The Arkenstone - ارکنستون

Zulfiqar Dimensions Redux

2013-05-10T22:28:00.001-07:00

Recently I happened across a discussion at Iran Defense Forum about the Zulfiqar-3 and its possible relationship with Iran's other tanks like the T-72M/S and M-60A1. Broadly speaking, one of the key differences between the Zulfiqar-3 and these tanks is its size; it's quite a bit larger in size.

Take, for example, this image of a crewman standing next to a T-72 versus Khamenei et al standing in roughly the same spot relative to the Zulfiqar. Compare the relative hull heights.

As always, 'right-click' - 'open link in new tab/window' to view full size

I have estimated Zulfiqar dimensions before, but because of the low precision (on account of photo perspective), a broader sample size necessarily improves accuracy. Dimension estimates are based off a road wheel diamter of 66 cm.

Iran's Disappearing Divisions continued - the 28th Infantry Division

2013-04-12T17:53:00.001-07:00

Continuing with my focus on the Iranian Army's doctrinal evolution and its relationship to the ever-changing art of modern warfare, I now turn my lens to one case study in particular - the 28th infantry division.

The first part of this analysis can be found here: "Iran's Disappearing Divisions"

The 28th infantry division was been based out of the Kurdistan province on Iran's western border with Iraq and was organized under both the armed forces of Imperial Iran, and the Islamic Republic. However, in 2011 it was broken up as part of the Iranian Army Ground Forces 'restructuring plan' (طرح تغییر ساختار) that resulted in a growth in the number of independent brigades throughout the country.

This process occurred in three stages. The first stage began in May 2011 with the conversion of the 2nd brigade in Saqqez to the 228th independent brigade. In November, the second stage saw the conversion of the 3rd brig. in Marivan to 328th IB. Most recently, in February 2013, the 1st brig in Sanandaj began its conversion to the 128th IB in the final stage of the plan.

The end-state of this reorganization is four independent maneuver brigades (the three listed above, plus the 71st independent mechanized infantry brigade in Sarpol Zahab) under the operational coordination of the former divisional headquarters that appears to be roughly equivalent to a 'corps'. At first glance, because a four-brigade corps is similar in size to a division, one is left with the question "why?". The key distinction to make between these two systems is that brigades are now the basic combat unit whereas previously they dependent on the divisions for combat support (for example: engineering, air defense, transport and logistics battalions).

This new body - the 'Northwest Tactical Command Division' (لشکر تاكتيكي قرارگاه شمالغرب) - is described by its commander - Second Brigadier General Cyrus Razmgir - as providing intelligence oversight (قرارگاه ضمن نظارت اطلاعاتی). The combat support units (یگانهای پشتیبانی) it used to command have now been reassigned to the brigades themselves.

The stated objective of this reorganization seemingly could have been lifted directly from any number of RAND monographs from the 1990s expounding on the virtues of breaking down command hierarchies. Cyrus's comments specifically emphasized that the plan was designed to preserve the commander's decision-making capabiltiy in the prsence of overwhelming attacks against their organizational hierarchy (سلسله مراتب ). The conclusion the army reached was that in order to react to these threats, combat units needed to be able to operate within the shortest possible reaction time and be agile and dexterous (چابکی و چالاکی) all in the absence of support from the "top".

Relevant Works:
IRNA Article One

IRNA Article Two

IRNA Article Three

Fars News Article

Note on Source: Persian-speakers are invited to check my claims against the articles themselves since there's always the risk I may have misrepresented an argument. For instance, it's unclear what the "Norwhest Tactical Command Division's" relationship to the "Northwest Operational HQ" commanded by Second Brigadier General Heshmat Malekian is.

Howeizeh APC

2012-12-10T16:17:00.004-08:00

*Working Copy*

The Howeizeh(هویزه), also known as the Sheni-Dar(شنی دار), is a light tracked personnel carrier first shown without fanfare in December 2011 during a visit by Generals Pourdastan and Vahidi to a MODAFL conference. The Sheni-Dar was than officially announced in January 2012 during the IRGC's Shohadaye Vahdat wargames in Eastern Iran, where it was shown alongside the wheeled Sarir APC. Then in September 2012, the Howeizeh was officially announced for a second time an an unidentified 'APC prototype and development office', this time under the name Howeizeh.

Front-Left

Rear-Right

Development and Doctrine
The show-casing of the Howeizeh has contributed to a growing understanding of the IRGC's armored doctrine over the past year. It was developed as the result of the requirement by the armed forces - presumably the IRGC in particular - to provide operational mobility for mechanized forces. This has been a criticism of Iran's infantry-centric armies ever since they proved unable to exploit any "Schwerpunkts" they created during their offensives against Iraq. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop describe Valfajr-8 offensive of February 1986:

"The Iraqi 2nd Naval Brigade and the 15th MD were almost completely annihilated, and only one armored brigade remained between Faw and Basrah, trying to stop the Iranian push northwards. The Iraqi's were overwhelmed, and if the Iranians had more tanks and APCs, as well as a more effective supply capability, they could have easily rode to the north and marched into the second largest Iraqi city almost unopposed." (The Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988, 198)

During the Shohadaye Vahdat wargames, an IRGC general described the Howeizeh as the outcome of an internal evaluation of "positional defence" and "mobile defence" strategies, as a response to a Western/NATO-type mechanized assault. (Iran Military Forum) Both of these terms have specific doctrinal implications. In brief, positional defence emphasizes attriting an enemy attack through direct engagement from static/prepared positions. Mobile defence, on the other hand, avoids frontal confrontation between similarly-dense forces, instead using screening forces to shape the creation of a favourable battle-space on which to use counter-attacks to decisively defeat an attacker. Iraq's doctrine post-1982 unquestionably trended towards the static end of the spectrum, while NATO in western Europe transitioned from the former to the latter in the early-1980s, and underwent significant internal debate as to the merits of both.

Additional comments in the Iranian media have made it clear that the Howeizeh has been designed with mobile defence in mind. In other words, this AFV aims to provide the necessary mobility required for Iranian forces to keep the initiative and dictate when and where an engagement will take place. This explains the emphasis on agility and concealment within the descriptive lexicon as both are geared toward gaining manoeuvre superiority over an attacker at the operational level.

Like "mobile defence", "operational mobility" is used in reference to a specific concept. Ogorkiewicz, in Technology of Tanks, defines it as

"...the ability of tank units to move in the zone of operations. This is a matter of tanks moving under their own power, mainly along roads and tracks but often also cross-country." (The Technology of Tanks, 225)

This is a function of both characteristics like power-to-weight ratio, or maximum speed, as well as logistical requirements like fuel range, mechanical reliability, and crew ergonomics. A smaller, lighter vehicle can cross softer ground, cross more brigdes, go down narrower paths, than a larger, heavier one, and therefore has a much larger theoretical area of operations. Likewise, the need for fuel, spare parts, and other mechanical support all tie the AFV to a certain degree of support infrastructure, limiting it's theoretical AoO.

Understanding these abstract factors contributing to mobility is key to understanding the language used to describe the Howeizeh. The ability to navigate cross-country was a center-piece of publicity videos, with shots of the AFVs operating in typical high-desert environment. It's light-weight (فوق سبک ) means it can climb steeper hills, and travel down narrower mountain roads roads than a BMP, or an M113. It's touted-simplicity also gives it a longer range, and while more features (i.e electronic subsystems) might have made it more versatile, they also would have required more repair-hours. Its small-signature () means it is able to travel in areas that might otherwise be denied to it by enemy fire, broadening it's AoO.

At a more general level, the Howeizeh is the essence of the APC concept. It provides organic, cross-country mobility to infantry forces, which otherwise might rely on divisional motorized transport, which in turn would limit the ability concentrate force at a required moment in space-time. In many ways, the Howeizeh (along with the Tala'eeyeh) constitute a conceptual successor to the Boragh program, which also aimed to provide basic infantry mechanization. Unlike an IFV like the BMP, the Howeizeh is not designed to stay in the fight; its infantry squad functions as its armament, which is 'fired' at the enemy by manoeuvre.

Physical Description
Configuration/Overview: The Howeizeh is a conventional, light, tracked APC. The powerpack is mounted at the front-right. The driver and commander* sit front-left, while the rear troop compartment holds room for six dismounts on inward-facing seats. There are two access/egress points: a rear-facing door, and the commander's hatch. The lack of roof hatches is further evidence that this APC has not been designed with fighting so much as delivering in mind. The overall configuration - particularly the superstrucutre - is very similar to the Wiesal 2 UF/BF, and observation/reconnaissance variants.

* It is unclear if there is space for a vehicle-commander as space would be at an extreme minimum behind the driver's high-backed, bucket-seat. This lack would almost certainly have implications for the IRGC's doctrine, again pertaining to the inability to fight from the vehicle, though at this point I am operating under the assumption there is.

Dimensions: Note the following comments remain in the provisional phase, and thus may be inaccurate. The Howeizeh is slightly taller than the Boragh (~1.88 m), but slightly shorter than the Boragh mortar-carrier (~2.02 m). If this is an accurate estimate, than this assumed height of ~1.95 m would correspond to length: ~4.6 m and width: ~2.3 m. This compares closest to the Canadian Lynx recon vehicle (L:4.6 W: 2.41 H:2.18), but also in the same range as the Wiesal 2 (L:4.8 W:1.87 H:2.17). This would likely put it in the ~8-tonne range, which is consistent with the maximum sling load of a CH-47(IRIAA), though well above an Mi-17's(IRGCAF) capacity.

Vision Devices: The driver is fitted with a ballistic window rather than the usual periscopes found on AFVs. This decision might have been made to make it easier and more intuitive to drive (greater FOV). Because they don't need to be filled with a gas, or maintain assembly alignment, they're also cheaper than periscopes. The troop compartment is fitted with two side-facing periscopes on either side, while the rear-facing door contains a single, small window. The vehicle commander lacks any vision devices that can be used buttoned-up. This is a further indicator that the vehicle is not meant to be fought from.

Protection: Composition of the Howeizeh's armor is unclear, though it is most likely welded steel and/or aluminium. (If any readers know of a way of telling the two materials apart visually, they are invited to comment below). The road-wheels have the same reinforcing ribs used on the M-60A1 MBT aluminum wheels, which suggests at least some of the components used are of this material.

Weight/dimension requirements make it unlikely that all-around protection exceeds that of small-arms / shell-splinters. The prominent air louvres and driver's window all represent weakened zones in the frontal arc that might indicate the Howeizeh is optimized against indirect fire weapons like shell-splinters. This would be an interesting perspective given the trend away from massed-area to precision bombardment, but may represent a "lesson learned" from the Iran-Iraq war in which light-infantry forces were decimated by prepared and overlapping fields of fire.

Mobility: The Howeizeh is powered by an unknown engine, likely a diesel in the ~200 hp range. One change between the Sheni-dar shown in January, and the Howeizeh shown in September was in the inclusion of further air louvres, which could indicate a cooling problem.

The forward-mounted final-gearing and sprocket drives a conventional running gear with single-pin, rubber-brushed track links, two track-return rollers, four aluminium, rubber-tired road-wheels, and rear idler. Suspension is torsion bar, with shock absorbers on the number 1 and 2 road-wheels.

While exact specifications cannot be ascertained, the publicity videos show that the Howeizeh is comparable to other light AFVs in terms of tactical mobility, turning-radius, maximum speed, stopping distance.

Armament: The prototypes seen thus far have been entirely unarmed, reflecting the above-mentioned point that the Howeizeh's 'weapon' is actually its infantry squad. The vehicle commander lacks any sort of cupola or pintle mount from which to operate a weapon, and his position to the extreme front-right of the vehicle would make any hypothetical mount cumbersome to use. The lack of roof hatches and side-firing ports also reflect a rejection of the cold-war doctrine that the squad should be able to fight from their vehicle. Despite this, official announcements indicate that the vehicle could be armed with, ambiguously described, rockets.

Iran's Disappearing Divisions

2012-10-22T14:34:00.001-07:00

For the past two-plus years, the Iranian Army ground forces have been engaged in the process of reorganizing their forces away from a division-centric, to brigade-centric model. This is hardly a novel concept - Iran follows in the footsteps of both the Spanish, and U.S armies. However, instead of producing medium-weight expeditionary forces (i.e Stryker brigades), this transformation ass been geared toward fighting a defensive war against modern maneuver army.

Until recently the army has maintained the same division-centric model it inherited from the imperial Iranian army, and fought their war with Iraq with. These were comprised of three combat brigades with the usual range of divisional-level support company/battalions. The purpose of the divisional staff was to coordinate combined arms operations between the brigades and support assets.

Now, however, brigades rather than divisions are the basic combat unit capable of carrying out sustained combat operations. On Army Day 2012 General Pourdastan announced that in 2011 (1390) the Army had a total of 19 independent brigades, while 12 more would be created in 2012 (1391). Of the 19 pre-existing brigades, we can identify the 37th (Shiraz) and 38th (Torbat Jam) independent armored brigades (IAB), the 40th (Ardebil), and 41st (NW Iran) independent infantry brigades (IIB), the 71st (Sarpol Zahab) independent mechanized infantry brigade (IMIB), the 11th (Maragh), 22nd (Shahreza), 33rd (Tehran), 44th (Isfahan), and 55th (Isfahan) independent artillery groups (IAG), and the 25th (Pasveh), 35th (Kermanshah), 45th (Dezful), 55th (Shiraz), and 65th (Tehran) commando/airborne brigades (ICB/IAbnB). The identities of four brigades remain unknown; they may include engineering, or air-defense brigades.

The 12 new independent brigades have been formed by shearing them off from existing divisions, which have now been reduced to two brigades in strength, or effectively abolished altogether. Newly independent brigades include the 284th IIB (Lorestan), 228th, 216th IAB (Zanjan), 277th IIB (Quchan), 177th IIB (Torbat Heydariyeh), 288th IAB (Khash), 130th IIB (Bojnourd), 221st IIB, 264th IIB (Urmia), 281st IAB (Kermanshah/Bistoon), and 292nd IAB (Dezful). Convinently, the last two letters of the brigade's numerical designation corresponds to their parent unit, making identification relatively easy. For instance, both the 277th and 177th IIBs were formed from the 77th MID, while the 288th and 292 IABs were, respectively, once part of the 88th and 92nd ADs. Furthermore, these many of these newly independent brigades are relocating away from their historical garrisons inside cities toward new bases outside of the congested urban environment.

At the regional level, these combat units are supported by an increasing number of independent support brigades - artillery groups being the most well-known examples. While these brigades existed before, they are now being relocated away from large, centralized garrisons in places like Isfahan and Tehran towards forward deployment in border regions. At least two have been re-deployed in the eastern cities of Khash and Qaen.

According to General Pourdastan, this reorganization was the product of internal study of past wars, particularly those involving western-style maneuver forces. The conclusion drawn was that if Iran wanted to defeat a modern NATO-type army, such as the one that faced Iraq in 1991 and 2003, their organizational structure (aka C2 hierarchies) would have to be made resilient against concentrated, high-density firepower. In essence, Iran is trying to prevent the U.S from being able to achieve battle-space (aka 'information')-dominance.

That fact that these concepts have been trivialized as buzzwords does not take away from their real world power. By controlling your enemy's vision of the battle-space, you are ensuring that he will always be reacting to the way the battle used to be, not the way it is. The quintessential example of this is from 1991 in which coalition forces were able to simultaneously maintain total situational awareness through tactical communication, while degrading the Iraqi's C2-network. British General Rupert Smith recounts one example where Iraqi tankers had been ordered to attack a breach that had occurred "...24 hours previously and 100 kilometers back.", but because their staff didn't have an accurate picture of the battle the unit in question wandered blindly into prepared (aka situationally-aware) British forces and where destroyed. (The Utility of Force, 51)

To see how this strategy might be negated at a conceptual level, one has only too look to the 2006 Lebanon war in which Hezbollah was able to defeat Israel's military strategy because they controlled the information battleground. By practicing adept denial-and-deception, and 'shoot-and-scoot' operations, Hezbollah was able to deny Israel - including their air-based surveillance platforms - an accurate picture of the battlefield at an operational level. This meant that the IDF, like the Iraqis, had given up the initiative to their enemies, allowing them to control the tempo and flow of the battle.

To this end, Iran's reorganization can be seen as flattening decision making by giving brigade commanders a larger tool-box that can be called upon without relying on divisional-C2 to remain intact. Pourdastan has consistently described the motivation behind such a move as boosting unit's tactical/operational flexibility, making them better equipped to respond self-sufficiently to these kind of "critical situations" imposed by todays rapidly changing battlefield.

Historically, the divisional hierarchy arose as the most efficient way to manage the rapid expansion in the size of national armies following the Napoleanic revolution in military affairs. At this time, the corps-level staff simply couldn't coordinate the number of troops in action as well as the growing density of firepower available to these combat units (independent artillery units being the best example). The division solved this problem by pushing the coordination of combined arms 'down' a level, preventing total organizational paralysis that would have resulted should C2 remained centralized at the corps level.

However, the success of such a system still depends heavily on intact C2-structures, and as national armies have shrunk in size since the high-water point of WWII and the Cold War, the same problem of combat unit flexibility has again reared its head, exacerbated by Western information-dominance strategies, which seeks to exploit this inherent weakness in all hierarchies.

Shifting toward independent brigades pushes 'combined arms coordination' down another level. Thus, in Iran we should expect brigades to now field a more robust level of organic artillery, air-defense, anti-tank, and engineering support. While the ORBAT of Iranian divisions is not well known, several guesses can be made which, if nothing else, will illustrate the principal behind the reorganization. Until recently the brigades belonging to the 30th ID have relied on divisional-level heavy transport to ferry its motorized infantry battalions. Now that the 130th brigade is now independent, we should expect it to be able to provide its own operational transport, allowing it to function where before they could have been rendered impotent by destroying (electronically or kinetically) the C2 links between Bojnourd and Gorgan.

---

EDIT:

For an excellent description of the implications of information-dominance and control of the battle-space-image, consider reading this piece on network-centric warfare from Australia Airpower.

http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-NCW-JanFeb-05.html

Provisional Eastern Theater Organization

2012-09-28T20:20:00.001-07:00

Here's where things are in the process of going on the Arkenstone ...

Eastern-Theater ORBAT of the Iranian Army

(Bring up photo-viewer --> Right Click --> "View image" --> Magnify and Navigate Image)

30th ID

2012-09-28T20:15:00.003-07:00

Located in north-eastern Iran, the 30th ID is among the smallest and lightest of the regular army divisions. The divisional headquarters along with the 1st brigade is based in Gorgan, in the Golestan province, while the 2nd brigade is found in Sari in the neighboring Mazandaran province. The infantry brigade in Bojnourd was, until very recently, attached to the 30th ID, but now operates independently. The current commander is Sartip Dovom (aka Brig. Gen. 2nd class) Mansour-Khumri. (Footnote 1)

While it is unconfirmed at this point, there are possible indicators that the division is under pressure to relocate their garrison out of the city in order to relieve urban congestion. (Footnote 2)

Operationally, the brigade falls into the army's eastern theater. Geography, as well as the lack of any high-density weapons like self-propelled artillery, tanks, or APC/IFVs suggests that the 30th ID is a second-tier unit designed to reinforce units like the 77th MID.

The first brigade is located directly in the city-center of Gorgan, adjacent to road 22 which runs from Tehran to Mashhad. Google Earth imagery of the base dates from June 2003 and, over the eastern-most half, from September 2007. Very little ORBAT-related equipment is visible on available imagery.

What is available includes a relatively large array of heavy earth-moving equipment (1) along the same lines as can be seen in other divisional headquarters (examples: Qazvin, Mashhad). Nearby are additional motor pools including one with pickup-truck and Jeep-type vehicles (2) as well as larger 2 ½, and 5-ton vehicles (3). The division depends on these soft-skin vehicles for everything including troop transports, to artillery-tractors. Semi-trailer type trucks, also likely used for material-resupply, are found along the northern portion of the base.

Heavy Motor Transport

Fortunately, parade photography fills in some gaps. Light tactical vehicles – like the Toyota Land Cruiser – are as weapons platforms, carrying at least DShK machine-guns and 82 mm mortars. In order to imagine how these might be deployed, one might be able to look to the similarly equipped border police. Rifle squads of six or more strong are assigned to pickup-trucks, which are then supported by a handful of machine-gun, recoilless rifle, and MLRS-armed vehicles. It is, quite frankly, impossible to say with any degree of certainty exactly how they are deployed, but it wouldn't be unusual to see mortar or MLRS batteries, as well as recoilless-armed anti-tank platoons at the battalion level. Alternately machine-guns, and maybe even heavier weapons, could easily be found at the company level, as was the case with Soviet infantry companies. At any rate, given the overall lack of mechanization there are likely to be substantial anti-tank units attached at the divisional level.

DShK and Mortar-Equipped Land Cruiser

The brigade is also equipped with M-46 towed guns, which are likely organized at battalion strength.

M-46 Towed Gun and Gun Tractor

One report indicates that the 30th ID has an organic UAV capability, presumably supplementing other divisional level reconnaissance assets.(3) During one parade, a powered paraglider was flown overhead, suggesting another possible reconnaissance tool.

Like all army divisions/brigades observed thusfar, the 30th ID also has an attached 'commando' unit. While I have long puzzled over the exact battlefield role for these troops, one of the more plausible explanations is that they are intended as a reconnaissance force similar in doctrine to the U.S Marine recon battalions.

Commando detachment

The second brigade – based in Sari, along Artesh street – is even smaller. Compared to the battalions in Zabol and Birjand with compounds of roughly 60 acres (ignoring hardened storage), the brigade in Sari is housed in a compound of only 20 acres. To drive this point home, there are only two-four buildings which are at all reminiscent of barracks (length/width ratio) visible on Google Earth, imagery from which dates from July 2010. The only other assets visible on GE include a smattering (less than 10) of heavy transport.

Footnotes:
(1) http://www.shabestan.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Serv=42&Id=123967&Mode
(2) The limiting factor being my Persian-language skills and the inadequacies of Google Translate.
First Source - http://gorganemruz.persianblog.ir/post/27
Second Source - http://khabarfarsi.com/n/334442/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%B1_30_%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87_%DA%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A8%D9%87_%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC_%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1_%DA%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84_%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF
(3) http://gorganma.persianblog.ir/post/545

130th IIB

2012-09-12T22:53:00.001-07:00

Stylistic note: Since I've used a numbering system (i.e (1), (2), (3)) for both footnotes, and for annotating GE Imagery, I'd better codeify a new way to use them. Footnotes are designated by - unsuprisingly - the label "Footnote" inside the parenthesis, while the imagery annotations will not. The annotations will also likely all be grouped in the same location and be fairly self-evident

Galen
---

The newly-formed 130th independent infantry brigade (IIB) is one of the byproducts of the Army's 2011/2012 reorganization. Originally attached to the 30th infantry division (ID), the 130th IIB is based out of the city of Bojnourd in the North Khorasan province; its base located in the north-central part of the city itself. This means the brigade falls into the Army's eastern theater of operations tasked with defending Iran's Afghan/Pakistan border.

According to General Pourdastan, current commander of the Artesh's ground forces, this reorganization was aimed at increasing the brigades "agility". (Footnote 1) Operationally, we can make several guesses about this brigade's operational role. Lacking any apparent mechanization, this infantry-centric brigade would likely be deployed in maneuver warfare to secure and hold territory in support of vanguard units like the 38th IAB. This operational theory contextualizes Pourdastan's comment on the brigade's improvided flexability. Located in Bojnourd, this brigade would be the best well-suited to be transformed into a rapid reaction force (the 30th ID's other two brigades can be found further west in Gorgan and Sari). Giving them the ability to support their own forces rather than wait on divisional logistics could drastically affect mobilization time.

While details remain unknown, at the most general level this reorganization would entail the pushing of divisional assets downward. Because the brigade is now operating independently, it must be capable of providing all of its own maintenance, logistical, and other support capability below the theater-level. Pourdastan obliquely confirms this when he talks about the addition and subtraction of units. On one level, we are likely to see an increase in the amount of firepower directly available to the brigade. Some possibilities might include the addition of Zu-23-2 batteries, towed gun batteries, and anti-tank companies. Logistically, the brigade would have to duplicate their battlefield supply chain in addition to their peace-time facilities for training, maintenance, and so forth. This might manifest itself in battalion sized signal and material support battalions where companies might have been found before. It must be emphasized that any descriptor of unit size (Bn, Co, etc) is largely speculative on my part, but should illustrate the situation nonetheless.

As of July 2009, very little can be observed with satellite imagery that would help fill out an ORBAT (especially since it dates since before the reorganization). The base itself is rather small, which may suggest there is additional off-site facilities. Indeed, there is a military facility about 8 km north-west of the city, but this cannot be tied to the 130th IIB, and may very well be an IRGC facility. At any rate, the base inside the city can be tentatively identified as such since the main entry-control-point (ECP) (1) can be seen in images accompanying news footage of the base dedication along with the adjacent building. (2)

The few visible assets include a battalion of towed guns with three batteries of six, five, and six guns respectively; they are ~~likely D-30s in travel-configuration~~ M-101s. (3) The only other thing of note in the motor pool are the soft-skinned trucks of the 5-ton and lighter types. (4) Assuming there is no depot elsewhere, this lack of even basic mechanization drives home just how light many of Iran's infantry divisions are.

Footnotes:
(1) http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=3&year=1390&month=9&day=2&id=3371857

16th AD Update

2012-09-06T10:46:00.001-07:00

The third* brigade of the 16th armored division in Western Iran, based out of Hamedan, was previously obscurred by low-quality imagery. A recent Google Earth update, with imagery from June 2011, now shows the base in relatively high-resolution along the 48 road leading northwest out of Hamedan ( 34.852852°, 48.446303°).

* Though due to the recent reorganization which saw the formation of the 216th IAB it must be remembered that it would now be more accurate to refer to it as the division's second brigade. For the purposes of continuity, the former designation will be kept to avoid confusion.

Unlike some nations which have a marked distinction between 'tank' and 'mechanized' brigades, Iran has – for the most-part – uniformly equipped their armored divisions with brigades of equal strength. The 16th AD is an example of this, rather than concentrating their tank battalions in full-strength brigades (i.e with multiple tank battalions) the army has favored an even distribution among mechanized brigades (i.e muliple infantry battalions with one tank battalion).

This has resulted in a scenario where Iran's armored divisions are almost all uniformly better classified as mechanized infantry divisions. On one hand, this likely reflects the fundamental reality that Iran can't field Soviet-style tank divisions. On the the other, it also likely reflects the relative utility that Iran places on tanks. Rather than seeking the decisive concentration of force that heavy divisions represent, which are fundamentally offensive in nature, Iran has chosen to relegate tanks to the support role in which they serve as theater-level anti-armor assets.

Speculation aside, the third brigade in Hamedan doesn't buck this trend. Beyond the usual range of barracks (1) and including single unit housing with their private courtyards (2,3), the motor-pool offers an excellent view of the brigade's vehicles. These include a wide range of soft-skinned vehicles, including 5-ton, 1 ¼-ton, and ¼ ton trucks, often with trailers or other towed equipment. (4) A handful of M113s can be found scattered around the compound (4, 8), suggesting a likely role as command, or other special-use vehicle rather than in a homogenous infantry battalion. The usual accompaniment of a 12+ gun M109 battalion (5) is present, though no M548s are. More than 40 FV4201 tanks (6) are visible – likely approximating a full-strength battalion. It's worth noting that this comes close to Iran's original pre-war battalion strength, with three companies of 15 tanks each. This compares to a Soviet tank company of 10 tanks. The brigade also retains some organic combat engineering capability, as evidenced by the AVLB (7) visible next to the seven M113s (8). A handful of unidentified armored vehicles can be seen under garages (9) in the far east of the motor-pool. These are likely shielding the brigades BMP-2 IFVs or FV101 light tanks, which have been observed on parade.

M-40 RR and 107 mm MLRS - Fire Support

FV101 - Armored Recon

M109 SPG (Fire Support) and BMP-2 IFV (Mech. Inf.)

38th Independent Armored Brigade

2012-09-02T12:08:00.000-07:00

The 38th independent armored brigade is based out of the city of Torbat Jam, east of Mashhad and close to the Afghan border. The current commander is Sartip Dovom (Brig. Gen. 2nd Class) Hamidreza Asadi.

According to it's former commander, the brigade functions as a quick-reaction force tasked with responding to “infiltration” of enemy forces. In this manner, the 38th IAB would likely serve as a screening force in order to buy time for the mobilization of the 77th MID in Mashhad. This is supported by the geography of Iran's eastern border, which earily resembles the Fulda Gap in Cold-War Germany. Any attacking force wishing to take the key city of Mashhad, and continue westward toward Tehran must pass through two parallel valleys divided by a series of road-less east-west ridge-lines, with their garrison cities of Torbat Heydariyeh, and Torbat Jam (the latter being the more direct route). It may be somewhat poetic that 'Torbat' means "burial place".

The base, located in the eastern portion of the city includes a munitions depot (1) with a mix of hardened shelters and open-air revetments. Nearby are a handful of handgun and rifle firing ranges (2). The base also includes a generous amount of mocked-up fighting positions (3, 4), presumably for training purposes. These fields include foxholes, trenches, mortar pits, and tank ramps. The most interesting feature of these training yards is, what appears to be, an underground garage for an armored fighting vehicle, of the sort that can be seen in Iranian wargames. More than just a ditch, the garage also includes side-trenches, likely rudimentary living or storage facilities for the crew.

On the southern edge of the base is what appears to be a gun battery (5) with raised concrete pads, ammunition pits, and fire-control centers. Unfortunately, the guns on the pads cannot be identified as either field, or anti-aircraft artillery.

Another interesting feature is a drive-through garage in a walled-off compound (6) (thus limiting the apparent value of a drive-through garage)The Brigade's motor-pool (7) includes the usual array of soft-skin vehicles used to motorize Iran's forces. Very little information is available about the available armored vehicles – the backbone of the brigade's fighting strength. On the southern edge of the motor-pool are nine wheeled-AFVs of an unkown type. Approximately 6.75 m long, and 2.5-2.75 m in width, they are ostensibly too small to be BTR-60s (length: 7.56 m, width: 2.82 m). On the other hand, almost every AFV across Iran that I can identify as a BTR is almost always under 7.56 m, which is making me think that I need to revisit my dimensions on file rather than search for a new AFV. This is backed by the fact that the BTR-60s I've examined outside of Iran almost always measure in at less than 7.56 m as well. It may well also be that the Google Earth measuring tool just isn't that accurate. At any rate, much of the features of the vehicles in question at Torbat Jam also share features with the BTR-60 including sloped sides, pointed-front, and length/width ratio.

East of these vehicles is a garage being constructed of the type typically used as shelters for AFVs. True to form, a handful of M113 APCs can be seen (9). These likely belong to a mechanized infantry battalion, either in conjunction with the BTR-60 Co mentioned above, or as part of their own mechanized battalion. Lacking a clear picture of the numbers of AFVs available prevents us from determining the organization further.

Additional garages can be found around the motor-pool, which likely hide away the rest of the brigades armor, including any self-propelled artillery, and tanks – each of which are likely deployed at battalion strength (understrength or otherwise). An unidentified vehicle (10) can be seen peeking out from under the east-facing awnings.

The base's main gate is located in the north-eastern corner (11)

88th AD Update

2012-08-28T11:16:00.000-07:00

Following my original post detailing the known ORBAT / TO&E of the 88th AD, Google Earth updated their imagery of the Zahedan area. In addition to this, I located the new divisional headquarters.

At the same time I was writing the first ORBAT in early-2011, the 1st AB was in the process of transferring their forces to the newly constructed "Shahid Yaqoob Ahmad Beigi" divisional HQ, which was nominally operational by this time with functioning administrative, maintenance and garrison facilities. By late-spring 2012, the majority of this transfer was reported to have been completed.

The given reason for this transfer was to decrease the congestion incurred when operating in major urban areas. It is unclear whether this refers to the brigade's ability to mobilize its forces, or to any negative effect on normal civilian movement.The new base has far better infrastructure to expedite the flow of men and equipment from motor-pools to the adjacent highways; the increased size will also allow for far more expansion in the future when compared to the finite facility inside the city.

Whatever the reason, updated GE imagery from August 2011 shows the results of this transfer, giving more insight into the Artesh's order of battle. For one, the divisional commander has been identified by Iranian media as Sartip Dovom (aka Brigadier General, 2nd class) Haqiqatfard; the commander of the 1st brigade is reported to be named "Ali", but little else is known about either officers, including the latter's rank.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the new base is the grid of high-capacity, median-divided roadways, which are set in stark contrast to the small, winding roads found in the former base. An entry-control point (1) marks the base's main entrance with a nearby reception building and parking lot. A handful of administrative buildings (2) - including "the fort" (3) - can be found nearby. The far-eastern collection of buildings (4) are likely to support the brigade's forces as they are gradually transferred to the new compound. These also likely include the classrooms reported by Iranian media. A parade and drill yard (including mocked-up trenches), similar to those found across the country, can be found further south-west (5). The collection of buildings to the far south (6) with their distinctive red, peaked roofs is the base's maintenance and repair workshops as evidenced by the abundance of nearby construction materials (ex: coiled cables, pipes), and earth-moving equipment, identifiable by their unique bright-yellow paint scheme. It's unclear how much these buildings are necessarily divisional assets versus temporary measures required during base construction. Note the nearby water towers.

Also visible is a handful of armor, but before I describe those, I should segue into a brief discussion about using Google Earth's measuring tool to determine the identity of AFVs. In many cases I have often used the length of an object to determine whether it is, say for example, a BMP or a BTR. While dimensions are unquestionably useful for determining identity, using them for analysis on scale of AFVs (often less than 10 m in length) risks misinterpretation simply because the tools aren't precise enough - hull-lines blur, shadows create distortion, etc. This creates significant difficulties when the difference between vehicles is only a question of one or two meters. In short, measured dimensions are only as useful as their accompanying context, which can be used to understand the observable differences observed in GEOINT. For instance, comparing the length/width ratio of vehicles is often far more important than their absolute measured dimensions, providing a crucial distinguishing feature between wheeled BTR-60s, and tracked BMPs.

Situated next to the maintenance workshops is a collection of 15 BMP-type vehicles (presumably BMP-2s) along with six M113s (variant unknown, likely M113A1) (7). This stands in contrast to the six BMPs which were visible at any given time previously. Taken together, the organization of these 21 vehicles is difficult to discern given the multitude of possibilities. One possibility is that 15 BMPs represents a mechanized infantry battalion with severely understrengthed rifle companies (less than 50% of an equivalent Soviet battalion). It's also possible that the M113s are not affiliated with infantry companies at all, and are instead used to provide some unknown capability at the battalion or brigade level as command vehicles, or as anti-tank or machine-gun platoons.

It's possible that all the mechanized assets have been consolidated together into a single full-strength battalion-sized force. This would mean combining forces with the two companies of BTR-60PBs (10 rifle squads/company) located to the north (9). Like the BMPs, the number of visible APCs exceeds those visible at the former base. Alternately, these two companies may represent a second mechanized infantry battalion - albeit understrengthed. At this point, these guesses are just that, guesses.

Adjacent to the BTR-60s are two platoons worth of M-48A5 MBTs (8).While some M-48A5s can still be observed at the old base (see below), the question of where the remaining elements of the tank battalion are remains. The most probable answer is that they are in the nearby garages. These garages are aytpical designs (with rather small doors), but could conceivably hold the missing armor. This applies not just to the tanks, but to the other armor as well.

Not all of the 1st AB (and supporting divisional assets) had been relocated from the old base as of August 2011, the equivelent of two tank platoons remain in their old motor-pool, as does the full battalion of M109 SPGs. Notably, the M109 battalion is equipped with 13 guns, rather than the usual 12 (three batteries of four guns). The purpose for this is unclear. Also nearby is a battery of D-30 towed guns, which is also reinforced with an additional gun (seven, rather than the usual six pieces). Organizationally, this is atypical as towed guns are usually deployed in battalions. It's possible that this could be a unique support asset deployed at differently than the standard brigade-level fire-support. Also still garrisoned in the old facility is the division/brigade's engineering company with a number of highly-visible earth-moving equipment (possibly front-end loaders) in bright yellow.

Another noteworthy development in regard to the 88th AD is the continued trend towards smaller field formations among the Artesh. The typical three-brigade structure of Iranian armored division is being reduced even further to a two-brigade structure, with the third brigade operating independently under the command (presumably) of the regional/theater hierarchy. In this case, the 2nd brigade - operating from Khash - has been redesignated the 288th independent armored brigade.

Summer/Fall 2012

2012-07-24T09:29:00.002-07:00

As commenters have noted, this blog has petered off over the last several months. It hasn't been the result of any particular decision on my part, I've always considered this an 'active' blog with the writings dictated purely by whether or not I'm able to write about anything interesting. Unfortunately, for reason and that, I've found myself with increasingly less time to write these days. In part this is due to competing academic demands, but now is mostly due to the abysmally slow speeds of satellite internet, which really prevents any form of intensive research (Google Earth is essentially unusable). Assuming several logistical questions work out in the real world September should be especially active for The Arkenstone, with a decreased, but steady output for the rest of 2012.

All the best.
Galen

2012 is going to be an Interesting Year

2012-04-29T13:44:00.001-07:00

The insurgency in Syria is becoming increasingly militarized as government forces will have to demonstrate they can rebuild their legitimacy after clearing and holding insurgent territory (to use the parlance of the U.S's Afghanistan strategy). A daunting task considering how much of that legitimacy has already been lost through the (mis)use of force.

The overwhelmingly-Sunni nature of the insurgency has drawn cross-border support from populations in Lebanon and Iraq. In Iraq this has coincided with a power-grab by Tehran-backed Maliki which is now threatening the countries fragile cohesion. This is most acute in the north where Iraqi-Kurdistan has openly threatened to declare independence.

While this is unlikely in the short term, it underlines the emerging split in greater-Kurdistan which threatens to drawn in a host of countries. Turkey is increasingly aligning itself with the KRG and President Barzani who they see as essential to marginalizing armed-PKK activity inside Turkey. To this end they may be willing to support Kurdish independence inside Iraq. The PKK, eager to ensure their survival, has been working to improve their ties with Iran and Syria.

This gradual slide by Baghdad toward Tehran is a key part of the GCC's growing fear of a Shia arc of conflict that needs to be checked by an aggressive foreign policy in Syria. The confrontation over Abu Musa is an example of the security-fears of the Gulf Arab States.

What we're seeing is the emergence of opposing blocs with Turkey, the GCC, the Syrian-insurgency, the KRG, Iraqi/Lebanese-Sunnis, and non-local supporters like the U.S, and Western Europe on one side, with Iran, the Syrian-government, Baghdad, the PKK, Hezbollah, and non-local supporters like Russia. This is by no-means a monolithic group, but is accurate enough IMO to represent a loose conceptual framework.

I don't know what's going to happen in 2012, but I know something is going to happen.

New Google Earth Imagery

2012-04-11T09:57:00.003-07:00

GE has updated their imagery available of Persian Gulf Islands including Abu Musa, Sirri, and Qeshm.

Check it out to see the evolution of military fortifications on these islands. The high quality of the imagery is astounding.
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Second Edit - April 17
Looking over Abu Musa some more, I continue to be amazed by the high-quality imagery of such an important strategic location, especially given the recent tensions between Iran and the UAE over their ownership.The HQ imagery is somewhat of a double-edged sword as it poses just as many questions as they answer.

One example of that problem is this fighting position in the south-west portion of the island. It ostensibly looks like a conventional AAA position common to the island; it is equipped with a raised concrete pad and is adjacent to a number of small ammunition storage and crew pits. Upon closer inspection though, this concrete pad is unique in that it has ~~two distinct entry points, with what appears to be tracks leading up to the pad.~~(turns out, this isn't that rare of a feature on AAA sites.) More importantly, the weapon on the concrete pad looks nothing like a Zu-23-2 or GDF-series; its appearance is more reminiscent of a recoilless rifle mounted on a Jeep although it is difficult to tell for sure. This raises the question of which of the other AAA positions around the island are actually coastal defence weapons, and more broadly it raises questions about how Iran intends to fight back an amphibious assault on the beaches of Abu Musa because they've certainly prepared for such a contingency.

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First Edit

Abu Musa
The island's port has seen significant construction between 2006 and 2011. This includes a fort that shares several design features with the forts on the Iran-Afghanistan border such as circular turrets located at opposing corners. To the east is another fort, this time within a security perimeter, indicating high-value of some sort; a trench connects the building to a second fenced-off area with several dome objects within them. GPS jammers perhaps, or other communications or EW devices? To the west of the large fort is another building that is somewhat obscured by dirt; perhaps an attempt at deception, or maybe the IRGCN has adapted what we in the northwest call a 'living roof' and are now going the eco-sustainable route for power-projection. West of this is a blue shed and boat-ramp identical in design to the dry-docks used by the Iranian military elsewhere. A substantial jetty provides protection for a fairly substantial fleet of HSPBs, including a decent number armed with navalized rocket launchers. North of the jetty is a large building of indeterminate purpose. Any guesses on what this might be, mundane or otherwise?

Abu Musa port facilities

Two different examples of Iran-Afghanistan border forts

The south-eastern tip of the island has seen the construction of a wide array of beach defenses and defensive fortifications. Unsurprisingly, they are placed to defend against the most likely direction of an amphibious assault to seize the islands. The sheer quality of the imagery available on Google Earth illustrates just how much Iran has turned the island into a pin-cushion; there are trenches cut into the top of earthen revetments connected to pillboxes and other fighting positions. Bunkers and strongpoints are set at regular intervals. Further inland are pre-prepared firing positions with attached bunker, likely for rockets, ASCMs, or other artillery. AAA positions, often with protected fighting positions and control centers, dot this area.

The HAWK battery that was transferred to the island in the 90s appears to have been reactivated in some form or another and there are now a handful of support buildings and networking cables.

Outlook for this Spring

2012-04-04T20:27:00.000-07:00

In the short term, the Arkenstone will continue its focus on the Iranian ground forces ORBAT. This means renewed satellite IMINT analysis combined with exploitation of Persian-language sources. Unfortunately though, beyond a small update to the 88th AD I do not expect to be able to publish any detailed pieces because yet again I find myself embroiled in an independent research project as part of my degree; over the next ten weeks I will study the Libyan and Syrian civil wars and complete a detailed analysis of the tactics and strategies of pro/anti-government forces. I'm really excited about it because it's allowing me to revisit many of the themes I first explored when I came to college and started doing security studies like COIN, 4th generation and net-centric warfare, as well as develop some of my more recent academic research about Iran (like the need to buck-pass to local powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia).

Here's to wishing for an "Army Day" parade this year with plenty of high-quality photos from Tehran and the provinces!

Ruminations on Sanctions and Democracy

2012-03-26T21:51:00.001-07:00

One of the more important debates over the U.S.'s contemporary Iran-policy surrounds the use of sanctions to coerce certain behavior out of Iran. Typically this is framed in the context of the nuclear issue; economic sanctions are meant to induce Iranian leadership into believing that nuclear enrichment isn't worth the cost. What's noteworthy about this strategy is that it's aimed at the Iranian leadership; the U.S. hoped to modify Ali Khamenei's behavior just as they hoped to modify Saddam Hussein's or Kim Jong Il's. For the purpose of this piece, I'm ignoring targeted sanctions meant to prevent the country in question from acquiring specific arms or technologies; these are not primarily coercive in nature.

Those opposed to sanctions typically cite these same cases of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Kim Jong Il's Korea as examples of the failure of a coercive sanction strategy. In many ways they are right, sanctions failed to fatally cripple the Baath regime in Iraq or in Korea; they haven't in Iran yet either. One important detail I feel that these critics sometimes(always?) miss is the crucial difference between these case studies and contemporary Iran - Iran's a democracy, the rest weren't. For whatever flaws the democratic system in Tehran does have (and it does have many), at the end of the day they're accountable to public opinion. The policy of steadfast resistance that defined Iran through the mid/late-2000s was never inevitable, it came into being because it was electorally popular.

A broader strategy, not just one involving sanctions, will have to take this into account when looking to history examples. Ropert Pape argues in his ground-breaking book "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" that democracies are uniquely vulnerable to acts of terrorism because they are forced to respond to the whims of their populace whereas an authoritarian state could simply absorb the relatively small, theatrical acts of violence that define terrorism. Likewise, when U.S. policy-makers are deciding how to influence Iranian behavior, they have to keep in mind that Tehran too is forced to respond to the whims of its populace.

The verdict is still out on how sanctions have affected Iranian behavior, initial reports appear somewhat promising from a policy-making standpoint; economic hardships that are directly linked to the behavior of certain factions is likely to decrease support for that faction. That being said, it is difficult to estimate their structural role in reinforcing the narrative of a hostile 'West' in the Iranian political consciousness. It must also be noted that a successful coercive strategy must also be paired with inducements to choose an alternative; punishment alone risks further intransigence. While the current U.S. administration has been successful in generating international support for unprecedented coercive measures against Iran, they have failed to, as of yet, successfully present an alternative to 'Steadfast Resistance' that can be rallied around in Tehran.

There are still many unanswered questions*, but I thought I'd throw out my early thoughts and present the question to my readers: does Iran's democratic political structure uniquely affect how coercion via sanctions operates?

*for instance, are U.S. and/or international sanctions against Iran actually comparable to other historical examples like Iraq, South Africa, Korea, etc, Pape's model also has questionable application to Iran's unique interpretation of democracy.

Imagery Update

2012-03-10T21:37:00.002-08:00

TO&Es for the 81st and 16th AD have now been posted.

In other news, Google Earth has posted updated imagery from 2011 of the Qazvin and Hamedan areas.

81st Armored Division

2012-03-02T22:20:00.001-08:00

I am trying out a slightly different format for this post. Instead of attempting to describe everything in the text and being forced to use clunky directional adjectives (ex: "200 m south-west of the western-most garage), I am now directly annotating the screenshots from Google-Earth which will hopefully allow a much more precise analysis of imagery.

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The 81st armored division is based in Iran's Kermanshah province on their border with Iraq. Naturally they were among the first forces to come into contact with the invading Iraqi army in 1980. At the outbreak of the war, their three brigades in Kermanshah, Sarpol-e Zahab and Eslamabad Gharb were outfitted with Chieftain MBTs and M113 APCs. (1) Today the situation is less clear; some evidence suggests that one of these brigades has been moved to a base nearer to Kermanshah in Bistoon. (2)

There are, however, two unaccounted-for armored brigades in Eslamabad Gharb, and in Sarab Ghale Shahin. While they most likely belong to the IRGC's 4th ID(3), it is extremely unusual that an infantry division would be so heavily mechanized. One distinguishing feature unique to these two bases compared to their Artesh equivalents is that they all appear to be undergoing some form of construction during the mid-2000s, typically centered around garages. Another possibility (however unlikely), is that the Artesh's armored divisions are much stronger than previously imagined and what we're seeing is merely the 81st AD.

All three brigades are co-located on the east-west Road 48 that leads to the Iraqi border.

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Bistoon
The divisional HQ is located on northern side of the Road 48 leading east out of the city. The compound can be identified as belonging to the 81st division because of the markings on a small hill facing the highway which reads "Artesh".

(Google Earth)

On the far-eastern side of the motor-pool is a large battalion - 38 - of BMP IFVs (#9 on the map). Although the size of this formation more closely mirrors a BTR battalion (which we've seen on parade in Kermanshah), the dimensions and appearance are more similar to a BMP. Even though they all appear to be BMPs, there are differences between the IFVs in the western-most column and the rest of the vehicles. Though the following cannot be confirmed, this may be a difference between the visually similar BMP-1 and BMP-2.
North of the motor-pool are a wide array of firing ranges and fighting positions. In between the motor-pool and the firing ranges are a handful of concrete ramps dug into the earth with tracks leading to and from them. It is unclear what the purpose of such a feature is but it may be to practice quick movement to and from firing positions; a tactic we know to involve underground ramps thanks to imagery from exercises. They can be found in armored brigades across the province which makes it a fairly distinctive feature.

Kermanshah
Although Bistoon is described as the divisional HQ, the configuration and relative sizes of each compound points to the lion's share of 81st division's assets being based out of Kermanshah as there are several distinct administrative and support sections which are absent at Bistoon. One explanation is that Kermanshah is the former divisional headquarters (which is supported by the historical record) and that the facilities at Bistoon are more recent and as of yet underdeveloped.

(Google Earth)

One of these areas in question is marked #12 on the map. It contains a number of "T" shaped buildings which are common at military compounds across the country and are usually associated with garrison facilities. It also includes a number of long, narrow barracks-like buildings, motor-pools with tractor-trailers and parade yards. Combined with the fact that the compound sits outside the entry-control point for the main base, this evidence may indicate that it functions in some sort of separate capacity to the 2nd brigade. This is purse supposition however.

An army aviation facility is also located in Kermanshah.

Sarpol-e Zahab
Smaller than either the garrisons in Bistoon or Kermanshah, the compound at Sarpol-e Zahab is rather atypical. Rather then having a rigid organization, buildings here are often small and clustered in disorganized patterns. There are three main types of buildings, a) large, flat-roofed structures; at least a few may be garages or wharehouses, b) multi-winged, flat-roofed buildings; may be barracks, and c) brick/mud buildings with domed roofs similar to buildings at the 1st brigade HQs for the 88th AD in Zahedan. Entering the compound, there are four main clusters of buildings that the roads lead to, two on either side of the main road.

(Google Earth)

Works Cited:
(1) http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_206.shtml
(2) http://www.centralclubs.com/topic-t65380.html
(3) While the IRGC has since been reorganized, doing away with the numbered system of brigades and divisions, the imagery dates from before this shift in force structure. Compiled from various sources during the Open Source Intelligence Project.

Maintaining U.S. Primacy in the Middle East

2012-02-08T11:43:00.000-08:00

In January I posted one of the pieces of writing I did for a research project about the political history of modern Iran. The following piece was my concluding essay for the project, drawing together themes I had been studying for several months into a broad look at US-Iranian competition in the Middle East.

Maintaining U.S. Primacy in the Middle East [Scribd Document]

Factional Competition in the Leadup to the the 2012 Majlis Election

2012-01-18T21:09:00.000-08:00

One recurring debate that pops up about US-Iranian relations surrounds the perceived rationality of Tehran's decision making process - is it governed by apocalyptic religious ideology, or is it instead guided by rational self-interest? Supporters of the former explanation would argue that a politician like Ahmadinejad, who is not typically known for shying away from provoking confrontation (his comments about the Holocaust and Israel early in his administration were carefully calculated to produce the most amount of shock at home and abroad), would always pursue such a behavior even if it induced negative consequences.

Recent developments continue to add mounting evidence to the proposition that this is not the case and that the leadership in Tehran is not governed by an iron-clad ideology, but by a desire for survival (and the power needed to ensure survival) in the meat-grinder that is domestic politics.* Most recently, Ahmadinejad was rumored to have denounced the brinksmanship that Iran has engaged in over the Persian Gulf. The Telegraph asserts that:

Mr Ahmadinejad claims the supreme leader's loyalists are deliberately provoking a confrontation with the West to make him look weak, thereby undermining his supporters' prospects in elections to the Majlis... (The Telegraph)

This would provide a tempting explanation for the statements by figures like Gen. Safavi which, to all involved, appeared to be setting Iran up to lose face after being forced to back down from impossible positions (i.e. refusing to allow a USN carrier to reenter the Persian Gulf); in other words, to paraphrase John Limbert, it was a product of maximalist rhetoric painting the leadership into positions they could never hope to defend.

If this source is to be believed however this was not an accidental occurrence, but a concerted effort to sap Ahmadinejad's political capital leading up to the 2012 Majlis election. Indeed, Khamenei may be attempting to restrain an unpopular (among elites anyway) Ahmadinejad in order preserve the tenuous balance of power which sustains the legitimacy of the political sphere. The Supreme Leader's goal is not to publicly exclude Ahmadinejad or his allies from participation in they system because doing so would have much the same effect as the boycott by certain reformist candidates is intended to achieve - demonstrate to Khamenei that he (and by extension Velayat-e Faqih) no longer have the consent of the population to govern. In this manner, it's essential for the current alliance between traditional conservatives and principlists to actually deprive Ahmadinejad of his support at a popular level, and among key power nodes.

In this scenario, escalation could have several purposes. Sabotaging the economy by way of international relations would have negative consequences for Ahmadinejad who is already suffering significant public relations flak for his handling of the economy - the number one issue to many voters in the coming election. This option would also simultaneously be privately attractive to many key IRGC-aligned figures close to the Suprme Leader who could use the opportunity to consolidate their own 'grey-market' patronage networks. It seems short-sighted to believe however that this strategy will function without blowback for Khamenei; Ahmadinejad may be blamed in the short-term for the state of the economy, preventing him from using his faction to successfully balance against Khamenei, but it may be a Pyrrhic victory if it comes at the cost of heightened tensions, and an a sluggish economy overall. Furthermore, because Khamenei essentiallys offers no real alternative to this strategy it may eventually end up delegitimizing him as well in the end.

Alternately, it could function as a form of brinksmanship within Tehran. Khamenei may be gambling that when Iran is eventually forced to backdown from its 'impossible positions', then Ahmadinejad would be saddled with the blame for "bowing to foreigners intent on dominating Iran" - a common refrain in domestic factional warfare.

Maybe some other dynamic is at work here?

* It should be noted that this is not to say that Iran is a purely rational state governed by formulaic calculations of power; they are still subject to the influence of ideology and the threat of miscalculation. This is far from a unique problem as all nations suffer from it to some degree and while it may weight the calculations one way or another, it can never negate the calculations altogether. Even if Ahmadinejad (or any politician) has come to the conclusion that his interest lies in avoiding conflict, it must be remembered that this is still only just a means to an end. In this case, the end is a revisionist redistribution of power towards a global multi-polar world.

16th Armored Division

2012-01-15T23:28:00.002-08:00

***Note: TO&E based on later imagery update that post-dates the accompanying analysis***

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The 16th armored division is headquartered in Qazvin, but also garrisons brigades in Zanjan and Hamedan, and is one of heaviest Artesh divisions. During the Iran-Iraq war they were equipped with M-60A1 MBTs but have since transitioned to Chieftain MBTs. (1) In November 2011, Mehr News announced that the 2nd brigade was being split-off into the 216th independent armored brigade. However the actual meaning of the article may have been misinterpreted and as such, this remains unconfirmed (anyone able to confirm or deny this is invited to comment below). (2)

Brigade location overview (GE)

Qazvin
The first brigade, based in Qazvin, serves as divisional headquarters and as a consequence has a larger compound than in Zanjan or Hamedan. The compound can be found north-east of the city-center on the outskirts of town. Imagery is low-quality and dates from April 2003.

(GE)

A large number of different vehicles can be found in different motor-pools clustered in the center of the compound. The western portion is primarily given over to armored vehicles including what is almost certainly a high-strength battalion of Chieftain tanks. About a companies worth of M113s are visible, indicating a larger mechanized infantry formation (possibly including BTR-60 APCs which have been seen on parade in the city). Several smaller vehicles in the vicinity may be Scorpion light tanks which have also been seen on parade. The overall higher strength of the 16th's tank battalions versus other examples (such as those in the 88th AD) more closely resembles pre-revolutionary strength which allocated 15 tanks per company. (3)

On the eastern portion of the compound are several battalion-strength collections of artillery including ~23 D-30 guns, ~27 other towed guns, and an unknown (probably battalions worth) number of M-109 SPHs. It's noteworthy that the towed gun groupings exceed the usual battalion strength (18 pieces). The large number of units also possibly indicates that some of them are divisional level support units.

Littered around the motor-pools are collections of automotive vehicles, including semi-trailer trucks and containers for logistics, five-ton trucks used for infantry and artillery motorization as well as logistical support, and smaller 1/4, 3/4, and 1 1/4-ton tactical vehicles used for infantry motorization.

Zanjan
The second brigade in Zanjan is located in a compound north of the city-center. Compared to Qazvin, Zanjan enjoys clear, recent imagery from October 2010. A collection of firing ranges - relatively advanced compared to the rest of the country - as well as training yards (i.e. obstacle courses, tranches) can be found in the northern half of the compound. The southern half includes the usual range of administrative and garrison facilities.

(GE)

In between the two in the middle of the compound is the brigades motor pool including garages and workshops. Fortunately all the vehicles appear to be neatly organized into their respective organizations and are clearly separated from one another which makes analysis all that much easier.

The north-eastern row includes a battalion of light AFVs - possibly BTR-60s or BMPs, but most-likely the former. Just south of this is a battalion of M-109 SPHs, complete with M-548 ammunition resupply vehicles. East of this are two more motor pools which holds the majority of the brigades armor - a heavy (35+) battalion of Chieftain tanks including at least two examples of the ABLV or CEV variants. Not visible, but which have been observed on parade, are M113 APCs.

Hamedan
The third brigade in Hamedan is located several km north-west of the city of Hamadan. While no high quality imagery of the base is available, there is a large motor-pool which indicates a similar level of mechanization as the other brigades. Parade imagery confirms the presence of BMP IFVs and M109 SPHs.

(GE)

Works Cited
(1) http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_206.shtml
(2) http://www5.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1457731
(3) http://www.iran-heritage.org/interestgroups/war-iraqiran-news2.htm

The Tanker War 1987-1988 - Operational Lessons for 2012 and Beyond

2012-01-05T14:25:00.000-08:00

As I mentioned in late-October, one of the reasons for the lack of posts this Fall has been due to my focusing on a research project concerning the modern political history of Iran as part of my academic studies at the Evergreen State College. One key element in this study was an examination of the dynamics that affected the US-Iranian relationship during the Tanker War and the effect of military force on attempts to coerce the Iranian leadership in Tehran to adopt certain positions. In light of recent tensions in the Gulf, I feel an examination of historical precident may serve to clear away at least some of the clouds. What follows is one of the papers I wrote for the project.

I offer this disclaimer: it must be remembered that 2012 is not 1988 and no matter what historical similarities may exist, there are also differences that make it risky to base ones future moves entirely off of past precedents. All the same, while history may not offer us a panacea, it is still valuable nonetheless.

My apologies if any of the foot-notes are off, I had to transcribe them from "chicago-style" footnotes in a word document which doesn't lend itself to copy-paste.

---

One of the primary effects of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was to radically alter the balance of power in the Persian Gulf region. The US strategy of using Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure regional stability and contain the Soviet Union had collapsed; Iran’s military was also left in disarray, a mere shadow of its former self. Iraq meanwhile was now under the leadership of Saddam Hussein who seized power in 1979 and who, in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian peace accords in the late-1970s, began to envision Iraq as the leader of a pan-Arab ‘rejectionist’ bloc who could fill the security void in the Persian Gulf. (1) This came to a head in September of 1980 when, following months of escalating border clashes, the Iraqi army crossed the border en masse and attempted to seize and hold a significant portion of south-western Iran in what James Bill describes as a “political struggle for the hegemony of the Persian Gulf”. (2) Inevitably the war spilled into the Gulf; after spending two years forcing Iraq out of their territory, Iran began a series of offensives aimed at punishing Baghdad and overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Facing defeats in the ground war, Iraq opened the first phase of the Tanker War in 1984 by using the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) to strike at shipping in an effort to deplete Iran of their ability to export the petrochemicals on which it depended. Unable to attack Iraqi oil export capacity (Iraq had switched to using Kuwaiti tankers, or using overland pipelines), Iran resorted to attacking neutral shipping traffic carrying Iraqi oil and other goods. (3) The Tanker War escalated through 1986, drawing more and more international attention. A number of successful Iranian offensives, especially the capture of the strategic Faw peninsula, Iraq’s only border with the northern Persian Gulf, was beginning to create the fear that Iran might be able to topple Baghdad and in doing so, mark the first step in Iran’s regional domination. This was also paired with the revelation in the second half of 1986 that the US had been secretly supplying arms to Iran. (4) This confluence of factors led Washington to accept Kuwait’s call at the end of 1986 for international escorts for their tanker convoys.(5)

The decision to escort Kuwaiti tankers and protect them from Iranian attacks officially marked the US entry into the Tanker War and the start of confrontations between the US Navy (USN) and Iran’s naval forces (INFs). (6) Between 1987 and 1988 the USN and INFs would butt heads on several occasions, eventually concluding with Operation Preying Mantis in the spring of 1988. This paper aims to explore the operational lessons that can be gleaned from studying these engagements and what these lessons can tell us today about the possible behavior of INFs in a contemporary naval war in the Persian Gulf. Its experience has had a catalyzing effect on Iranian strategic planning and has revolutionized the way Iran intends on fighting the US but despite this, the case-study remains woefully underexploited as a pedagogical tool for contingency planning within the US. (7) Specifically, this paper will unpack the conventional wisdom surrounding the efficacy of military force to coerce Iranian policymakers into both drawing down the Tanker War, and contributing to an overall cease-fire with Iraq.

Following Kuwait’s request in late 1986 for international escorts, Iran began a wide range of provocative military posturing in order to avoid this scenario which it rightfully felt would unjustly help Iraq. In February and April INFs began deploying Chinese-built HY-2 anti-ship cruise-missiles (ASCM) and threatened to seize the straits of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) also began a process of highly-visible arms procurement and training in preparation for a conflict with the USN; they also escalated their sea-mining operations. The political leadership also threatened the US and USSR that they would be repulsed if they attempted to interfere in the Persian Gulf, specifically saying that it would become “a second Afghanistan”.(8)

Then, on May 17, an IrAF fighter jet on an anti-shipping operation in the Persian Gulf fired at what it likely believed was an Iranian tanker. The ship in question was in fact a USN frigate called the USS Stark. The damage caused by the two Exocet ASCMs crippled the ship and killed 37 US sailors. In the US, debates erupted about the nature of the US mission in the Gulf and whether or not Reagan had the authority to station military forces in a warzone without getting authorization through the War Powers Act. This led many parties in the region, including Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)(9) , to fear that “…a peripheral strategy of indirect attacks on U.S. ships and forces … might lead the Congress and American people to demand that the U.S. halt its reflagging effort, or even withdraw from the Gulf.”(10) The debate over the Stark also came in the wake of the US withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984 following the car-bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut where 241 marines were killed, an attack which was most likely perpetrated by Iran’s proxy group in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Iran’s interpretation of these two events was such that Iran believed that the US was ‘self-constrained’ when it came to force and even though the US might theoretically have an extremely power military, it lacked the national will in order to use it and at the same time remained vulnerable to highly symbolic attacks that dealt significant blows (such as the casualties in the wake of the barracks bombing and the Stark). Furthermore, the lack of any punitive measures toward Iraq in retaliation for the attack further emboldened Iran into believing that the convoy escorts that were about to begin were toothless.

The first US escort convoy for Kuwaiti tankers was set to take place in mid/late-July. Only a month earlier in June, Iran had begun sea-mining operations in the northern Gulf near Kuwait. (11) It was in this environment that the US-flagged Bridgeton, part of the very first US-protected convoy, struck and was crippled by a floating sea mine on July 24th. Up until this point, the USN strategy was to rely on the threat of US power alone to deter Iran from attacking the convoys. (12) The failure in this policy was that while the presence of a carrier-battle-group was a powerful show of force that Iran recognized could deal significant damage to their navy; they didn’t believe the US would ever be able to muster together enough support to actually use it, a belief that was verified when Iran escaped all retaliation for the mining.

In the wake of the incident, Iran was further emboldened by the fact that USN was impotent against a threat like naval mines. Guided-missile-frigates were effective in projecting power across the Pacific and Atlantic oceans against waves of hypothetical Soviet aircraft, but carried no counter-measures against WWI-era floating mines that were found in the confines of the Persian Gulf; as an ad-hoc measure, the USN resorted to stationing sailors at the bow of ships with a rifle and a set of binoculars. As a result, the US has proved incapable of carrying out its mission of protecting the tankers and was dealt a sharp blow to their prestige.

The Bridgeton incident also demonstrated to Iran the importance of ambiguity. Because Iran never directly admitted responsibility and there was nothing conclusively tying Iran to the mines in question the international community was never able to pin the blame on Iran and generate momentum for any kind of punitive action. (13) Then-PM Mir Hossein Mousavi credited the attack to “invisible hands” and top military authority Hashemi Rafsanjani threatened further attacks on states that supported Iraq’s war effort. (14) (15) In the following months, the IRGCN was encouraged by Ayatollah Khomeini to escalate its confrontations with the USN. (16) Cordesman asserts that in August 1987, “…every week brought a new Iranian effort to strike at the U.S. by indirect means … that would embarrass the U.S. and potentially force it to withdraw.”(17)

The US’s only response to the incident is to issue Iran one of the first major ‘lines in the sand’ so-to-speak – if the US caught an Iranian mine-laying ship, it would be sunk. (18) This threat does not appear to have had any deterrent effect because INFs followed Khomeini desire to escalate their confrontation with the USN with numerous small boat attacks and a renewed sea-mining campaign in August and September. During this time, Iran relied heavily on plausible deniability to protect them from retaliation from the USN, relying on a fleet of covert mine-laying ships which were difficult to track in the crowded Persian Gulf. However, this strategy failed when USN forces were able to capture the Iran Ajr landing craft being used to lay a minefield north of Qatar on September 21.(19)

The reason this line-in-the-sand didn’t have a deterrent effect on Iran with regard to their decision to continue mine warfare can be traced to the same fundamental reason that Iran felt it could attack the Bridgeton – US threats still didn’t hold any credibility. Mine warfare offered enough anonymity to avoid retaliation, but still offered the possibility of dealing a crippling blow to the USN which would then, presumably, spark a withdrawal. Interestingly though, the Iranian leadership initially took a conciliatory posture when the possibility of a major US attack in response was still possible; then-President Ali Khameini emphasized that Iran had no interest in entering into war with the US.(20)

On one hand, while the Iran Ajr incident did result in an increase in domestic support for Reagan and for the idea of a military reprisal against Iran, and helped isolate Iran diplomatically, the continued lack of any actual punitive retaliation quickly swept fears of a war with the US from the INF’s minds. (21) Consequently, by October the Tanker War was back to its regular tempo with small boat attacks and clashes with the USN. This culminated on October 15/16 when Iran fired a handful of HY-2 ASCMs toward Kuwait, striking both a neutral tanker, and the US-flagged Sea-City Isle.(22)

This time, the US decided that they would strike back. Launched on October 19, Operation Nimble Archer was conceived of as limited, proportional response designed not to escalate the existing level of tensions so as to not endanger a comprehensive cease-fire being negotiated at the same time; a handful of USN surface vessels destroyed two abandoned oil platforms off the southern coast of Iran.(23)

In response to this show of force Iran temporarily halted all anti-shipping operations until November when Iraq resumed attacks on Iranian targets in the Gulf. At this point, even though Iran resumed tanker-hunting in the Gulf, they were careful to only attack neutral targets and steered clear of any direct attacks on the USN. (24) This indicates that Iran responded at least somewhat positively to Operation Nimble Archer by choosing not to continue the harassing attacks against the USN. Despite this, the incident also confirms a second trend in INF behavior which is that while Iran does respond positively, within the framework established, they will continue to do it’s best to subvert the aims of USN forces. What I mean by this is that in the wake of Nimble Archer Iran might have retreated to the limits set – Iran stopped attacking US-flagged tankers, but within this rule Iran stretched the limits as far as possible by escalating the mining war, and in attacks against neutral-flagged tankers. This was again illustrated at the end of 1987 when it appears that the US covertly threatened Iran over the conditions in the Gulf. While it is impossible to know the exact nature of the threat, it appears to have been in regards to Iran’s continued attacks against maritime traffic. (25) Combined with an aggressive naval strategy of shadowing Iranian warships by the USN, Iran relented and in February through early-March, the Persian Gulf was relatively calm.(26)

In March and April of 1988, the Iranian leadership was under extreme pressure following setbacks in the ground war to produce a final victory so as to end the war. (27) (28) During this time, there is a divisive internal debate going on in Tehran surrounding the strategy in the Gulf, some believed that only had to be dealt a further blow, while some others felt that a military confrontation would only end in disaster. (29) Ultimately though, the IRGCN restarted their sea-mining campaign in the Gulf which culminated on April 14 when the US warship USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a floating mine in the southern Persian Gulf which crippled the vessel. While this attack would justify a more significant response then Nimble Archer, the retaliation for the deliberate mining of a US warship was still a limited, proportional response; On April 19 the USN destroyed two oil platforms, sunk an IRIN frigate, missile-boat, and severely crippled another frigate. (30) The USN also declared that it would now act to protect all neutral shipping passing through the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s response to this incident was mixed. Those who favored a confrontational posture suffered significant fallout in Tehran as the US, instead of backing down, struck back at Iran. (31) Likewise, many in Iran’s conventional armed forces were stunned, for the rest of the war the IRIN and IRIAF were ordered not to engage the USN. (32) Combined with the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf by the US cruiser USS Vincennes on July 3, Preying Mantis had the effect of indicating to Tehran that the US would never tolerate an Iranian victory and now had no compunctions about intervening directly on Iraq’s behalf. The fact that the US response took place on the same day that Iraq recaptured the strategic Faw peninsula drove this point home. Rafsanjani declared that “Time is not on our side anymore, the world – I mean the anti-Islamic powers – has decided to make a serious effort to save Saddam Hussein and tie our hands.”(33)

The most interesting reaction came from the IRGCN however, despite the fact that Khomeini was under intense pressure to end the war the IRGCN was further incensed in the wake of Preying Mantis, and, against the better urging of various factions in Tehran, continued to harass the US after a limited operational pause in May. (34) By June, small-boat attacks and mine-laying had resumed, and HY-2 ASCM facilities were expanded around the straits of Hormuz. (35) This is easily one the more important lessons of the US’s interaction with the INFs during 1987-1988; one cant talk about how “Iran” responds to coercive violent force like Preying Mantis because there isn’t a singular ‘Iran’ to respond to it in the first place. What the US perceived when it saw Khomeini spitefully accept the ‘chalice of poison’ when he signed the ceasefire with Iraq was that “This sequence of events...has clearly indicated that Iranians, despite all their rhetoric, religious zeal and determination, at the end of the day are also quite susceptible to the implications [and effects] posed by an overwhelming and decisive military force”.(36) In reality however, the decision to accept a cease-fire was far more complicated and owed the final outcome more to factional competition then the decisive impact of US operations. For instance, without the pressure from other factions, it is more then likely that the IRGCN would have escalated its attacks on US ships, leading to further confrontation in the Fall of 1988. In other words, it might have been necessary for the US to demonstrate that they would never let Iran win the Tanker War in order for a comprehensive ceasefire, but it alone would not have been sufficient to force Iran to cease hostilities.

The reason the Tanker War serves as such a good teaching tool today is because this is exactly the way Iran has approached it, Tom Cooper asserts that:

“Preying Mantis should be seen as a 'university' of the modern Iranian naval power. Not only that the Iranian leaders learned a lot about the behaviour of the US politicians and military commanders from that operation, but their naval forces learned about all of their inherent weaknesses, about the equipment of their enemy and his/her technological superiority, and prompted them to search for ways of evading these, or exploiting their weak spots. Preying Mantis prompted them to tackle all of these through successive reforms and modernizations ever since. The modern-day Iranian naval forces are actually neatly tailored to the (Iranian) lessons of Preying Mantis.” (37)

Today the possibility of naval warfare between the US and Iran is again a prescient threat. In the same way that the Iran-Iraq war sprung from a contest between Iran and Iraq over the hegemony of the Persian Gulf, Iran and the US are now locked in a geostrategic struggle for control over the influence of the same region. (38) So what can the Tanker War tell us about the contemporary behavior of INFs?

The fundamental and most important lesson is that Iran can in fact be successfully deterred and coerced through the threat and use of military force. The ability to successfully extract concessions however is dependent on the credibility of a ‘greater force’ which can be brought to bear should Iran fail to be deterred by a limited reprisal.

Historically Iran has proven to be extremely vulnerable to threats against its ability to export petrochemicals; while Iran did maintain an overall policy of confrontation with the USN over the span of the Tanker War, political leaders were careful into never provoking the US into attacking this lifeline. (39) In fact, this specific threat proved its efficacy as Iran, after been informed by the US that any use of HY-2 ASCMs in the straits of Hormuz would be tantamount to a declaration of war on the United States, never used them except in the Northern Gulf. (40) Throughout the Tanker War Iran relied on these exports to maintain their war against Iraq and prevent the complete erosion of public support for the war. It should be noted that Iraqi anti-shipping efforts never seriously endangered the ability of Iran to export the majority of its oil. (41) Moreover, the Iranian economy is still highly dependent on petrochemicals and is the single largest source of government revenue.(42)

However, it should be noted that today Iran still feels the US has little credibility in the Persian Gulf, in part because Iran is so confident in its strategy developed in the wake of their defeat in the Tanker War. (43) Meanwhile, strategists in Tehran have carefully observed the US experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq and have come to the conclusion that, in the words of the current military advisor to the Supreme Leader, Major General Safavi “The Americans have many weaknesses. In fact, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they clearly displayed their strengths and weaknesses. … They are very cowardly, there are even scenes from Iraq in which they are seen crying. When their commanders encounter a problem, they burst into tears. … I can therefore say that our advantage over the foreign forces is moral and human.” (44) This is, in essence, a repackaging of the same ideology that perceived the US withdrawal from Lebanon as signaling the US position as a ‘paper tiger’ that couldn’t stomach a fight.

The fact that the U.S. lacks this credibility is one of the reasons we can expect INFs to continue their policy of brinksmanship in the Gulf, aimed at exposing the US’s supposed inability to exert its will. Like their operations in the Tanker War, INFs will push the limits of US ‘lines-in-the-sand’ in an attempt to discredit the US effort. This can be observed even today in the numerous confrontations that have happened in the past decade in encounters between the USN and the IRGCN. (45) Defeating this brinksmanship can only be achieved by immediately and decisively responding in order to establish credibility. In other words, Iran cannot be allowed to test and exceed the limits set by the USN.

In carrying out a reprisal aimed at establishing credibility, the US would be aided by a significant transformation in the way US forces have operated in the region since the 1980s. During the Tanker War, the US was restricted to basing their forces from aircraft carriers and floating barges because of the reluctance of Arab states to visibly cooperate with the United States. (46) Today these same states are less far less reluctant to balance growing Iranian influence by shoring up their relationship with the US; after being asked about the loss of US influence in the Gulf, Secretary of Defense Panetta quipped that “…in Bahrain … we've got almost 5,000 troops … We've got about ... 3,000 in the UAE and about 7,500 in Qatar.” (47) Gulf Arab States would be far more likely to contribute to any Gulf peace-keeping operation and just as importantly, aid the US logically by providing basing for US airpower.

But this advantage would do little to outweigh many of the new challenges that have sprung up in the 20+ interceding years. Most notably, Iran’s naval forces are far more capable today; instead of only being equipped with small-boats armed with machine-guns and light rocket launchers, the IRGCN now operates a large fleet of advanced torpedo and missile-boats, a modest fleet of light submarines, and a large number of shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). Sea-mining capability has also become more credible since 1988.(48)

The lack of a parallel conflict like the Iran-Iraq war to drain the economy and consume resources means that the Iranian populace will be much more likely to oppose political concessions to de-escalate the naval conflict in the same way that Preying Mantis, in conjunction with Iraqi ground offensives, pressured pragmatic factions to push-through a cease-fire agreement in opposition to the hardliners. Furthermore, the fact that IRGC-led factions are currently politically dominant in Tehran means that those individuals and factions most likely to be successfully deterred by the threat of force from the US are the same ones that will likely be sidelined in a confrontation between the two countries.(49)

Another challenge the US would face is the inherent unpredictability of warfare and the risk of miscalculation. For instance, it is extremely likely that Iran could misinterpret any wide scale punitive measures as attempts as ‘regime change’, the perpetual boogey-man in the night for Iranian strategists. (50) (51) If this happens, it is extremely unlikely that Iran would react rationally to a limited war, and would instead act to preserve the very survival of the Islamic Republic. This possibility casts into light the value of the proposed hot-line between US and Iranian forces that would mirror the red-telephone of the Cold War that connected Washington to Moscow in order to prevent accidental nuclear war. Iran rejected this possibility in late September. (52) The end-state of these diverse factors is that if the US hopes to coerce Iran into backing down from any future naval conflict, the US government must be prepared to invest significantly more in terms of effort invested, and in acceptance of any possible loss.

Footnotes/Endnotes
1) ‘Rejectionist’ meaning anti-Israel, anti-US, and anti-Imperialist; Farhang Rejaee, "Introduction," The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, ed. Farhang Rajaee (Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993), 2-3.
2) Keith McLachlan, "Analysis of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord 1979-1980," The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, ed. Farhang Rajaee (Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993), 26-27.
3) Tom Cooper, and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq War in the Air: 1980-1988, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000), 161.
4) Cooper and Bishop, 229. The US grew closer to Baghdad in the wake of Iran-Contra because Washington felt it had to mend its relationship with the Arab states, who felt betrayed that the US would provide arms to Iran.
5) David Christ, "Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea," Policy Focus, no. 95 (2009): 2,
6) Iran’s forces include the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Navy (IRGCN) and Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). ‘INF’ is a provisional designation not used outside of this report.
7) Tom Cooper. Operation Preying Mantis. Air Combat Information Group Forum. October 27 2011.
8) Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War , (Westview Press, 1990), chap. 9.
9) The GCC includes the nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The UAE, and Oman.
10) Cordesman, chap.9
11) Cordesman, chap.9
12) Christ, 4
13) Cordesman, chap.9
14) Cordesman, chap.9
15) Interestingly, both of these figures (Mousavi and Rafsanjani) are key figures in the modern-day reform movement within Iran
16) Fariborz Haghshenass, "Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare," Policy Focus (2008): 5
17) Cordesman, chap.9
18) Cordesman, chap.9
19) Christ, 13
20) Cordesman, chap.9
21) The US’s only response was to sink the Iran Ajr landing craft which was envisioned by some to be retaliation, but lacked any actual punitive measures against other targets, i.e. it didn’t actually raise the cost for mining operations.
22) Tom Cooper, and Farzad Bishop, 253.
23) Cordesman, chap.9
24) Cordesman, chap.9
25) Cordesman, chap.9
26) Christ, 7
27) Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War, (Westview Press, 1990), chap.10, p.29.
28) These setbacks include the failed Iranian Valfajr-10 offensive in which Iraq made heavy use of chemical weapons and the use of SCUD-type missiles during the War of the Cities to strike population centers.
29) Christ, 13
30) Cordesman, chap.10, 25-28
31) Christ, 13
32) Cooper and Bishop. 276
33) Cordesman, chap.10, 30
34) Cooper, ACIG Forums
35) Cordesman, chap.10, 34-40
36) Jahangar Arasli, "Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict," Occasional Paper Series, no. 10 (2007): 20
37) Tom Cooper, ACIG Forums
38) This can be observed in a number of official statements from naval commanders and other officials. See ‘Fars News English’ in the works cited section for a few examples.
39) Cordesman, chap.9
40) Christ, 10
41) Cordesman, chap.9
42) The implication here is that if because the USN and USAF today can operate a far more effective campaign to destroy infrastructure compared to the IrAF in the 1980s, as demonstrated during Iraq 1991/2003 and Libya 2011, the ability to actually affect Tehran’s policy by way of oil revenue would be far greater.
43) See Tom Cooper quote above
44) Arasli, 44
45) Shachtman 01/08/2008
46) Cordesman, chap.9
47) Dreyfuss, 10/14/11
48) For the full details of Iran’s naval modernizations and their larger doctrine aimed at asymmetrically defeating USN forces, see Haghshenass’s “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare” and Arasli’s “Obsolete Weapons”
49) Thaler et al, 2009
50) --- (foot-note related to another paper I had written for this project which is otherwise unavailable)
51) Fars News, December 2010
52) Gladstone, 2011

Works Cited:
McLachlan, Keith. Analysis of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord 1979-1980. The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Edited by Farhang Rajaee. Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993.

Cooper, Tom, and Farzad Bishop. Iran-Iraq War in the Air: 1980-1988. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000.

Christ, David. "Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea." Policy Focus. no. 95 (2009).

Tom Cooper. Operation Preying Mantis. Air Combat Information Group Forum. October 27 2011.

Cordesman, Anthony. The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War . Westview Press, 1990.

Haghshenass, Fariborz. "Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus. (2008)

Arasli, Jahangar. "Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict." Occasional Paper Series. no. 10 (2007): 20.

Fars News English, "Commander: IRGC Monitoring All Enemy Moves in Persian Gulf ." Last modified 10/25/2011. Accessed October 27, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270772.

Fars News English, "Armed Forces Hail Iranian Navy as Powerful Force in Region ." Last modified 11/27/2010. Accessed October 27, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8909061458.

Shachtman, Noah. The Danger Room, "How Iran Attacks at Sea (Updated)." Last modified 01/08/2008. Accessed October 28, 2011. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-irans-se/.

Dreyfuss, Robert. PBS Frontline-The Tehran Bureau, "Iran after the Iraq Pullout ." Last modified 10/24/11. Accessed October 29, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/10/opinion-iran-after-the-iraq-pullout.html.

Fars News English, “Minister: Enemies Continuing Soft War to Overthrow Islamic Republic.” Last Modified 12/03/2010. Accessed October 29, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8909120562

Gladstone, Rick. "Iran Mass-Produces New Missile and Rejects ‘Hot Line’ Idea With America." The New York Times, , sec. World, September 28, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/middleeast/iran-mass-produces-new-missile-rejects-hot-line-idea-with-america.html (accessed October 29, 2011).

Thaler, David, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey. "Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics." RAND Corporation Monograph. (2009).

Greater Tunb IMINT

2011-12-31T16:45:00.000-08:00

Greater Tunb belongs the the trio of islands - including Abu Musa and Lesser Tunb - that Iran occupies, but is also claimed by the UAE. It offers a commanding view of the Strait of Hormuz and is flanked on either side by the primary shipping lanes running through the Persian Gulf, in other words: it is of extreme strategic importance. As a consequence, it is heavily militarized and offers fodder for IMINT (image intelligence) analysis.

Greater Tunb has a total area of 26 sq/km and more hilly geography than either Lesser Tunb or Abu Musa. The island's red, sandy terrain is dotted with vegetation and animal life, relatively lush compared to the barren Lesser Tunb 13 km to the west. A small civilian population, presumably fisherman, may reside on the island but their current status is unclear. In 2001, the total number had declined from 350 in 1993 to 35. (1) Whatever civilian population does reside would likely occupy the cluster of residential buildings on the southern portion of the Island.

Following the islands seizure in 1971 by the Imperial Armed Forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran fortified the islands during the Tanker War. Tensions between Iran and it's Arab neighbors in the early 90s, Iran is reported to have stationed surface-to-air missiles on the island. (2)

For the first time, high quality satellite imagery of the island recently become available on Google Earth. (3) This imagery reveals a highly fortified island with a number of hardened shelters, underground facilities, fighting positions, artillery, and air-defenses.

Ringing the island almost without interruption are earthen fighting positions intended to repulse an amphibious attack. These range from relatively simple revetments on either side of the coastal road with enlarged areas at intervals to packed-earth revetments complete with trenches, strong-points, and reinforced pillboxes. The high-quality of the imagery available sheds light on similar fortifications on other islands whose individual features are harder to discern. The rest of the island is also dotted with various fighting positions of varying ages. Supplementing these fighting positions are guard-posts also located at set intervals around the coast (usually 1-2 km). The buildings are 15 x 15 m and incorporate a watch-tower on the roof. They are often co-located with AAA.

Air defense of the island is typical of Iranian facilities with numerous 23 mm AAA emplacements on concrete pads, usually on raised earthen platforms. Each site is normally accompanied by a small building or hardened shelter for the weapons crew and/or ammunition storage. No evidence of the above-mentioned SAM from the 1990s is visible, however on the north-eastern side is a Skyguard air defense system with two 35 mm guns.

Like on the other islands, the only surface-to-surface weapon actually visible in imagery are a handful of towed artillery pieces. On Greater Tunb this consists of four 122 mm D-30 guns (60% battery) located just west of the Skyguard system. Unlike the other islans though, there is also a second collection of four guns with the conventional split-trail configuration and which are pointed directly towards the waters of the UAE. The specific type of gun is unknown but it is likely 155 mm. At the ranges involved, it's unlikely that these guns would actually be used for fire support on the island, but rather as coastal artillery, either to harass shipping, or to repel an amphibious assault.

Hardened shelters and underground facilities are also a key component of the military garrison on Greater Tunb. While the majority appear to be basic hardened shelters dug into the hillside, or located above ground the storage of munitions and weapon systems as per the style used throughout Iran for the same purpose, there are also a number of sites that possibly hold larger UGFs that could contain command-and-control nodes or even living facilities. The key when differentiating UGFs from hardened shelters is to look for a) relatively few entrances in a specific area, b) the specific style of concrete ramps leading into the entrance, and c) the presence of air-circulation vents.

Other important relevant features include a pier on the eastern side of the island in which a number of small high-speed patrol boats are visible. The small 1,300 m landing strip which has served the island in the past appears to be in the middle of an on-going expansion to 2,200 m. This may indicate a growing effort to increase the strategic importance of these islands in general.

Works Cited:
(1) Great Little Tonbs. The Iranian. May 2001. http://www.iranian.com/GuiveMirfendereski/2001/May/Tonb/index.html
(2) The Iranian, 2001.
(3) Imagery dates from March 2010.

Things that make you want to throw your computer across the room...

2011-12-30T23:45:00.000-08:00

...such as when Blogger deletes an extremely long paper you've been working on the better part of the last three days exploring the dynamics of a possible conflict between the UAE and Iran over the Persian Gulf Islands right before you were about to publish it. (the piece originated as a response to this post from Uskowi on Iran)

C'est la vie I suppose.

Happy holidays from the Arkenstone!

77th Mechanized Infantry Division

2011-12-28T22:59:00.000-08:00

The 77th mechanized infantry division (MID) is a regular army unit based in the Khorasan province in north-eastern Iran. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the 77th was comprised of one armored brigade and two mechanized brigades; at the time they were armed with M-47 tanks and BTR-50 APCs. At this time the 77th maintained one infantry battalion and one armored company in Khuzestan. (1) While a complete history of their operations during the war remains unknown, the 77th is known to have participated in the following operations, Fath ol-Mobin (March 1982)(2), Ramadan (July 1982)(3), Badr (March 1985)(4), and Karbala-6 (Early 1987)(5).

Today, little is known about their current operational status or capability. They still maintain three brigades; the first is in Mashhad, the second in Quchan, and the third in Torbat Heydariyeh. (6)

Anthony Cordesman asserts that Iranian mechanized infantry divisions like the 77th are composed of: (7)
- one armored brigade
- three mechanized infantry brigades
- one reconnaissance battalion
- one SPA battalion
- one towed artillery battalion
- one engineer battalion
- one supply battalion
- one transport battalion
- one army aviation contingent
- one air defense contingent
Even assuming that this description would represent a 100% strength that may not translate to actual strength, the fact that Iran's divisions overwhelmingly use three brigades rather then four calls into the veracity of this claim. Regardless, it still might offer some indication into what the 77th looks like at a general level, especially when cross-refernced with visible features in available imagery. For instance, most mechanized units throughout the world maintain independent supply, transport, air defense, and engineering battalions at a divisional level. Presence of these independent units are difficult to independently confirm, but some evidence for them does exist. [EDIT: A commenter has pointed out that this chart needs one point of clarification; the army aviation contingent is not under the direct command of the 77th MID, but belongs to a different, independent command structure within the IRIAA)

Although nominally a mechanized unit, the 77th is more closely comparable to a conventional motorized infantry division with a ratio of one lightly armored brigade, to two motorized-infantry brigades, especially by the standards of today where mechanization is standard in any infantry unit. On top of being understrengthed, the armored battalion is also equipped with the obsolete M-47M tank, though there are some signs of it being replaced with the T-72. Mechanized infantry battalions resemble those found in the rest of the country, with a mix of BMP/Boragh AFVs, M-113 APCs, and BTR-60 APCs. Motorized infantry meanwhile have been seen with the usual mix of motorcycles and ATVs, Jeeps, pickup-trucks and 5-ton trucks. Self-propelled artillery is entirely lacking, with artillery support being provided by towed battalions of towed guns like the D-30 and M-46. 107 mm Type-63 rockets are also deployed at an unknown level. Air defense is provided in part by Zu-23-2s and MANPADSs; these may be augmented by HAWK SAMs and/or 35 mm AAA. A commando battalion, identified in the past by their duck-hunter pattern uniform, is likely equipped for airborne assault operations using the Havinarooz detachment. Weapons deployed as a lower level includes recoilless rifles, RPGs, M-47 ATGMs, TOW ATGMs, mortars, G-3 rifles and possibly MANPADSs. Like the rest of the Artesh, the 77th is transitioning toward desert-pattern safariflage uniforms.

Armor of the 77th MID

Motorized Infantry

Artillery support

Air-defense

Light infantry

1st Brigade - Mashhad
The brigade HQ is located south-west of the city-center buttressed against a mountain range bordering the city. It is adjacent to a number of other military facilities belonging to various entities.These facilities are mostly found across the highway and occupy the north-facing slope of the mountains.

The central compound serves as the divisional headquarters for the 77th MID and is the largest of the division's bases. The reason for this, in addition to the fact that the 1st brigade is armored and consequently larger, is that any independent battalions attached to the division (such as supply, or air defense) are likely based here; this possibility is supported by the relatively large footprint of the facilities compared to other brigades, and the presence of multiple well-delineated sub-compounds.

Overview (GE)

In general, the northern portion of the compound tends to be occupied by living quarters and administrative buildings as indicated by the low, barracks-style buildings. The southern-half tends to be dominated by motor-pools, repair/overhaul shops and garages. One of the more visually interesting features of the base is the presence of scattered hardened shelters which likely hold munitions. Dispersing them throughout the compound is likely aimed at preventing the catastrophic detonation of a massive arms collection in the heart of a large city; the danger of which was illustrated to some degree by recent (as of the time of this writing) detonations in China and Cyprus.

1st Brigade (GE)

Dominating the compound is the central motor pool and adjacent parade yard. In this motor pool is the brigades armored contingent, including a tank battalion made up of M-47Ms. While in most imagery, only a handful are visible at a given time, imagery from July 2006 shows 15+ tanks arrayed into three companies at 50-60% strength (five-six tanks each). The T-72s which have been paraded in Mashhad are nowhere to be seen. Immediately north of this are several BMP-type IFVs; using historical imagery, the most seen at any one time is ~five which matches the typical deployment rate for mixed light-armor companies incorporating a 50/50 mix of M-113 APCs and BMP-type IFVs.(8) North of this is approximately another company's worth of M-113 APCs. While they are not visible on recent imagery, parade photographs confirm the identity of a company of BTR-60PBs in early imagery from 2004 and 2006. On parade, soldiers in mechanized infantry units typically wear red berets.

Some of the brigade's artillery can also be observed in two locations within the compound. Occupying a parade-ground in the north-west portion of the compound is a battery (six pieces) of towed artillery, probably the M-46 judging by its split-trail carriage and length (~11 m). Historical imagery from 2004 actually shows a number of M-46 and D-20 guns in towed configuration and and connected to trucks. The self-contained nature of this sub-compound possibly suggests that the immediate vicinity houses the brigade's artillery battalion(s). In the south-east corner of the compound, several artillery pieces including M-46s and D-30s are visible from time-to-time in a courtyard surrounded by long buildings roofed in corrugated metal; possibly garages or workshops.

By far, the most common feature in the compound is the wide variety of trucks and other light, motorized vehicles. These include Safir-type Jeeps, Toyota Land-Cruiser pickup trucks as well as the larger five-ton trucks, probably Mercedes 1924s or 2624s; semi-trailer tractors are also common.

Opposite this compound, on the the other side of the highway, are a large collection of firing ranges, the Samen police academy(9), and a storage depot with hardened shelters and revetments. Most notably though, there is also a relatively new compound with large, blue-roofed warehouses. Adjacent to these buildings are a large number of widely varied earthworks which might indicate it's some sort of combat-engineering training area. It's unknown if this area is affiliated with the army, or belongs to the IRGC. The lettering on top of the roof of the warehouse reads "Martyrs for Peace". To the north and east of the brigade HQ are two military hospitals. (10)

"Martyrs for peace" (GE)

The 77th's army aviation contingent - the 5th assault and support group - is also based in Mashhad at TAB-14. (11) The Havinarooz airbase is located north-east of the main airstrip. Scramble on the Web indicates that this contingent is comprised of two airborne assault squadrons equipped with Bell 212s, one attack squadron equipped with AH-1s, and a recon squadron with Bell 206s. This composition is easily verified on recent satellite imagery from October 2010; 10 212s occupy the northernmost pads while the six AH-1s are intermingled with six 206s on the southernmost pads. Adjacent to these pads is a large drive-through garage; the bases repair and overhaul facility. In the southern portion of the compound are several hardened shelters; likely the bases munitions storage. AAA emplacements dot the facility.

Army aviation base at TAB-14 (GE)

2nd Brigade - Quchan
This location is significantly smaller then the brigade in Mashhad, with little insight into its makeup visible from satellite imagery. Adjacent to the compound are a collection of firing ranges and about 2,000 m to the north is a storage depot with earthen revetments. A smattering of offices and administrative buildings can be found throughout the compound.

2nd Brigade (GE)

Running along the northern-most edge of the compound are a series of earthen berms surrounding a handful of hardened shelters and warehouses; this protection likely indicates munitions storage. In the middle of the compound are two different clusters of small buildings organized in rows and columns; because these buildings are surrounded by trees and only approachable via foot paths these are likely living facilities along the lines of barracks, kitchens, or classrooms.

South of these two clusters is a paved parade yard and a small training area with trenches, an obstacle course, and other minor features. Sometime between 2004 and 2010 a second training facility to the east of the parade yard, on the opposite side of the road, was bulldozed over.

The southern-most portion of the compound holds a good deal of garages, workshops and other metal-roofed buildings. Although no mechanization is visible, whatever armor this brigade does operate would be found inside these garages. A handful of large and small trucks are spread out throughout this area. At least one battalion of D-30 towed guns is visible in the open.

3rd Brigade - Torbat Heydariyeh
Like the 2nd brigade, the detachment located north of the city of Torbat Heydarieyeh is relatively small. Moreover, the only imagery is from 2003, though the quality is relatively good given the age.There is a second, suspicious compound 7.5 km to north-east which may be military related, but this cannot be confirmed for sure. In the general vicinity of the compound are a series of firing ranges buttressed in between the compound and a small collection of hills to the east, and immediately north of the compound is a prison.

3rd Brigade (GE)

Within the compound itself, near the southern edge is a storage depot with a number of sheds surrounded by revetments. Following the road north to the parade ground, a mosque with its distinctive domed roof is visible on the right. Like Quchan, no visible mechanization is present; the motor pools on the western edge of the compound, as well as a smaller one on the east only contain the usual range of motorized transport ranging from jeeps to 5-ton trucks. Adjacent to the motor pool, and in the northern portion of the compound are exercise fields used for routine training. In the center of the compound can be found the parade yard and a small number of buildings which are, most likely at least, barracks and administrative buildings.

Footnotes:
(1)I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980. T. Cooper, F.Bishop. ACIG. 9/09/2003
(2)The Iran-Iraq War in the Air. T. Cooper, F.Bishop. 2003.
(3)I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980.
(4)The Iran-Iraq War in the Air.
(5)Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Karbala-6
(6)Central Clubs Forum. http://www.centralclubs.com/topic-t65380.html
(7) Unfortunately I cannot find the original source where Cordesman claimed this. This information is sourced from the authors work on the "Open Source Intelligence Project", also available on this blog (here).
(8) This organization can also be observed more clearly in the 1st Brigade of the 88th AD in Zahedan.
(9) Wikimapia
(10) Wikimapia
(11) Scramble on the Web. Iranian ORBAT. http://www.scramble.nl/ir.htm

Bidqaneh Update

2011-11-28T19:19:00.000-08:00

ISIS has published satellite imagery of the facilities that were rocked by explosions earlier this month. It answers our most primary question which is - where did the explosion take place? The Digital Globe imagery shows that the explosion took place in a compound I labeled as a 'possible industrial facility' just west of the main Bidqaneh-adjacent facility in my original post.

The facility has been under various levels of renovation since 2004 when the oldest imagery dates from. Between 2004 and 2007 the compound remains roughly the same with only minor changes. It should be noted that the suspected static missile test site 2 km south of this compound was first built somewhere between 2004 and 2007, and only completed. In 2009 construction escalates; the fact that the landfill is in use confirms the construction happening during that time. In 2010 the first blue-roofed buildings emerge; speaking broadly, the use of blue roofing material has become more common recently and is often associated with industrial military buildings (for other examples of this, look to the IRGC's HSPB factory in Bandar Abbas, or the suspected IRGC engineering buildings adjacent to the 77th mechanized infantry division's headquarters in Mashhad). A number of new trees have been planted near the northern buildings and they have a more lived-in appearance. By June 2011 several new buildings have been erected near the entry-point as well as additions onto the pre-existing garages and workshops. Paved areas have also been expanded around these workshops. Not much changes by September of 2011 except for the apparent completion of construction on the same additions. There are also what appear to be, possibly, large tanks for holding liquids.

[EDIT: The picture below isn't the proper size, fixing sometime soon]

Construction from 2004-2011

The size and configuration of the garages point to some sort of industrial application for these buildings; the fact that recent construction was accompanied by a road leading to a rocket engine test site indicates that it could be related to the fueling of rockets. This would present a plausible explanation for how the explosion took place.

Looking at the imagery provided by ISIS (see hyperlink above), the blast appears to have originated in the western-half of the compound, likely from the two bottom-most workshops on the western side. Both of these buildings have been completely annihilated as has the blue-roofed building north of these garages. Several of the administrative buildings bordered with trees have also been destroyed, but it's unlikely the explosion originated from either of these buildings and it's more likely they were damaged and later demolished in the cleanup. The four other workshops all suffered significant damage though are still standing.