favour of their commanding officers; for instance, the author bribed his base commander in Kurdistan with free auto insurance to be transferred to an easier station. He also describes how knowing the right people can get you extra rations, smuggled goods like cell phones and MP3 players, exemption from duty, and passes. This likely corresponds with a lack in discipline as rules and orders no longer have force of law.

Deleterious Effects of Conscription: At a very basic level, Iran shows that it's not invulnerable to the usual weaknesses of a conscript army - many of the soldiers simply do not want to be there, and so readiness, morale and overall war-fighting capability suffers.  In fact, the author puts it perfectly himself: "everyone -- from the commanders on down knows that they can't make soldiers out of us; the training is perfunctory, the mood is somber, and discipline is mostly non-existent ... Most of us are so disgusted that we have been drafted into this life that we try to resist everything, from obediance to discipline ; all suffer because of our reluctance. " Combine this with the cronyism mentioned above, and a situation develops where the rank and file are filled with people who are doing their best to coast through their service with as little disturbance and get on with their life. Commanders meanwhile are too busy shuffling around yet another batch of recruits to invest time in what are obviously not career soldiers.

While many will say that in the event of a war, "every Iranian citizen will rally around their government and armed forces" - a statement that, while being accurate, misses the point that this kind of peace-time organization doesn't produce high-readiness units. In other words, fervor and patriotism doesn't make up for the ability to shoot a rifle accurately.


 This is yet another factor diluting the supposed elite ideological nature of of the IRGC. It would be one thing if the IRGC only admitted dedicated soldiers who actively chose the corps, much like the reputation the Marines hold within the US, but as soon as they start recruiting from the pool of conscripts at large, they lose this edge, especially if they have the reputation as an "easy" branch.


Deleterious Effect of Focus on Religious and Political Indoctrination: First off, it's important to note that 'indoctrination' isn't necessarily a value judgement despite it's popular negative connotations. It's also a touchy subject because any form of military training is fundamentally an exercise in control over an individuals will. However the process the author describes crosses the line of what would be considered reasonable, even allowing generously for the unique identity of an organization like the IRGC.

The author writes that: "There is no talk of military tactics ... but the indoctrination is serious. Most of the time is spent talking about the enemies of religion and state -- everything from the Fetne 88 ... to the Baha'is." While this was only the first week of training and it would be unreasonable to assume that this alone is an accurate representation of training, however since he never recants this initial observation and goes on to provide supplementary evidence saying that he has been deemed an adequate soldier because he has fired a small number of bullets and has memorized the Quran, is probably is accurate of his entire experience. 

The author also indicates that this training transcends traditional bounds by directly reflecting the anti-liberal stance of the Supreme leader and conservative factions allied with the IRGC. According to the author the representative of the SL, Mojtaba Zolnour, gave a speech declaring that figures like like Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Karroubi, and Khatami would be dealt with "...when their time is ripe...".

This should come as no surprise as the IRGC has always been identified as a praetorian guard type unit with a close relationship to the Supreme Leader. The fact that almost every article about them in the Western press begins with the words: "The Elite IRGC..." is thanks to the fact that it's members have always been reported to be highly dedicated, fanatical zealots that would lay down their lives for the Velayat-e Faqih at a moments notice.

 The author contends that this may no longer be a universal truth. As mentioned above the effects of conscription and corruption have eroded this advantage by replacing zealots with amateurs. He admits that many in the officer, political and intelligence cadre are dedicated believers but insists that the rank-and-file largely couldn't give a damn. "In my unit, most of the cadre, with the exception of a few in the political and cultural divisions ... did not care about politics".

Lack of Discipline / Professionalism: A major theme that runs through the entire report and is already evident in the points above is that the IRGC is an organization beset with problems of professionalism and lax discipline. Corruption has created conditions where any rule can be bybassed by the right connection or a suitable bribe.

The only rules the author reports being enforced are the wearing of the uniform, having short hair, a beard and being on time. He describes garrison as lounging around, jumping to attention when the political cadre comes by, and then relaxing after they leave. The author himself reports being at his station 15 out of every 30 days - 50% absenteeism.

It goes without saying that discipline is a key metric when evaluating any armies war-fighting capability. Disciplined soldiers can better be commanded their officers, will hold their position and perform better then ill-disciplined soldiers who distrust their officers, operate without strict command, and are much more likely to break in combat.

Overall Low Quality of Equipment and Facilities: This is a relatively minor point overall, but bears mentioning. It's to be expected that a country that has to supply for a large conscript force like Iran would be unable to provide every soldier with their own tailor-made uniform, boots, new rifles, or body armour. Even though this is to be expected the author also describes that the bases are lacking in basic hygiene as well as supplying insufficient nutrition which would have a further compounding effect on unit readiness and morale.

Maintaining Perspective: In the beginning of this piece, I mentioned the fact that the Tehran Bureau is predominantly a pro-reformist site because it's clear that this is article by an unnamed correspondent is not an objective piece. The author describes himself as a liberal agnostic who despises the IRGC. Moreover it's clear that he's opposed to the idea of mandatory military service and resents having been forced into it.

Because of this bias, we should take his claims with a grain of salt as large of Everest because of his strong incentive to portray the IRGC in the way he did and, even given pure intentions, his work would still be tainted by his personal experience. There's simply no way to verify any of his claims because there isn't anyone else stepping up to give their account of what military training and service is like to the English-speaking community at large. (On a side note, if anyone who is reading this has gone through the Iranian military as a conscript or volunteer and would like to rebut these points, I would be more then happy to host it on this blog)

However his narrative can still provide accurate information so long as we keep it in perspective. Specifically, we have to realize that his experience is not necessarily universal. While unmotivated, low-readiness units like the authors must certainly exist, there are also much more competent units that certainly exist as well (such as the IRGC's airborne commandos), we just don't know which are which, which in many ways, is the crux of the issue.