The insurgency in Syria is becoming increasingly militarized as government forces will have to demonstrate they can rebuild their legitimacy after clearing and holding insurgent territory (to use the parlance of the U.S's Afghanistan strategy). A daunting task considering how much of that legitimacy has already been lost through the (mis)use of force.
The overwhelmingly-Sunni nature of the insurgency has drawn cross-border support from populations in Lebanon and Iraq. In Iraq this has coincided with a power-grab by Tehran-backed Maliki which is now threatening the countries fragile cohesion. This is most acute in the north where Iraqi-Kurdistan has openly threatened to declare independence.
While this is unlikely in the short term, it underlines the emerging split in greater-Kurdistan which threatens to drawn in a host of countries. Turkey is increasingly aligning itself with the KRG and President Barzani who they see as essential to marginalizing armed-PKK activity inside Turkey. To this end they may be willing to support Kurdish independence inside Iraq. The PKK, eager to ensure their survival, has been working to improve their ties with Iran and Syria.
This gradual slide by Baghdad toward Tehran is a key part of the GCC's growing fear of a Shia arc of conflict that needs to be checked by an aggressive foreign policy in Syria. The confrontation over Abu Musa is an example of the security-fears of the Gulf Arab States.
What we're seeing is the emergence of opposing blocs with Turkey, the GCC, the Syrian-insurgency, the KRG, Iraqi/Lebanese-Sunnis, and non-local supporters like the U.S, and Western Europe on one side, with Iran, the Syrian-government, Baghdad, the PKK, Hezbollah, and non-local supporters like Russia. This is by no-means a monolithic group, but is accurate enough IMO to represent a loose conceptual framework.
I don't know what's going to happen in 2012, but I know something is going to happen.