tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16202645500740136952024-03-13T03:03:41.348-07:00The Arkenstone - ارکنستونTechnical, Geospatial, and Organizational Analysis of the Iranian Armed ForcesAuthor: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.comBlogger77125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-14616147996007099412016-05-07T00:54:00.002-07:002016-05-07T00:55:10.151-07:00Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters (PADAJA)<br />
<b><span style="font-size: large;">Overview</span></b>:<br />
<br />
The Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters is the branch of the regular Armed Forces (Artesh) responsible for providing strategic and operational-level air defense over the country, as well as much of the tactical air defense for other branches. [1]<br />
<br />
For brevity's sake, the HQ is hereafter referred to by its infrequently-used Persian acronym, PADAJA ("پدجا "). It is more commonly referred to, especially in English-language media, by the acronym for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF).<br />
<br />
The headquarters was first formed in 1992 to coordinate the respective air defense efforts of the Artesh and IRGC. In August 2008 the HQ was promoted to its current status as an independent branch and given full command over the relevant units and their equipment, including the Artesh Air Force's radars, SAMs, and AAA. [2]<br />
<br />
Today, the PADAJA is organized geographically. Operational control at the national-level is provided by a hardened air defense operations command (ADOC) at an unknown location. Control at the regional level is provided by nine regional commands, each headquartered in a sector operations center (SOC). These are sometimes referred to as divisions. [3] Each region has authority over a number of air defense groups – each equivalent to a brigade – and independent sites for radars and other equipment.<br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Staff / Personnel</b></span>:<br />
<br />
As of April 2016 the PADAJA is commanded by Brigadier General Farzad Esmaeli. [4] He has held the position since December 2010. Before his appointment Esmaili commanded the force's Central Region HQ. Before this he served in a handful of groups on the western border. His positions included both technical and staff positions including radar operator, training officer, and operations deputy. [5]<br />
<br />
The PADAJA's deputy commander is BG Ali-Reza Sabahi-Fard. [6] One of the more notable staff appointments is Coordination Deputy BG2 Mousa Bakhtiari, who is an IRGC officer, rather than Artesh. [7]<br />
<br />
One point of uncertainty surrounds the position currently held by BG2 Abolfazl Shahri-Rad, which translates approximately as "executive deputy", or "administrative deputy". However, the precise meaning is unclear. The wording suggests a role equivalent to a chief-of-staff, but this role is traditionally associated with the coordination deputy.<br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b><br />Air Defense Regions</b></span>:<br />
<br />
1) <u>Northern Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered in Tehran, the northern region spans part or all of the Tehran, Alborz, and Mazandaran provinces (full extent unknown). [9] <br />
<br />
As of September 2015 this region is commanded by BG2 Saeed Saeedi. [8] <br />
<br />
2) <u>Central Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered in Isfahan, the central region spans part or all of the Isfahan, Qom, and Markazi provinces (full extent unknown). [11] Its command is co-located with the Air Force's 8th Tactical Airbase <br />
<br />
As of April 2016 this region is commanded by BG2 Abazar Jukar. [10] <br />
<br />
3) <u>Northwest Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered in Tabriz, the northwest region spans East and West Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Zanjan, and part of Kurdistan province. [13] It is suspected that the command is co-located with the Air Force's 2nd Tactical Airbase. <br />
<br />
As of February 2016 this region is commanded by BG2 Malik-Ali Asadi-Fard. [12] <br />
<br />
4) <u>Western Region</u>:<br />
Headquartered in Hamedan, the western region spans part of Kurdistan and Markazi provinces, as well as Hamedan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan (full extent unknown). Its command is co-located with the Air Force's 3rd Tactical Airbase. [15] <br />
<br />
As of August 2015 this region is commanded by Col./BG2 Bijan Saadi. [14] <br />
<br />
5) <u>Southwest Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered at an unknown location – likely co-located with the Air Force's existing bases at Omidiyeh or Dezful – the southwest region spans the Khuzestan province and part of nearby Kohgiluyeh va Boyer Ahmed. It includes at least four groups (Ahvaz, Dezful, Omidiyeh, Behbahan). [18] <br />
<br />
As of August 2015 this region is commanded by BG2 Mahmoud Ahmadi. [16] <br />
<br />
It is infrequently referred to as the "4th Air Defense Region". [17] <br />
<br />
6) <u>Southern Region</u>:<br />
Headquartered in Bandar Bushehr, the southern region spans the Bushehr and Shiraz provinces, as well as Khark Island. [19] <br />
<br />
As of September 2015 this region is commanded by BG2 Gholam-Abbas Esmail-Zadeh. [20] <br />
<br />
7) <u>Southeast Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered in Bandar Abbas, the southeast region spans the Hormozgan province, and part of Sistan va Baluchistan, as well as – almost certainly – the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding islands. [21] <br />
<br />
As of January 2016 this region is commanded by BG2 Mohammed Farzan. [22] <br />
<br />
It is infrequently referred to as the "6th Air Defense Region". [23] <br />
<br />
8)<u> Eastern Region</u>: <br />
Headquartered in Birjand, the eastern region spans South Khorasan, parts of Sistan va Baluchistan and Razavi Khorasan, and some or all of theYazd and Kerman provinces. [24] [25] <br />
<br />
As of April 2016 this region is commanded by BG2 Fardin Nisaen. [26] <br />
<br />
9) <u>Northeast Region</u>:<br />
Headquartered in Mashhad, the northeast region spans the Razavi and North Khorasan provinces, as well as part of Golestan. [27] Its command is located at the Air Force's now-vacant 14th Tactical Airbase.<br />
<br />
As of September 2015 this region is commanded by BG2 Abdullah Rashad. [28] <br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Footnotes</b></span>:<br />
[1] The branch is sometimes described as a "base" in English media. This arises from a mistranslation of the Persian word for "headquarters", which can either mean an abstract command body, or its physical garrison (ie base). This shows up in another acronym – KAAB – which is infrequently used by Iran's English-language media to refer to the "Khatam al-Anbiya Base". For example: (<a href="http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115584/KAAB-bolstered-by-indigenous-knowledge-capabilities">Mehr</a>, 04/05/2016). <br />
[2] <i>History of [PADAJA]</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=db9e990b-0626-47f0-b2eb-a750e55c4b13&WebPartID=15f6de99-4e7e-4eae-8f84-b3df08686aab&ID=62109984-5846-4caf-bbf5-64304358312c">AJA</a>. Undated.<br />
[3] <i>Air Defense Has the Ability to Identify Any Enemy Movement</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/80796674/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7/%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF_%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C_%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C_%D9%87%D8%B1%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87_%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%B1%D8%A7_%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 08/31/2013. <br />
[4] <i>KAAB ‘bolstered by indigenous knowledge, capabilities’</i>. <a href="http://en.mehrnews.com/news/115584/KAAB-bolstered-by-indigenous-knowledge-capabilities">Mehr</a>. 04/05/2016.<br />
[5] <i>Familiarization with Air Defense Commanders After the Revolution</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=90c71259-d338-44e7-8e49-899c6eebdf2c&WebPartID=fbeb62c0-37c8-48ae-bc00-6f06eb204e67&ID=147b644b-3d62-457f-b063-ccee90792636">AJA</a>. Undated. <br />
[6] <i>Protection of Key Sites, Air Defense’s Main Duty: Iranian Commander</i>. <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/01/18/624158/protection-of-key-sites-air-defense-s-main-duty-iranian-commander">Tasnim</a>. 01/18/2015. <br />
[7] <i>Youth Soldier Festival</i>. <a href="http://basijpress.ir/fa/news-details/71771/%D8%AC%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2/">Basij Press</a>. 03/06/2016.<br />
[7.5] <i>Farewell & Introduction Ceremony for [PADAJA's ... Deputy] Held</i>. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5286808/%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF">YJC</a>. 08/10/2015. <br />
[8] BG2 Saaedi is first mentioned in 2013, when he is described as the region's commander. (<a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&CategoryID=740c120a-0943-473c-83d7-8b8ed0d8e12c&WebPartID=ccc02693-272a-4775-ab16-dd72b2c0e7b7&ID=ed85e108-53c8-4aa5-8e16-59876590fdef">AJA</a>, 09/23/2013) A later article describes him as a one of the region's group commanders. (<a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/52338">Defa Press</a>, 09/05/2015) <br />
[9] [<i>title unclear</i>]. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/news/1782354/%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C">MNA</a>. 01/02/2013. <br />
[10] <i>Artesh Biggest Protector of Security After the Revolution</i>. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/news/3591583/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%B1%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B3%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF">MNA</a>. 04/05/2016.<br />
[11] eg Markazi province (<a href="https://youtu.be/l2fWj_0lvH0">Youtube</a>, 09/01/2014). <br />
[12] [<i>title unclear</i>]. <a href="http://tabrizeman.ir/%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87/">Tabriz-e Man</a>. 02/06/2016.<br />
[13] <i>Skies of the Northwest Are Completely Covered</i>. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2902497/%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B4-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF">MNA</a>. 09/02/2015. <br />
[14] <i>Col. Saadi Became Commander of Western Air Defense Region</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940522000470">FNA</a>. 08/13/2015. <br />
[15] <a href="http://www.parsnamaddata.com/tenderview-74478.html">Pars Namad Data</a>, 01/12/2012 <br />
[16] <i>Skies of Iran Safest in Region</i>. <a href="http://www.khouznews.ir/fa/news/98688/%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">Khouz News</a>. 08/27/2015. <br />
[17] [Image Gallery] <i>Nowrooz Rahin-e Noor Caravan</i>. 04/12/2014. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=Album&CategoryID=4a0fddf9-ed53-4663-a459-1ac99e941213&WebPartID=0c78cb96-2c38-4efc-8c83-c32465519ff4&ID=b943f876-dd0b-42a8-b3ac-6cf50fb23c79">AJA</a> <br />
[18] ibid Khouz News, 08/2015. <br />
[19] <i>[Air] Defense in the South of the Country Equipped Best</i>. 01/12/2011. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/printable.php?nn=8910220636">Fars News</a>. <br />
[20] <i>Air Defense Completely Prepared to Proect Borders</i>. 09/05/2015. <a href="http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/529691/%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7">Tabnak</a>. <br />
[21] <i>Air Defense and Nat'l Security</i>. Undated. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=90c71259-d338-44e7-8e49-899c6eebdf2c&WebPartID=fbeb62c0-37c8-48ae-bc00-6f06eb204e67&ID=b39179db-a68b-455b-8929-15ce09e902d3">AJA</a>. <br />
[22] <i>Air Defense Monitors Possible Threats Deep in Neighboring Countries</i>. 01/13/2016. <a href="http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/94102313841/%D9%BE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C">ISNA</a>. <br />
[23] Parade imagery, Rooz-e Artesh 2009 & 2015.<br />
[24] (<a href="http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=4&year=1392&month=6&day=12&id=5071450">Khorasan News</a>, 09/03/2013) <br />
[25] <i>Air Defense Does Not Secure the Country's Skies with Anyone / ...</i> . <a href="http://www.dana.ir/News/704125.html">DANA</a>. 04/15/2016.<br />
[26] ibid DANA, 04/2016. <br />
[27]<i> Iran's Air Defense Monitors Spy Aircraft to an Altitude of 60,000 feet</i>. 08/31/2015. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81742596/">IRNA</a> <br />
[28] ibid IRNA, 08/31/2015.<br />
<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-13549241595450723022015-11-28T02:09:00.002-08:002015-11-28T02:09:43.617-08:00IRIAA Airbases - 5th Combat Group<u>Introduction</u>:<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj-V8k-uadcJd-7xIyyA6t-PVkZinjnSs-G97WMI-_XE1_ORLY09re-aC10uSjcGCHDdcOriCxp4J_DxDcnYHngtIIZlhk0gh80Ab-8dLM_wiHzGaZH4wgHAK8eNoOCip_yUO2jhyP8sBfn/s1600/Export_1_Mashhad+Overview.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj-V8k-uadcJd-7xIyyA6t-PVkZinjnSs-G97WMI-_XE1_ORLY09re-aC10uSjcGCHDdcOriCxp4J_DxDcnYHngtIIZlhk0gh80Ab-8dLM_wiHzGaZH4wgHAK8eNoOCip_yUO2jhyP8sBfn/s200/Export_1_Mashhad+Overview.jpg" width="196" /></a></div>
Based in Mashhad, the Havanirooz's 5th Combat Group is responsible for providing rotary-wing support to the <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/09/northeast-regional-operations.html">Ground Force's Northeast Operations Headquarters</a>. Its relatively small size means it lacks some of the capabilities of the <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2015/01/iriaa-airbases.html">IRIAA's other bases</a>.<br />
<br />
The group was established between 1992 and 1996 in response to the lack of regional aviation and the pressing need for border security during Afghanistan's civil war. [1] As of 2014 the base was commanded by Col. Abdulreza Khodadi. [2]<br />
<br />
<u>Employment</u>:<br />
<br />
In the conventional role the 5th CG is expected to perform attack and air assault missions to support corps-level maneuver, consistent with the IRIAA's broader doctrine. While the IRIAA has traditionally maintained a robust air assault capability, the 5th CG's small size means that they would be restricted to small actions. This was demonstrated during exercises in November 2015 when units from the northeast operations HQ were reinforced with heavy-lift CH-47s from elsewhere in the country.<br />
<br />
The group is also responsible for supporting border security operations, particularly along the Iran-Afghanistan border. These operations include surveillance patrols to support other security forces as well as dedicated “fire teams” that can rapidly interdict “bandits and traffickers”. [3]<br />
<br />
The helicopters from the 5th CG are also employed for a range of non-military tasks across the province. These tasks include MEDEVAC for the hospitals in Mashhad, disaster relief operations (e.g. firefighting or SAR), and VIP transport for government officials traveling in the province. [4]<br />
<br />
<u>Organization</u>:<br />
<br />
The group is composed of at least two combat battalions and a ground-based support section. The exact strength of each battalion depends on mission-capable rates, which vary over time. The numbers below describe the documented strength, which is assumed to be somewhat lower than the theoretical strength typically used to describe fleet sizes.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCANejUEdQAk1CLrsnGMtvAqzb_LBvayRPFgs5gCo-XllKqK5W647q71B8d1im5IInsBDCd6PdmDqYbLw_CY8f8pH1REZBpWrO8UL0vOnBNFtQtCNC7cVYaGlwOeDWWn15GBsLKyX1GLCw/s1600/Export_3_Group+Overview.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="316" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgCANejUEdQAk1CLrsnGMtvAqzb_LBvayRPFgs5gCo-XllKqK5W647q71B8d1im5IInsBDCd6PdmDqYbLw_CY8f8pH1REZBpWrO8UL0vOnBNFtQtCNC7cVYaGlwOeDWWn15GBsLKyX1GLCw/s640/Export_3_Group+Overview.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXTKbWJFJRL32TuJKuSIURyP_9UTK9KCjwFEmi8B8eUTAl8Z_s3-5diqnsIwLqanTW704yp4ouJCUziySYgwXKSnZzbxxGrrlxASXrg7wRp2qnWSBtkfvuZl5kJNuBjvIWoCX82N3QYwJP/s1600/Export_4_Closeup.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="560" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXTKbWJFJRL32TuJKuSIURyP_9UTK9KCjwFEmi8B8eUTAl8Z_s3-5diqnsIwLqanTW704yp4ouJCUziySYgwXKSnZzbxxGrrlxASXrg7wRp2qnWSBtkfvuZl5kJNuBjvIWoCX82N3QYwJP/s640/Export_4_Closeup.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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The attack bn is composed of ~7 AH-1J Cobra and ~4 AB-206 light-utility helicopters. The latter are used for reconnaissance and to spot targets for the former, which provide the battalion's striking power. Most of the group's AH-1s are non-TOW capable and are armed only with 20 mm cannons and 70 mm rocket pods. The AB-206s can be fitted with light weapons, but this has not been documented in practice.<br />
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Known AH-1 serials: <br />
3-4437 (11/2015) <br />
3-4459 (06/2014) <br />
3-4464 (11/2015)<br />
3-4465 (maintenance; 06/2014)<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBUkgpB96XCYptE8ESTYzVUTajb4O5YTPYVfunW3hX2Gkwrn_NFLawHp-vCjkGbl-IhTz-BQ6r4Qi9phicUt8lE3E2njpwZhVoen-K35_is7nGAxYmX2TIJX8STmRkSHP8iAvXVKqOMByM/s1600/MRA+Exercise_R.Khorasan_Nov+2015_IRNA+%252824%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="276" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBUkgpB96XCYptE8ESTYzVUTajb4O5YTPYVfunW3hX2Gkwrn_NFLawHp-vCjkGbl-IhTz-BQ6r4Qi9phicUt8lE3E2njpwZhVoen-K35_is7nGAxYmX2TIJX8STmRkSHP8iAvXVKqOMByM/s400/MRA+Exercise_R.Khorasan_Nov+2015_IRNA+%252824%2529.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">AJ-1J 3-4437 fires 70mm rockets during maneuvers. (IRNA, 11/2015)</td></tr>
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Known AB-206 serials: <br />
2-4116 (06/2014) <br />
2-4211 (11/2015)<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMIDwAkPn6Wn-1osdwdEUycR1zUjmSKk1Jn_4fugsmdL8OmErRatuPywltUVd85jR-CxSNLXkeoujIjmPdU9bDcwEcmjejI7CleHoRS2fOYGdnaohHdim2qnZRNncZThBNaO6jOmLrpAif/s1600/MRA+Exercise_R.Khorasan_Nov+2015_AJA+%25287%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMIDwAkPn6Wn-1osdwdEUycR1zUjmSKk1Jn_4fugsmdL8OmErRatuPywltUVd85jR-CxSNLXkeoujIjmPdU9bDcwEcmjejI7CleHoRS2fOYGdnaohHdim2qnZRNncZThBNaO6jOmLrpAif/s400/MRA+Exercise_R.Khorasan_Nov+2015_AJA+%25287%2529.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">AB-206 2-4211 spots targets for AH-1Js during maneuvers. (AJA, 11/2015)</td></tr>
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The assault battalion is composed of ~10 Bell 214s.<br />
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Known Bell 214 serials: <br />
6-4764 (06/2014) <br />
6-4784 (06/2014) <br />
6-4785 (04/2015) <br />
6-4831 (09/2014)<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSEyjAiLDJIG4OSPT92HoD41vo2PlMMMdLmCfnJyiRy6FTp5IbRCsoLzdush5vqiyUx9Fg25U_lvgmij_NIS04TRpvrQ3tjxRf2nkyQBK_-PlUrg_YCdt6kKtyEY-MfCnBkdFUe8HdUwQx/s1600/n2718942-3921069.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="276" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSEyjAiLDJIG4OSPT92HoD41vo2PlMMMdLmCfnJyiRy6FTp5IbRCsoLzdush5vqiyUx9Fg25U_lvgmij_NIS04TRpvrQ3tjxRf2nkyQBK_-PlUrg_YCdt6kKtyEY-MfCnBkdFUe8HdUwQx/s400/n2718942-3921069.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Bell 214 6-4764 takes off during a visit to the garrison by IRAA commander, Houshang Yari. (IRNA, 06/2014)</td></tr>
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The group also includes a maintenance and support section organized at an unknown level(s). In larger groups, each battalion is provided with a workshop to perform basic service work necessary to keep machines operational. These are absent in Mashhad, which suggests that this level has either been folded into, or is performed by, the group-level workshops found in the garrison's sole hanger. Generally, group-level maintenance includes any installation and repairs short of an overhaul, which would be carried out at the PANHA facilities in Tehran. [5] [6]<br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Footnotes</u>: <br /><span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] <i>A Romantic Flight Over Iran's Spiritual Capital</i>. <a href="http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=2&year=1390&month=1&day=29&id=2209634">Khorasan News</a>. 04/18/11 <br />[2] <i>Northeast Regional Operations Headquarters</i>. <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2015/01/iriaa-airbases.html">Arkenstone</a>. 09/29/14 <br />[3] <i>Familiarization with the 5th Combat Airbase; [unclear]</i>. Quds Daily (archived at <a href="http://www.aerospacetalk.ir/vb/showthread.php?t=47221">aerospacetalk</a>) 04/19/09 <br /> [4] ibid Khorasan News, 2011; and Quds Daily, 2009. <br /> [5] The IRIAA employs the same Level-of-Repair-Analysis (LORA) methodology used by the US Department of Defense, likely a legacy of the extensive contracts undertaken by Bell during the 1970s to build extensive support and production facilities for the then-Imperial Army Aviation. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /> See also, the commander of the IRIAA's “Ya Ali Industries Center” describing the three levels (<a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5106325/%D9%85%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%B2-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%BE%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">YJC</a>, 03/22/15).</span></span>Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-9984391167396645722015-09-22T06:21:00.000-07:002015-09-22T06:21:29.555-07:00UAV Update - A Look Inside the Mohajer-4's GCSThis past August, the governor of Ilam met with a team from the Artesh to examine whether or not UAVs could be used to help fight the wildfires blazing across the mountainous province in western Iran. As part of this process, the team conducted a demonstration flight.<br />
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This event was captured by photographers from IRNA who have published some of the most comprehensive images of the system's support equipment seen thusfar.<br />
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The full gallery is available <a href="http://www3.irna.ir/ilam/fa/Photo/2904391/">here</a>.<br />
The article describing the evaluation is available <a href="http://www3.irna.ir/ilam/fa/News/81721002/">here</a>.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgcETyf95BQUvhv_HDi6NXdi6yTw76hFlAC7GaBsJquRuQZ4zk_Cj3DsYbk24iwiJEOcA4foTi4HCgTKTXYry__xAiA8DYFTYrrQVxgVKfthu9BF7cMI-ckNa5slhTbFxICzqaenYiy4_jT/s1600/n2904391-4456771.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="432" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgcETyf95BQUvhv_HDi6NXdi6yTw76hFlAC7GaBsJquRuQZ4zk_Cj3DsYbk24iwiJEOcA4foTi4HCgTKTXYry__xAiA8DYFTYrrQVxgVKfthu9BF7cMI-ckNa5slhTbFxICzqaenYiy4_jT/s640/n2904391-4456771.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKGAgkNtZdsr1VCAjKxxwrN-TudqHWBtuxIuD0dJIwpxoEIw0pZ5nPKcehqJoTcpPhWdBYamUraT983dRBktopfsWlgl7Azcdt7FER_a9-X-cy4dHs-reJofO3atgOOnfdWfA-R4C2kqeW/s1600/n2904391-4456779+-+Copy.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgKGAgkNtZdsr1VCAjKxxwrN-TudqHWBtuxIuD0dJIwpxoEIw0pZ5nPKcehqJoTcpPhWdBYamUraT983dRBktopfsWlgl7Azcdt7FER_a9-X-cy4dHs-reJofO3atgOOnfdWfA-R4C2kqeW/s1600/n2904391-4456779+-+Copy.jpg" /></a>The UAV in question was a recent-generation Mohajer-4, which can be distinguished from earlier examples by its streamlined fuselage. It is likely operated by the Army's Ground Forces, though the Air Force is a plausible alternative. One crew-member wore an unrecognizable patch on the front of his jumpsuit.<br />
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This example bears the serial "P062A-36". This is consistent with the only other documented serial of this type - P062A-007 - which was <a href="http://i.imgur.com/tKRHUnk.jpg">found </a>on an airframe downed by ISIS over eastern Syria in January 2015. Both of these are also consistent with the pattern among other M4s, where the first string of text identifies the model (A041 on previous-generation M4s) and the second string identifies the unique air-frame. This suggests there are at least 36 new-generation airframes.<br />
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The setup is operated by a crew of between five and seven. This includes two operators, a mission commander, and a launch section. System components include a towed launch rail for rocket-assisted-takeoff, a flatbed truck, a crane truck, a light van, a generator, and a containerized GCS. It is expected that a transport/storage/maintenance container is also part of a typical deployment, though it was absent in this photo-set.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCfrrtyTDo0PP0nuYTdgmX1XmBGyvQ3nwooDOghsn_ZjWjG0a-h6-_kWfaYtKu-24fif-iwudf_-HZim7vgOzbDpkTyQKPktibW6N18W9r2QzHkECTEByrS8IYdl0mVfmj2gpVE_0wJiF_/s1600/n2904391-4456784.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="432" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCfrrtyTDo0PP0nuYTdgmX1XmBGyvQ3nwooDOghsn_ZjWjG0a-h6-_kWfaYtKu-24fif-iwudf_-HZim7vgOzbDpkTyQKPktibW6N18W9r2QzHkECTEByrS8IYdl0mVfmj2gpVE_0wJiF_/s640/n2904391-4456784.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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Part of the photo-set's value is the high quality shots of the interior GCS and its operator controls. Three consoles line the container, facing the cab. The payload operator sits to the right, controlling the camera and the directional tracking antenna fitted to the roof used for real time media transfer. The center console displays flight control software used for automatic route planning. The software used here is a US-made COTS product named "FliteMap" marketed to civilian aviators. The left console displays engine information and other telemetry data.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJjMnaqDHrA6BUIMUMw8jIBD2w0kE5Knp9ks_eHUDkFSMs43b1ZKTI6z15GS67T-PJgMT5J5wQgqJnmaI9KXXigpFManpiMTkquYA8c2ky7OHy-EQvYO9W61HtlW_mjECZLx2JuXq9_7nG/s1600/n2904391-4456778.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="432" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJjMnaqDHrA6BUIMUMw8jIBD2w0kE5Knp9ks_eHUDkFSMs43b1ZKTI6z15GS67T-PJgMT5J5wQgqJnmaI9KXXigpFManpiMTkquYA8c2ky7OHy-EQvYO9W61HtlW_mjECZLx2JuXq9_7nG/s640/n2904391-4456778.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-68738592773956931782015-09-14T22:11:00.001-07:002015-09-14T22:11:46.811-07:00[Archive] UAVs Over SyriaThis post first appeared on the website OSIMINT on January 8, 2014.<br />
It is preserved here as an archive. Some brief edits have been made for clarity and grammar.<br />
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<br />Before the demands of war led to the use of rotary and fixed-wing attack aircraft, pro-Assad forces in Syria used lightweight UAVs for aerial surveillance. Since they were first documented over Homs in February 2012, footage of Iranian built AB-3 tactical UAVs have increasingly appeared in open-source reporting. Since the Summer of 2013 AB-3s have been joined by smaller Yasir UAVs, also built by Iran. Insurgents downed their first UAV in May 2013 and have brought down at least eight more since.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlOq5_wahQlXzwD-KvHOSm9c2Z471rXyztiEb2EMcMNXvtxnU32SCZ6Tqylxw3G6HMk_d19oQ516vtUqayXwQRVE3UOyR3NpNVrW556-5Ei6qby5IsD4z_U3H_g1cFdy50pBRlYzmhBZ8p/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlOq5_wahQlXzwD-KvHOSm9c2Z471rXyztiEb2EMcMNXvtxnU32SCZ6Tqylxw3G6HMk_d19oQ516vtUqayXwQRVE3UOyR3NpNVrW556-5Ei6qby5IsD4z_U3H_g1cFdy50pBRlYzmhBZ8p/s640/1.jpg" width="492" /></a></div>
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Open-source reporting indicates that the majority of UAVs have been deployed to Damascus. 80% of all AB-3 sightings took place over the capital. This likely reflects both the importance of the capital, and the project's evidence bias. There's no way to know whether or not aerial activity over Damascus is more likely to be recorded than elsewhere around the country (for example, due to the greater population density).<br />
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In Damascus itself, the AB-3 sightings are - unsurprisingly - concentrated on the city's peripheral suburbs, which have been the focus of insurgent activity around the capital. 13 sightings have been reported over West Ghouta, while 26 have been reported over East Ghouta.<br />
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There is some difficulty in positively identifying the specific district in question. For one, each district is small enough that any flight would inevitably cross a broad swath of territory. Thus, trying to pinpoint just one district is somewhat meaningless.<br />
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Like the pattern of geographic deployment, the distribution of sightings over time is simlarly asymmetric. Through all of 2012, only four AB-3s were spotted over Damascus, and all but one of these were spotted in the last two months of the ear. This number skyrocketed in 2013. Between January and April, Damascus averaged two sightings/month, but in May this number jumped to 15. This declined to an average of just under three sightings/month between June and August, and 1.25 per month between September and December (though this number jumps to 1.75 if the two Yasirs sighted during this time are included in the tally).<br />
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As one last remark it is worth mentioning that these maps are a work in progress. It is unlikely that every incident has been documented, and some of those that have may be misidentified. Thus, the author invites readers to submit any corrections they feel may enhance the accuracy of these maps.Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-8022333156529069872015-06-28T16:54:00.000-07:002015-06-28T16:54:08.708-07:00Iran's UAVs: Supplement (Video Feed Recognition)Enlarge for full size:<br />
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<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-31099540441960490462015-03-05T18:40:00.001-08:002015-03-05T18:40:12.273-08:00Mohajer UAV<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Index</b></span>: <br />
Introduction <br />
Mohajer-1 <br />
- Development <br />
- Technical Assessment <br />
- Use <br />
- Recognition Features <br />
Mohajer-2 <br />
- Development <br />
- Technical Assessment and Specifications<br />
- Variants <br />
- Use <br />
- Recognition Features <br />
Mohajer-3 <br />
- Development <br />
- Technical Assessment and Specifications<br />
- Use <br />
- Recognition Features <br />
Mohajer-4 <br />
- Development <br />
- Technical Assessment and Specifications <br />
- Variants <br />
- Use <br />
- Recognition Features<br />
Appendix: Documented Airframes and Serials<br />
Footnotes/ Works-Cited <br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Introduction</b>:</span><br />
<br />
The Mohajer family encompasses a range of tactical surveillance UAVs, and are among the most well known and mature Iranian designs. Developed during the height of the Iran-Iraq war by the Qods Aviation Industry Company, they continue to be used by various branches of the Iranian military. Though not as widespread in foreign service as the Ababil, they have increasingly been seen over Iraq and Syria.<br />
<br />
The Mohajer's name is often translated as immigrant or emmigrant, but is likely intended to specifically invoke the Arabic muhajirun and muhajir, which – respectively – refer to Mohammed's original 'emmigration' to Mecca, and those that have made the pilgrimage since.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Mohajer-1 (M1)</b>:</span><br />
<br />
Fielded under wartime pressures, the Mohajer-1 was a relatively unsophisticated design. Although it had only a minor impact on the overall course of the Iran-Iraq War, the tactical experience helped lay the institutional foundations for Iran's development and use of unmanned aircraft over the following decades.<br />
<br />
<u>Development</u>:<br />
The Mohajer-1 was developed following the IRGC's first forays into unmanned reconnaissance in the early-1980s. By 1985, the Qods Industries was formed as a wing of the IRGC's self-sufficiency department and tasked with supplying the nascent Raad Brigade. The M1 was developed sometime that same year.<br />
<br />
<u>Technical Assessment</u>:<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(Soureh Cinema)</td></tr>
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An impediment to assessing the M1 is the lack of documentation. Much of the imagery purporting to show wartime M1s are from “Mohajer”, a movie released in 1990.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 1 2</span> However, given the government's role in making war movies, it is a reasonable assumption that the portrayal is fairly accurate.<br />
<br />
Physically, the Mohajer-1 is characterized by a narrow cylindrical fuselage, twin-boom tails, and straight wings high and to the rear of the fuselage. It is similar in size to the RQ-7. For flight control, the M1 is fitted with an elevator on the horizontal stabilizer to control pitch, rudders on the vertical stabilizers to control yaw, and ailerons on the wings to control roll.<br />
<br />
A tricycle landing gear is employed for launch and recovery. A parachute can also be used for recovery.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(Soureh Cinema)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
For surveillance, the M1 is fitted with a single oblique camera in the nose. Based on other Iranian UAVs from this period, it is likely that this was a still camera, whose film was processed after recovery. One source indicates that it could transfer real-time imagery, though this is questionable. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">3</span><br />
<br />
The Mohajer-1 could also be armed and the 1990 movie shows it fitted with 3-round RPG launchers under each wing.<br />
<br />
The M1 is controlled via hobby-class radio-control (under 100 mhz). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">4</span><!--100--><br />
<br />
<u>Use</u>:<br />
During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC's Raad Brigade operated an unknown number over the southern front. Although the they first used UAVs during Operation Kheibar (Feb/March 1984), and Badr (March 1985), the Mohajer in particular is first associated with Operation Valfajr-8 (Feb 1986), and Karbala-5 (Jan/Feb 1987). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">5</span> They were used to prepare for these offensives by photographing Iraqi positions. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">6</span> They were also reportedly used for artillery correction, but it is unclear if this took place in real time, or were used for assessment after the fact.<br />
<br />
In the 1990 movie, two teams of personnel are shown: a rear-area launch section, and a forward control section. The need to forward deploy the operators was the result of the radio-control, which limited signal power and precluded data transfer. This, in turn, meant that the M1 could only be used over the front line, and lacked the ability to reconnoiter in depth.<br />
<br />
There are reports of Iraqi forces jamming Iranian UAVs by using their HF/VHF/UHF radios, which would have operated in a similar frequency. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">7</span><br />
<br />
There are no reports of how effective the M1's armament was. However, given the manual line of sight control, it is unlikely to have been too accurate. This is one area where the movie takes artistic license, purporting to show real time targeting via the on-board camera. In addition, some report that this armament was tested as an anti-shipping weapon in the Gulf. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">8</span><br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Spotting artillery impacts during Karbala-5 (UAS Yearbook)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Mohajer-2 (M2)</b>:</span><br />
<br />
The Mojajer-2 is representative of the intermediary generation of Iranian UAVs developed during the 90s. In this regard it is largely equivalenent to the Ababil-2, both in generation and in capabilities (e.g. MTOW, endurance). However, unlike the Ababil, the M2 is still routinely used for ISR. Although its capabilities are downright modest compared to the current generation designs, updates promise to keep the M2 relevant.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0wid7voDn2bPJS-ZefHX8wyTHQbsQZRljxuqkvcoKB9sa01fmnhCIpkx-0huOj0PLIMNKreQbCGFAX2QzXyGAnPXjaK5R2yY6Bk9P2Eg5No1I9AZfqyC0PDHSabDzVGcl0WQwOuxPR0Rg/s1600/M2_MRA+Exercises_Dec+2014+(3).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg0wid7voDn2bPJS-ZefHX8wyTHQbsQZRljxuqkvcoKB9sa01fmnhCIpkx-0huOj0PLIMNKreQbCGFAX2QzXyGAnPXjaK5R2yY6Bk9P2Eg5No1I9AZfqyC0PDHSabDzVGcl0WQwOuxPR0Rg/s1600/M2_MRA+Exercises_Dec+2014+(3).jpg" height="281" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">NEZAJA M2 during Mohammed Rasoolallah Exercises, December 2014 (Jam-e Jam)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<u>Development</u>:<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjG-LxPcZwSDYZy7h3foOIjLfE-ezyBXeYUs1grLyJOT92VthQyhZWiO0JSVRnVx5r7D21O_42vBa2x6u9Lf3YEH5b6gP43XyywjaQTPq5iTFZ3ODWx9pIayp8GCfLmr0gJAWY_j9drXshy/s1600/M2_1996+Parade.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjG-LxPcZwSDYZy7h3foOIjLfE-ezyBXeYUs1grLyJOT92VthQyhZWiO0JSVRnVx5r7D21O_42vBa2x6u9Lf3YEH5b6gP43XyywjaQTPq5iTFZ3ODWx9pIayp8GCfLmr0gJAWY_j9drXshy/s1600/M2_1996+Parade.jpg" height="133" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">1996 parade (Getty)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The Mohajer-2 was developed prior to 1996, when it was documented on parade in Tehran. Then, in 1999, the Qods company announced that they would host a flight demonstration alongside the Mohajer 3 and 4 (though there is no record of said demonstration). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">9</span> The M2 was next documented during the 2005 Kish Airshow. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">10</span> Since then, the M2 and its variants have been documented regularly. <br />
<br />
As of the mid-2000s, 253 Mohajers had been produced. Although it is impossible to say how many of these were M2s, it is a reasonable assumption that they comprised the bulk of this number.<br />
<br />
In 11/2014, a new generation was unveiled at that year's Kish Airshow, boasting greatly improved performance.<br />
<br />
<u>Technical Assessment</u>:<br />
Physically, the Mohajer-2's airframe is an evolution of the Mohajer-1 design. It is characterized by the same cylindrical fuselage, twin-boom tails, and straight wings. Its flight controls are the same, including an elevator on the horizontal stabilizer, rudders on the vertical stabilizers, and ailerons on the wings. Subtle variations in M2s, such as the engine nascalles, indicate slight changes in manufacturing over time.<br />
<br />
The use of skids, rather than the M1's tricycle gear, means that the M2 is dependent on pneumatic or rocket assisted launch (usually the former). Recovery is by parachute or conventional landing.<br />
<br />
The Mohajer-2 is powered by the 26 hp WAE-342 twin-cylinder piston engine fitted with a pusher prop, which is also used on Iran's AB2 and Saeqeh. However, a handful of examples have<a href="http://i.imgur.com/XW8ePZZ.jpg"> atypical exhaust systems</a>, possibly explaining the discontinuity between the 342's known power, and the 25 hp consistently claimed on M2 brochures. Official advertisements claim an operational range of 50 km (100 km ferry range), and an endurance of 1.5 hours. <br />
<br />
The M2 is fitted with two stub antenna, one on either wing. These support the higher frequency datalinks that allow for real-time control (under 10 ghz).Like the Ababil family, the lack of OTOH control is unlikely to be a significant problem given its short range. Although exact details are scant, export brochures indicate that it is fitted with control software that allows the Mohajer to be flown in one of three modes: manual, semi-automatic, and automatic. <br />
<br />
- Manual: The operator controls all aspects of UAV flight by using the real-time feed from the onboard cameras. This mode relies on high and low bandwidth communication between the UAV and GCS. <br />
- Semi-automatic: The operator determines the UAV's flight path, but does not control the flight itself. This mode relies on the lower bandwidth control and telemetry channels, which have a longer range than the higher frequency channels used for imagery downlinks. <br />
- Automatic: The UAV follows a preset flight path and executes commands using GPS and INS-cued waypoints. This mode does not require any uplink/downlink between the UAV and the GCS. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdJvShqZfpulZmDQCllgPJqtKHIEb7l2uFPCQaKE-DvsddoF7XiJyUghHNO2oGGIgK3DZJ5Jjh-vGuh6BxqZ7UB_A1pznLj38F8pjaOIhqRH9039FhHU25Qkd9so7vTFRZwkOHmjfabPtK/s1600/M2_AD+2009+Display+(1).png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdJvShqZfpulZmDQCllgPJqtKHIEb7l2uFPCQaKE-DvsddoF7XiJyUghHNO2oGGIgK3DZJ5Jjh-vGuh6BxqZ7UB_A1pznLj38F8pjaOIhqRH9039FhHU25Qkd9so7vTFRZwkOHmjfabPtK/s1600/M2_AD+2009+Display+(1).png" height="150" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">NEZAJA display, 2009 (Unknown)<br />Forward-facing and gimbaled cameras</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The Mohajer-2 can be fitted with three different optical payloads: a) a gimbaled EO-system for surveillance, b) a fixed downward-facing still camera for aerial surveying, and c) a fixed forward-facing camera in the nose for flight. The gimbaled imager is used for real-time surveillance and is limited to light-weight models by the M2's relatively small payload. In practice, only daylight cameras, such as the IEI's Oghab 11, have been fitted. <a href="http://i.imgur.com/xniBs5o.jpg">Early-production M2s</a> lacked the forward-facing camera. <br />
<br />
Product brochures also advertise the use of laser line scanners (for wide area aerial surveying), and unspecified electronic-warfare payloads. Neither of these have been documented.<br />
<br />
Like the M1, the M2 can also be armed. Documentary <a href="http://i.imgur.com/B2nJvWS.jpg">footage <span id="goog_1835031361"></span></a>shows <span id="goog_1835031362"></span>development <a href="http://i.imgur.com/COfU1sr.jpg">models </a>fitted with two six-round RPG launchers. However, these have not been documented in service.<br />
<br />
<b>Specifications (M2)</b>:<br />
Length: 2.91 m<br />
Wingspan: 3.8 m<br />
Weight, Empty: 70 kg<br />
Weight: Payload: 15 kg<br />
Weight, MTOW: 85 kg<br />
Speed, Max: 200 km/h<br />
Ceiling: 3,350 m (11,000 ft)<br />
Range: 50 km<br />
Endurance: 1.5 hours<br />
Powerplant: 25 hp L-275<br />
<br />
<b>Specifications (M2N)</b>:<br />
Length: 2.90 m<br />
Wingspan: 3.82 m<br />
Weight, MTOW: 90 kg<br />
Speed, Max: 180 km/h<br />
Range: 150 km<br />
Endurance: 6 hours<br />
<br />
<u>Variants</u>:<br />
<br />
<b>Raad-85</b>:<br />
It is assessed with low to moderate confidence that the Raad-85 is a 'suicide' strike variant of the M2, comparable to the similarly equipped Ababil-2 variant. Its designation may be associated with the NEZAJA in particular.<br />
<br />
The first reference to the Raad came in 02/2011 when then-DM Vahidi announced the manufacture of an offensive UAV capable of precision strike. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">11</span> Then, in 10/2011, Mashregh News described the Raad as a variant of the Saeqeh target drone (also produced by the Qods Company). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">12</span> Although there was no reason given for this claim, and at first glance appears to be a product of their own open-source research, this possibility cannot be dismissed. The most significant evidence for the Raad's link to the M2 came during the IRGC's Great Prophet 8 exercises in 02/2013, which showed unnamed M2-based UAV being used in the suicide strike role.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicXZja74j53XNC_i_Nip30ZlGYPqarqNkQ4CqosJDKu4EGNmBTKHqChmt-H2TXJDXKWszE2NceotYXT4lT-crXeroN-8Hsbembwt4Jv5YIG5jAvqV6a6bBrfrjNnvQ-SM4byYOxvF5ffyl/s1600/0.54.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicXZja74j53XNC_i_Nip30ZlGYPqarqNkQ4CqosJDKu4EGNmBTKHqChmt-H2TXJDXKWszE2NceotYXT4lT-crXeroN-8Hsbembwt4Jv5YIG5jAvqV6a6bBrfrjNnvQ-SM4byYOxvF5ffyl/s1600/0.54.JPG" height="251" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Suicide M2 being prepared for launch during 2013 exercise (IRIB)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
Finally, during a delivery ceremony in September 2013, the NEZAJA announced that they were producing the Raad-85 in cooperation with the Qods Company. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">13</span> At the ceremony, both the M2 and Saeqeh were on display, providing no further clarification.<br />
<br />
Specifications for the Raad are elusive. In 09/2013, a NEZAJA commander claimed the Raad had a 100 km range (equivalent to the M2). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">14</span> Then, during a later exercise in 12/2014, another commander said that the Raad had a range of 250 km, suggesting a closer relationship to the M2N than the much shorter ranged M2 or Saeqeh. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">15 16</span><br />
<br />
<b>Mohajer-2N</b>:<br />
The M2N (the 'N' stands for 'new') was unveiled during the 2014 Kish Airshow. Nearly identical to the M2 in outward appearance, it reportedly enjoys a significant increase in performance. This includes a 200% increase in range (from 50 km to 150 km), and a 300% increase in endurance (from 1.5 hours, to 6 hours). It is also reportedly capable of carrying underwing missile launchers. Although this capability has yet to be documented, it could likely carry any armament in a mode similar to the M2 and M4 variants described elsewhere.<br />
<br />
It is unclear how the M2N achieves this increased range and endurance. The most likely explanation would be the addition of fuel tanks in the wings combined with weight reductions elsewhere (to explain the modest 5 kg increase in MTOW).<br />
<br />
At the Kish Airshow, a poster showed the M2N fitted with wheeled landing gear even though the accompanying model was shown with the traditional skids.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtG6PW064nav9YZ28yirleb1661CrHtQYzWCnhjFGy2ptdlPgK2jkAxMMMoA2GpeTBTkAps_4LtS4QHRs-fkZenTeWhnE4UeFNashcGeIbjnhketWAl8_HJqQkiS4I2j543I7fFjdMOytv/s1600/M2_Kish+Airshow+2014+(1).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtG6PW064nav9YZ28yirleb1661CrHtQYzWCnhjFGy2ptdlPgK2jkAxMMMoA2GpeTBTkAps_4LtS4QHRs-fkZenTeWhnE4UeFNashcGeIbjnhketWAl8_HJqQkiS4I2j543I7fFjdMOytv/s1600/M2_Kish+Airshow+2014+(1).jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">M2N at Kish 2014 (military.ir)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<u>Use</u>:<br />
In Iran, the Mohajer-2 is employed by the Army and IRGC for surveillance and attack. However, it is rarely documented in IRGC service – whether on exercise or parade – suggesting the majority are held by the Army. The majority of the Army's M2s have been documented in their ground forces. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">17</span><br />
<br />
In NEZAJA service, it is used for both high and low-intensity ISR. For high intensity conflicts, they are organized into or within UAV battalions to provide corps-level reconnaissance. Low intensity service includes routine border surveillance in support of ground operations, much the same way their significant helicopter fleet already operations. They are also used for non-military purposes, such as when the Army is mobilized to perform disaster relief during floods, earthquakes, or snowstorms.<br />
<br />
The Raad-85 is expected to enter NEZAJA service in 2015, following its first tests during the Army's 12/2014 exercises. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">18</span> Once it enters service, the Raad will be tasked with long-range strike missions. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">19</span> This positions them alongside the NEZAJA's rocket artillery (e.g. Nazeats and Zelzals), which itself is a national-level force with a similar range (~100-300 km). Additionally, the NEZAJA is the only one of the Army's branches that will operate suicide UAVs, further widening the conceptual gap between the Raad and – for example – the role of the Air Force's PGMs, or the Navy's ASCMs. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">20 21</span><br />
<br />
Outside of the army, IRGC-GF was documented using a suicide strike variant during the Great Prophet 8 exercises in 02/2013.<br />
<br />
<u>Exports and Foreign Use</u>:<br />
Outside of Iran, the Mohajer-2 is operated by the <a href="http://i.imgur.com/N6bdTzf.jpg">Venezuelan Air Force</a>, where they are known by their local name<a href="http://i.imgur.com/DXtg40e.jpg"> 'Arpia' (Harpy)</a>. They are assigned to the 83rd UAV Squadron, which is part of the 8th ISR Aviation Group based out of the El Libertador Airbase in Maracay. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">22</span><br />
<br />
Venezuela's acquisition of M2s began in 2007 when they inked an agreement with Iran that included UAV production. By 2009, the state-owned company CAVIM began assembling them from knock-down kits ships from Iran. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">23</span> They were first unveiled to the public in 06/2012. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">24</span> By 06/2013, CAVIM claimed to have produced 15 of them. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">25</span> Three have reportedly crashed, leaving about a dozen in service. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">26</span> In addition, an unknown number were delivered to a state-owned oil company – PDVSA – for pipeline inspections. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">27</span><br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAc6YhEGUH_3vNEIt2GZkMPf6ScFSys-PF8PAyJCiDNevBpl2n1nfmAnqA0kIsZd_wYlboa8H-jwjoO_SpLRtep16CK8m7EsqgNUgKvHEk8el3A8Q-Rvg-rWnJT_oTNsltbKaB08GRsiv/s1600/Sant_Arpia_ER-4.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjbAc6YhEGUH_3vNEIt2GZkMPf6ScFSys-PF8PAyJCiDNevBpl2n1nfmAnqA0kIsZd_wYlboa8H-jwjoO_SpLRtep16CK8m7EsqgNUgKvHEk8el3A8Q-Rvg-rWnJT_oTNsltbKaB08GRsiv/s1600/Sant_Arpia_ER-4.jpg" height="194" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A Venezuelan Arpia up close (FAV Club) </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Beyond Venezuela, there are some reports of the Mohajer-2 being sighted over Syria. However, the available imagery is inconclusive, and the M2 cannot be positively identified.<br />
<br />
<u>Recognition Features</u>:<br />
<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4kHa-w2qABscPyoKBaG0yCCApN1k1dsdMys7QUnTLw_AtpTkDndvQ88Nc4d6YKlT50AdoUHeCOews3QTkTQ17BZuHXOIQPk36ViEnZKt0qbyNIc-qGCCdPo000FHunmuYNpQalNmz2TWh/s1600/M2_Refn-a.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4kHa-w2qABscPyoKBaG0yCCApN1k1dsdMys7QUnTLw_AtpTkDndvQ88Nc4d6YKlT50AdoUHeCOews3QTkTQ17BZuHXOIQPk36ViEnZKt0qbyNIc-qGCCdPo000FHunmuYNpQalNmz2TWh/s1600/M2_Refn-a.jpg" height="280" width="400" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj55raWwuIUjUkPwiH7RsjHL47f4UUf1TksQIiFHLDTSUJqkL56ytgly-GIoD_whI7E-e7NfHgeKs1-MRTVCN2V-yQ7FbGF0zIhMebPIzeY3V-5Y0iqlRXrQ_93tkCEWr3kUExu3UMJPYv7/s1600/M2_Refn-b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj55raWwuIUjUkPwiH7RsjHL47f4UUf1TksQIiFHLDTSUJqkL56ytgly-GIoD_whI7E-e7NfHgeKs1-MRTVCN2V-yQ7FbGF0zIhMebPIzeY3V-5Y0iqlRXrQ_93tkCEWr3kUExu3UMJPYv7/s1600/M2_Refn-b.jpg" height="277" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Mohajer-3 (M3) (Dorna)</b>:</span><br />
<br />
<u>Development</u>:<br />
The Mohajer-3 was announced alongside the the Mohajer-2 and 4 in 1999, presumably developed during the mid-90s. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">28</span>. It was supposedly designed as the initial attempt to extend the endurance of the M2. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">29</span> It has not entered production, and was soon superseded by the Mohajer-4<br />
<br />
The M3 is sometimes refered to as the 'Dorna', a reference to the crane bird.|<br />
<br />
<u>Technical Assessment</u>:<br />
The Mohajer-3 is a significant evolution of the Mohajer-2, and is characterized by its larger, squarish fuselage, and a redesigned tail section.<br />
<br />
<b>Specifications</b>:<br />
Speed, Cruise: 180 km/h<br />
Range: 100 km<br />
Endurance: 2-3 hours<br />
<br />
<u>Use</u>:<br />
There is no known operational employment of the Mohajer-3.<br />
<br />
<u>Recognition Features</u>:<br />
<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdUPeC2lhdopLdPovb6U73vk7xFDXdlCNV3XgxO4TTXlDQd1Uld5q3zj-92q_5REYE6RJaUkBYFjqpkRCmX3hTDlibrrrUPuALRhWxOAuPS2JHfHYiGrEGG9nbGNxibW6fbl3eqBOKmTE7/s1600/M3_Refn.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdUPeC2lhdopLdPovb6U73vk7xFDXdlCNV3XgxO4TTXlDQd1Uld5q3zj-92q_5REYE6RJaUkBYFjqpkRCmX3hTDlibrrrUPuALRhWxOAuPS2JHfHYiGrEGG9nbGNxibW6fbl3eqBOKmTE7/s1600/M3_Refn.jpg" height="157" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Mohajer-4 (M4) (Hodhod / Shahin)</b></span> <br />
<u><br />Development</u>:<br />
The Mohajer-4 was first referenced in 1999, when it was discussed alongside the M2 and M3. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">30</span> It was documented photographically by at least 2003, possibly earlier. By the mid-2000s, more than 34 M4s had been produced (19 in ~2005, and 15 in ~2006), out of a total of 253 Mohajer-1/2/3/4s around the same time. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">31</span><br />
<br />
A new generation of M4 was unveiled in 09/2014, but has yet to supplant the current generation. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">32</span><br />
<br />
The M4 is sometimes referred to as the Hodhod, or Shahin. 'Hodhod' is a reference to the crested Hoopoe bird, which resides across Asia, Europe, and Africa, and is present in Persian mythology. 'Shahin' is a translation of 'falcon'. These designations are discussed further below.<br />
<br />
<u>Technical Assessment</u>:<br />
The Mohajer-4 continues the evolutionary path of the M2 and M3. Its larger size and aerodynamic refinements reflect its guiding design consideration: increased range and endurance.<br />
<br />
Physically, the M4 is characterized by a) its square fuselage, and b) wings with a tapered trailing edge, canted wingtip, and a prominent fairing where they join the lower fuselage. Control surfaces are the same and include an elevator on the horizontal stabilizer, rudders on the vertical stabilizers, and ailerons on the wings.<br />
<br />
Although a handful of early examples are powered by different engines, the Mohajer-4 is now uniformly equipped with the 50 hp Limbach L550 four-cylinder two-stroke engine fitted with a pusher prop. The examples equipped with different engines are typically painted in bright colors and lack markings, suggesting they are prototypes belonging to the Qods Company. The <a href="http://i.imgur.com/nUv3vtM.jpg">first </a>of these is powered by an unknown 4-cylinder engine fitted with a carburetor superficially similar to that on the WAE-342. The <a href="http://i.imgur.com/eW7ibzl.jpg">second </a>is fitted with the 38 hp AR-741 rotary engine. The reasoning behind choosing the L550 is opaque and may be due to specific circumstances such as availability. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">33</span> One can speculate that the L550 – despite weighing more, and burning fuel at twice the rate of the 741 – was chosen foremost for its power, which would allow it to carry more fuel.<br />
<br />
The Mohajer-4 is fitted with two antenna, typically arrayed on top of the avionics bay. Although the specifics of the system are unknown, it uses the same three modes found on the M2, which are described above. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">34</span> Since the M4 enjoys a larger payload-capacity, and has more onboard power, it is a reasonable assumption that its functional control range is greater.<br />
<br />
The M4 can be fitted with three different optical payloads: a) a fixed forward-facing camera in the nose for navigation, b) a gimbaled EO-system for surveillance, or c) a fixed downward-facing still camera for aerial surveying. The current-generation M4 can carry either the gimbal or survey camera, but not both. In practice, only daylight cameras have been documented in use. However, the next M4 generation (described below) can carry both types simultaneously, and has been<a href="http://i.imgur.com/j5g3Q3i.jpg"> shown fitted</a> with a multi-channel imager. Even if these imagers were fielded immediately, their relative simplicity and lateness in arriving contrasts to the wide use of more sophisticated payloads in the similarly-sized AB3.<br />
<br />
In 2014, the MoD revealed that the M4 could be equipped for air-defense with two QW-1 MANPADS. Lacking a dedicated system, these QW-1s would function much as they would on the ground. The operator would aline the tube with the target using onboard cameras, relying on the missile's own IR-seekers to acquire the target. Although its easy to see where this could be useful – for example, against a lone helicopter presenting itself as a target of opportunity – this system has not turned the Mohajer into a dedicated interceptor by any means.<br />
<br />
<b>Specifications (Mohajer-4*)</b>: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">35</span><br />
Length: 3.64 m<br />
Wingspan: 5.30 m<br />
Weight, MTOW: 175 kg<br />
Max Speed: 180 km/h<br />
Endurance: 3-5 hours<br />
Ceiling: 4,500 m<br />
Range: 150 km<br />
<br />
* Unknown powerplant fitted to associated model. <br />
<br />
<b>Specifications (Hodhod A/100*)</b>: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">36</span><br />
Length: 3.74 m<br />
Wingspan: 5.3X m (where x=2, 3, or 4)<br />
Weight, MTOW: 210 kg<br />
Speed: 200 km/h<br />
Endurance: 3 hours<br />
Ceiling: 4,500 m<br />
Range: 150 km<br />
<br />
* Shown fitted with rotary engine. See description below.<br />
<br />
<u>Variants</u>:<br />
<br />
<b>Hodhod A/1 [A/100]</b>:<br />
It is unclear whether the 'Hodhod' designation applies to a specific variant with unique characteristics, or something else. One plausible explanation is that it is name used by the IRGC, while another plausible explanation is that it is an M4-variant with slightly different physical specifications.<br />
<br />
Two specific cases have been documented:<br />
<br />
<a href="http://i.imgur.com/zX6bwya.jpg">First</a>, in 09/2010, the designation was applied to a display model fitted with with the AR-741 engine, and painted in a bright red and white paint scheme. The accompanying placard produced by the IRGC included unique specifications that differed from those usually attributed to the M4. Specifically, it claimed that the Hodhod is slightly longer than the M4, has a slightly wider wingspan, has a larger MTOW, and possibly a shorter endurance. Because these differences are inconsistent with the use of the AR-741 in place of the more powerful L550, it is a reasonable working assumption that the 'Hodhod' designation does not refer to a variant powered by this engine. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">37</span> <br />
<br />
<a href="http://i.imgur.com/5T38vfJ.jpg">Second</a>, during a parade in 09/2010, it was applied to two M4s operated by the IRGC. These two were identical to other M4s except for a unique serial format, and – possibly – a new payload bay under the fuselage. Unlike the first case, they were fitted with the L550 and lacked the 'A/1' or 'A/100' suffix in their designation.<br />
<br />
<b>Shahin</b>:<br />
Like the Hodhod, it is unclear whether the 'Shahin' designation refers to a specific variant, or is a service-specific designation.<br />
<br />
The designation was first applied to a <a href="http://i.imgur.com/tuMiAZl.jpg">NEZAJA M4 on parade</a> in 09/2010. By 10/2013, media sources were referring to it as a specific M4 variant, and suggesting – albeit, ambiguously – that it was NEZAJA-specific. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">38</span> This source also noted that the Shahin's MTOW was 230 kg, higher than most descriptions of the M4's MTOW.<br />
<br />
However, this claim is difficult to assess because the media may have based this claim entirely on the 09/2010 imagery, potentially creating a circle of erroneous confirmation based on trust in 'official' sources like Fars and Mashregh News. This is exacerbated by the tendency of most major agencies to copy and paste whole sections from preexisting articles. For example, sections from the 10/2013 article were reproduced in reports ostensibly talking about the Shahin's participation in a 12/2014 exercise, creating the illusion of independent confirmation. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">39</span><br />
<br />
<b>Sadiq / Mohajer-4B</b>:<br />
The Sadiq – or Mohajer-4B <span style="font-size: xx-small;">40</span> – is a significant evolution of the M4 platform that was unveiled during a defense industries <a href="http://i.imgur.com/ad9n7Fh.jpg">exhibition in 08/2014</a>. No performance information is available.<br />
<br />
There is some uncertainty over its designation because they were unveiled alongside two related MoD projects (aerial-survey and air-defense payloads). However, given the payload's parallel use on current generation M4s, it is a reasonable assumption that the M4B is a stand-alone development. It is possible that the 'Sadiq' designation may refer to any M4 equipped with the specific aerial-survey payload.<br />
<br />
Physically, the Mohajer-4B can be recognized by:<br />
- New landing skids<br />
- Wings mounted midway on the fuselage; canted wingtips removed; wider span possible.<br />
- Fuselage reshaped for better nose aerodynamics, and improved engine cooling. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">41</span><br />
- Expanded payload bays can now carry gimbaled and downward-facing cameras at the same time.<br />
- Undetermined payload may be associated with new housing on the bottom fuselage.<br />
<br />
<u>Use</u>:<br />
In Iran, the M4 is employed by the Army and the IRGC for high and low intensity ISR. They are known as the Shahin in the Army's Ground Forces, and appear to be organized similarly to the M2. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">42</span> The Ground Forces have used M4s since at least 2010 and <a href="http://i.imgur.com/mcmwIJ8.jpg">took delivery</a> of a significant number in Fall 2013, emphasizing their use in border security. In November 2014, one of the M4s documented earlier on parade (SN: A041-112) was<a href="http://i.imgur.com/jdZGhFz.png"> downed by the Islamic State</a> during a surveillance flight over Diyala, Iraq. Notably, this particular UAV included a <a href="http://i.imgur.com/wFHR72Z.jpg">tail-boom from a different kit</a> (SN: A041-66), which itself was <a href="http://i.imgur.com/SW3315r.jpg">documented </a>during the 2013 delivery as part of another mixed kit, illustrating the modular nature of the M4's components.<br />
<br />
Although they have not been confirmed in use by the IRIAF, IRIN, or IRIADF, an M4 was shown in the Persian Gulf during 2010's <a href="http://i.imgur.com/UbOJd5g.jpg">Velayat-89 exercise</a>, which is typically associated with the Army's air and naval forces.<br />
<br />
They are also used for maritime surveillance by the IRGC, who have published videos of their M4s documenting the transit of international warships through the Strait of Hormuz. Among other uses, the IRGC also employs them for internal security in places like <a href="http://i.imgur.com/8FaouRA.jpg">Sistan & Baluchistan</a> alongside the force's own Shahed UAVs.<br />
<br />
<u>Exports and Foreign Use</u>:<br />
<br />
Outside of Iran they have been documented in use over Iraq and Syria, though it is not always clear who is operating them. A handful have been reported in flight over Syria since 2012, but these may be misattributed AB3s, which are far more common. However, <a href="http://i.imgur.com/on0Hxl7.jpg">an M4B</a> was shot down over Deir az-Zohr in January 2015 and recovered.<br />
<br />
In Iraq, in addition to the Ground Force's M4 described above, at least two more M4s have been lost in action. The <a href="http://i.imgur.com/uePF0wJ.jpg">first </a>of these was recovered near the city of Samarra in July 2014, and the <a href="http://i.imgur.com/LDyi8UU.jpg">second </a>was recovered near Kirkuk in January 2015. In the second case, the M4 bore no identifying markings, but in the first case carried several Iraqi flag decals.<br />
<br />
<u>Recognition Features</u>:<br />
<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhoM44TfjErMRCgFA7m8omn5yyHHOOt8aoWIUWDWUF9AZEanTWMTkHzXmhPpSqVqeOfywJk4g-RyXPoWsPRG47nZNxfYlJko1J7DqalIeDtTyoINqISDFT1ZcrNuZ0wbx0JcOXFwfCvtZDx/s1600/M4_Refn.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhoM44TfjErMRCgFA7m8omn5yyHHOOt8aoWIUWDWUF9AZEanTWMTkHzXmhPpSqVqeOfywJk4g-RyXPoWsPRG47nZNxfYlJko1J7DqalIeDtTyoINqISDFT1ZcrNuZ0wbx0JcOXFwfCvtZDx/s1600/M4_Refn.jpg" height="440" width="640" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEja1-U_ltX1xpHsR3epX4J_XT5SRJhiBt7THDAE1XJaXD9RmmsHZc8hHo_jsgl2M-S_7jYXoiNPLHT27QlqI1J9oRmjY5wQmHSnF_W8eRNAaWI7i7ov8A8EQMEBsy5PDep50xVNocmr1QpH/s1600/M4B_Refn.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEja1-U_ltX1xpHsR3epX4J_XT5SRJhiBt7THDAE1XJaXD9RmmsHZc8hHo_jsgl2M-S_7jYXoiNPLHT27QlqI1J9oRmjY5wQmHSnF_W8eRNAaWI7i7ov8A8EQMEBsy5PDep50xVNocmr1QpH/s1600/M4B_Refn.jpg" height="426" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Appendix: Documented Airframes and Serials</b>:</span><br />
<br />
<u>Mohajer-2</u>:<br />
MX2-009 (IRGC, Great Prophet 8)<br />
<br />
<u>Mohajer-4</u>:<br />
<br />
A041-44 (09/2011)<br />
A041-63 (04/2009)<br />
A041-65 (09/2013) (NEZAJA)<br />
A041-66 (09/2013) (NEZAJA)<br />
A041-67 (unknown)<br />
A041-80 (2010)<br />
A041-81(?) (04/2010)<br />
A041-90 (12/2014) (NEZASA)<br />
A041-92 (09/2013) (NEZAJA)<br />
A041-108 (09/2013) (NEZAJA)<br />
A041-111 (09/2013) (NEZAJA)<br />
A041-112 (09/2010, 11/2014) (NEZAJA)<br />
<br />
120 (07/2014) (Iraq)<br />
<br />
A041-A/B119 (08/2014) (unknown)<br />
A041-A/B201 (01/2015) (Iraq/unknown)<br />
<br />
TUAV-M4B-08 (SDW 2010)<br />
<br />
<u>Mohajer-4B</u>:<br />
P062A-007 (M4B) (Syria/unknown)<span style="font-size: large;"><b><br /><br />Footnotes / Works Cited</b>:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">1) There is a handful of imagery, which shows an M1 being recovered by parachute, that appears to be genuine.<br />2) Image gallery and additional information about the movie available at <a href="http://www.sourehcinema.com/Title/Title.aspx?id=138109201495">Soureh Cinema</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/we-got-our-hands-on-a-bootleg-of-irans-weird-drone-movie-1d434ac7348a%20">War is Boring</a><br />3) <i>Past and Current UAS Activities in Iran</i>. UAS Yearbook 2009.<br />4) ibid UAS Yearbook, 2009<br />5) <i>A Look at the Role of the Mohajer and Tallash in Karbala-5 and Valfajr-8</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/69193/%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C-5-%D9%88-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-8%20">Mashregh News.</a> 10/11/2011<br />6) <i>Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988</i>. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop. Schiffer Military History. 2000. p.196, 235<br />7) The original source for this claim has since been lost, and may only be apocryphal.<br />8) Cooper and Bishop, 2000. p.196<br />9) <i>Iran Exhibits Advanced Aircraft and Drones</i>. IRIB. 07/19/1999.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"> Summary archived at: Iran Missile Chronology. <a href="http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/iran_missile.pdf?_=1316474223">NTI</a>. 08/2011.<br />10) It is very likely that the M2 appeared in earlier exhibitions, including Kish 2002, but the lack of currently available imagery from these events makes it impossible to confirm at this point.<br />11) <i>DM: Raad and Nazir are two aircraft with offensive power and maneuverability … [unclear] </i><a href="http://isna.ir/fa/news/8811-11309/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%BE%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%20">ISNA</a>. 02/08/2011<br />12) <i>Saeqeh and Toofan for the Enemies; Sofreh Mahi for Future Generations</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/71119/%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%87-%D9%88-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3">Mashregh News</a>. 10/19/2011<br />13) <i>Production of the Raad-85 Suicide UAV in the Army Ground Forces</i>. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4571371/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%AF-85-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4">YJC</a>. 09/28/2013.<br />14) <i>Commander: Iranian Ground Force's Drones Make 150 Flights in 1 Year</i>. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920706001281">FNA</a>. 09/28/2013<br />15)<i> Targeting at 250 km with Suicide UAVs</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=9e502e41-366d-4882-8d93-e2bd672d3003&WebPartID=efd1d971-a6f9-4a65-bafe-817d074f072a&ID=50a5217a-d0af-4e97-8946-beebdf1d143b">AJA</a>. 12/2014.<br />16) It is assumed that two different practices are used when describing the respective ranges of reconnaissance and suicide UAVs. The 250 km one-way range of Raad is close to the M2N's 300 km one-way range, allowing for extra payload weight.<br />17) It is possible that this documentation is only a reflection of circumstances, and do not reflect the actual distribution of equipment.<br />18) <i>Suicide UAVs Used for the First Time in the Mohammed Rasoolallah Exercise</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=9e502e41-366d-4882-8d93-e2bd672d3003&WebPartID=efd1d971-a6f9-4a65-bafe-817d074f072a&ID=5f3fc97d-0638-4fa9-af77-a7951fa1aba7">AJA</a>. Date Unknown, 12/2012 suspected.<br />19)<i> NEZAJA's UAV Group's Fleets Ready to Enter Asymmetric Battle Space</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=9e502e41-366d-4882-8d93-e2bd672d3003&WebPartID=efd1d971-a6f9-4a65-bafe-817d074f072a&ID=ea4e28af-9826-42eb-84ed-4a2a678ac5a5">AJA</a>. Date unknown, Fall 2013 suspected.<br />20) <i>Using Suicide UAVs in the Army's Exercise</i>. <a href="http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/page/1942306/%D8%A8%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C+%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C+%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C+%D8%AF%D8%B1+%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4+%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4+.html">IRDiplomacy</a>. 12/25/2014<br />21) <i>Suicide with the Yasir; the NEZAJA's [RQ-7 Shadow]</i>. <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/610287">Tasnim News</a>. 01/06/2015<br />22) http://www.fav-club.com/qods-aeronautics-industries-mohajer-2-cavim-sant-arpia/<br />23) A handful of current and former CAVIM employees with profiles on LinkedIn list work experience relating to the Mohajer beginning in 2009.<br />24) <i>Venezuela-Iran UAVs</i>. Jeffrey Lewis. <a href="http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5390/venezuela-iran-uavs">Arms Control Wonk</a>. 06/12/2012<br />25) http://www.fav-club.com/qods-aeronautics-industries-mohajer-2-cavim-sant-arpia/<br />26)<i> Iranian Mohajer-2 Drone Appears in Venezuela. Chavez's Building His Own Drone Fleet with the Help of Tehran</i>. <a href="http://theaviationist.com/2012/06/12/venezuela-mohajer-2/">The Aviationist</a>. 06/12/2012.<br />27) ibid CAVIM employees' LinkedIn profiles.<br />28) ibid IRIB, 1999<br />29) <i>The Mohajer 3 and 4 [Mark] Iran's Entry Into the Major League of UAVs</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/70051/%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B13-%D9%88-4-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%BE%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3%20">Mashregh News</a>. 10/10/2011<br />30) ibid IRIB, 1999<br />31) Official production data presented during public expo in mid-2000s. Via MATF<br />32) <i>Mohajer and Misagh; a Combination That Will Break Any Evil Intentions</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/347932/%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A8%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3">Mashregh News</a>. 09/23/2014<br />33) Around the same time period (late-90s/early-00s), the AB2 was advertised with a rotary engine as well, but has only ever been produced with the two-stroke WAE-342. Only more recently has the rotary AR-741 begun to show up as the standard engine in some of the smaller Shahed-series.<br />34) <i>The Most Famous Iranian UAV Family Documented Again / Mohajers Looking for Air Targets</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930701000976%20">FNA</a>. 09/23/2014.<br />35) MATF, SDW 2011<br />36) Mohammed Hussein, SDW 2010. HT @ AminCo at IMF<br />37) Although, as a general rule, 2-stroke engines consume less fuel and are offer less power for their size and weight than rotary engines, the L550's greater power (50 hp vs 38 hp) flips these characteristics. This means that one would expect to see this 'Hodhod' (which is fitted with the 38 hp AR-741) have a lower MTOW, and longer endurance.<br />38) <i>The Heavy Shadow of the “Shahin” on the Borders / Eyes that See Blind Spots</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920707001101">FNA</a>. 10/19/2013.<br />39) <i>Shahin Flight; Heaviest NEZAJA UAV in the Big Army Exercise</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13931004000659">FNA</a>. 12/25/2014<br />40) The notional designation is based off a) the explicit labeling of this UAV as a “Mohajer-4”, combined with b) the unique characteristics distinguishing it from current-generation M4s. The specific origin of the “-4B” designation is a poster displayed in the mid-2000s showing the progress of various projects being undertaken by the Qods Company. One such project was the Mohajer-4B, whose development was reportedly 95% complete.<br />41) ibid Mashregh News, 09/23/2014<br />42) ibid FNA, 10/19/2013</span><!--10-->Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-47251333417026908332015-02-20T21:25:00.001-08:002015-02-20T23:05:06.537-08:00Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Overview</b></span>: <br />
Iran's current Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics was created in 1989 by the Rafsanjani government in a bid to streamline and centralize the military's procurement system. In this restructuring, the parallel ministries tasked with wartime logistics – the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the IRGC – were folded into one another, doing away with the worst of the wasteful duplication, and compartmentalization.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 1 </span><br />
<br />
Today, MODAFL is responsible for providing logistical support to the Armed Forces, and for managing the associated military industries. Specifically, their responsibilities are:<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 2 </span><br />
- Production and manufacture of new equipment. <br />
- Maintenance of existing equipment.<br />
- Coordination of intra and inter-service research under unified oversight.<br />
- Foreign purchases. <br />
<br />
Unlike other defense ministries around the world, the MODAFL is NOT responsible for shaping defense policy. Instead, this authority flows to the IRGC and Army from the Armed Forces General Staff, which is also responsible for directing the MODAFL's research and production. <br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsrxCCy946XBCA3pnDlzk8609iIPeBgu3qXr7nbs1_bZKYYPHp1lU3iW_3ryyZAyy3f_2CA8bYQdLbVUOZkmRLACOOmeWsyf2sYoiaqAREbKOijRgfeJe45bmkozv-pxlUf77GSJGGSo6M/s1600/Export_Draw_MoD+Organization.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsrxCCy946XBCA3pnDlzk8609iIPeBgu3qXr7nbs1_bZKYYPHp1lU3iW_3ryyZAyy3f_2CA8bYQdLbVUOZkmRLACOOmeWsyf2sYoiaqAREbKOijRgfeJe45bmkozv-pxlUf77GSJGGSo6M/s1600/Export_Draw_MoD+Organization.jpg" height="364" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Organization, MODAFL (click to enlarge)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsdJei-dRLr4cR6BoHVKZg-PDk7HGn3C1fhg20iKYd95AXHkHB0brR_xHJK4pqWxTdKgEZ6hl4HXxERhi8JiUnf640yUGkcz5BkMS-fuk4IIfJxbtaw9BX7ljvB8dJe3QmuoMwakMvYvcO/s1600/Export_Draw_MoD+Personnel.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsdJei-dRLr4cR6BoHVKZg-PDk7HGn3C1fhg20iKYd95AXHkHB0brR_xHJK4pqWxTdKgEZ6hl4HXxERhi8JiUnf640yUGkcz5BkMS-fuk4IIfJxbtaw9BX7ljvB8dJe3QmuoMwakMvYvcO/s1600/Export_Draw_MoD+Personnel.jpg" height="278" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Personnel, MODAFL (click to enlarge)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Staff / Personnel</b></span>: <br />
It is reasonable to assume the ministry's staff is organized into a body equivalent to an 'office of the minister of defense', which includes various deputies who direct and coordinate the ministry's subordinate industries. <br />
<br />
<u>Minister of Defense</u>: <br />
The ministry is currently headed by BG Hossein Deghan (IRGC), who was appointed in 08/2013 under the Rouhani government. Deghan is often portrayed as a compromise candidate with ties to all major political factions, who was chosen after Rouhani's initial pick – Hossein Alaei (IRGC) <span style="font-size: xx-small;">3</span> – was rejected. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">4</span> This is plausible given his history since 1979, which would have put him into contact with core IRGC personnel, as well as other perennial heavyweights like Shamkhani and Larijani.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 5 </span><br />
<br />
According to his official biography, he has held command positions since the Revolution, including:<br />
<br />
- His time in the field spans spans six years (1980-1986), and includes: commander, Tehran IRGC (1980-1982); commander, IRGC in Lebanon and Syria (1982-1984); commander, IRGC's Sarallah Operations HQ in Tehran (1984-1986). <br />
<br />
- His time as a general-staff commander spans spans 10 years (1988-1996), and includes: deputy commander, IRGC-AF (1986-1990); commander, IRGC-AF (1990-1992); deputy head, IRGC-GS (1992-1996). <br />
<br />
- His time in management and government positions spans nearly two decades (1996-present), and includes: director, IRGC's Cooperative Foundation (1996-1997); deputy defense minister under Shamkhani (1997-2003); senior advisor to DM Shamkhani (2003-2004); deputy head of the Veterans Affairs Foundation (2004-2009); deputy head and secretary to the Center of Defensive Strategic Studies (2009-2010); head of Expediency Council's Political, Military, and Security Commission (2010), adviser to the Majlis Speaker, Ali Larijani (2010). <br />
<br />
<u>Deputy Minister of Defense</u>: <br />
The current deputy minister is BG Amir Hatami (Army), who was appointed in 11/2013 under the Rouhani government. Prior to this, he was the deputy head of AFGS's HQ and Joint-Affairs Department for around two years under MG Mohammed Bagheri (IRGC).<span style="font-size: xx-small;">6</span> Prior to this, he served as the AFGS's manpower deputy through at least 2011.<span style="font-size: xx-small;">7</span> <br />
<br />
<u>Deputy, Coordination</u>: <br />
Believed to be equivalent to a chief-of-staff, this position is currently held by BG Nasrallah Ezzati (Army).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 8 </span><br />
<br />
BG Ezzati has also been described as the MODAFL's manpower deputy. It is unclear if he holds both positions separately, or if there is some other explanation. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">9 </span><br />
<br />
<u>Deputy, International-Affairs, Communications, and Defense Research</u>: <br />
The identity of the current deputy is unknown, but as of 2012 the position was held by BG2 Nasrallah Kalantai (IRGC).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 10 11 </span><br />
<br />
When BG Vahidi held the position 2003-2005, it was known as the “deputy for plans and programs, and international affairs”. The significance of the change in nomenclature is unknown.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 12 </span><br />
<br />
<u>Deputy, Industrial Affairs and Research</u>: <br />
It is unclear who holds this position. Media articles simultaneously give the title to Mohammed Eslami (IRGC). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">13</span> and BG Mehdi Farahi (IRGC). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">14</span> One difference is that Eslami is described as the deputy to the minis<b>ter</b>, while Farahi is described as the deputy to the minis<b>try</b>. <br />
<br />
Before being appointed to his current position in 11/2014, BG Farahi directed the AIO. <br />
<br />
<u>Deputy, Legal and Majlis Affairs</u>: <br />
BG2 Reza Tallaei-Nik (IRGC), appointed in 08/2013, holds this position.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 15 </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Subsidiaries</b></span>:<br />
<br />
<u>Defense Industries Organization (DIO / SASAD)</u>: <br />
The DIO is responsible for the MODAFL's general industrial production, which includes equipment that doesn't fall under the specialized air and naval industries described below. It is currently directed by BG2 Qasim Taqizadeh (IRGC).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 16 17</span><br />
<br />
The organization is composed of six or seven groups*: which in turn are comprised of 30+ distinct 'industries' that reflect further specialization (e.g. the VEIG's 'armor industries'). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">18 19 </span><br />
<br />
These groups are: <br />
- Armament Industries Group (AIG)* - Produces mortar tubes, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, guns, and howitzers.<br />
- Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) – Produces ammunition for guns and cannons, field artillery, and mortars. <br />
- Chemical Industries Group (CIG) – Produces propellants and explosives. <br />
- Individual Combat Industries Group (ICIG)* - Produces small arms and ammunition <br />
- Rocket Industries Group (RIG) – Produces artillery rockets (107mm-333mm), and RPGs.<br />
- Vehicle and Equipment Industries Group (VEIG) – Produces vehicles including tanks, APCs, trucks, and bulldozers, as well equipment like trailers and fire-control upgrades.<br />
- Special Industries Group (SIG) – Produces miscellaneous equipment such as CBW gear, uniforms, and stoves. <br />
<br />
* The ICIG may be associated with the AIG; DIO brochures indicate it's a distinct group, MODAFL brochures lump them together. <br />
<br />
<u>Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)</u>: <br />
The AIO is responsible for missile development. It is currently headed by Mehrdad Ekhlaghi, who was appointed to the position in 11/2014, and about whom little is known. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">20 21</span> It's deputy director is BG2 Abdul-Karim Bani-Turuf. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">22</span><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span><br />
Although less is known about the AIO's subsidiaries and their responsibilities, those bodies that can be identified include: <br />
- Samen Alaeme Industries Group – May produce naval weapons, including torpedoes. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">23 24 25</span><br />
- Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG) – Produces solid-fuel ballistic missiles, including Nazeat and Zelzal. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">26 27 </span><br />
- Shahid Hemmet Industries Group (SHIG) – Produces liquid-fuel ballistic missiles. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">28 29</span><br />
- Ya Mahdi Industries Group – Produces guided missiles, such as ATGMs. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">30 31</span><br />
- Shahid Babaie Industries – Associated with SAM development.<br />
- Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industries Group – Associated with SAM Development. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">32 </span><br />
- Shahid Mallati Industries Group<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 33</span> <br />
- Fajr Industries Group<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 34</span><br />
- Sanam Industries Group <span style="font-size: xx-small;">35</span><br />
- Other entities mentioned in one form or another include the Parchin Missile Industries, Shahid Motahari Industries, and the Shahid Shahabadi Industries.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 36</span> <br />
<br />
<u>Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)</u>: <br />
Responsible for aircraft production and support, the IAIO is currently directed by Manoucher Manteghi. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">37</span><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span>It is also known as the 'AIO', but the acronym 'IAIO' is typically used to distinguish it from the Aerospace Industries Organization. <br />
<br />
Subsidiaries include:<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 38 39 </span><br />
- Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI/SAHA) – Founded and 1970 and based in Tehran, the IACI is responsible for major overhauls of civilian and military aircraft. Also responsible for producing components necessary for repair, including engines. <br />
- Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Company (IAMI/HESA) – Founded in 1964, and based in Isfahan, the IAMI is responsible for manufacturing new aircraft. <br />
- Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (IHSRC/PANHA) – Founded in 1969 and based in Tehran, the IHSRC is responsible for major overhauls of civilian and military helicopters. <br />
- Qods Aviation Industry – Founded in 1985 and based in Tehran, the Qods Industries is responsible for much of Iran's UAV production. <br />
- Shahid Basir Research Center <br />
<br />
<u>Naval/Marine Industries Organization</u>: <br />
Comparable to the IAIO, the Marine Industries Organization is sometimes incorrectly described as a DIO subsidiary, the 'Marine Industries Group'. <br />
<br />
It was founded in 1986 and is responsible for producing small fiberglass patrol boats, submarines, and larger ships such as the Sina missile boat, and the Mowj frigates, as well as a handful of civilian craft like tugboats and ferries. <br />
<br />
It is currently directed by BG Amir Rastegari (Army).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 40 </span><br />
<br />
<u>Iran Electronics Industry Company (IEI / SAIRAN)</u>: <br />
Alternately described as a 'company' or an 'organization', the IEI is responsible for producing radios, radars, jammers and other networking systems, as well as periscopes, weapon-sights, and other optics. It's current director is unknown. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">41</span> <br />
<br />
Subsidiaries include: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">42 </span>- Shiraz Electronics Industry (SEI/SA Shiraz)<br />
- Iran Communications Industry (ICI/SAMA)<br />
- Iran Information Systems Company (ISI/IS Iran)<br />
- Iran Electronic Components Industry Company (ECI/SAQA)<br />
- Isfahan Optics Industry Company (IOI/SAPA)<br />
- Iran Electronics Research Center (IERC) <br />
<br />
<u>Armed Forces Social Security Organization</u>: <br />
Responsible for an overwhelming – yet typically unseen – share of Iran's overall defense expenditure.<br />
<br />
It is currently directed by BG Hossein Daqiqi (IRGC).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 43 </span><br />
<br />
<u>National Geography Organization (NGO)</u>: <br />
Responsible for mapping and surveying, the NGO is currently headed by Mehdi Modri. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">44</span> <br />
<br />
<u>Energy Resource Development Organization</u>:<br />
Currently directed by Seyyed Majid Hedayat. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">45</span> <br />
<br />
<u>Cooperation Bonyad</u>: <br />
Although the specific responsibilities of this foundation are unknown, bonyads generally serve as investment vehicles for the associated organization. <br />
<br />
It is currently directed by BG/BG2 Said Rafi'ei (Army).<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> 46</span> <br />
<br />
<u>Armed Forces Medical Service</u>: <br />
Currently directed by BG2 Najafipour (Army). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">47 </span><u><br /><br />Malek Ashtar University</u>: <br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>Footnotes</b>:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">1) Military Industries in the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment of the Defense Industries Organization. John Shields. USAF. 05/1996. p.7 <br />2) Shields, 1996. p.8 <br />3) Alaei fell out of favor with other high-level IRGC commanders after he criticized Khamenei's response to the 2009 unrest. He has since recanted, but remains tainted. IRGC Command Network. The IRGC Command Network: Formal Structures and Informal Influence. Will Fulton. AEI. 07/2013. p.19 <br />4) Rouhani's Cautious Pick for Defense Minister. Will Fulton. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/rouhanis-cautious-pick-for-defense-minister.html">Al-Monitor</a>. 08/07/2013<br />5) <a href="http://www.dolat.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Serv=6&Id=230015">Dolat.ir</a><br />6) Amir Hatemi Became Deputy Defense Minister. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4617286/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%AF">YJC</a>. 11/03/2013. <br />7) All Soldiers in Kermanshah Given Added Service. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&CategoryID=f7d36395-588c-496a-983f-379f6fcae43f&LayoutID=c997cbc2-e1fb-4ffc-9360-99122e25e385&ID=f0479007-9ead-4a31-a50a-b120d3f5dd7b">AJA</a>. 10/20/2011 <br />8) <a href="http://basijpress.ir/fa/news-details/37233/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B4-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%7C-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA/">Basij Press</a><br /> 9) Honorable Youth Are Always Ready to Sacrifice on the Holy Path of the Islamic Republic of Iran. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C/3508-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF.html">Defa News</a>. 02/16/2015 <br /> 10) The MoD's Dep't of Communication and Defense Studies Congratulated Fars News on its Anniversary. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8912181253">FNA</a>. 03/09/2011 <br /> 11) Red Cross to Expand Cooperation with Red Crescent in Iran. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/news/1637093/%D8%B5%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AF">Mehr News</a>. 06/27/2012. <br /> 12) Gen. Ahmed Vahidi. <a href="http://mod.ir/content/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%BE-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AD%DB%8C%D8%AF%DB%8C">MoD</a>. <br /> 13) Deputy Minister: Thanks to Sanctions, We Have Become Self-Sufficient in the field of Satellites. <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/644726">Tasnim News</a>. 02/05/2015 <br /> 14) Aerospace Industry is the Nucleus of the Country. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81499931/">IRNA</a>. 02/09/2015 <br /> 15) Reza Tallaei-Nik Became the MoD Deputy for Legal and Majlis Affairs. <a href="http://www3.mashhad.irna.ir/fa/News/80797853/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C/%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7_%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C_%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9_%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3_%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA_%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D8%B4%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 09/01/2013. <br /> 16) <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9/2916-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C.html">Defa News </a><br />17) <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9/2907-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF.html">Defa News</a> <br />18) <a href="http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/9001-12375/%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B261-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%98%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1">ISNA</a>. 04/18/2011 <br />19) The ICIG appears to be a recent creation, perhaps broken off the AIG post-2011. <br /> 20) <a href="http://www.ilna.ir/news/news.cfm?id=222500">ILNA</a>. 11/12/2014 <br /> 21) <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930821000229">FNA</a>. 11/12/2014 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">22) <a href="http://defapress.ir/Fa/News/41398">Defa Press</a>. 02/20/2015. <br />23) Minister of Defense Visits Samen Alaeme Industries Group. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7/2746-1393-05-22-10-19-10.html">Defa News</a>. 08/08/2014 <br />24) <a href="http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/hoot.pdf">FAS</a>. <br />25) ibid Defa News, 08/08/201</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">26) Top SBIG Commanders Visit Ayatollah Hashemi. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7/3272-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%85%DB%8C.html">Defa News</a>.11/03/2014</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">27) Iranian Missile Entity Interest In Purchasing Mercedes Benz Vehicles. <a href="http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE5439_a.html">Wikileaks</a>. 01/17/2008 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">28) The Iranian Revolution is a Pattern for the Islamic Awakening. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7/2439-1391-12-23-07-23-49.html">Defa News</a>. 04/13/2014</span><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">29) Iranian Procurement Entities Non-Paper Delivered At March 1 U.S.-UAE Counterproliferation Task Force. <a href="https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUDHABI493_a.html">Wikileaks</a>. 04/22/2007. <br />30) Unknown Aspects of the Imposed War, Such as Science, [To Be] Taught. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7/3270-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AF%D9%8A%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF.html">Defa News</a>. 11/01/2014. </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />31) ibid Wikileaks, 04/22/2007. <br />32) UNSCR 1929. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf">IAEA</a>. 06/09/2010. </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;">33) NEZAJA Commanders Visit Shahid Mellati Industries Group. <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7/3426-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C.html">Defa News</a>. 12/14/2014 </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />34) UNSCR 1737. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf">IAEA</a>. 12/27/2006.</span> <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">35) UNSCR 1747. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf">IAEA</a>. 03/24/2007</span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />36) <a href="http://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/aerospace-industries-organization-aio">Iran Watch</a>.</span> <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">37) Iran's Saeqeh-2 Fighter to be Unveiled Soon. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2483696/%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%87-%DB%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">Mehr News</a>. 02/02/2015 </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />38) Subordinate Organizations. <a href="http://mod.ir/content/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C">Ministry of Defense</a>. </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1620264550074013695&pli=1#sdfootnote39anc">39</a> Aviation Section. <a href="http://www.mindexcenter.ir/products-category/aviation">MoD Export Center</a>. </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1620264550074013695&pli=1#sdfootnote40anc">40</a> <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/12/16/340297/iran-able-to-design-build-submarines/">PressTV</a>.</span> <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">41) <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930410001034">FNA</a>. <br />42) Iran Electronics Industry Company. <a href="http://mod.ir/content/%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%AA-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86">MoD</a>.<br /> </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;">43) <a href="http://mod.ir/content/%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF">MoD</a>. 02/09/2015 </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1620264550074013695&pli=1#sdfootnote44anc">44</a> <a href="http://www.ncc.org.ir/DesktopModules/News/NewsView.aspx?TabID=1&Site=nccportal&Lang=fa-IR&ItemID=830&mid=14288&wVersion=Staging">NCC </a>05/26/2014 </span> <span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />45) <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-17-03/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86/3157-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-1404-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B2-5-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF.html">Defa News</a>. 11/05/2014. <br />46) <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81228515/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C/%DA%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9%20_%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C_%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C_%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA_%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF_%D9%85%DB%8C_%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 07/07/2014. <br />47) <a href="http://defanews.ir/index.php/2014-06-13-16-54-43/%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9/2729-1393-05-13-06-33-43.html">Defa News</a>. 08/04/2014 </span><!--12-->Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-3242005983588728842015-01-19T15:32:00.000-08:002015-11-28T02:10:49.449-08:00Army Aviation AirbasesIran's Army Ground Forces (NEZAJA) includes a substantial rotary-wing aviation component commonly known as the Havanirooz. The hundreds of Bell helicopters purchased during the 70s and the facilities built to operate and maintain them still form the backbone of the service. Today, they are tasked with supporting the NEZAJA's corp-level headquarters with attack and air-transport capabilities (the latter including airborne assault, and logistics).<br />
<br />
The Havanirooz falls under the authority of the NEZAJA's central command.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> (1)</span> However, it is assessed with high confidence that their constituent elements are also operationally subordinate to the NEZAJA's regional headquarters. <br />
<br />
The force's current commander is BG2 Houshang Yari, who has held this position since September 2011. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(2)</span> Prior to his appointment, he was the force's deputy commander. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(3)</span> The staff headquarters is located in Tehran, within the NEZAJA HQ.<br />
<br />
Below this, the Havanirooz's staff-level organization is unclear. Unlike the Army's and IRGC's distinct branches, whose staff is relatively predictable (e.g. operations, personnel, etc), very little in the way of open source reporting exists for Army Aviation. The one exception to this is the force's Research and Self-Sufficiency body, which is alternately described as a “department” <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(4)</span>, or an “office” (a level below “department”). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(5)</span> At any rate, reporting on this body is scant.<br />
<br />
Under the Havanirooz's staff are upwards of nine bases of varying size. The largest of these are sometimes referred to in English reports as combat or support 'groups'. Generally, 'group' is used by the NEZAJA to refer to a brigade-sized combat support unit, such as – for instance – the 33rd Artillery Group. Although this term is almost never used in reference to the Havanirooz today, they are consistently used to describe the same bases during the war, suggesting that the concept of equating each base to an aviation brigade remains sound.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgHLV8MJTEvtNcZG9V-1IhWkgpuZn9BOs6cuXViVVGG9-cypGcSW5xe8e5O7k1GnUExZvucbsFF_Wmrem6ZVHii7YSF74O5avFlL2qB9dsgx1VqZqfBsKn6Zif0xO2ePJnvtzVZgECWpU8/s1600/Overview+GEOINT_Export.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="326" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgHLV8MJTEvtNcZG9V-1IhWkgpuZn9BOs6cuXViVVGG9-cypGcSW5xe8e5O7k1GnUExZvucbsFF_Wmrem6ZVHii7YSF74O5avFlL2qB9dsgx1VqZqfBsKn6Zif0xO2ePJnvtzVZgECWpU8/s1600/Overview+GEOINT_Export.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: large;">Aviation Bases</span></b>:<br />
<br />
<u>1st Combat Airbase (Kermanshah)</u>:<br />
This group is commanded by BG2 Yusef Qorbani, who has held this position since at least June 2010 when he was still a Col. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(6) (7)</span> As of December 2012, the base's deputy commander was Ali Heydar Zaraei. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(8)</span><br />
<br />
This base is co-located with the Kermanshah Airport. <br />
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<u>2nd 'Shahid Asayee' Combat Airbase (Masjed-e Suleiman)</u>:<br />
This group is commanded by Col. Heshmataollah Azadifar, who was appointed in November 2014. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(9)</span> Previously, he was the base's deputy commander.<br />
<br />
<u>3rd Combat Airbase (Kerman)</u>:<br />
This group is commanded by Col. Gaeini, who was appointed in December 2011. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(10)</span> Previously, he was the base's deputy commander since ~2005/2006.<span style="font-size: xx-small;">(11)</span><br />
<br />
This base is co-located with the Kerman Airport. <br />
<br />
A contingent from this group is deployed from to an unnamed base in Zahedan to support internal security operations in the south-east region. This base is co-located with the Zahedan airport. <br />
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<u>4th Combat and Support Base (Isfahan)</u>:<br />
This group is commanded by BG2 Nurbakhesh Bagheri, who was appointed in November 2011. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(12) (13)</span> Previously, he served as the commander of the Havanirooz's nearby training center at Shahid Vatanpour Airbase. <br />
<br />
This base has been described as the Havanirooz's largest and most important base. It is co-located with the IRGC's Badr Airbase. <br />
<br />
<u>5th Combat Airbase (Mashhad)</u>: (<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2015/11/iriaa-airbases-5th-combat-group.html">main article</a>, 11/2015)<br />
This group is commanded by Col. Abdulreza Khodadi. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(14)</span> Along with the Tabriz airbase, it is one of the Havanirooz's smaller combat bases.<br />
<br />
The base is co-located with the Mashhad airport. <br />
<br />
<u>6th Combat Airbase (Tabriz)</u>:<br />
This group is commanded by Col. Maqsoudi. Along with the Mashhad airbase, it is one of the Havanirooz's smaller combat bases.<br />
<br />
The base is adjacent to the Tabriz Airport.<br />
<br />
<u>Abyek Airbase (Abyek)</u>:<br />
This airbase was formed when the Ghale Morghi base in Tehran was closed down around 2011, and some of it's personnel and equipment were transferred here. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(15)</span> Abyek is not a combat airbase. <br />
<br />
This airbase is co-located with the Army's central equipment depot. <br />
<br />
<u>Mehrabad Airbase (Tehran)</u>:<br />
When Ghale Morghi was closed, a number of fixed-wing aircraft were transferred to the Havanirooz's pre-existing facilities co-located with Mehrabad Airport. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(16)</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: large;">Training Centers</span></b>:<br />
<br />
<u>Shahid Vatanpour Airbase (Isfahan)</u>:<br />
The forces primary training center, this base is currently commanded by Col. Mojtabi Rouhani, who was appointed in May 2014. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(17)</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Industry</b></span>:<br />
<br />
<u>Ya Ali Industrial Center (Isfahan)</u>:<br />
Subordinate to the Havanirooz's Self-Sufficincy Jihad, the exact location is unknown. It is possible that it is co-located with the HESA facilities in Shahin Shahr. <br />
<br />
<u>PANHA</u>:<br />
The Havanirooz are closely affiliated with, but organizationally distinct from, the Iranian Helicopter Repair and Support Company (PANHA), which falls under the authority of the Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO). <br />
<br />
PANHA is responsible for depot-level repair and maintenance. <br />
<br />
It's current head is BG2 Mohammed-Ali Ahmed-Abadi. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(18)</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Other</b></span>:<br />
<br />
<u>Hazrat Vali Asr UAV Group</u>:<br />
Responsible for operating the Havanirooz's UAVs, little is known about the organization of this group. Its location, if it is centrally located at all, is unknown. It's current commander is Col. Reza Khaki. <br />
<br />
For further reading, see Adam Rawnsley's recent piece on them. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">(19)</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b>Footnotes</b>:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">1) <i>Translation - Iranian Army Ground Forces (NEZAJA) Organization Charts</i>. <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/02/translation-iranian-army-ground-forces.html">The Arkenstone</a>. 02/26/2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">2) <i>New Havanirooz Commander Appointed</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/66360/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%AF">Mashregh News</a>. 09/12/2011. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">3) <i>Havanirooz Commander: The Role of the Havanirooz in the Sacred Defense Epic</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=810a7911-4eb3-4cfd-a13c-5e59f996ecd9&WebPartID=a7489094-03eb-46f3-ad94-5ffcc14c0291&ID=909547ee-0791-4f9a-a3ad-0f63d7f9265b">AJA</a>. Date Unknown.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">4) <i>All Havanirooz Bases Equipped with Simulators</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13900630000846">FNA</a>. 09/21/2011.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">5)<i> News Meeting Held with Army Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Officials</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&CategoryID=b8789b0b-9886-4e12-94fb-8ecaaa0f102e&WebPartID=8f4ea065-6385-42a4-b57e-87b7304cd4ba&ID=827dfbee-5821-4a46-9c34-e482436d7efb">AJA</a>. 09/23/2014</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">6) May 2014 exercise photography.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">7) <i>Reconstruction of 5 Helicopters by the Kermanshah Havanirooz, Havanirooz Commander: The Havanirooz is Always Ready to Protect the Water and Land</i>. <a href="http://isna.ir/fa/news/8903-12296/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A-5-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87">ISNA</a>. 06/09/2010.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">8) <i>The Shahid Fahmideh Center for Innovation and Scientific Collaboration Opened in Kermanshah</i>. <a href="http://isna.ir/fa/news/91091508029/%D9%85%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%B2-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A2%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%87%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87">ISNA</a>. 12/05/12</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">9) <i>[Change] in the Masjed-e Suleiman Havanirooz</i>. <a href="http://cjmis.ir/?p=11127">cjmis</a>. 11/26/14.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">10)<i> Commander of the Havanirooz Base in Kerman Appointed</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13900910000684">FNA</a>. 12/01/2011</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">11) <i>Interview with the Commander of the Kerman Havanirooz Base</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=b8789b0b-9886-4e12-94fb-8ecaaa0f102e&WebPartID=dec2520c-2881-448a-a61c-15883a9d5fd8&ID=5d611f2d-8daa-4dc8-9542-f2296d86e3b9">AJA</a>. Date Unknown.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">12) <i>Emergency-Rescue Helicopters Dispatched to Eight Emergencies</i><a href="http://www.emszabol.blogfa.com/post-311.aspx">. EMS Zabol Blogfa</a>. 11/23/2011.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">13) <i>Memories of the Imposed War According to the Commander of the Isfahan Havanirooz</i>. <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/9Day/Single/341822">Tasnim News</a>. 04/18/2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">14) <i>Two Overhauled Helicopters Returned to the Havanirooz Fleet in Mashhad</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81210850/%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1/%D8%AF%D9%88__%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF_%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C_%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87">IRNA</a>. 06/22/2014. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">15) <i>The Havanirooz Has Today Reached a Stage of Development in Which They Don't Require Assistance from Any Country to Repair Helicopters</i>. <a href="http://aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=9ce0ffff-6667-4cc8-8cc7-7d8be06f03e4&WebPartID=2e7955f8-26ce-4f17-8474-d27311d970c3&ID=0cef8172-9d6b-4edc-b4e8-d1a2a8537f57">AJA</a>. 06/08/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">16) <i>What Aircraft are the Commanders Riding in?</i> <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910119000882">FNA</a>. 10/15/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">17) <i>Ceremony Held for the Introduction of Havanirooz's Training Center's Command</i>. <a href="http://www.shabestan.ir/detail/News/370983">Shabestan</a>. 05/26/2014</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">18) <i>Three-Fold Increase in Helicopter Firepower / Work in America with Iranian Certificate / Delivery of 20 Helicopters during Sacred Defense Week</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930422000599">FNA</a>. 09/06/2014 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">19) <i>The Artesh Ground Forces Vali-e-Asr Drone Group (Updated)</i>. <a href="http://rawnslnotebook.tumblr.com/post/107343663537/the-artesh-ground-forces-vali-e-asr-drone-group">rawnsl notebook</a>.01/06/2015.</span>Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-10716190149730509732015-01-15T15:47:00.002-08:002015-01-22T14:09:49.868-08:00Operation Beit al-Moqdas (1982) - An Institutional Perspective from Iran's Army Ground Forces (Working Copy)This report is a brief look at one of the more important operations in the Iran-Iraq War. The purpose of this report is to illustrate some of the Army Ground Forces history, and the way it has shaped their development over the past three decades. It is loosely intended to precede a more thorough treatment of the current doctrine and structure. <br />
<br />
<u>Introduction</u>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"A year and a half after the Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980, Tehran launched Operation Beit al-Moqdas, the final operation in its campaign to expel the Iraqi Army from its territory. Today, the operation holds a special place in the national memory and in the official narrative that instrumentalizes the war's symbols. The operation has also shaped the world-view of the contemporary Iranian military. In particular, for the Army Ground Forces (NEZAJA), it has been used to help articulate their doctrine and reconcile their identity as a professional service within a Revolutionary system."</blockquote>
<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4EEUCpHdMaKX3RXaVlfRUtXRms/view?usp=sharing">Google Docs Link (pdf)</a><br />
<br />
This is a working copy. Most everything is there, but near the end of
the project I happened to come across Gen. Bakhtiari's exhaustive
treatment of the operation, which I'm slowly working my way though. This
text will likely answer many of the implicit and explicit unknowns that
beset this report. At the very least, it would allow for a great deal more fleshing out. Indeed, the parts of it I have already read
were exceedingly valuable.<br />
<br />
...and yes, in case you're wondering, saying something is a "working copy" is just another way of saying "I don't feel like editing this anymore".<br />
<br />
<u>Errata</u>: <br />
HT at ACIG Forums for providing Gen. Bakhtiari's account of the war described above, and for general research assistance ("Tom" & "Gabriel Garrido").Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-46695856388098850112014-12-08T15:31:00.000-08:002014-12-09T14:26:50.263-08:00Defense Expenditures in Iran's 1394 BudgetMore so than other translations, the highly technical nature the budget reports means that the relative simplicity of the following tables hides potential difficulties in not just translating Persian to English, but financial-speak to layman-speak. <br />
<br />
<u>At a Glance</u>:<br />
- High disparity between the Army and IRGC's funding. Even ignoring the one-time allocation to the IRGC's Khatem al-Anbiya organization (see below), IRGC receives a billion more than the Army. <br />
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<br />
<u>Ministry of Defense and Armed-Forces Logistics</u>:<br />
- Large quantity of ministry's funding earmarked for the ambiguously titled "strengthening/promoting defense".<br />
- At first glance, industrial defense base (IEI, HESA, AIO) will recieve a paltry sum. However, since this is listed under capital assets, their actual funding may be buried elsewhere in the budget (e.g. "strengthening defense", or "maintaining defense industrial production"). <br />
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<u><br /></u>
<u>Armed Forces General Staff</u>:<br />
- Not insignificant amount earmarked for development of naval infrastructure. Developments in the Oman fleet may correspond to the relatively new IRIN bases at Jask or Pasabandar, or their region-HQ at Konarak. Note that this funding is described as a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_asset#The_most_specific_common_definitions_in_use_are_as_follows">capital asset</a>. <br />
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<u><br /></u>
<u>Army</u>:<br />
- $1.8 m earmarked for Navy's expeditionary voyages, a relatively small sum in the grand scheme.<br />
- Compare the $1.8 m allocated for all of the Army's border-security operations to the $185 m allocated for the IRGC's operations in the south-west. This makes clear who has the primary responsibility for internal security (which is entirely expected).<br />
- $1.8 m for air-defense seems like a small sum given importance of IRIADF, again suggesting that funding may be buried elsewhere.<br />
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<br />
<u>IRGC</u>:<br />
<br />
- $185 million for counter-insurgency (and general security) operations in Baluchistan (Shahid Shushtari Plan)<br />
- $13 million for recruitment of Kurdish militias (Shahid Kazemi plan)<br />
- One time allocation of $3.7 b for the Khatem al-Anbiya consturuction HQ (more than twice as much as the Army's entire budget, and a billion more than all the rest of the IRGC's budget) eludes apparent explanation. Major investment for something, but what?<br />
Without the specific line-item 'plans' and the construction allocation, the IRGC's budget is much closer to the Army's. <br />
<br />
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<u><br /></u>
<u>Miscellaneous / Unsorted</u>:<br />
- Traditionally a hidden cost, ongoing social-security costs dwarf much of the 'normal' defense budget. <br />
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<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-4977773604032670582014-11-17T11:33:00.000-08:002014-11-17T11:33:02.291-08:00The Fakour and Rasool Air-Defense Components At the request of a reader, we now take a brief look at two different elements of Iran's integrated air defense system (IADS).<br />
<br />
<u>Introduction</u>:<br />
On May 25 2014, the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters (aka IRIADF) unveiled two new systems that they reported would soon enter production. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span> These were:<br />
<br />
1) The Fakour command-and-control (C2) system, which is responsible for gathering, fusing, and distributing tactical information within the IRIADF's sectors.<br />
2) The Rasool communications system, which is responsible for linking the Matla ul-Fajr radars with other elements of the air-defense network.<br />
<br />
<u>Fakour</u>: <br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj11-mbJy3VgWliDA8yxK6256qOcKJ9MUty8Y1nBfVA3_VqP-m9vTXZB5x1kTXuhHqps98o5uuIA6QbDOSXt_YSxp4SoDu02hA88ySfFrh66MnDxUYzvgUBRdb6nMtEGaJwgcrSfFcu2lly/s1600/Export_1_Rasool.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj11-mbJy3VgWliDA8yxK6256qOcKJ9MUty8Y1nBfVA3_VqP-m9vTXZB5x1kTXuhHqps98o5uuIA6QbDOSXt_YSxp4SoDu02hA88ySfFrh66MnDxUYzvgUBRdb6nMtEGaJwgcrSfFcu2lly/s1600/Export_1_Rasool.jpg" height="320" width="232" /></a>The Fakour is employed as a command-post for fusing and distributing sensor information at the tactical level. This means gathering data from a range of sources, which is reported to include active sources such as military and civilian radars, passive ELINT such as emission-finders, and air-defense units such as SAM batteries. This data is fuzed to produce a unified picture of the battlefield that can be used to cue air and ground-based defenses onto target. <br />
<br />
However, it is unclear if the Fakour is only responsible for assembling information and passing it on (this includes passing both sensor data from below, and commands from above), or whether it is also responsible for analyzing the resulting picture (i.e. deconflicting contradictory information and assigning targets). The use of “C2” terminology in the Fakour's name would suggest the latter, at least to some degree. <br />
<br />
The answer to this question would be a major indicator of the IRIADF's flexibility, and thus its overall survivability. If the Fakour only gathered and passed along information, local IRIADF units could blinded by disrupting the upper levels of this hierarchy. This has generally been the Western experience against Soviet-designed IADSs. However, if the Fakour were equipped with the processing and communication power to maintain a relatively comprehensive picture on its own, these local units could retain much more of their effectiveness. <br />
<br />
Based on descriptions of the Fakour's compatibility with the IRIADF's sector-operations-centers (SOC), it is assessed to moderate to high confidence that the Fakour will be deployed within SOCs. SOCs are believed to be synonymous with the IRIADF's geographic regions (e.g. northwest, west, southwest, south, southeast, east, northeast, central), with a number of air-defense groups under each ones command. It is possible that the Fakour will be utilized at the group level. <br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibTHJU8z-ZmDi4-FFjB-B9Oae8unUDBWJSdRarjqfG9XYcVjveyCPVJ1bFotkyXm-BMBE7JLUOl3bnechhJU3Nn_4Ls61-Jl3j3KgzLd00gbq8VOaYOBYIk6aWhUTqueeXh_KCukIXxSeR/s1600/Fakour+(14).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibTHJU8z-ZmDi4-FFjB-B9Oae8unUDBWJSdRarjqfG9XYcVjveyCPVJ1bFotkyXm-BMBE7JLUOl3bnechhJU3Nn_4Ls61-Jl3j3KgzLd00gbq8VOaYOBYIk6aWhUTqueeXh_KCukIXxSeR/s1600/Fakour+(14).jpg" height="121" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Fakour, operation section, interior</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
The Fakour system itself is composed of three elements, these include:<br />
<br />
Operations section: Mounted on a large containerized trailer, this section is responsible for processing received information, and using it to plan and coordinate subordinate operations. The trailer contains at least seven computer workstations <br />
<br />
Communications section: Mounted on a smaller containerized trailer, this section is responsible for the system's signal reception and transmission. This helps protect the operations section by allowing it to function without emitting. For intra-system communication, the different sections can be linked by fiber-optic or conventional cables, and for external communication this section is equipped with HF, VHF, UHF, AM/FM, and microwave radio, which can be used for audio and data transfer (at a reported rate of 32 mbit/s).<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPdag9ADwCCM1REnMNxc-MaIJDeC28dBxXNOFkZLT0QP5sRYN_6n1-h1jbdrFfPxRT2cmeaO6n3ifD_b4Pai7LijfjO42fG6W1wW8M3rwD2ZjLwdp3__99vaP3WQAZjk7M5uJ9XLBmP8a2/s1600/Fakour+(9).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPdag9ADwCCM1REnMNxc-MaIJDeC28dBxXNOFkZLT0QP5sRYN_6n1-h1jbdrFfPxRT2cmeaO6n3ifD_b4Pai7LijfjO42fG6W1wW8M3rwD2ZjLwdp3__99vaP3WQAZjk7M5uJ9XLBmP8a2/s1600/Fakour+(9).jpg" height="138" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Fakour, communications section</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Communications-relay section: This section is equipped with a microwave relay station mounted on a pickup truck, and is responsible for extending the range of the communication section's LOS data-transfer. <br />
<br />
<u>Rasool</u>: <br />
The Rasool is a communications node associated with Matla ul-Fajr family of acquisition radars. It can be used to integrate the radar with other elements of a local IADS, or with distant command centers in order to allow it to function as an independent early-warning radar. <br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKbE06-PpZdOyaa3aGwYhgPGZ3moKI_KG81HXYfLSILtdGEioB11KR7X3TN2-aGdG7xNaMg2hihoI8FmK9EW21DU6MSGXWlVu72MWp-BbNFqQlQ2psm2X-yQdjP4PLHg_uC0cuTlXw8BX2/s1600/Export_2_Rasool.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKbE06-PpZdOyaa3aGwYhgPGZ3moKI_KG81HXYfLSILtdGEioB11KR7X3TN2-aGdG7xNaMg2hihoI8FmK9EW21DU6MSGXWlVu72MWp-BbNFqQlQ2psm2X-yQdjP4PLHg_uC0cuTlXw8BX2/s1600/Export_2_Rasool.jpg" height="270" width="320" /></a>The Matla ul-Fajr (MuF) family includes the MuF-1, and MuF-2, which are descended from the Soviet P-12/18. Both operate in the VHF-band, which has led them being described as counter-stealth radars. They are visually characterized by their distinctive Yagi antennas arranged in rows on a retractable mast mounted on a containerized trailer. <br />
<br />
According to press reports: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2]</span><br />
<br />
The MuF-1 is a 2D (range, azimuth) medium/long-range radar with a maximum range of 300 km, and altitude of 20 km. It is characterized by its 12 antennas arrayed in two rows of six.<br />
<br />
The MuF-2 is a 3D (range, azimuth, height) long-range radar with a maximum range of 480 km. It is characterized by its 32 antennas arrayed in four rows of 8. <br />
<br />
The Rasool appears to be organic to the MuF, though, depending on how the MuF is organized, may be used to link it with C2-hubs like the Fakour, or SAM batteries at specific air-defense sites. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2TVHtpfL8-h71Lwa6hIMx3bH7oh3IAc_HOdeMwXjpK5VZktPDG-HlN9LZDL01XE0on-UvSjcPQJI6AxZ75kmPFlEl3FBL-CJHjli0FaA37vGOyKk-mNDRnevXMoiVyUBm7nBwnWOiXDeN/s1600/Rasool+(9).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2TVHtpfL8-h71Lwa6hIMx3bH7oh3IAc_HOdeMwXjpK5VZktPDG-HlN9LZDL01XE0on-UvSjcPQJI6AxZ75kmPFlEl3FBL-CJHjli0FaA37vGOyKk-mNDRnevXMoiVyUBm7nBwnWOiXDeN/s1600/Rasool+(9).jpg" height="222" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Rasool communications shelter</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The system is composed of two vehicles, a communications shelter, and a relay station. The relay station is the same as the one used with the Fakour, and consists of a microwave station mounted on a pickup truck (32 mbit/s capacity). The communications shelter is mounted on an Iveco 4x4, and is fitted with HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave radios, and associated encryption and recording hard/software. Linking the Rasool with the radar itself is via fiber-optic wiring. <br />
<br />
An example of how the Rasool may be employed can be found at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP), and the air-defense group assigned to protect it. Assets deployed for the facilities point defense are detailed <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/09/hazrat-masumeh-air-defense-group-iriadf.html">here</a>, and include the use of a MuF-1 as an acquisition/EW radar for two half-strength HAWK batteries, and a handful of gun batteries. Imagery from late-2012 onward show the radar supported by a small truck fitted with a mast-mounted transmitter, very likely the microwave radios employed by the Rasool. Also wired to the MuF is a larger containerized trailer, which may function as a C2-hub like the Fakour, which is itself linked to a smaller container with an unknown roof-mounted transmitter/receiver.<br />
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<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works-Cited</u>: <br />
[1] A Look at the Newest Achievements in the Field of Air Defense. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=b8789b0b-9886-4e12-94fb-8ecaaa0f102e&WebPartID=5f839c92-0f3f-44f6-b8e5-54f8133dd762&ID=51a934e5-5ed1-475c-8c4f-94816f803057">AJA</a>. 06/01/2014.<br />
[2] Which of the Iranian Eyes Exposed the Zionest Hermes? <a href="https://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/339327/%DA%A9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%DA%86%D8%B4%D9%85-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B3-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3">Mashregh News</a>. 08/28/14<br />
<br />
<u>Further Reading</u>:<br />
<a href="http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-032.htm">Comments </a>on Air Defense Systems. Stuart Slade. 1999<br />
<br /> <br />
<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-27990917426977494622014-11-05T17:04:00.001-08:002014-11-05T17:18:10.222-08:00Basij Organization - The Shahid Shushtari Operating BaseIn the fifth part of the 'Basij Organization' series, we now turn to one of the so-called special categories of Basij: the Shahid Shushtari Operating Bases (SSOB) in Iran's restive south-east. <br />
The <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/02/basij-organization-imam-hussein.html">first part</a> in this series covers the Imam Hussein battalions. <br />
The <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/03/basij-organization-beit-al-moqdas.html">second part</a> covers the Beit al-Moqdas battalions. <br />
The <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/08/basij-organization-semnan.html">third part</a> covers the the Semnan province Basij. <br />
The <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/10/basij-organization-imam-ali-security.html">fourth part</a> covers the Imam Ali battalions <br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrwCnRLmtmsAi9vwh0DvYxJI4cBTVm6ANfVgSCEX2vXFGOuvxgpOO5yVRqBJwxt-5CYRgck-wFYSLi7ZvfQcA4jc-m85oHlaINLb46BfKTbc_zwWZSM6NUiaObpyZ22ahqCgkfWCHiLqlH/s1600/85293067500762858949.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrwCnRLmtmsAi9vwh0DvYxJI4cBTVm6ANfVgSCEX2vXFGOuvxgpOO5yVRqBJwxt-5CYRgck-wFYSLi7ZvfQcA4jc-m85oHlaINLb46BfKTbc_zwWZSM6NUiaObpyZ22ahqCgkfWCHiLqlH/s1600/85293067500762858949.jpg" height="266" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Baluch Basij, pictured during the opening of a base in Qasr-e Qand</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<u>Index</u>: <br />
Index <br />
Abbreviations/Acronyms <br />
Intro <br />
Origin and Development <br />
External Organization <br />
Internal Organization <br />
Appendix: Shahid Shushtari <br />
Footnotes / Works Cited <br />
<br />
<u>Abbreviations/Acronyms</u>: <br />
BG – Brigadier General <br />
BG2 – Brigadier General, 2nd Class<br />
Cmdr - Commander <br />
Col. – Colonel <br />
HQ – Headquarters <br />
IRGC [-GF] – Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps [Ground Forces] <br />
MG – Major General <br />
SM [HQ] – Shahid Mamar [Headquarters] <br />
SSOB – Shahid Shushtari Operating Base<br />
S&B - Sistan va Baluchistan <br />
<br />
<u>Intro</u>: <br />
Since 2012 these rural bases staffed by personnel from Sunni tribes have tried to assimilate the indigenous population into the state, increase oversight of tribal leadership, and project a kinder, gentler face to a population that had previously suffered under the security forces, and who are uniquely at risk to the appeal of transnational Salafism. <br />
<br />
To this end, 60 SSOBs have been built in the remote ethnic-Baluch villages that dot the Kerman and Sistan va Baluchistan provinces. Parallel to the traditional province-based organization, these bases are organized under the supervision of the Shahid Mamar Operations HQ, which itself falls under the regional Qods HQ.<br />
<br />
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<br />
These bases are equivalent to small rural police-stations, providing a modest amount of law-and-order to areas with little existing state influence. More importantly, they also provide employment, and a friendly point of contact between the state and the population. <br />
<br />
Unfortunately, it is impossible to gauge the success of this program. State officials are quick to speak of its success, but there are no ways to independently verify these claims. Driven by identity-based mobilization, anti-government attacks continue, and indeed have escalated since 2011 when Tehran was still enjoying a relative calm following the collapse of Jundallah. Similarly, Baluchistan remains one of the most underdeveloped regions in Iran, something that cannot be changed overnight. Yet, these attacks remain limited in scale and it is clear that – Tehran's fears of regime-change aside – they face no real existential threat from the insurgency. <br />
<br />
Whether or not these bases will be effective in the long run, they represent a recognition of the challenges facing Tehran in these border areas. Namely, the program recognizes the need to address the legitimate material and identity-based grievances of disenfranchised populations, and that relying on brute force alone risks further inflaming the insurgency. <br />
<br />
<u>Origin and Development</u>: <br />
October 18th, 2014 marked the fifth anniversary of the 2009 suicide bombing that killed several high-ranking Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders in the Baluch town of Pishin. The bombing was carried out by insurgents from the now-defunct group Jundallah, which had its roots in the grievances and historical autonomy of the Sunni-Baluch population in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. <br />
<br />
Among those killed in the bombing was BG Nur-Ali Shushtari, who was the deputy commander of the IRGC's Ground Forces (IRGC-GF) and commander of their southeastern Qods HQ. Over his 30 year career, Shushtari was counted among the IRGC's core leadership, and developed a reputation as one of the nation's top counter-insurgents. <br />
<br />
Following his assassination, Shushtari's legacy was redeployed by Tehran to articulate their counter-insurgency strategy in the south-east in an effort to counter the increasing perception among many Sunnis that Tehran is an imperial Shia power. <br />
<br />
This narrative is characterized by: <br />
a) pan-Islamic Sunni/Shia unity <br />
b) the inclusion of indigenous tribal populations into the security forces <br />
c) the use of infrastructure-development and social-assistance to alleviation material grievances <br />
d) the necessary but not sufficient role of military security <br />
e) persistent attempts by the West and Gulf Arab states to create ethno-sectarian divisions in order to topple the Islamic Republic <br />
<br />
In particular, Shushtari's legacy has lent its name to one key aspect of Tehran's counter-insurgency strategy: the Shahid Shushtari operating base. The conceptual origin of the SSOB plan is rooted in descriptions of Shushtari's tactics and his highly personalized approach to internal security. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilzcSFXkascNZFygRCZPSLhOq4V8uCq383Zsml0hQ-OLtfFvzIcVuC_K5SCztWex2hnbSpV14jgjOseh_YLDrWtW7TEPH4KHsB4kUzdIRuBeaQ1FX9woBp6-6sewDZN-HgMc-PQCizw3L2/s1600/Qadratollah+and+Mansouri.jpg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilzcSFXkascNZFygRCZPSLhOq4V8uCq383Zsml0hQ-OLtfFvzIcVuC_K5SCztWex2hnbSpV14jgjOseh_YLDrWtW7TEPH4KHsB4kUzdIRuBeaQ1FX9woBp6-6sewDZN-HgMc-PQCizw3L2/s1600/Qadratollah+and+Mansouri.jpg" height="240" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Shushtari during the war alongside his deputy and the current <br />
commander of the IRGC's Qods HQ, Qadratollah Mansouri.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
When the new commander of the Qods HQ – BG Qadratollah Mansouri –was appointed in 11/2009, the commander of the IRGC – MG Jafari – noted that he expected Mansouri to continue along Shushtari's path. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span> This shouldn't have been surprising since Mansouri fought alongside Shushtari in Kurdistan during the war, and served as his deputy during the 1990s, when the two were responsible for securing the country's northeast against spillover from the Afghan Civil War. When Mansouri laid out part of his vision for the southeast's security in late-2009, he invoked Shushtari's legacy, saying that the IRGC would work toward eradicating poverty in the region and that lasting security would not be provided with guns or tanks, but by handing the responsibility to the people and tribes of the region.<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> [2]</span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span> <br />
<br />
In this regard, SSOBs are the means by which the Baluch population is to be assimilated into the security forces and the state. By 11/2011, initial preparations had been completed, and the first wave of recruits entered training shortly thereafter. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[3]</span> Reporting is incomplete, but the available documentation suggests the majority of bases were opened in late-2012, and 2013. <br />
<br />
<u>Role</u>: <br />
The reasons for the creation of SSOBs are consistent with the themes of the Shushtari-narrative outlined above, and include the promotion of:<br />
1) State-tribe security cooperation<br />
2) Shia/Sunni unity <br />
3) Economic development<br />
These three themes are unified by an underlying intent to alleviate the ethno-sectarian grievances that have historically sustained the Baluch insurgency. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEirKwgcNg6KZ0K2rTYrZl6bZ73-_sIQHpiVIWJWWwQH-_hgz3fc9kV77LrkN_pdIhzIy5hTfzJocdMfVha1XD7wuCQFKcT5V0zdq98ue_s1gGS0Ird-V91XLymvK1DyW94MBVtfLRSM6mdo/s1600/al_Farooq+Media.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEirKwgcNg6KZ0K2rTYrZl6bZ73-_sIQHpiVIWJWWwQH-_hgz3fc9kV77LrkN_pdIhzIy5hTfzJocdMfVha1XD7wuCQFKcT5V0zdq98ue_s1gGS0Ird-V91XLymvK1DyW94MBVtfLRSM6mdo/s1600/al_Farooq+Media.jpg" height="243" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Ex. of sectarian narrative employed by the Baluch insurgent group <br />
Harakat Ansar Iran in context of wider region's balance of power</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Although today's insurgents still draw from local grievances to mobilize support, they are more willing than their predecessors to draw on sectarian symbols to articulate their discontent. They evoke Tehran's role in Syria and Iraq to explain their own repression in the context of an imperial Shia power seeking to dominate the region's “true” Muslims. In Baluchistan, state neglect and kinetic-approaches to security have fueled charges of ethno-sectarian discrimination, couching local grievances in a transnational narrative.<br />
<br />
Thus, creating an inclusive system for their own Sunni minorities is essential for Tehran to counter this perception. This, in turn, is key to checking a) the rise of an external Sunni coalition dedicated to balancing Tehran, and b) the attractive appeal of Salafi politics to Iran's own Sunni population. <br />
<br />
The SSOB program addresses this by assimilating the Sunni population into the state and its security forces. Whenever a base is opened, attending officials inevitably describe them in explicit (non-)sectarian terms, citing the recruitment of Sunni personnel as evidence of the non-discriminatory nature of the Islamic Republic in face of efforts by Gulf Arab and Western states to exploit sectarian divisions. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[4]</span> <br />
<br />
For instance, in 02/2013, civilian official(s) from the Sistan va Baluchistan province recognized the existence of legitimate grievances, saying: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">“Referring to the recruitment of Baluch youth into the IRGC, the governor of Sistan va Baluchistan said: This positive action has strengthened lasting security in the province </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Hatem Naroui stated: The recruitment of Sunni Baluch volunteers for the Basij may be 30 years late, but this positive action helps the province in many different ways. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The head of the security-council in Sistan va Baluchistan stated: Among the results of this good action is to strengthen lasting security and reduce anti-security actions against the Islamic Republic in the south-east border area of our country. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Naroui said: Now, different social-classes of Sunni and Shia of Sistan va Baluchistan, even from distant villages, believe in their border region and [unclear], because the Islamic Republic, unlike the previous regime, values them highly, especially the Baluch youth who are seen as useful in various social and political domains. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He added: Whereas many Baluch youth escaped military service in the past, now they have more love for their homeland's security with recruitment into the IRGC's Basij.”<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> [5]</span> </span></blockquote>
In pursuit of this overarching goal, the IRGC-GF's first objective is to directly promote security by handing responsibility to the indigenous population. This is accomplished by recruiting local personnel, and coopting tribal authority.<br />
<br />
Although there is no way to independently confirm such his specific claims, Col. Morvarid, the then-commander of Shahid Mamar HQ, described the effects of this transfer during the opening of a SSOB in Qasr-e Qand County in 11/2012: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">This base was formed “with the objective of helping to promote lasting security in the province… Various crimes and anti-security actions in Sistan va Baluchistan have declined 36%, much of which is thanks to the cooperation of the people, tribes, and nomads with the security and military apparatus.” <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span> </span></blockquote>
A month later, during the opening of a SSOB in Nikshahr county, he said: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">“The participation and cooperation by the population, tribal-leaders, the Islamic Councils, and the provincial nomads with the military, security, and intelligence apparatus has significantly decreased various crimes and anti-security activities in Sistan va Baluchistan. …Elders and tribal-leaders and the population of each region have an important role to play in establishing security in their region by identifying suspects and preventing disputes, and this is the best way to establish lasting security.”</span> <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7]</span> </blockquote>
Coopting tribal structures allows the IRGC to take advantage of their existing legitimacy in the absence of comparable state institutions. Tribal leaders were initially drawn into cooperation with security forces by offers of economic assistance and other promises of development. These relationships have been maintained by routine consultations taken through official security structures such as the Shahid Mamar Operations HQ. <br />
<br />
This process was described in 05/2013 by the spokesperson for the Shahid Mamar HQ, who underscored the mutually beneficial nature of these consultations, and the incentives for tribes to participate in the program out of self-interest: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">“250 tribal-leaders in this region are cooperating greatly with … one another, the Shahid Mamar HQ and the Qods HQ, and they hold advisory-meetings in the field of security weekly and monthly. … This kind of cooperation and coordination has led to security and peace in the region, and a peaceful life for the population. … Last year, tribal-leaders raised issues and problems in a meeting in Iranshahr with Sardar Pakpour – the commander of the IRGC-GF – and very good decisions were made. He stated: The most recent meeting with Sardar Majidi – the representative of the Supreme Leader – was held in the Shahid Mamar HQ ... and tribal-leaders expressed the needs and desires of the population.”</span> <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[8]</span> </blockquote>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">One of the pictures released after Shushtari's martyrdom, <br />
showing him in a meeting with tribal leaders. </td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This consultation is a major theme in the Shushtari narrative. Much of the imagery and accounts released after his martyrdom show him personally meeting with tribal leaders in remote mountains, and taking great pains to gain their cooperation. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[9]</span><br />
<br />
Consultation helps build the state's legitimacy by demonstrating Tehran's tolerance of traditional culture and by giving them a stake in the Islamic Republic. However, it also serves to subordinate these previously independent structures to state oversight, making the former dependent on the latter for dispute resolution and their livelihood. <br />
<br />
The effect of this consultation can be seen in the initial implementation of the SSOB plan itself in 2011. Rather than direct recruitment by the IRGC, the first wave of recruits were identified by their respective tribal leaders. By gaining tribal endorsement, the government gained the trust of residents who otherwise would have been skeptical of such a program. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[10]</span> <br />
<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinqe5KLYW8ZkRZEsp_WZY1cTd-7aebVRIow33a0R-I7gq-vGvAaX-ErdSrqkTbup1tDc3bzm8bUEqdeGK0ckdA_I4OfDu6YyF4nc7a26NGbNYGF2m4kicj9mWAA9cK3yVKvmPzk31_ATMt/s1600/360811_687.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinqe5KLYW8ZkRZEsp_WZY1cTd-7aebVRIow33a0R-I7gq-vGvAaX-ErdSrqkTbup1tDc3bzm8bUEqdeGK0ckdA_I4OfDu6YyF4nc7a26NGbNYGF2m4kicj9mWAA9cK3yVKvmPzk31_ATMt/s1600/360811_687.jpg" height="201" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Local personnel in the background during <br />
handover of border-guards captured by Jaish ul-Adl</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Similarly, when Tehran needed to negotiate the return of police conscripts who had been captured by insurgents from Jaish ul-Adl in early 2014, they turned to the tribes and indigenous Basij to manage the their return.<br />
<br />
This assimilation of indigenous personnel into state structures also serves to reinforce a key rhetorical element of the Shushtari narrative: intra-Islamic unity, which comprises the program's second major objective. <br />
<br />
The program's third objective aims to reduce grievances that spring from a perception of sect-based underdevelopment by alleviating poverty and promoting development. The SSOB program explicitly targets those who have refused to do their mandatory national service. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[11]</span> Media descriptions of this targeted recruitment indicate a sympathy to the reasons for doing so. They note that many of these men already have families and face severe economic challenges as it is, and simply cannot afford to be absent for upwards of two years. <br />
<br />
These media reports also note that this absenteeism has cascading effects. The failure to secure proof of service means that they are vulnerable to arrest, can be denied employment, and cannot legally cross the border, all of which force them deeper into the cycle of poverty and crime. <br />
<br />
SSOBs address this concern by allowing recruits to serve locally, alleviating both the challenges of conscription, and of avoiding conscription. In addition, their training is reported to include vocational and educational courses, potentially leading to long term economic competitiveness. <br />
<br />
Officials are quick to tout the SSOB's role in fostering economic development, citing the number of people hired by bases, and describing their role in creating jobs in local communities. These numbers are couched in sectarian terms, describing the number of jobs created for Sunnis or the number of jobs created for Baluchs. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[12]</span> For instance, by 05/2013, 1,000 Sunni-Baluchs were reportedly employed throughout the Shahid Mamar HQ, with another 700 employed by the HQ itself. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[13]</span> <br />
<br />
In addition to direct employment, IRGC officials highlight the role of the security forces in developing public infrastructure, including hospitals, utilities (water/electricity/communications), roads, schools, and agriculture/economic projects. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[14]</span> Indeed, one of the few pieces of this program that can be verified via open-source satellite imagery are the miles of new roads that now snake their way through the mountains of Baluchistan. <br />
<br />
<u>Organization (External)</u>: <br />
Shahid Shushtari Operating Bases are a unique category of Basij, and are not organized according to the the standard 'province-area-zone-base' system. SSOBs haven't replaced these levels, but operate in parallel to them in predominantly Sunni-Baluch areas in southern parts of the Kerman and Sistan va Baluchistan provinces. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj60uUMV31ZHrSOzgNlG7wcSJ-vs4l82tAHT2o7s3RQ6LD39TjB-uAGBXqpluExoF8HXw25HQVNyqjslw4xuzJqbXCmV1qBVg5dNsLZpW1HfiPaKbYjqaqcAk7QWgNZ4J9_FOOIAkVeQh0J/s1600/Col+Zarifi_June+25+2014.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj60uUMV31ZHrSOzgNlG7wcSJ-vs4l82tAHT2o7s3RQ6LD39TjB-uAGBXqpluExoF8HXw25HQVNyqjslw4xuzJqbXCmV1qBVg5dNsLZpW1HfiPaKbYjqaqcAk7QWgNZ4J9_FOOIAkVeQh0J/s1600/Col+Zarifi_June+25+2014.JPG" height="133" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">SM HQ Cmdr, Col. Zarifi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
SSOBs are grouped under the Qods HQ, which is responsible for the IRGC-GF's operations in the southeast, including border security. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[15]</span> The HQ's current commander is BG Qadratollah Mansouri. <br />
<br />
Subordinate to the Qods HQ is the Shahid Mamar Operations HQ (SM HQ). Based out of the city of Iranshahr, the SM HQ is otherwise known as the Salehin Brigade, and has been operational since 04/2012. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[16]</span> Its current commander is Col. Hossein Zarifi, who has held the position since at least 12/2013. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[17]</span> It's previous commander was Col. Barat Morvarid, who is notable for being an active member of the Saberin special forces. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[18]</span> <br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDa-4jyjc-1SU2Yz0xPs-QmMzd7mg6CsGkwOK9tRrlID24Jl4w6WXgBpJegBvWUwwJocYJXJ0R2hFSQGAxSDq0x3GZz9tSZnJGffJrp8dpTpQ6k1NtCbk9pelBrW-JKb7yc-SYBLIgLpkx/s1600/58268343485950331445.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDa-4jyjc-1SU2Yz0xPs-QmMzd7mg6CsGkwOK9tRrlID24Jl4w6WXgBpJegBvWUwwJocYJXJ0R2hFSQGAxSDq0x3GZz9tSZnJGffJrp8dpTpQ6k1NtCbk9pelBrW-JKb7yc-SYBLIgLpkx/s1600/58268343485950331445.jpg" height="150" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Fmr SM HQ Cmdr, Col. Morvarid</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
The SM HQ is the primary body responsible for coordinating SSOB activities. It's role is consistently described in terms of managing county-level security through the SSOBs. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[19]</span> A key part of this responsibility is conducting security-consultations with local tribes, which is described above. <br />
<br />
By 05/2013, the SM HQ was responsible for 60 SSOBs in 18 counties, with a combat strength of 8,000 personnel drawn from “active-duty Basij, combat squads, and [active-duty soldiers from the IRGC-GF]”. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[20]</span> <br />
<br />
However, it's unclear how exactly this number corresponds to the strength and distribution of SSOBs. The 8,000 includes personnel not directly affiliated with SSOBs, while SSOBs may employ non-active-duty Basij as well. For instance, Col. Morvarid noted that these 60 bases employed 1,000 people. However, in late-2011, when the program first kicked off, 2,000 personnel had been earmarked for training. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[21]</span> This suggests that the number who could be mobilized for security are distinct from both the number employed for the base's day-to-day functions, and the total active combat-strength of the headquarters. <br />
<br />
Exactly which counties make up the 18 total is also unclear. It is assessed with moderate confidence that 10-11 are in Sistan va Baluchistan province, including: Chahbahar, Konarak, Sarbaz, Nikshahr, Zaboli, Sib va Suran, Saravan, Khash, Iranshahr, Dalgan, and possibly Zahedan. The situation is less clear in Kerman province, but the remaining 7-8 counties are likely found in the province's southernmost 'foot' south-east of Kerman city itself. <br />
<br />
The location of the 60 SSOBs is similarly unclear thanks to wide variances in local and national reporting. Out of the 60 total, around 17 have been documented, upwards of 14 of those are in Nikshahr county. Some uncertainty arises from imprecise media accounts, and the difficulty in geolocating certain locations. <br />
<br />
Documented bases include: <br />
2x Qasr-e Qand District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Mehban, Central District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Espakeh, Lashar District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Hariduk, Lashar District, Nikshahr County <br />
2x Unspecified, Lashar District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Nikshahr, Nikshahr District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Chahan, Nikshahr District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Mohtaramabad, Fanuj District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Khairabad, Fanuj District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Bent, Bent District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Kurandap, Bent District, Nikshahr County <br />
1x Ahuran, Nikshahr/Sarbaz County <br />
2x Zarabad District, Konarak County <br />
1x Kahir, Central District, Chahbahar County<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiemfVXNEgX6rkvvopoNdOT_wzK50Udc47iVfybMR2FQL3yT2TfwwyyKJEwRoe3BgjblwFWuDClS5jlKmQtjEAhMC4OTBXpChrLPr_-NcA6ue91Z1dkfS6U6tQ8TClMzUi2r1kpTJFfAuZy/s1600/Export_2_+Bases.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiemfVXNEgX6rkvvopoNdOT_wzK50Udc47iVfybMR2FQL3yT2TfwwyyKJEwRoe3BgjblwFWuDClS5jlKmQtjEAhMC4OTBXpChrLPr_-NcA6ue91Z1dkfS6U6tQ8TClMzUi2r1kpTJFfAuZy/s1600/Export_2_+Bases.jpg" height="306" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<u>Organization (Internal)</u>:<br />
The bases themselves are small and relatively rudimentary. In line with their stated purpose of providing local security, they can be thought of as equivalent to rural police-stations.<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3LGFRWWLzzvxdHHyuwCxg6M5AxRrr8hz4e62xjJqPoeMMBJlFP4hsQK7oWfYqUmpcBInZBQzF-QEChOfZQAd1Qwvwul5D4PX8V7f3hlNtDNSTjrt_sTfINQUq8lBeswLlBePDNRkJMWp3/s1600/07900227695484730462.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh3LGFRWWLzzvxdHHyuwCxg6M5AxRrr8hz4e62xjJqPoeMMBJlFP4hsQK7oWfYqUmpcBInZBQzF-QEChOfZQAd1Qwvwul5D4PX8V7f3hlNtDNSTjrt_sTfINQUq8lBeswLlBePDNRkJMWp3/s1600/07900227695484730462.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">SSOB, Qasr-e Qand</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsUvJ4QRaA0LOZZFOy26cX-HOXSlTNg0Y4KRHFW08M9TMawyx2PZ1M6IOlF_WHcpDS7q1AqwBx7QdE6LLTZSHot9ooOn-uo_SQjCJFM0-yJBm5AWenl6Q5JD2dy0T9Nf3ii4Sv5NQaAS1S/s1600/49485850181717387458.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsUvJ4QRaA0LOZZFOy26cX-HOXSlTNg0Y4KRHFW08M9TMawyx2PZ1M6IOlF_WHcpDS7q1AqwBx7QdE6LLTZSHot9ooOn-uo_SQjCJFM0-yJBm5AWenl6Q5JD2dy0T9Nf3ii4Sv5NQaAS1S/s1600/49485850181717387458.jpg" height="300" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">SSOB, Khairabad or Mohtaramabad</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Although they are about the same size as the forts dotting the Iran-Pakistan border, these bases are more focused on administration and local-interaction than permanently housing a garrison. Thus, they are constructed in much the same manner as other government buildings. Available imagery shows them as one-two story brick & plaster construction, often with an attached courtyard. According to comments made by Col. Morvarid in 2012, they range in size between 220 and 660 sqm (for reference, the average house size in the US is about 220 sqm). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[22]</span> <br />
<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHv1m0Kkx0Xfht6hcr9QIdRIKVcwo3kBFltNECQd3oIZs7SFvN3tgWmGHbOhT38tAlrKqkrkerlkpMbYgziV5EoaZ6LufMzrKBtjsO1s9c8-4BVkVeQCurMA5Z-z2ripOyVr_zLb-j1qyY/s1600/95400013320083383228.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHv1m0Kkx0Xfht6hcr9QIdRIKVcwo3kBFltNECQd3oIZs7SFvN3tgWmGHbOhT38tAlrKqkrkerlkpMbYgziV5EoaZ6LufMzrKBtjsO1s9c8-4BVkVeQCurMA5Z-z2ripOyVr_zLb-j1qyY/s1600/95400013320083383228.jpg" height="180" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Baluch Basij, Qasr-e Qand</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
In 2013, Col. Morvarid claimed that each base could employ up to 24 people, indicating that they are manned by active-duty Basij. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[23]</span> However, this alone doesn't account for the quoted quantity of personnel associated with the program, suggesting that these core personnel handle day to day operations and can be supplemented by so-called 'normal' Basij who operate on a part-time basis. As with all Basij units, the exact strength of each base will vary according to the location's needs, and the population's capacity to support it. <br />
<br />
Notably, available documentation shows that at least some of these bases are not commanded by IRGC officers, but by indigenous locals who don't carry a rank.<span style="font-size: xx-small;">[24]</span> This does not appear to be a universal pattern, but is worth continued observation. <br />
<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsEbwhv1y69lGjCMlMudVg0K4ybr9fS2GrXi94ExnZXYclRJm1fAmpS-4_D99lG6e-9SWMtDRuzrABPdk0ndWgBqsSbMeEkWUtXbnqnqocY8zsEiWvXSfr_vSajuwj9iV7jdcbK5mf-jRf/s1600/DSC01750.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsEbwhv1y69lGjCMlMudVg0K4ybr9fS2GrXi94ExnZXYclRJm1fAmpS-4_D99lG6e-9SWMtDRuzrABPdk0ndWgBqsSbMeEkWUtXbnqnqocY8zsEiWvXSfr_vSajuwj9iV7jdcbK5mf-jRf/s1600/DSC01750.JPG" height="140" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Special Company, Qasr-e Qand</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Recruits go through a two-month training period conducted by regional IRGC bodies, such as the IRGC's Salman [Brigade] in Sistan va Baluchistan. This period includes basic military and non-military (e.g. literacy) training. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[25]</span> <br />
<br />
In at least one case, a “special company” of around 70 Basij from SSOB(s) was created in order to provide extra security in the Qasr-e Qand area. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[26]</span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span> <br />
<br />
<u>Appendix: Shahid Shushtari</u>: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[27] [28] [29] </span><br />
A native of the Khorasan region in NE Iran, Shushtari first cut his teeth as a company commander putting down the 1979 Kurdish insurgency. In this task, he was joined by Qassam Soleimani and other figures who would go on to figure prominently in the Qods Force, the IRGC's foreign-service arm. <br />
<br />
Through the rest of the war, Shushtari developed relationships with other influential Khorasanis, including the current Supreme Leader, whom he had known before the revolution. In 1982, he was tasked with forming the Khorasan-based 5th Nasr Division along with Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf (current mayor of Tehran) and Esmail Qani (current deputy commander of the Qods Force). By 1983 he was the division's deputy-commander, and by 1984 it is reported that Qalibaf gave de facto control of the division to Shushtari. In the final years of the war, he was given command of the IRGC's Najaf HQ. After the war, Shushtari played a key role in defeating the ill-fated Mersad Operation by the Mujahadin-e Khalq that followed the 1988 ceasefire.<br />
<br />
By 1991, Shushtari took command of the Fifth Division, and went on to play a major role in internal security operations in NE Iran during the 1990s. This period saw violence from the Afghan Civil War spill over the border, including displaced persons, drug trafficking, and direct attacks. At the same time, Esmail Qani was given command of the IRGC's Samen Alaeme northeast regional HQ in Mashhad, Qassam Soleimani was conducting his own operations in the southeast, and the Qods Force were extending their reach into Afghanistan. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSXM4OIwQDwtPiao2xPRwWXKmBXoxyRkuLxPsUhEYv3iTT9Zg3k3G-UPE6kSsg4IsBZ7ddDXTg-f7dQ2qh48leZ77C0ahqdjGDeXtUV86kv2OEaJ0CKqW-LwjHKzRIMwotIZlL8dz9TBT8/s1600/226781_931.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSXM4OIwQDwtPiao2xPRwWXKmBXoxyRkuLxPsUhEYv3iTT9Zg3k3G-UPE6kSsg4IsBZ7ddDXTg-f7dQ2qh48leZ77C0ahqdjGDeXtUV86kv2OEaJ0CKqW-LwjHKzRIMwotIZlL8dz9TBT8/s1600/226781_931.png" height="320" width="240" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Shushtari in S&B, pictured with the<br />
elusive Khaybar rifle.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Around 2000, he returned to NW Iran, where he was tasked with fighting Kurdish insurgents as head of the Seyyed al-Shohada HQ. Then, in early-2009, he was transferred to the southeast and tasked with fighting Baluch insurgents as head of the Qods HQ. He also held the position of deputy commander of the IRGC-GF though it is unclear when he was appointed to this position. <br />
<br />
He held this position for around six months until October 2009, when he was assassinated in a Jundallah suicide bombing in Pishin. Alongisde Shushtari, those killed included BG2 Rajab-Ali Mohammed-Zadeh, who commanded the IRGC in the Sistan va Baluchistan province, Col. Fath Moradi, who commanded the IRGC in Iranshahr County, Col. Abdul-Samad Mirshahrki, who commanded the Imam Ali Brigade, and the IRGC in Sarbaz county. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[30]</span> Also among the dead were a number of the IRGC's Saberin special forces, as well as the tribal leaders that the IRGC were meeting with. <br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works Cited</u>: <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] The IRGC's Approach to Establishing Security is One of Light, not Power. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8808140398">FNA</a>. 11/05/2009.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[2] IRGC Construction [Jihad] to be Sent to Sistan va Baluchistan. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8810090190">FNA</a>. 12/30/2009.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[3] In the Shahid Shushtari Plan, 2000 Absentee Sunni Soldiers to b Absorbed into the Basij. <a href="http://nabikhabar1.blogfa.com/post-259.aspx">Nabikhabar</a>. 10/31/2011. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[4] Two Operating Bases Launched in the Mamar Operations HQ in Nikshahr. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/80645081/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C/%D8%AF%D9%88_%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87_%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C_%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7_%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87_%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%AF%D8%B1_%D9%86%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1_%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87_%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C_%D8%B4%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 05/06/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[5] Attracting Youth to the IRGC Strengthens Security. <a href="http://www.nahad.info/%D8%AC%D8%B0%D8%A8-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%DA%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7/">Nahad</a>. 02/22/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[6] Shahid Shushtari Operating Base Launched in Qasr-e Qand County.<a href="http://nikshahr1.mihanblog.com/post/1800"> Nikshahr Blog</a>, 11/16/12 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[7] Shahid Shushtari Operating Bases Launched in Mehban Nikshahr. <a href="http://junaid.blogfa.com/post/22">Junaid Blog</a>, 12/21/12</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[8] 700 Sunni-Baluchs Are Being Absorbed into Bases of the Shahid mamar HQ. <a href="http://www3.irna.ir/fa/NewsPrint.aspx?ID=80676118">IRNA</a>. 05/28/2013</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[9] Who Were the Internal Enemies of Shahid Shushtari in Sistan va Baluchistan? <a href="http://zahedanpress.com/11086/%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%84/">Zahedan Press</a>. 10/18/2012.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[10] ibid Nabikhabar, 10/31/2011 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[11] ibid Nabikhabar, 10/31/2011 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[12] Visit by the Commander of the Shahid Herati HQ to the New Friday-Prayers-Leader in Zabol. <a href="http://www.oshida.ir/vglhkkni.23n-x2yttzfd2.u.html">Oshida</a>. 05/10/2014. <br />Note: This article corresponds to a seperate sub-regional HQ in Sistan, not the Shahid Mamar HQ in Baluchistan. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[13] 8,000 Basij Operating Subordinate to the IRGC's Shahid Mamar Operations HQ. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/NewsPrint.aspx?ID=8064358">IRNA</a>. 05/06/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[14] ibid IRNA, 05/28/2013</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[15] Special Shahid Shushtari Company Opened in Qasr-e Qand County. <a href="http://tayefehazizi.ir/index.php/matalebe-vije/112-2013-12-12-10-25-37">Tayef-e Hazizi</a>. 12/09/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[16] ibid IRNA, 05/28/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[17] Opening of Shahid Shushtari Operating Base in Zarabad. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4679790/%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF">YJC</a>. 12/31/2013. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[18] ibid IRNA, 05/28/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[19] ibid IRNA, 05/06/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[20] ibid IRNA, 05/06/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[21] ibid Nabikhabar, 10/31/2011 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[22] ibid Junaid Blog, 12/21/2012 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[23] ibid IRNA, 05/06/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[24] ibid Junaid Blog, 12/21/2012 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[25] ibid Nabikhabar, 10/31/2011 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[26] ibid Tayef-e Hazizi, 12/09/2013</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[27] PLACEHOLDER </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[28] PLACEHOLDER </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[29] PLACEHOLDER </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[30] Several IRGC Commanders Killed in Attack in South-East Iran. <a href="http://www.radiofarda.com/content/F8_TERROR_SEPAH/1854499.html">Radio Farda</a>. 10/24/2009.</span><br />
<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com14tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-31304115353928710792014-10-20T10:24:00.000-07:002014-10-28T13:58:50.231-07:00IRIN Naval RegionsWith an increasing emphasis on power projection, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) is responsible for Iran's maritime security in the Caspian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and the greater Indian Ocean. The IRIN is organized into four or five naval regions, details about some of which are unclear. These administrative and/or operational divisions are believed to be largely equivalent to other services' 'regional headquarters'.<br />
<br />
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<br />
<br />
<u>1st Naval Region – Bandar Abbas</u>:<br />
The 1st region, as well as the IRIN's general HQ, is co-located with the IRGCN in Bandar Abbas. As of 11/2013, it is commanded by Vice-Admiral (hereafter, BG2*) Hossein Azad. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">* <i>This article </i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>employs generic nomenclature for titles (e.<span style="font-size: x-small;">g. Brig. Gen. / Mag. Gen.</span>) rather than their naval-specific <span style="font-size: x-small;">equivalents</span> (e.g. <span style="font-size: x-small;">Rear Admiral / Admiral</span>) in</i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i> order to si</i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>mplify the issue a</i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>s much as possible, and </i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>make it clear which posit</i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>ions are <span style="font-size: x-small;">equivalent</span> to one another</i>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<u>2nd Naval Region – Bandar Bushehr or Bandar Jask</u>:<br />
Multiple sources refer to both sites as the IRIN's 2nd region. Facilities at Bushehr pre-date those at Jask and include much of the service's industrial capacity, while the facilities at Jask are more recent, less extensive and reflect the more recent operational shift towards the Indian Ocean.<br />
<br />
As 10/2014, the Bushehr regon is commanded by BG2 Mohammed Reza Abbasian. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2] [3] </span><br />
<br />
As of 10/2013, the Jask region – also known as the 'Velayat' region – is commanded by BG2 Gholamreza Shirani. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[4] [5]</span><br />
<br />
<u>3rd Naval Region – Bandar Konarak</u>:<br />
As of 12/2013, the region is commanded by BG2 Shafii. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span><br />
The location of this site is sometimes referred to as Chahbahar, a larger city nearby. <br />
<br />
<u>4th Naval Region – Bandar Anzali</u>:<br />
As of 04/2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Afshin Rezai-Haddad. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7]</span><br />
<br />
<u>Independent Bases</u>:<br />
In addition to these regions, the IRIN began operating out of an an independent base in Pasabandar in October 2014, which is located at Iran's south-easternmost corner.<span style="font-size: xx-small;">[8]</span><br />
Other independent bases are rumored to exist along the Gulf of Oman, but these cannot be confirmed at this time.<br />
<br />
<u>Training Centers</u>: <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[9]</span><br />
Imam Khomenei Naval Science and Technology College (Nowshahr)<br />
Marine Training Center (Manjil) <br />
Specialty Training Center (Rasht)<br />
Task Training Center (Sirjan)<br />
<br />
<u>Appendix – Commander IMINT</u>:<br />
Known staff-level personnel include:<br />
- Commander: BG Habibollah Sayyari <br />
- Deputy Commander: BG2 Gholam-Reza Khadem Bigham <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[10]</span><br />
- Deputy, Coordination: BG2 Jafari-Tehrani <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[11]</span><br />
- Deputy, Operations: BG2 Siyavash Jareh <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[12] </span><br />
- Deputy, Manpower: BG2 Mohammed Pourkalaher <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[13]</span> <br />
- Deputy, Engineering and Passive Defense: Hassan Jafari <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[14]</span><br />
- Head of the Ideology/Politics Office: Mohammed Baqer Rooshandel <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[15]</span><br />
- Head of Research and SS Jihad Organization: BG2 Ali Gholamzadeh <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[16] </span><br />
<br />
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<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes/Works Cited</u>: <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] News Meeting with the Commander of the IRIN's 1st Region. <a href="http://khalijefars.isna.ir/Default.aspx?NSID=5&SSLID=46&NID=17629">ISNA</a>. 11/27/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[2] Overhauled Lavan Warship, Combat Chopper Back into Operation.<a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920909000760"> FNA English</a>. 11/30/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[3] "The War of the Bushehr Commandos in Khorramshahr" to be Released Soon. <a href="http://www.iqna.ir/fa/News/1461703">IQNA</a>. 10/19/2014</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[4] Commander of the 2nd Velayat Naval Region (Jask): The Sacred Defense Was the Fulfillment of God's Promise. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/80834575/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87_%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85_%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C_%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA_%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B3%DA%A9_%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3___%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82_%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C_%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 09/27/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[5] Each Year the IRIN Provides Assistance to Low Income People in this Area. <a href="http://www3.bandarabbas.irna.ir/fa/News/80633097/favicon.ico">IRNA</a>. 04/28/2013</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[6] Visit of the Commander of the IRIN's 3rd region with the Friday-Prayers Leader of Konarak During Navy Week. <a href="http://konaraknews.blogfa.com/post/409">Konarak News</a>. 12/02/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[7] Commander: Iranian Navy's Best Destroyers Navigating in Caspian Sea. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930130000638">FNA English</a>. 04/19/2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[8] NEDAJA Forces Deployed in Pasabandar. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/354159/%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF">Mashregh News</a>. 10/15/2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[9] <a href="http://nedaja.aja.ir/">NEDAJA front page & index</a>. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[10] Societal Immunity to Cultural Invasion Are Among the Blessings of the Quran. <a href="http://nedaja.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=25758883-3646-441b-9b8c-e58bdd6c0e5c&WebPartID=b6cafa52-8b09-47e6-bbbb-1901422d12aa&ID=3ede1099-23f6-4601-9c1c-e267c5ff520a">NEDAJA</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[11] Iran [to] Host Conference on Naval Security in the Indian Ocean (IONS) in 2018. <a href="http://nedaja.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=25758883-3646-441b-9b8c-e58bdd6c0e5c&WebPartID=b6cafa52-8b09-47e6-bbbb-1901422d12aa&ID=0516ac2a-d797-42ef-9d98-adb62a7b3812">NEDAJA</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[12] Iranian Navy Warships Repel Pirate Attack on LPG Vessel. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920728000792">FNA English</a>. 10/20/2013.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[13] Interview with BG2 Mohamed Pourkalaher, the IRIN's Manpower Deputy. <a href="http://news.bazarekar.ir/01/Fa/Gallery/Gallery.aspx?gId=44">Bazarekar</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[14] Launch of the Jask Airport by the IRIN. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=811b51fb-3154-427f-a8a7-103dc816c867&WebPartID=d50d9553-9365-4354-984b-e3ceafff8b35&ID=ef450cb6-abf1-4c81-a85f-89c9367bf17e">NEDAJA</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[15] New Head of the IRIN's Political-Ideology Office Appointed. <a href="http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921119000510">FNA</a>. 02/08/2014.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[16] News Meeting Held with Officials from the Army's Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&CategoryID=b8789b0b-9886-4e12-94fb-8ecaaa0f102e&WebPartID=8f4ea065-6385-42a4-b57e-87b7304cd4ba&ID=827dfbee-5821-4a46-9c34-e482436d7efb">AJA</a>. 09/23/2014.</span>Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-31368150691290770482014-10-11T18:56:00.002-07:002014-10-11T19:05:53.567-07:00Basij Organization - The Imam Ali Security BattalionIn the fourth part of 'Basij Organization' series, we look at the organization and role of the Imam Ali security battalions (IA bn).<br />
The<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/02/basij-organization-imam-hussein.html"> first part</a> of this series covered the Imam Hussein battalions.<br />
The <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/03/basij-organization-beit-al-moqdas.html">second part</a> covered Beit al-Moqdas battalions.<br />
The<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/08/basij-organization-semnan.html"> third part</a> took a look at Basij in Semnan province.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhw87XcqOQXGeSgx9eYo6Yy6KgzIyAsBYKthmTscrW7Xwg6lnx7f1rHh9yLf6wvGIaAFgmTYw7-XhsWj4IeY6VNaY-eNTbJ-dW6nGk9CHpikDgxZqohFoy6rWo-CHzdSdnrqn_au2NiFbT/s1600/Khuzestan-December+2013.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhw87XcqOQXGeSgx9eYo6Yy6KgzIyAsBYKthmTscrW7Xwg6lnx7f1rHh9yLf6wvGIaAFgmTYw7-XhsWj4IeY6VNaY-eNTbJ-dW6nGk9CHpikDgxZqohFoy6rWo-CHzdSdnrqn_au2NiFbT/s1600/Khuzestan-December+2013.jpg" height="277" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Imam Ali bn personnel, during a December 2013 exercise in Khuzestan</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<u>Index</u>:<br />
Origin<br />
Acronyms and Abbreviations<br />
Role<br />
Organization (external)<br />
Organization (internal)<br />
Footnotes<br />
<u><br /></u>
<u>Acronyms and Abbreviations</u>:<br />
bn - Battalion<br />
BaM - Beit al-Moqdas [bn]<br />
IA – Imam Ali [bn]<br />
IH – Imam Hussein [bn]<br />
IRGC – Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps<br />
<br />
<u>Origin</u>:<br />
The groundwork for the creation of the Imam Ali security battalion was laid in 2007 when Gen Ali Jafari was appointed to the position of IRGC commander in 2007. Jafari then initiated a well-known restructuring that included strengthening Basij response capabilities across a range of kinetic and non-kinetic domains, while also further integrating them within the IRGC command chain.<br />
<br />
However, following the suppression of the the anti-government demonstrations that followed the 2009 presidential election, in large part by Basij forces, the IRGC sought to translate their 'lessons learned' into developments that could better enable them to respond to such anti-government protests in the future. In fact, according to comments made by Gen. Jafari in August 2014, the recruitment of IA bn personnel came directly from those who played an active role in suppressing the 2009 protests. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span><br />
<br />
Out of this reflection emerged the Imam Ali security battalions. The formation took approximately two years, with first battalions reportedly becoming operational in early/mid-2011. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2] [3]</span><br />
<u><br /></u>
<u>Role</u>:<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJ0aau3kcZWn3X-M2tNkisE9OlFhtJOnoWkytewV1HiFeBA-xQLVOx9lUJxq1ycI8r2c62qHAHaIA5G4Mx9_QmBOFlCSpBcWOLmsTtyMogneRH13nldp3wUcFC18oGwNhgKWYVyhUpbvA-/s1600/21428.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJ0aau3kcZWn3X-M2tNkisE9OlFhtJOnoWkytewV1HiFeBA-xQLVOx9lUJxq1ycI8r2c62qHAHaIA5G4Mx9_QmBOFlCSpBcWOLmsTtyMogneRH13nldp3wUcFC18oGwNhgKWYVyhUpbvA-/s1600/21428.jpg" height="212" width="320" /></a>As one might expect from a battalion formed in the aftermath of the 2009 protests, IA bns are oriented towards the suppression of mass demonstrations in urban areas. Descriptions of their role include the confrontation of “internal threats” <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[4]</span> and “establishing urban security”. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span> They are largely equivalent to the police forces' Special Unit, which also conducts riot-control, though the Special Unit is smaller and more tactically versatile than IA bns.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkoLA789sj2oy6QlJ2mcNgEYSeBkNxjN-c5q-eHWBNnpomhXEGCCpPlKTpg4Z7cT0Lj14r3vp5YXmeMHk1uAUIBt4k70fHH03KLmF39ynyXKb9fS0RBqSXVTRgywqEkR5QI_0fUFwpws05/s1600/13920908135012688_PhotoL.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkoLA789sj2oy6QlJ2mcNgEYSeBkNxjN-c5q-eHWBNnpomhXEGCCpPlKTpg4Z7cT0Lj14r3vp5YXmeMHk1uAUIBt4k70fHH03KLmF39ynyXKb9fS0RBqSXVTRgywqEkR5QI_0fUFwpws05/s1600/13920908135012688_PhotoL.jpg" height="222" width="320" /></a>Although they might otherwise be described as a riot control unit, officials note that their responsibility is not limited to dealing with physical confrontations. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span> Specifically, this means “confronting the enemy's soft threats”, which includes “economic, political, and social pressures”. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7] </span>This means, to be blunt, the suppression of non-violent, civil protests.<br />
<br />
Although this has negative connotations from a liberal point of reference, where it is viewed as further evidence of the IRGC's growing stranglehold over the Islamic Republic's last gasping institutions of democracy, it is an entirely legitimate response when viewed through the lens of the IRGC's 'soft war' narrative.<br />
<br />
This narrative posits that since WWII the spectrum of warfare has been broadened by the West to encompass not just the traditional concept of kinetic war – which is labeled as 'hard war' – but also includes abstract concepts that fall far outside traditional security domains (aka securocratic wars). Specifically, it argues that social liberalization is a threat to the Revolutionary System equal to that of the Saddam's invasion, but instead of relying on tanks to topple the government, soft war relies on tactics that decrease the legitimacy of said government, ranging from human-rights promotion, to the sale of candy bars, to criticisms of the government's handling of the economy.<br />
<br />
Although easy to dismiss as just another example of autocratic insecurity, like Qaddafi laying the blame for anti-government protests on the youths these days what with their LSD and their MDMA, Tehran's argument – at its most basic – is absolutely true. Social liberalization <u>DOES</u> pose an existential threat to the Revolutionary System, whose core pillar of legitimacy rests on a state of perpetual confrontation between the Global Oppressed (Iran), and the Global Oppressor (the West with a capital-'W'). Calling this Manichean narrative into question by entertaining a political posture that is anything less than total resistance against what is ostensibly an absolute evil, calls into question the very raison d'etre for the Revolutionary government. <br />
<br />
Indeed, this perspective is actually firmly rooted in the historical record. It builds on established western theory when it comes to the concept of 'soft power', as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose demise was due in large part to the attractive power of Western norms like human rights and the free exchange of people and ideas across borders. During the Cold War, promotion of these norms following the 1975 Helsinki Agreement helped galvanize domestic opposition across the Eastern Bloc, who called for greater freedoms and political rights, a process which eventually culminated in the collapse of post-WWII communist project. <br />
<br />
Although numerous criticisms of this perspective can be made – the main one being that if Tehran's Revolutionary ideology is less attractive than liberal political and social norms, than perhaps it doesn't deserve to be defended in the first place – one cannot take the intellectually lazy approach and simply write it off as the product of an evil government. In fact, Tehran's narrative would find the distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful protests, and the distinction between civilian and soldier exactly as useful as the distinction between a tank and a fighter aircraft, they may operate in different domains, but both are legitimate combatants nonetheless. <br />
<br />
<u>Organization (external)</u>:<br />
As with other Basij battalions, an accurate image of the total number of IA bns is unavailable. Because they are focused on urban security, a reasonable assumption is that they are concentrated near major urban areas, particularly Tehran given it's political importance and high-density. <br />
<br />
In October 2011, it was reported that Gen. Jafari attended a ceremony with 31,000 Basij from IA bns in the Tehran area, though this reporting is likely inflated, or otherwise inaccurate given that a year later in September 2012, Jafari reported that “more than 100” IA battalions had been formed, ostensibly nationwide. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[8] [9]</span> This suggests that the personnel strength mentioned the year before likely corresponds to a national strength. Jafari also noted in his 2012 comment that 400 IH battalions had been created, hinting at a 1:4 ratio between IA and IH-type battalions. This provisional ratio is largely born out by the author's observation, which indicates that IA bns are deployed at a lower rate than other types. <br />
<br />
<u>Organization (internal)</u>:<br />
Unlike other Basij battalions – such as the IH or BaM bns – an accurate image of IA bn strength cannot be provided at this point. The same is true of the bns subordinate units, including companies and platoons. It is a reasonable assumption is that it does not diverge too far from the pattern established in other battalions. That is, one should expect a strength of around 200 personnel, organized into three companies. <br />
<br />
Battalion personnel are typically equipped with: protective vests, helmets and face-guards, circular or rectangular riot shields, batons, and paintball-guns (the latter likely firing pepper-spray projectiles).<br />
<br />
IA bns make heavy use of motorcycles for urban mobility, recalling the ubiquitous imagery of the 2009 election protests. These are typically operated by teams of two, a vehicle operator and a dismount who carries a circular shield and baton. These are supplemented by a smaller number of lightly armored vehicles such as Land Cruisers.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgO3Hxy4qaKUa4if2k7co-DJadxMcCNMcx0lvJo0Y775gyRIzVhN8TpQNyA3ET12ReRUQ_BirhQBcWrw5P2ZzotnFFHcPG3P5aV2Jbcmy028lVFVtQ1UDJKG-TqX6fuH7sVtg60RHX02MRt/s1600/IMG_2243.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgO3Hxy4qaKUa4if2k7co-DJadxMcCNMcx0lvJo0Y775gyRIzVhN8TpQNyA3ET12ReRUQ_BirhQBcWrw5P2ZzotnFFHcPG3P5aV2Jbcmy028lVFVtQ1UDJKG-TqX6fuH7sVtg60RHX02MRt/s1600/IMG_2243.jpg" height="241" width="320" /></a></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq-GT4fwr_oqUHfC4zXfEOf2cyP8hMDlNZI9PG1X1j4EXO6EEJMQdnkmTgLyocmKsB3bmKnwjp0M7advMlUaUhHMkIrL6N5TxYrlWgt7ErQu7SU9IwRHhYDFZ3HOv8ejsr35ojuCV3rxW0/s1600/2009_Tactical+Employent_b_Via+getty.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq-GT4fwr_oqUHfC4zXfEOf2cyP8hMDlNZI9PG1X1j4EXO6EEJMQdnkmTgLyocmKsB3bmKnwjp0M7advMlUaUhHMkIrL6N5TxYrlWgt7ErQu7SU9IwRHhYDFZ3HOv8ejsr35ojuCV3rxW0/s1600/2009_Tactical+Employent_b_Via+getty.jpg" height="213" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Tactical employment of motorcycles by police in 2009</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOuAV09SeAlzY_CXaS-baAldVranhOiA7JO4SSVe2EYj2NHbZDALnpfY_hHxtrB1tua1BnSv87D_rLFl0p5tJWmUtSSjtphkpZsTo_eGdyVwLaGw0zLliVq9FFSdwgT9-ZyEQELmGvKcVG/s1600/50040.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOuAV09SeAlzY_CXaS-baAldVranhOiA7JO4SSVe2EYj2NHbZDALnpfY_hHxtrB1tua1BnSv87D_rLFl0p5tJWmUtSSjtphkpZsTo_eGdyVwLaGw0zLliVq9FFSdwgT9-ZyEQELmGvKcVG/s1600/50040.jpg" height="239" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Armored Land Cruiser</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes</u>: <br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] The recent confrontation with the Fitna '88 formed the Imam Ali battalions. <a href="http://www.jamejamonline.ir/newspreview/1626061285877029851">Jam-e Jam</a>. 08/30/14.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[2] Imam Ali battalions active in the Semnan Province's IRGC. <a href="http://mojnews.com/fa/Miscellaneous/ViewContents.aspx?Contract=cms_Contents_I_News&r=764857">Moj News. </a>05/11/11. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[3] Two-day tactical practice exercise for Imam Ali security battalions held in in Darab. <a href="http://bpfars.ir/fa/news/15743/%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%AA%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF">BP Fars</a>. 10/05/13.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[4] ibid BP Fars, 10/05/13.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[5] ibid Moj News, 05/11/11. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[6] Our task is not only to deal with physical incidents.<a href="http://www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID=2372655"> Etemaad Newspaper</a>. 10/08/11</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[7] ibid Moj News, 05/11/11. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[8] ibid Etemaad, 10/08/11</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[9] Organization of more than 100 Imam Ali security battalions. <a href="http://www.pana.ir/Pages/Printable-News-6582.aspx">PANA</a>. 09/28/12.</span>Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-9449338755129899292014-09-30T19:46:00.003-07:002014-09-30T20:02:51.501-07:00[Translation] - Interview with Gen. Pourdastan on Iranian Assistance to Iraq and the 'Daesh' Threat In the following interview with the commander of Iran's Army Ground Forces - BG Pourdastan - he doesn't offer any groundbreaking revelations when it comes to Iran's security policy, but he does offer a handful of noteworthy comments. <br />
<br />
First, he describes the existence of political-security red-lines "far from Iran's borders". This isn't a new trope in Tehran's lexicon, but is important in the continued recognition of the fundamentally trans-national nature of Iran's national-security. Whether it's Tehran's concerns in the Levant, or Moscow's desire for a glacis in eastern-Europe, or Washington's continued hegemony over the Caribbean Basin, national security is never just national.<br />
<br />
Second, he couches the rise of ISIS within the same historical processes that account for Tehran's interpretation of the post-Soviet political scene, and the resulting 'future war' framework that encompasses the so-called soft, semi-hard, and hard forms of war. For documents related to this theoretical outlook, see the following rough translations:<br />
<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/02/translation-what-is-soft-war-and-ways.html">What is Soft War, and Ways of Confronting It</a><br />
<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/08/title-recognizing-enemy-and-paying.html">Recognizing the Enemy and Paying Attention to the Leader's Guidance Keeps the County Safe </a><a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/03/translation-selected-writings-on-modern.html">Selected Writings on Modern War Theory</a><br />
<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/06/translation-will-history-repeat-itself.html">Will History Repeat Itself? [Iran's Characterization of the 1975 Helsinki Accords] </a><br />
If one ignores those articles and only takes one thing away from this post, it should be that for Tehran, the threat from ISIS is the same as that from Twitter, or Facebook, or any of the other manifestations of calls for a more open society. The difference between the two is, to indulge in a bit of hyperbole, no more than the difference between an M1A2 Abrams, and an F-16; they simply operate in different domains.<br />
<br />
This, tragically, is the legacy of Revolutionary ideology. A world view dominated by the Manichean struggle between the Global Arrogance and the Global Oppressed, cannot help but see every event in these terms. Like other post-colonial ideologies, Khomenei's Islamic Ideology remains bound by the same constructed power relationships it sought to overturn, building up an image of a skilled, scheming, omniscient Washington unfettered by incompetence, coincidence, or above all, the agency of others. <br />
<br />
Third, he describes Iran's military support for Iraq as training, noting that if Baghdad requests more, it would go through Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), before being implemented by the branches of the Armed Forces itself.<br />
<br />
Fourth, he characterizes the Army Ground Forces' doctrinal theory of 'rapid reaction' in terms of two distinct threats; a transregional power (aka, NATO/the US), and regional proxy wars. This is consistent with the global embrace of 'rapid reaction' forces that has happened worldwide in line with the declining likelihood of conflict requiring the full-scale mobilization of a nation's industrial might, and the increasing demands placed on a national OODA-loop to quickly respond to, and deploy force against, security threats. In short, just like <a href="http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/08/31/an-introduction-to-the-so-called-wild-or-national-battalions-of-the-russian-federation-currently-engaged-in-ukraine/">Russia's RRFs in Ukraine</a>, the US's Stryker Brigades, or the UN's own RRF in Bosnia, Iran is seeking a lightweight force that can quickly be deployed to a theater for limited kinetic engagements short of full mobilization.<br />
<br />
Fifth, he notes (in a paragraph that is omitted below) that the Zulfiqar tank has entered mass production.<br />
As a Zulfiqar-enthusiast, let's just say that I'll believe that when I see it. <br />
<br />
---<br />
<br />
Title: <b>Our Assistance to Iraq in the Struggle against ISIS is Training / Holding of Two National Exercises in the East and West of the Country / We are not Exposed to Transregional Threats</b><br />
Date: September 28, 2014 / Mehr 6, 1393<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/512960">Tasnim News</a><br />
Note: Following translation is approximate. While accuracy is estimated to be high, it's precision is not. <br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Stating that that Iran has assisted Iraq with training in the struggle against, the commander of the Army Ground Forces said: A big exercise in the southwest and another in the southeast, which are national-level maneuvers, will be held.<br />
<br />
In an interview during Sacred Defense Week, Amir Pourdastan said about the defensive ability and readiness of our military to confront threats: The continued observation of threats is one of the tasks of the military's tasks, and the provide the necessary defensive capacity as they observe regional and trans-regional threats, and analyze their intelligence-personnel.<br />
<br />
The commander emphasized: Our defense industry has very close communication with universities, and in addition to this, the military forces have innovative and creative individuals who can build arms and provide them to the military. <br />
<br />
** <b>Our red lines are very far from our borders / We now face the new methods used by threats </b><br />
Pourdastan continued about the new threats and solutions in confronting them, saying: Today we face the new methods [being used by] these threats, threats which are different from those in the past, and as the arm of the Islamic Republic we must create and strengthen our capacity to confront them. One of these threats are the activities of Takfiri groups in Iraq, Syria, and around Iran. To confront these, we have created the necessary capacity in our self, and we are watching all the movement of these groups. We've determined that if these terrorist groups or Takfiris come close to crossing our red-lines, which are very far away from Iran's borders, a heavy blow will be dealt to them.<br />
<br />
** <b>Our assistance to Iraq in the struggle with ISIS has been training</b><br />
The commander of the Army Ground Forces said about Iran's cooperation with the government of Iraq in the struggle against ISIS: Our main assistance to our brothers in Iraq has been training, and ... considering that the people of Iraq are under pressure every day, Iran has sent aid so that the pressure on them is reduced, however the primary assistance has been training, and if the government of Iraq requests military assistance from Iran, the AFGS will review this request and we will be implement it.<br />
<br />
**<b>ISIS is borne of America's Imagination, Thoughts, and Strategy in the Region</b><br />
According to Pourdastan, the US-headed coalition that was formed against ISIS cannot be a solution against ISIS, because if we go back a bit,we see that ISIS was born by the same imperialist countries, meaning that ISIS is borne of America's imagination, thoughts, and strategy in the region.<br />
<br />
And in response to a question about the reason for the historical formation of these Takfiri groups, he said: If I want to point out the history of these Takfiri groups, it is necessary to go back some time. This subject returns to matters related to the collapse of the of the USSR. After the collapse, America became the only superpower, and after several years one of the research institutes in America offered a theory stating that a new power was emerging, which would pose challenges if America could not confront it. [The institute said that] this power is the Islamic world, and comes from Shia-Sunni unity, which is [inspired] by the Islamic Revolution.<br />
<br />
Pourdastan said: America conducted lot of analysis and ultimately arrived at the conclusion that they themselves must enter the Middle East and West Asia, however to do this they needed an excuse, the same excuse that Mossad and the CIA planned. After the events of 9/11, it was one of the puppet groups that gave this excuse to America, with which America resorted to in order to enter the region with the objective of confronting of the pole of power in the Islamic world. After the Islamic Awakening, they saw that the countries in the region had awoken. <br />
<br />
** <b>The Main Goal of America is Confronting Iran.</b><br />
Pourdastan said: America's intention was confronting the Islamic Republic, however because of [the wise leadership of the Supreme Leader and the military's readiness], they headed towards Iraq and Afghanistan so that they could create a [regional development] and confront the Islamic Republic.<br />
<br />
Meanwhile, America suffered from challenges caused by the high economic cost, their soldier's lack of motivation, national discontent, worldwide discontent, so that they changed their strategy and today have placed proxy-wars on their agenda, and now ISIS fights as an American proxy in the region and the objective of America is not to confront ISIS.<br />
<br />
**<b> The way to confront ISIS, is not with Tomahawk missiles / This is no way to confront ISIS </b><br />
The commander of the Army Ground Forces said about the difficulties in confronting ISIS: The Takfiri-terrorist group ISIS is not a regular military force with positions that can be targeted by bombs or missiles. This group [uses] the strategy of hiding themselves among the people, and for this reason the way to confront these groups is not with Tomahawk missiles, and I [can firmly say] that until now, aerial bombing and missiles have only destroyed the infrastructure of Iraq and Syria, and ... is no counter to ISIS.<br />
<br />
Pourdastan ...said: If America is honest in their words, and want to confront ISIS, they must confront the countries that send ISIS money and arms, that buy oil from them, and use their land to train new forces, and then send them to Syria and Iraq. However, now we see a sham movement under the supervision of America, the [ostensible purpose] of which is to confront ISIS, [but] it is certain that this movement will not take this path, and I do not think that ISIS will be weakened by it. <br />
<br />
According to Pourdastan, the thing that would weaken and cripple ISIS is Shia-Sunni unity. When the Shia and Sunni authorities enter the field and give a fatwa, people [will] leave ISIS, [and then] Iraqi Army [can] take over. After this presence of [Shia and Sunni] religious authorities, we can have a role in stopping ISIS[.] [After] ISIS had come [as far as] Diyala, we now see that that [after an initial] retreat, the Iraqi Army has found a role [thanks to] the widespread popular support, and in the near future we will witness the destruction of ISIS in Iraq. I think that the Iraqi Army, thank god, has a very good capacity. <br />
<br />
He said: It has good capability in terms of ground, air and helicopter[-warfare], is capable when confronting ISIS, and also enjoys popular support. However, if they request assistance from the Islamic Republic, it will be raised in the SNSC, and the military forces are prepared to provide any kind of assistance that is necessary.<br />
... <br />
** <b>We have good rapid reaction forces at our disposal</b><br />
And in reference to Iran's new strategy for confronting these terrorist threats, including the formation of rapid reaction forces, he said: We have increased the Army ground forces capabilities in two areas of asymmetric threats, including the area of confronting a trans-regional country, and another area of proxy wars and confronting terrorist groups, and we have good rapid reaction forces at our disposal, which can enter this field and in these areas utilize all the military capacity of the Islamic Republic, and we use a joint-plan with the IRGC which has been planned, practiced, organized, and implemented so in case this threat materializes, we have the experience to confront it. </blockquote>
Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-17665377336598355272014-09-29T20:17:00.000-07:002014-09-30T00:01:07.183-07:00Northeast Regional Operations Headquarters<span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Index</u>:</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Acronyms and Abbreviations</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Introduction </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Headquarters</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Components</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Appendix<span style="font-family: inherit;">: Personnel Structure and Commander IMINT</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Footnot<span style="font-family: inherit;">es/Works<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Cited</span> </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Acro</u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>n</u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>yms and Abbreviations</u>:</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">AB: Armored Brigade </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Army: Term of art that refers specifically to the <span style="font-family: inherit;">'<span style="font-family: inherit;">Artesh'<span style="font-family: inherit;"> (aka. the regular-armed-forces). Distinct from 'Army' as a general <span style="font-family: inherit;">reference either to a nat<span style="font-family: inherit;">io<span style="font-family: inherit;">n's <span style="font-family: inherit;">ground forces, or <span style="font-family: inherit;">armed forces in general</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">BG: Brigadier General</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">BG2: </span></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Brigadier </span></span></span>General, 2nd<span style="font-family: inherit;">-Class</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">CB: Commando Brigade </span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Col.: Colonel </span> </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">HQ: Headquarters </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">IB: Infantry Brigade </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">IRIA: Islamic Republic of Iran Army (AKA<span style="font-family: inherit;">, Army Grou<span style="font-family: inherit;">nd Forces, or NEZAJA</span></span>) </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">IRIADF: Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force (<span style="font-family: inherit;">AKA, Khat<span style="font-family: inherit;">am ol-Anb<span style="font-family: inherit;">i<span style="font-family: inherit;">ya Headquarters</span>)</span></span></span> </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">IRIA<span style="font-family: inherit;">F: Islamic Re<span style="font-family: inherit;">public of Iran Air Force</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">MIB: Mechanized Infantry Brigade </span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span> </span></span> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Introduction</u>:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The third part in this series covers the Army's Northeast Operations Headquarters, which is based in Mashhad, and borders Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. The<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/04/north-west-regional-operations.html"> first part</a> in this series covers the Northwest Headquarters, and the <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/04/western-regional-operations-headquarters.html">second part</a> covers the Western Headquarters. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Northeast HQ is one of five other regional HQs created under the Army Ground Forces' (IRIA) 'Samen restructuring plan'. Operating on the assumption that they would face a simultaneous, multi-front attack that would preclude centralized strategic control of battles, the IRIA created these HQs to control operations and coordinate tactical actions within their respective theaters. By coordinating tactical actions at this level, the IRIA hopes to achieve their operational objective of regional integrity, which when taken as a whole comprises the national-level defense-in-depth strategy.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Their role is further described by the commander of the IRIA – BG Ahmed Reza Pourdastan – in a 2013 interview: </span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">“With the objective that units be completely self-sufficient and be able to confront threats independently, we created five regional headquarters in the northeast, southeast, southwest, west, and northwest, and we designed the structure and organization of these headquarters to be self-sufficient and not need outside equipment when confronting threats. These HQs have all of the structure and organization required for an independent and self-sufficient unit, [including] support, and transport units, as well as hospitals.”<span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Headquarters</u>:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The HQ itself is based in the city of Mashhad, and is currently commanded by BG2 Ali Jahanshahi, who was appointed to the position in November 2013. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2] [3]</span> Its deputy commander is BG2 Hadi Pour-Esmail<span style="font-family: inherit;">. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[</span></span><span style="font-size: xx-small;">4] </span>The HQ's area of responsibility covers the provinces of South Khorasan, Razavi Khorasan, North Khorasan, Golestan, Mazandaran, and Semnan. Moreover, as the top Army body in the region, the HQ is also responsible for other Army forces, including the Air Defense Force (IRIADF) and the Air Force (IRIAF). <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<u><span style="font-family: inherit;">Components:</span></u><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Units subordinate to the headquarters include the now-independent brigades of the Army Ground Forces' 77th Mechanized, 30th Infantry, and 58th Commando Divisions, as well as the pre-existing 38th Armored Brigade, the newly formed 444th Engineering Group. Less is known about other Army units ostensibly under the HQ's authority, including the IRIADF's own regional operations, and the IRIAF's forward-air-station and tactical-fighter-base.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 77th 'Sa A'Pirouz Samen Alaeme' Mechanized Infantry Division Operations HQ (IRIA) <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;">Location: Mashhad</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: BG2 Reza Azriyan <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Associated Units:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">177th Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Torbat Heydariyeh</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: Col. Abufazl Bozorgi <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[8]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">277th 'Shahid Tavalaee' Brigade </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Quchan</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: Col Gholamreza/Alireza Fakhrabad <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[9]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">377th 'Shahid Sarlashkar Parooz Hebroni' Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Mashhad</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: BG2 Masoud Tamizi <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[10]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 30th Infantry Division </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">(IRIA)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Gorgan</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> <span style="font-family: inherit;">Cmdr</span>: Unknown</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Associated Units:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">130th 'Shahid Daljuyan' Infantry Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Bojnourd</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: Col. Alireza Sadeqi <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[11]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">230th 'Shahid Mataji' Infantry Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Mazandaran and Golestan prov'n; Gorgan, Gonba<span style="font-family: inherit;">d</span>, Azadshahr,<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>and Doab. <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[12]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: BG2 Hossein Mirtaqi <span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: xx-small;">[</span><span style="font-size: xx-small;">13]</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> 330th Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Gorgan <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[14]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Note: Little or no references to brigade. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 58th 'Zulfiqar' Commando Division Operations HQ </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">(IRIA)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Shahrud</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Cmdr: BG2 Majid Zareh <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[15]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"> Associated Units<span style="font-family: inherit;">:</span></span> </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">158th 'Shahid Keshavarzian' Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Location: Shahrud</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Cmdr: Col. Mehdi Mehmarbashi <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[16]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> </span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> 258th 'Shahid Pajuhandeh' Brigade</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Location: Shahrud</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Cmdr: Col. Abulqassem Karimi Hosseini<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[17]</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 38th Independent Armored Brigade </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">(IRIA)</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Location: Torbat Jam<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>Cmdr: Col. Mohammed Suleimani <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[18]</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 444th Combat Engineering Group (IRIA)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Location: Unknown</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: Unknown</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- Region 5 Logistics/Support (IRIA)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Location: Mashhad</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: BG2 Hossein Firouzyan <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[19]</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 5th Army-Aviation Combat Base (IRIAA)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: Col. Abdulreza Khodadadi <span style="font-size: xx-small;">[20]</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Includes 'Vali Asr' UAV group; no details. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 'Imam Reza' North<span style="font-family: inherit;">east</span> Air Defense Region (IRIADF)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: BG2 Abdallah Rashad <span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: xx-small;">[</span><span style="font-size: xx-small;">21]</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- Mashhad Forward Air Station (IRIAF)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Location: Mashhad</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: Unknown</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">- 12th 'Shahid Hosseini' Tactical Air Base (IRIAF)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Location: Birjand</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span>Cmdr: Col. Hamid Moustafavi <span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: xx-small;">[</span><span style="font-size: xx-small;">22]</span></span><br />
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<u>Appendix: Personnel Structure and Commander IMINT</u>:<br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><u>Footnotes/Works Cited</u>:</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[1]</span></span></span></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i> Rapid Reaction, the Focus of Future Wars: Evaluation of NEZAJA rapid reaction Forces from the Sacred Defense to the Samen Plan</i>. <a href="http://www.aja.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&CategoryID=b8789b0b-9886-4e12-94fb-8ecaaa0f102e&WebPartID=5f839c92-0f3f-44f6-b8e5-54f8133dd762&ID=10fe0e20-ec47-460e-97cc-5b48d647f2e3">AJA</a>. 02/25/2013 </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[2] <i>Top Army Commander in the Northeast: The Sympathy of the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Armed Forces </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>was a Factor in the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Success of Operation Samen Alaeme</i>. IRNA. 09/27<span style="font-family: inherit;">/2014</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[3] [<span style="font-family: inherit;">temporarily</span> unavailable, as of 09/28/2014] <a href="http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=2&year=1390&month=10&day=18&id=3563312">Khorasan News</a>. </span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span>0<span style="font-family: inherit;">1</span>/<span style="font-family: inherit;">08</span>/201<span style="font-family: inherit;">2</span>.</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">4</span>] <i>The Army is Holding Eight Programs in </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>North Khorasan</i>. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2373665">MNA</a>. 09/20/2014.</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">5</span>] <i>The Ac</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>tivity of Transregional Country</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>s' Military Forces are in Full View of the Iranian Army</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911101000883">FNA</a>. 01/20/2013</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">6</span>]<i> Judo Champ</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>ionship Held by Units of the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>NEZAJA's North East Regional HQ</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/80779563/%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%B4%DB%8C/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D9%82%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%88_%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87_%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84_%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82_%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7_%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%B4%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 08/19/2<span style="font-family: inherit;">013</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">7</span>] [news i<span style="font-family: inherit;">n brief; no title</span>] <a href="http://www.nasimonline.ir/detail/News/664514/0"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nasim Onl<span style="font-family: inherit;">ine</span></span></a>. 11/05/2013.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">8</span>] <i>[<span style="font-family: inherit;">F</span>lowers <span style="font-family: inherit;">L</span>aid on the] Graves of Martyrs </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>in Torbat </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Heydari</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>yeh</i>. <a href="http://torbateman.ir/%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%AA-%D8%AD%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%B7%D8%B1/">Torbat-e Man</a>. 09/25/2014</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">9</span>]<span style="font-family: inherit;"> <i>The Army's Self-Confidence and Self-Sufficiency is the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>C</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>auses Frustration in the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Arrogance</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930129000393">FNA</a>. 04/18/2014.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">10</span>]<i> Interview with Seven Honorable [Generals] of Iran</i>. <a href="http://www.sardabir.com/websearch/35720.html">Khorasan/Sardabir</a>. 04/17/2014.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">11</span>] ibid MNA 09/20/2014</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">12</span>] <i>Military Forces from the 230th Brigade to Hold </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Parades in Four Cities in Golestan and Mazandaran</i>. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/TextVersionDetail/2272367">MNA</a>. 04/17/2014.</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">13</span>] <i>Th</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>e Power and Stability of the Army Ground Forces to be Displayed During Sacred Defense Week</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81320591/">IRNA</a>. 08/25/2014</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">14</span>] </span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">temporarily</span> unavailable, as of 09/28/2014] <a href="http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=4&year=1392&month=2&day=17&id=4862529">Khorasan News</a>. 05/07/2013</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">15</span>] <i>The Warriors of the S</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>acred Defense Proved the Legitimacy of Islamic Iran to the World</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81321862/">IRNA</a>. 09/22/<span style="font-family: inherit;">2014</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">16</span>] <i>The Capabil</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>ity of the Army Today</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i> Is </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Not [Concealed]</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930129000464">FNA</a>. 04/18/2014</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">17</span>] <i>The Main Role of the Army in the Protection of the </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Homeland / </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Model </i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>[Establishing <span style="font-family: inherit;">During</span>] the Sacred Defense is Fixing Problems</i>. <a href="http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2272683">MNA</a>. 04/17/2013.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">1<span style="font-family: inherit;">8</span></span>]</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> <i>The Army</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i> Has Brought Honor and Pride to the Popula</i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>tion</i>. <a href="http://jamerooz.ir/world/2014/04/18/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1">Jam</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jamerooz.ir/world/2014/04/18/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1">-e Rooz</a>. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> 04/18/2014</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">19</span>] ibid Khorasan<span style="font-family: inherit;">/Sardabir, 04/17/2014</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<span style="font-family: inherit;">20</span>]</span></span></span></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> ibid Khorasan<span style="font-family: inherit;">/Sardabir, 04/17/2014</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">[21] </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">ibid Khorasan<span style="font-family: inherit;">/Sardabir, 04/17/2014</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">[22] <i>IRIAF Air Bases</i>. <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/07/iriaf-air-bases.html">The Arkenstone</a>. 07/22/2014</span> </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></span></span>Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-1853795271045082782014-09-19T13:43:00.000-07:002014-09-19T13:45:05.687-07:00Iran's Army Ground Forces' General Staff<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGSdQrpPiGMJlNslfB9LL_ZtrFYOuZTp_h7gj8mqHi-ph4Acru1pqOC2NEGch7i3UqL1L87vm-SaxnYQbGk6WInwY9iosWCX62ZF4CRn1aTzp4B0S_27kR449sbhS5pNPpiVcPuY26zugR/s1600/Draw_NEZAJA+Staff_Export.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGSdQrpPiGMJlNslfB9LL_ZtrFYOuZTp_h7gj8mqHi-ph4Acru1pqOC2NEGch7i3UqL1L87vm-SaxnYQbGk6WInwY9iosWCX62ZF4CRn1aTzp4B0S_27kR449sbhS5pNPpiVcPuY26zugR/s1600/Draw_NEZAJA+Staff_Export.jpg" height="586" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Enlarge to view full size</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-23130761717959178292014-09-17T17:41:00.000-07:002014-09-18T01:06:41.353-07:00Hazrat Masumeh Air Defense Group (IRIADF)<u>Index</u>:<br />
Acronyms and Abbreviations<br />
Introduction and Overview <br />
Primary Garrison<br />
FFEP Deployment<br />
Footnotes and Works Cited <br />
<br />
<u>Acronyms and Abbreviatons</u>:<br />
AAA: Anti-Aircraft Artillery <br />
ADG: Air Defense Group<br />
BG2: Brigadier General, Second Class <br />
FFEP: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant<br />
HM [ADG]: Hazrat Masumeh [Air Defense Group]<br />
IRIADF: Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force; aka Khatem ol-Anbiya Air Defense HQ<br />
Lt. Col. : Lieutenant Colonel<br />
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile <br />
UGF: Underground Facility<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLfCyNmssKTCFh01m6wP6v2l8wMyelQ2s6qPXSpuqzwQEkgPEGzJqto01JL8RqJ76_c1EdFWRsWrmHLlqE2Uf02jZP-EKdun1SY_Og_N6kcianAF_Ywt2mQmI3itrXE1_u_-zd-5OMr1o4/s1600/HM+Group+Commander+-+LtCol+Abarshi+(2).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLfCyNmssKTCFh01m6wP6v2l8wMyelQ2s6qPXSpuqzwQEkgPEGzJqto01JL8RqJ76_c1EdFWRsWrmHLlqE2Uf02jZP-EKdun1SY_Og_N6kcianAF_Ywt2mQmI3itrXE1_u_-zd-5OMr1o4/s1600/HM+Group+Commander+-+LtCol+Abarshi+(2).jpg" height="137" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Lt. Col. Abarshi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<u>Introduction and Overview</u>: <br />
The IRIADF's Hazrat Masumeh Air Defense Group (HM ADG) was formed in 2009 to protect the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). It's current commander is Lt. Col. Hossein Abarshi. [1] Based on it's location near Qom, the HM ADG should be subordinate to the Central Air Defense Region, under the command of BG2 Abazar Jookar. [2]<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjonyG0uAdA2L6QUjUNw3HGFBElziwsiq5adH2niENeY6SPO5tfjFb94kvk2oQuLHmFZOx6qlr1n5aQUVQoJvW_-f74RvPvS6ahGX-Blrr5lH29KpQlXsus6mLiVGzz9km0r94MQCcrItYR/s1600/Draw_Export_1_Region+Overview.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjonyG0uAdA2L6QUjUNw3HGFBElziwsiq5adH2niENeY6SPO5tfjFb94kvk2oQuLHmFZOx6qlr1n5aQUVQoJvW_-f74RvPvS6ahGX-Blrr5lH29KpQlXsus6mLiVGzz9km0r94MQCcrItYR/s1600/Draw_Export_1_Region+Overview.jpg" height="260" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />
<u>Primary Garrison</u>:<br />
The Group's primary garrison is located along the Qom-Tehran Freeway, in-between the the FFEP and the military depot to the west. <br />
<br />
Construction began between 09/2009 and 03/2011, which is consistent with the group's reported creation date. As of the most recent imagery – 03/2013 – only a handful of buildings had been completed, and much of the available space remains undeveloped.<br />
<br />
As least some of the group's equipment can be seen from 01/2012 onward, including AAA and equipment containers. Between 01/2012 and 08/2012, construction began on a UGF dug into the hillside to the north of the garrison.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiUN3UBgcfgnDE-DEde1PJhe5MTyvtSL7_4V576ZVK1NOBelt30__CFAPwY06cpag_geccjd1eTizjVZVhTXAE7sWIJWkRb4FAfSMrQ7beqjLz_0FjeqS7p-vrUSfJM2zAu6VLbJNWhHyB/s1600/Draw_Export_Primary+Garrison.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiiUN3UBgcfgnDE-DEde1PJhe5MTyvtSL7_4V576ZVK1NOBelt30__CFAPwY06cpag_geccjd1eTizjVZVhTXAE7sWIJWkRb4FAfSMrQ7beqjLz_0FjeqS7p-vrUSfJM2zAu6VLbJNWhHyB/s1600/Draw_Export_Primary+Garrison.jpg" height="308" width="640" /></a><br />
<u>FFEP Deployment</u>:<br />
Much of the group is deployed to the FFEP itself, where a small garrison for the site's security can be found alongside a separate facility for FFEP personnel. The two can be distinguished by the former's parade-yard, obstacle-course, and proximity to nearby firing-ranges and munition-storage shelters. This garrison pre-dates the HM ADG's formation, and is documented as far back as 06/2004.<br />
<br />
The creation of the HM ADG in 2009 can be observed in the deployment of increasing levels of air-defense in the following years. Deployments are focused in a northward-facing arc, thanks to the passive defense provided by the range of hills running east-west, into whose north-face the FFEP is dug.<br />
<br />
As of late-2009, no air-defense assets are visible. By 2011, several sites had been established, including: <br />
<br />
1) Short/medium-range SAM Battery, most likely the MIM-23 HAWK. The battery is only visible at full-strength in 03/2011, with one of the firing-sections having displaced by the year's end. Four Zu-23-2s were deployed nearby.<br />
<br />
2) Four 35 mm GDF-001/002s. Two of these were deployed in individual emplacements, while the other two were part of a Skyguard emplacement. <br />
<br />
3) Four-gun AAA battery, organized into two firing sections. The type of gun is unknown, though the 100 mm KS-19 is a possibility. Orientation is toward the north-west.<br />
<br />
At this time, the sites are characterized by ongoing construction, and field-expedient infrastructure. Revetments are bulldozed earth, roads are unpaved, and earth-moving equipment can be seen at work. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj05t6AAIEVlHmdmyex6Qk_PxoUVNNiqrwTmcVmd62o57cxoeIihgpGc9H2x_O_LG_p5lnhKOnro0aA24nROJJg5VLK6kovkJUl4q7J7yn7fcBA7SoL8yZM6RASbnhQu2y2dYrNsmBQWLqJ/s1600/Draw_Export_2011.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj05t6AAIEVlHmdmyex6Qk_PxoUVNNiqrwTmcVmd62o57cxoeIihgpGc9H2x_O_LG_p5lnhKOnro0aA24nROJJg5VLK6kovkJUl4q7J7yn7fcBA7SoL8yZM6RASbnhQu2y2dYrNsmBQWLqJ/s1600/Draw_Export_2011.jpg" height="304" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />
By the end of 2012, the sites showed increasing signs of permanency, though the overall strength was only mildly increased. This includes:<br />
<br />
1) SAM firing-section. Though the original site is largely unchanged, except for the removal of AAA, construction had begun on a more permanent site further west with raised concrete pads reminiscent of Iran's other HAWK sites. <br />
<br />
2) Two of the individually emplaced GDFs were relocated to permanent sites around the perimeter; a third GDF supplemented these. Meanwhile, the original Skyguard site had been vacated, and replaced with a four-gun battery of Zu-23-2s.<br />
<br />
3) The northwest-oriented AAA battery remained, and had been further developed with raised concrete pads and crew facilities. <br />
<br />
4) Further east, an early-warning radar – likely the Matla ul-Fajr, judging from antenna shadow and container type – had been deployed in a non-permanent site. <br />
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5) By the end of 2012, construction had begun on a permanent Skyguard site just south of the EW-radar. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgwGihfd10KwTZi19TaEScu9M5Ry6v6rFC0hIBKpmmgQpwH6GYkTrjkUfMPVe4M603NlgKauCNE781-Fvk0jLKxvzfKG-P_FmU9S9Yjxtwajf3zkQIcMvGDjHKQ32XvDF3PX25CTchOAZpa/s1600/Draw_Export_2012.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgwGihfd10KwTZi19TaEScu9M5Ry6v6rFC0hIBKpmmgQpwH6GYkTrjkUfMPVe4M603NlgKauCNE781-Fvk0jLKxvzfKG-P_FmU9S9Yjxtwajf3zkQIcMvGDjHKQ32XvDF3PX25CTchOAZpa/s1600/Draw_Export_2012.jpg" height="304" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />
Little change was evident by mid-2013, the date of the most recent imagery. Both the Skyguard and SAM sites remained under construction, while the existing sites underwent only minor changes. However, a handful of equipment was now parked in the open, including two GDFs near the EW-radar, and at least two GDFs and 11 Zu-23-2s in a motor-pool near the primary facility.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi97W5DNVfcX3E-rWSB6mQoLHed20KrUQBOGcCp_dpFCB8RJSzimdPWP0hIqNk1-Qya84TK_F6ccOzgl6oPYae91V5ozDp72iFuF5djJ0jR7TGrFCrSUZ9q0gEKjGJkqUHG52ym8iQFOcGv/s1600/Draw_Export_2013.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi97W5DNVfcX3E-rWSB6mQoLHed20KrUQBOGcCp_dpFCB8RJSzimdPWP0hIqNk1-Qya84TK_F6ccOzgl6oPYae91V5ozDp72iFuF5djJ0jR7TGrFCrSUZ9q0gEKjGJkqUHG52ym8iQFOcGv/s1600/Draw_Export_2013.jpg" height="304" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works Cited</u>: <br />
[1] <i>Commander of the Hazrat Masumeh Air Defense Base Visits with Qom's Friday Prayers Leader</i>. <a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/26587">Defa Press</a>. 08/31/14.<br />
[2]<i> Iran's Air Defense Operations Center</i>. Persian_boy. <a href="http://youtu.be/l2fWj_0lvH0">Youtube</a>. 09/01/14.Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-67938485443187376672014-09-06T17:37:00.000-07:002014-09-06T17:40:25.454-07:00Iran's Armed Force's General Staff<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAaS4O-eTUvQzVIfhBDg1dBevnzoBZMdczMzU3fYzq3OQBx2879Ef-6vKCTJ-DPPFxOu_8nsgW2RUJtCzbl8f6izzc-IuA-PpzcUGaRW8Gi9jzTm-3pbJcupuB1UWZ3CsDDLJvISHutZ2-/s1600/AFGS+Logo_WIKI_via+MrInfo2012.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAaS4O-eTUvQzVIfhBDg1dBevnzoBZMdczMzU3fYzq3OQBx2879Ef-6vKCTJ-DPPFxOu_8nsgW2RUJtCzbl8f6izzc-IuA-PpzcUGaRW8Gi9jzTm-3pbJcupuB1UWZ3CsDDLJvISHutZ2-/s1600/AFGS+Logo_WIKI_via+MrInfo2012.png" height="400" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">AFGS emblem (MrInfo2012)</td></tr>
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<br />
<u>Acronyms and Abbreviations</u>:<br />
AFGS: Armed Forces General Staff<br />
BG2: Brigadier General, 2nd-Class<br />
BG: Brigadier General<br />
CoS: Chief-of-Staff<br />
HQ: Headquarters <br />
IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps<br />
LEF: Law Enforcement Forces <br />
MG: Major General<br />
MIA/KIA: Missing-in-action/killed-in-action <br />
SNSC: Supreme National Security Council<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<u> Background and Role</u>:<br />
The Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) was created in the summer of 1988, during the last days of the Iran-Iraq War, to coordinate and deconflict IRGC and Army activities by the creating a unified chain of command. [1] Just as importantly, this also helped integrate the IRGC into the formal security establishment, decreasing their institutional autonomy, and thus their ability to threaten the political balancing act during the critical transition of power that came with Khomeini's death. [2]<br />
<br />
Within the formal hierarchy, the AFGS is subordinate to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and controls the activities of both the IRGC and Army. [3]<br />
<br />
The AFGS loosely follows the western staff template, though its exact composition and structure is unknown. This is due, in part, to uncertainty over the administrative size or 'level' of various staff bodies such as departments, organizations, and directorates. This has been exacerbated since several of these bodies were abolished, split, or folded into others. This is especially true of the operations and intelligence sections. These not only have an important formal responsibilities, but have also been previously associated with key figures in informal influence-networks such as MG Bagheri (intelligence and operations deputy) and BG Mehrabi (intelligence deputy).[4]<br />
<br />
<u>Structure</u>:<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-5bM5Ci4lRsP9bID-RzvmJ665r7xAwxAKKivHbP5oi7aJAj_2jxx7yPWjZyKmhL5Fs-9bJjdMOwVGTHrce8it2LcX0D4y8KZcTEbda80GuwD-1bSaTQ7OwIzDTBMp__biB6lG8Q8977OG/s1600/Draq_AFGS_b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-5bM5Ci4lRsP9bID-RzvmJ665r7xAwxAKKivHbP5oi7aJAj_2jxx7yPWjZyKmhL5Fs-9bJjdMOwVGTHrce8it2LcX0D4y8KZcTEbda80GuwD-1bSaTQ7OwIzDTBMp__biB6lG8Q8977OG/s1600/Draq_AFGS_b.jpg" height="532" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Enlarge to view full-size</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<u>Chief of the General Staff</u> :<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjemdJgA2FGbOY3BkcuLkZRllia9eSUN7uoruHDBD9hZ6rb_yiNnG-6jZAdb5i4_VKGvSK4Y4So6-p77asThk57HTazrfm97zC2yZ0RnadE02AX6-zdAsgCgJZ5Wh8Lt_298wJuEafNLu6Q/s1600/3378_162.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjemdJgA2FGbOY3BkcuLkZRllia9eSUN7uoruHDBD9hZ6rb_yiNnG-6jZAdb5i4_VKGvSK4Y4So6-p77asThk57HTazrfm97zC2yZ0RnadE02AX6-zdAsgCgJZ5Wh8Lt_298wJuEafNLu6Q/s1600/3378_162.jpg" height="133" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">AFGS Chief, MG Firouzabadi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This positions is held by MG Hassan Firouzabadi (IRGC), who has headed the AFGS since he was appointed to the position by Khamenei 1989. [5]<br />
<br />
Firouzabadi has been characterized as a close confidante of the Supreme Leader since before the Revolution, and this relationship constitutes a key element of Khamenei's informal authority.<br />
<br />
According to a report by the AEI's Will Fulton, Firouzabadi first met Khameni in the 1970s where they coordinated ideological and operational opposition to the government. During the 1980s, Firouzabadi served in the civilian government, including as PM Mir-Hossein Mousavi's defense deputy. According to the author: “This relationship may help explain why Khamenei appointed Firouzabadi and retained him in this position since 1989, even though Firouzabadi does not have a formal military background.” [6]<br />
<br />
<u><br /></u>
<u>Deputy Chief of the General Staff</u>:<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyjWOZZY_9jUc19jQLfPV9UR-9qvicgSG7jrFr0mjzjGEbW5UORYrNYTdb69Oz8Ha70CNoyW6-Lmcx0MH_VBBF0U3TFwBMUnH-NlD50Fd28k47lzXE-hvqtJ13_zjFXnOFLPHy2lvNkkRT/s1600/Gholam+Ali+Rashid+(3).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyjWOZZY_9jUc19jQLfPV9UR-9qvicgSG7jrFr0mjzjGEbW5UORYrNYTdb69Oz8Ha70CNoyW6-Lmcx0MH_VBBF0U3TFwBMUnH-NlD50Fd28k47lzXE-hvqtJ13_zjFXnOFLPHy2lvNkkRT/s1600/Gholam+Ali+Rashid+(3).jpg" height="133" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Deputy AFGS Chief, MG Rashid</td></tr>
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This position has been held by MG Gholam Ali Rashid (IRGC) since 1999 when he was promoted from his position as the AFGS's Intelligence and Operations Deputy. [7] [8] He was a commander during the Iran-Iraq War and is assessed to have a close personal relationship with core IRGC personnel. [9] <br />
<br />
In traditional staff organizations, the deputy chief does not directly command the staff, but functions as an extension of the chief's authority, and is assigned specific duties as needed. [10] <br />
<br />
<u>Coordination Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibX27Z0tNKJoNYIwFX-PDCNW0Nei6ZdoUZyjFjEByRAvBn5bkmf2EugN0LZDR4YuluipZa38mdKNePFW9AKbWVtw3S0JTuKMEibzvaVya-Z81nWWlDpmDb9jsnUKgzYldQ158PUyg3nmQm/s1600/29929_orig.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibX27Z0tNKJoNYIwFX-PDCNW0Nei6ZdoUZyjFjEByRAvBn5bkmf2EugN0LZDR4YuluipZa38mdKNePFW9AKbWVtw3S0JTuKMEibzvaVya-Z81nWWlDpmDb9jsnUKgzYldQ158PUyg3nmQm/s1600/29929_orig.jpg" height="140" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Coordination Deputy, MG Saadi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This position has been held by MG Hassan Saadi (Army) since his appointment in 1999.[11] [12] Previously, he commanded the Army Ground Forces 1986-1991. [13] Despite his key position, he is relatively unknown, and has refrained from making political statements. At least one source characterizes him as a professional, and non-political officer. [14]<br />
<br />
This position of coordination deputy is equivalent to the chief-of-staff, or executive-officer, in a traditional staff organization. The CoS is a key position, forming the primary point of contact between the the chief (Firouzabadi) and the rest of his staff. The CoS coordinates other staff members, directing their activities, collects information from them and turns it into an actionable battlefield picture that the chief can make decisions based upon. [15] It is possible that Saadi's reputation for professionalism is critical to this responsibility, offsetting Firouzabadi's lack of direct military experience, and the politics of other officers. <br />
<br />
<u>Headquarters and Joint Affairs Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7TYUqgOqQs4XY_ITPWY3ohNKQ4RQilMDA118tzgnib4Zrc2o3eefNAWAotWpSG15VbrxhZvmhvbkSRQqT50ML4CujzLGe_UBRumDlZ30KOJkL5Y1O5UodRPZLD3MXNGMMY2bYXsxLtydV/s1600/Maj.+Gen.+Mohammed+Bagher_a.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7TYUqgOqQs4XY_ITPWY3ohNKQ4RQilMDA118tzgnib4Zrc2o3eefNAWAotWpSG15VbrxhZvmhvbkSRQqT50ML4CujzLGe_UBRumDlZ30KOJkL5Y1O5UodRPZLD3MXNGMMY2bYXsxLtydV/s1600/Maj.+Gen.+Mohammed+Bagher_a.jpg" height="150" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HQ and Joint Affairs Deputy, MG Bagheri</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The position is held by MG Mohammed Bagheri. Prior to this, he held the position of Intelligence and Operations Deputy through – at least – 2011. [16] <br />
<br />
This position corresponds to the personnel section of traditional staff organizations, and subordinate bodies include human resources and manpower directorates, which are responsible for manning units and personnel support, potentially making it an important position when it comes to promotions.[17]<br />
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<u>Manpower Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLs3uAbsXoeyRMwhHkTz2Qiiu8MUFLRETWdiLnQvofF24F8PkOa-nOmTu6sb67RG86_kBqCUxRUbw3Emo4H-BunH36aeqVV4NI6z7X2Gntc4Nz4JWkpqG9_oGIV5xFDPYSdnQffgg_3ZVm/s1600/8S9K2305.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLs3uAbsXoeyRMwhHkTz2Qiiu8MUFLRETWdiLnQvofF24F8PkOa-nOmTu6sb67RG86_kBqCUxRUbw3Emo4H-BunH36aeqVV4NI6z7X2Gntc4Nz4JWkpqG9_oGIV5xFDPYSdnQffgg_3ZVm/s1600/8S9K2305.jpg" height="133" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Manpower Deputy, BG Bagheri</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Subordinate to the HQ and Joint Affairs Deputy, this position is held by BG Mohammed-Hassan Bagheri (Army), who – confusingly – bears virtually the same name as his superior. Prior to this, BG Bagheri was the coordination deputy for the Army Ground Forces through – at least – 2009.<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Operations Deputy</u>: <br />
This position is held by BG Mostafa Salami (Army). [18] Prior to this, Salami held a number of staff-level positions in short succession, including intelligence deputy (2013), and second-in-command to the then-operations deputy (2012). [19] [20] Little is known about him beyond this. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDIL-iII4wqa-BS7tCexOnSReYyROAK6WvdZbQKXTXRzVzVf_LcCnpS1GYkfmjtcTJfw38PEMl3HnHu4fx8XnoEm4sgtTEN8-4BwRC7SUAdTLKWaR7oRyw-W9PtNSMrMXysOHAr4OG_vWv/s1600/salami.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhDIL-iII4wqa-BS7tCexOnSReYyROAK6WvdZbQKXTXRzVzVf_LcCnpS1GYkfmjtcTJfw38PEMl3HnHu4fx8XnoEm4sgtTEN8-4BwRC7SUAdTLKWaR7oRyw-W9PtNSMrMXysOHAr4OG_vWv/s1600/salami.jpg" height="163" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Operations Deputy, BG Salami</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The role of the operations deputy is muddled by the parallel existence of the 'head of the operations directorate', currently held by the influential and well-linked BG Shadmani (see below). It is also muddled by the existence of the 'operations and intelligence directorate', which the mentioned components and personnel may be subordinate to, or otherwise inclusive/included of.<br />
<br />
In a conventional staff organization, the operations deputy is generally considered the third-most important official (after the chief, and the chief-of-staff). Peacetime and combat responsibilities include coordinating operational orders and planning, materiel allocation, as well as force development and modernization. [21] In short, this constitutes the minutia of 'operational art' that links tactics with strategy. <br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfIWOxXXCB-tQp0yaaVhyphenhyphen5iNz_EtxNS_SGkUBq8bMsYZJwALjvCCh-VidBibyHHKfDRP6xEpUIkdUPQcVY3x1d-5IrvXFXaqn1O4oGhYjXQ0frkWpT14mg5tPgVSaW5-MptnmiCN08w5s5/s1600/Shadmani.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfIWOxXXCB-tQp0yaaVhyphenhyphen5iNz_EtxNS_SGkUBq8bMsYZJwALjvCCh-VidBibyHHKfDRP6xEpUIkdUPQcVY3x1d-5IrvXFXaqn1O4oGhYjXQ0frkWpT14mg5tPgVSaW5-MptnmiCN08w5s5/s1600/Shadmani.jpg" height="124" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Operations Directorate Head, BG Shadmani</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<u>Head of the Operations Directorate</u>:<br />
This position is held by BG Ali Shadmani (IRGC).[22] The position's relationship to the operations deputy (described above) is unknown. Shadmani himself is characterized as having links to core IRGC commanders. [23]<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Chief of Intelligence Organization</u>:<br />
This position is held by an unknown person appointed in 06/2014. [24]<br />
<br />
Like the operations section, much about this body, including it's relationship with the rest of the AFGS, is muddled. The position of 'chief' is generally higher than that of 'deputy'. Likewise, 'organization' is generally higher than a 'directorate' (which are either associated with a 'deputy' or a 'head'), suggesting that the intelligence body is one of the largest in the AFGS. For example, a comparable case may be the IRGC-GS's own intelligence organization, which was upgraded from a directorate, and in the process, saw the position of deputy superseded. [25]<br />
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<u>Strategy Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBfjIVmRTuDUFA2NL1-LiEvhisWf8ZHK6Fbow49EyBTpF9yRBAnRgH7RrDfEEMkr8M4NCajC3biKdYJoEUEIqcZzx4q4RKYEThCixgQuIvnJX6qwdiw_TGN7CPQk6CailAoX76hojQyns-/s1600/izadi+3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBfjIVmRTuDUFA2NL1-LiEvhisWf8ZHK6Fbow49EyBTpF9yRBAnRgH7RrDfEEMkr8M4NCajC3biKdYJoEUEIqcZzx4q4RKYEThCixgQuIvnJX6qwdiw_TGN7CPQk6CailAoX76hojQyns-/s1600/izadi+3.jpg" height="138" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Strategy Deputy, MG Izadi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
As of 09/2013, this position is held by MG Mostafa Izadi. [26] MG Izadi is another core IRGC commander with close ties to the Supreme Leader and other senior IRGC personnel. [27] [28] <br />
<br />
This position has been characterized as equivalent to the strategic-planning division of traditional staff systems, which handles civil-military coordination and relations. [29]<br />
<br />
<u>Planning and Programs Deputy</u>:<br />
No recent information. The last documented deputy was BG Saleh (IRGC), who was appointed in 2010.[30] <br />
<br />
Given that the responsibility for planning and programs traditionally falls to either the operations or strategy sections, it is possible that this position is subordinate to either of these bodies. <br />
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<u>Inspections Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxMt0QNE-I5o_0w_TSRClKrvaafhGDC1T7widMODpmExW4WFpNr_GeJCCZvwzCJoHS6-vu1o1EV-vao3fGwPncmtc-Tp_-4f8ETeSGUhCaSu1QEtJndNywExsjKBrpkpLxyu-a8hM3bDfo/s1600/Brig.+Gen.+Qarayi+Ashtiani_a.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxMt0QNE-I5o_0w_TSRClKrvaafhGDC1T7widMODpmExW4WFpNr_GeJCCZvwzCJoHS6-vu1o1EV-vao3fGwPncmtc-Tp_-4f8ETeSGUhCaSu1QEtJndNywExsjKBrpkpLxyu-a8hM3bDfo/s1600/Brig.+Gen.+Qarayi+Ashtiani_a.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Inspections Deputy, BG Ashtiani</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This position is held by BG Mohammed-Reza Qarayi-Ashtiani (Army). [31] Prior to his appointment in 2013, he served as the Deputy Commander of the Army. [32]<br />
<br />
Subordinate positions include the Head of Special Inspections, which – as of 02/2014 – was held by BG2 Mohammed Ruyanian (LEF). [33] However, only a month later he was arrested in conjunction with the Babak-Zanjani-Scandal, and was released soon after. His current status is unknown. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Basij Affairs and Defensive Culture Deputy</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiq3svxH59NHakergr724LK9zUfA1ja3p7LYhyphenhyphens5IFMP7eDddc1gHkWC1efvnE0ZHPSoczlCuvv8D3xaOKKSLVW8ZEovaZ_nt3UFIT9yxoThkD28e-08NNODGknJfl7SRqBOpoXkzv99AIf/s1600/19693_orig.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiq3svxH59NHakergr724LK9zUfA1ja3p7LYhyphenhyphens5IFMP7eDddc1gHkWC1efvnE0ZHPSoczlCuvv8D3xaOKKSLVW8ZEovaZ_nt3UFIT9yxoThkD28e-08NNODGknJfl7SRqBOpoXkzv99AIf/s1600/19693_orig.jpg" height="140" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Basij Affairs Deputy, BG Jazayeri</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This position is currently held by BG Masoud Jazayeri (IRGC). [34] This position allows Jazayeri to function as the spokesperson for the AFGS.<br />
<br />
This position was created in 2012 to coordinate cyber-space activity, passive-defense, Basij affairs, and other military-related culture. [35] [36]<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Chief of Engineering and Passive Defense Organization</u>:<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6eIIBjDAUIgun_URP9ae5URow02vFCimg5f6NN86NjZ2GHIzpjBz4W4l_6G_FZi3AeskulTl9fk7XsKZEB_bMYYZJ5NW5sR3iB02N3cccaf0AX3Z9zxkbJi1OqHhsvm8lYrxkuf_IDxi2/s1600/PDO+Chief+-+Gholamreza+Jalili+(1).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6eIIBjDAUIgun_URP9ae5URow02vFCimg5f6NN86NjZ2GHIzpjBz4W4l_6G_FZi3AeskulTl9fk7XsKZEB_bMYYZJ5NW5sR3iB02N3cccaf0AX3Z9zxkbJi1OqHhsvm8lYrxkuf_IDxi2/s1600/PDO+Chief+-+Gholamreza+Jalili+(1).jpg" height="140" width="200" /></a>This position is subordinate to the Basij Affairs and Defensive Culture Deputy, and is currently held by BG Gholam-Reza Jalali (IRGC). [37]<br />
<br />
This body was upgraded from a directorate to an organization in 2008. However, given that it is supordinate to the above-mentioned depuy, would indicate that the position of 'chief' is not necessarily less than that of 'deputy', further muddling the picture of other bodies such as the operations/intelligence sections. [38]<br />
<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIbTdUI8qobeKvCl9ggvWlNfDslr3FDfCQP7X5T8l_IZxqtiVdfSwjzg7CWP_6g4NVDi7XvAmIbdANfHQK2LQed9GBZPdv-DeXH8OXCd9JKdvf3ivZ_ZLLCmd9Ie0An-mXjGx3Hxw_sfEb/s1600/IMG_4995.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIbTdUI8qobeKvCl9ggvWlNfDslr3FDfCQP7X5T8l_IZxqtiVdfSwjzg7CWP_6g4NVDi7XvAmIbdANfHQK2LQed9GBZPdv-DeXH8OXCd9JKdvf3ivZ_ZLLCmd9Ie0An-mXjGx3Hxw_sfEb/s1600/IMG_4995.jpg" height="189" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Basij Deputy, BG Salehi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<u>Basij Deputy</u>: <br />
This position is currently held by BG Hossein Salehi (IRGC). [39] It's responsabilities and relationship to the Basij Affairs Deputy is unknown.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
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<br />
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<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfOdGch-cV0EHqZu4MBDj-JoQU9j9E39OyMvR5SjJBKxoPJJCT57Vd8dLSnuE7DpWJK6bnhc6xuEU4J7DB6iGJ3HiIO50s243hV6QfPNYPz4DlJ8kt0YiF2gDlp4uWTubeGoRzRNWkf8FM/s1600/Logistics+et+al+deputy+-+abdollahi+(3).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfOdGch-cV0EHqZu4MBDj-JoQU9j9E39OyMvR5SjJBKxoPJJCT57Vd8dLSnuE7DpWJK6bnhc6xuEU4J7DB6iGJ3HiIO50s243hV6QfPNYPz4DlJ8kt0YiF2gDlp4uWTubeGoRzRNWkf8FM/s1600/Logistics+et+al+deputy+-+abdollahi+(3).jpg" height="156" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Readiness Deputy, BG Abdollahi</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<u>Readiness, Logistics and Industrial Research Deputy</u>:<br />
This position is currently held by BG Ali Abdollahi (IRGC), who was recently appointed in 07/2014. [40] Previously, he served as the security deputy for the interior ministry, and held senior command positions in the security forces and the IRGC Ground Forces. His predecessor is the well-known BG Mohammad Hejazi. [41] <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Head of Training and Education Directorate</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhbWjXudaMq8mZ_Sihp8g-YzkSDnBG1kf37WoShelX2ZE_ktIH-L-5mmWVFbF1csX2OBA3acvPx68O4ULtRljrnzauXILglJNV3u2sVcP8rHeD8G7ZWKPLsr6J4Nc1caUhNMnsdwrcTf0_q/s1600/m_img.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhbWjXudaMq8mZ_Sihp8g-YzkSDnBG1kf37WoShelX2ZE_ktIH-L-5mmWVFbF1csX2OBA3acvPx68O4ULtRljrnzauXILglJNV3u2sVcP8rHeD8G7ZWKPLsr6J4Nc1caUhNMnsdwrcTf0_q/s1600/m_img.jpg" height="138" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Training Deputy, BG2 Raisiyan</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This position is held by BG2 Ramazan Raisiyan (Army). [42] Responsibility for training often falls under that of the operations section, indicating that this directorate might be subordinate to whatever level ultimately has responsibility for 'operations'. <br />
<br />
The same uncertainties mentioned above about the relative size and relationship between directorates, organizations, and other levels applies here as well.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGutH35Wj_wVxyKwM9IMtE1f8xqVfd4lAk0r09WraK1iHjy4zjLs_bFr4HxZ9qmpR_Fk51DT7V7ZefskeuK-Mu5Ex_odrZefiQF5JzfS1RH0ceXrNiTviWXVk-YZTyLEDm_SWh_ntUz971/s1600/bagherzadeh.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGutH35Wj_wVxyKwM9IMtE1f8xqVfd4lAk0r09WraK1iHjy4zjLs_bFr4HxZ9qmpR_Fk51DT7V7ZefskeuK-Mu5Ex_odrZefiQF5JzfS1RH0ceXrNiTviWXVk-YZTyLEDm_SWh_ntUz971/s1600/bagherzadeh.jpg" height="135" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Cmdr, search-for-missing comittee, <br />
BG Baqer-Zadeh</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<u>Commander of the Committee for the Search for the Missing</u>:<br />
This position is currently held by BG Baqer-Zadeh (IRGC) (08/2014). [43] The use of the title 'commander' is extremely atypical at this level. This committee's responsibility likely covers MIA/KIA-retrieval.<br />
<br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works Cited</u>: <br />
[1] Familiarization with the Military's General Staff. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/3970637/%D8%A2%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD">YJC</a>. 05/28/12<br />
[2] Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320.html">RAND</a>. 2001. Ch. 4<br />
[3] The Rise of the Pasdaran. <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG821.html">RAND</a>. 2009. p.33<br />
[4] The IRGC Command Network: Formal Structures and Informal Influence. <a href="http://www.aei.org/papers/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/the-irgc-command-network-formal-structures-and-informal-influence/">AEI</a>. 2013<br />
[5] ibid YJC, 2012<br />
[6] ibid AEI, 2013. p. 8<br />
[7] Ceremony for Late-Philanthropist Held in Tehran. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930328001134">FNA</a>. 06/18/14<br />
[8] ibid AEI, 2013. p.41<br />
[9] ibid AEI, 2013. <br />
[10] Staff Organization and Operations FM101-5. Dep't of the Army. 1997. p.4-1<br />
[11] ibid FNA 06/18/14<br />
[12] Appointment of Several to the AFGS. <a href="http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/?p=contentShow&id=1795">Leader.ir.</a> 08/17/97<br />
[13] Hossein Hassan Saadi. <a href="http://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%AD%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86_%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%AF%DB%8C">Persian Wiki</a><br />
[14] The Islamic Republic's 13 Generals. <a href="http://iranbriefing.net/the-islamic-republic%E2%80%99s-13-generals/">Iran Briefing</a>. 02/03/11.<br />
[15] ibid FM101-5, 1997. p.4-2<br />
[16] Intelligence and Operations Deputy to National Security Committee. <a href="http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/mobile/news/206376/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%84-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C">Tabnak</a>. 11/27/11<br />
[17] ibid FM101-5, 1997. p.4-10<br />
[18] ibid FNA 06/18/14<br />
[19] Salami: National Production Has Always Been on the Agenda of the Military. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/110380/%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">Mashregh News</a>. 04/10/12<br />
[20] Appreciation from Firouzabadi to Commanders. <a href="http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920707000691">FNA</a>. 10/29/13.<br />
[21] ibid FM101-5, 1997. p.4-12<br />
[22] Liberation of Khorramshahr Was the Turning Point in the War. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930303000970">FNA</a>. 05/24/14<br />
[23] ibid AEI, 2013. p. 26<br />
[24] Americans Want Someone to Confront Iran. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930320001034">FNA</a>. 06/10/14.<br />
[25] ibid AEI, 2013. p.35<br />
[26] AFGS Deputy: Necessary to Increase the VeF. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/80798421/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF_%DA%A9%D9%84_%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD__%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF_%D8%A8%D8%A7_%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4_%D8%A8%D8%B5%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AA_%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA">IRNA</a>. 09/01/13<br />
[27] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Messaging on Critcial US National Security Issues. <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/CriticalThreats/irgc-messaging-graphics">AEI</a>. 04/02/13. <br />
[28] ibid AEI, 2013 <br />
[29] ibid FM101-5, 1997. p.4-15<br />
[30] Sardar Saleh Became the AFGS Deputy for Programs and Planning. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8905080268">FNA</a>. 06/30/10<br />
[31] Amir Qarayai Ashtiani Became the AFGS Deputy for Inspections. <a href="http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920828001307">FNA</a>. 11/19/13.<br />
[32] The Iranian Army is Among the Best Trained and Most Elite in the World. <a href="http://icors.blogfa.com/post-142.aspx">icors.blogfa</a>. 03/07/10\<br />
[33] Ruyanian's General Staff Uniform. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/282389/%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3-%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%84">Mashregh News</a>. 02/03/14.<br />
[34] The War-Readiness of Gaza Will Destroy the Occupation. <a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/25930">DEFA Press</a>. 08/24/14.<br />
[35] ibid AEI, 04/02/2013<br />
[36] ibid AEI, 2013. p.34 <br />
[37] Part of the Success of the Military is due to the Effort of Journalistis.<a href="http://defapress.ir/Fa/News/24694"> DEFA Press</a>. 08/07/14.<br />
[38] ibid AEI, 2013. p.34 <br />
[39] [unclear]. <a href="http://basijnews.ir/provinces/1393/06/12/index.html:id=3036678">Basij. News</a>. 09/03/14<br />
[40] Sardar Ali Abdollahi Became the AFGS Deputy for Readiness, Logistics, and Industrial Research. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930330000129">FNA</a>. 06/22/14.<br />
[41] FM: Iran Supporting Iraqi Nation in Campaign Against Terrorism. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921024001297">FNA-E</a>. 01/14/14.<br />
[42] Basij Thought Will be Established in the Population. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921208001130">FNA</a>. 02/27/14.<br />
[43] Baqer-Zadeh's Proposal to Kuwait. <a href="http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/93060402719/%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA">ISNA</a>. 08/26/14. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-8723940319041458832014-08-13T16:40:00.001-07:002014-08-15T23:20:29.155-07:00[Translation] - Recognizing the Enemy and Paying Attention to the Leader's Guidance Keeps the County SafeTitle: <b>Recognizing the Enemy and Paying Attention to the Leader's Guidance Keeps the County Safe</b><br />
Date: July 15, 2014 / Tir 24, 1393<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/431825">Tasnim News </a><br />
<br />
Tasnim
News: The director of intelligence in Sistan & Baluchistan said:
Familiarization with the enemy, and paying attention to the guidance of
the Supreme Leader [and the] Quran, is a roadmap for confronting the
Arrogance and [protecting] the country against damage. <br />
<br />
In
a conference on the activities of terrorist groups in the Islamic
world, the director of intelligence in S&B said to Tasnim News in
Zahedan: Our Islamic Revolution occurred in conditions that affect the
whole world, an area of soft and hard confrontation between two poles of
the world, in which one was located in America, and the other in the
Soviet Union. <br />
<br />
He added: In Islamic Iran, Khomenei's leadership and his enlightened guidance based on Islam
transformed the world order and the [balance] of power by taking a third
form. <br />
<br />
The director of intelligence in Sistan &
Baluchistan said: Centered around Iran, Islam encountered these two
camps, both of which used policies to confront the [Islamic]-System, and
became the scene of an invasion by both eastern and western enemies. <br />
<br />
He
said: The main conspiracy against Iran's Islamic System originates in
the intelligence-services of those two camps, and the reason for their
attention towards the Islamic Revolution … is because it is a model for
all the world's oppressed. <br />
<br />
Explaining that confronting
Israel has been a primary goal since the early-Revolution, the director
of intelligence in Sistan and Baluchistan said: Because of this
position, hard and soft actions were began on behalf of the Arrogance in
the form of a conspiracy by the Hypocrities, anti-revolutionary groups,
and the 8-year Imposed War against the Islamic Republic.<br />
<br />
The
director added: In the final years of the 20th century, important
events such as the failure of Russia in Afghanistan, the removal of the
Soviets as the world's second power, and the Soviet's demise led to
America's victory.<br />
<br />
He stressed: This [was] important
for America and forms the roadmap of their plan, [including] the use of
religious extremists such as Al Qaeda, their formation in Afghanistan,
and the creation of spaces necessary for their support. <br />
<br />
The
director said: Due to this strategy, the collapse of the Soviet Union
created the events of 9/11 and [the US's] war with the Taliban, so that
now the puppets of the Arrogance are now against the Arrogance. [<i>paragraph unclear</i>]<br />
<br />
Noting
that after 9/11, the approach was to turn these threats into
opportunities in the form of regional projects, he said:[After]
transferring al-Qaeda to Sudan and then Afghanistan, they confronted
them there for the past 10 years. [<i>paragraph unclear</i>]<br />
<br />
The director said: The importance of this drawn-out process with two major goals was [<i>paragraph unclear</i>]<br />
<br />
The
director said: The rise of Takfiris in Waziristan and Afghanistan was
formed in order to send trained fighters from this region to Syria.<br />
<br />
He
said: The group's trained personnel were prepared in 81 countries
around the world and went to America's war [for/against?], however it
can be observed that they are deployed in Syria opposite the Resistance
against Israel.<br />
<br />
He stated: America, as well as
harnessing and converting threats by transferring Takfiris from
Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria, [<i>unclear</i>] the forces that were
arrayed against Israel with the people and government of Syria with the
strategic objective of transferring the conflict from the occupied
territories to Lebanon. <br />
<br />
The director said: The Takfiri
conflicts, and the drawing-out of this process, [brought] many
strategic benefits, which includes downplaying the Intifada and
positioning the scene of confrontation in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine
over the past three years. [?]<br />
<br />
He said: The killing of more than a hundred thousand is an outcome of the [<i>unclear; "Aqaba"?</i>]
school-of-thought, which was planned by Israel, America, and England,
[after] they lost three wars in Palestine and Arab region.<br />
<br />
He
continued: [Following their] loss in the 33-day and 22-day wars, the
Intifada, and the destruction of Israel's Iron-Dome system by Hezbollah
UAVs, their master-plan [became] religious-conflict and the importation
of Takfiris into the region. <br />
<br />
The director said: Due
to the issues in Iraq, and the failure in Syria, their main objective is
the transfer of conflicts from the occupied territories to Lebanon and
the conflict between the Takfiris and Lebanon … [unclear/this map having
another side?].<br />
<br />
He said: A deep look at the function of our intelligence-services [<i>paragraph unclear</i>]<br />
<br />
He
stressed: Due to their designs, we are tracking all these issues, and
with the creation of a common understanding, mobilization efforts,
solidarity, and the necessary measures, the plots of the enemy and the
Arrogance will be thwarted.<br />
<br />
The director added: The
enemy has endeavored to create a security barrier for Israel such that
this regime's defense in 2013 was their strongest because the conflicts
that have arisen from the actions of the Global Arrogance have diverted
the consensus of the Islamic World away from Israel.<br />
<br />
He
said: I am surprised to see that the people who have gone to Syria have
not fired one shot against Israel, and are being converted into a tool
against Muslims, which is the plot of think-tanks [that are] the enemy
of Muslims. <br />
<br />
He stated: The creation and
intensification of differences, the destruction of Shia and Sunni
beliefs, and the creation of differences [between them], are strategies
used by them against the Islamic world. <br />
<br />
The director
said: Khomenei's model of unification underlying the comments of the
Supreme Leader [is] the principle [which] alerts public opinion, and
thwarts [the enemies] plot.<br />
<br />
Adding that provoking
differences in Islamic countries is considered the main strategy of the
Arrogance: Protecting unity, and the need for vigilance in confronting
tricks are principles that we have in most cases, [and because of these
principles], free nations in the world and Islamic-[community] can turn
to us as a model.<br />
<br />
---Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-5309144510493601282014-08-11T21:18:00.003-07:002014-08-11T21:28:00.597-07:00Basij Organization - Semnan ProvinceIn the third part of the 'Basij Organization' series, we now turn to our first case study: Semnan province. The first part covered the <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/02/basij-organization-imam-hussein.html">Imam Hussein battalion</a>, and the second part covered the<a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/03/basij-organization-beit-al-moqdas.html"> Beit al-Moqdas battalion</a>.<br />
<br />
<u>Index</u>:<br />
Abbreviations/acronyms<br />
Introduction <br />
Province<br />
Area<br />
Zone, base and battalion<br />
Footnotes<br />
Appendix - Reference material translations <br />
<br />
<u>Abbreviations/Acronyms</u>:<br />
aZ: al-Zahra; battalion name.<br />
BaM: Beit al-Moqdas; battalion or exercise name.<br />
bn: battalion <br />
BRB: Basij Resistance Base; lowest administrative level.<br />
BRZ: Basij Resistance Zone; middle administrative level.<br />
BRA/SRA: Basij/Sepah Resistance Area; highest administrative level below the province.<br />
co: company <br />
HQ: headquarters.<br />
IA: Imam Ali; battalion name.<br />
IH: Imam Hussein; battalion name.<br />
IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (aka, Sepah)<br />
IRGCGF: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces
<br />
<br />
<u>Introduction</u>:<br />
The Basij in Semnan province are organized according to the Gen. Jafari's Mosaic Doctrine, which directly subordinated the Basij of each province to the IRGC's command structure, and is briefly described in part one of this series. The highest level of this organization is the provincial IRGC itself ,and in Semnan it is the 12th 'Mohammed al-Qaem' Infantry Brigade. Below this are eight SRAs, corresponding to each of the province's counties. Below this, are BRZs and their associated BRBs and combat battalions.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkv3yeZO2asa1SNYb3nq88Hh7mG0b4kO7O_yeOR6J-C9GrOE7zyzKJUcLO6SHrlphcfHk8h1-qu_CrW_gsRAW7XukdsOPzK35uqnLBo7j2NMNaVcmhSv_uMSSuqhShNyJTjQvsHOm5ufM7/s1600/Province+Overview.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkv3yeZO2asa1SNYb3nq88Hh7mG0b4kO7O_yeOR6J-C9GrOE7zyzKJUcLO6SHrlphcfHk8h1-qu_CrW_gsRAW7XukdsOPzK35uqnLBo7j2NMNaVcmhSv_uMSSuqhShNyJTjQvsHOm5ufM7/s1600/Province+Overview.jpg" height="314" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<u>Province</u>:<br />
Based in Shahrud city, the 12th Brigade is the nexus around which the Basij are organized. The brigade is responsible for coordinating and providing regular training to the province's Basij.[1] <br />
<br />
The only other IRGCGF maneuver element in the province is the 10th Air Defense Group, which is based in Semnan city.[2] Their relationship to the provincial IRGC is unknown, and it is possible that a combat-support unit such as this one is subordinate to a larger operations command in much the same way they are in the Army. Otherwise, a strict province-based command for the IRGCGF would risk an inefficient piecemeal deployment of support equipment like artillery and air-defense. <br />
<br />
<u>Area</u>:<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg10v9_1xDdATR-c-NReHh_ipOPKAdDV-FpCShHBTEAINXV5f-Rax4xw5e63nh6I51HK0B1HkjDyTfg5A5bIwnI65YfTp6Yu5RKc1Syk0rgcxvd-ITrkOAOnf_R9eaMlvCv-6lqCNxEoXt9/s1600/Draw_Export_Commander+IMINT_Semnan+Basij.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg10v9_1xDdATR-c-NReHh_ipOPKAdDV-FpCShHBTEAINXV5f-Rax4xw5e63nh6I51HK0B1HkjDyTfg5A5bIwnI65YfTp6Yu5RKc1Syk0rgcxvd-ITrkOAOnf_R9eaMlvCv-6lqCNxEoXt9/s1600/Draw_Export_Commander+IMINT_Semnan+Basij.jpg" height="224" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Leadership hierarchy of the Semnan-province Basij and IRGC</td><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The eight SRAs in Semnan correspond to each of the province's counties, and include: Aradan, Damghan, Garmsar, Mehdishahr, Miyami, Semnan, Shahrud, and Sokheh.<br />
<br />
The are alternatively known as BRAs, or SRAs, highlighting the degree to which the Basij have ceased to function as an independent entity. There is no distinction between the two terms.<br />
<br />
Each area is commanded by an active-duty IRGC officer, typically a colonel.<br />
<br />
<u><br /></u>
<u>Zone, Base, and Battalion</u>:<br />
Below the county-level, the picture of Basij combat-strength is incomplete. BRZs and BRBs cease to predictably correspond solely to geographic designations, as some are organized according to type, many of which do not have a combat role. Similarly, they are too great in number and localized to be uniformly reported on.<br />
<br />
Instead, an alternative is the use of exercise reports to estimate combat strength. This includes the 'Beit al-Moqdas' exercises, which have taken place twice in the Semnan province, first in late-2012, and most recently in early-2014. Since they are meant to simulate a simultaneous mobilization of all SRAs in a 'rapid-reaction' scenario against a conventional military threat, these two-day exercises offer the best approximation of the province's practical capacity. <br />
<br />
Although the numbers vary between exercises, are questionably precise, and are subject to interpretation, they provide an approximate picture of an SRA's strength:<br />
<br />
Beit al-Moqdas Exercise, 2012: [5], [6], [7]<br />
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="width: 462px;">
<colgroup><col width="87"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="69"></col>
</colgroup><tbody>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">SRA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Bns, all</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">BaM</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">IH</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">aZ</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Personnel</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Aradan:</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Damghan:</span></td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[8]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[5]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[1]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[2]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1700</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Garmsar:</span></td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[7]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[5]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[1]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[1]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1250</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Mehdishahr: </span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">5</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">3</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1100</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Miyami: </span></td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[7]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[5]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[1]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[1]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1250</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Semnan:</span></td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[8]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[4]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[2]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">[2]</span></div>
</td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1800</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Shahrud:</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">10</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">5</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">3</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">2</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">2400</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Sorkheh:</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">NA</span></td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Total:</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">45</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">27</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">9</span></td>
<td width="64"><span style="font-family: inherit;">9</span></td>
<td width="69"><span style="font-family: inherit;">9500</span></td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Beit al-Moqdas Exercise, 2014: [8]<br />
<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="width: 600px;">
<colgroup><col width="87"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="64"></col>
<col width="63"></col>
</colgroup><tbody>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">SRA</td>
<td width="64">Bns, all</td>
<td width="64">BaM</td>
<td width="64">IH</td>
<td width="64">aZ</td>
<td width="64">Kosar</td>
<td width="64">Other*
</td>
<td width="63">Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Aradan:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[3+1 co]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">2</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
1 co</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">690</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Damghan:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[4-6]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">2</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1-2]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1-2]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">1000</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Garmsar:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[4]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">2</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">768</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Mehdishahr:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[3]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">2</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">668</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Miyami:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[4]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">2</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">868</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Semnan:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[8-10]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[3-5]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[2]</div>
</td>
<td width="63">1770</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Shahrud:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[5-6]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[2]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[2-3]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">1300</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td width="87">Sorkheh:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[3]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">1</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[1]</div>
</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="64">0</td>
<td width="63">650</td>
</tr>
<tr valign="TOP">
<td height="1" width="87">Total:</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[34-39]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[16-18]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[8-10]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[6-7]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[2]</div>
</td>
<td width="64"><div style="font-style: normal;">
[2]</div>
</td>
<td width="63">7714</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">* Includes Ashura, IA, and HQ type bns</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Note: Brackets indicate uncertainty where the number of participating bns is not explicitly stated, but instead deduced from context. Low-moderate confidence in exact figures, high-confidence in overall trend and distribution.</span><br />
<br />
Generally, each SRA contributes between 500 and 2500 personnel. The more populous counties provide more, while the less populous counties provide less, though not necessarily proportionally to population size. For instance, Semnan and Shahrud counties together contain close to 75% of the province's population, but contribute only about 40% of exercise participants. It is unknown whether the larger SRAs are mobilizing less of their available forces, or if the smaller SRAs have to fulfill a quota that is a proportionally larger.<br />
<br />
The majority of personnel – half or more – are assigned to BaM battalions, while the remainder are generally split in equal measure between IH and female (aZ and Kosar) bns. This skew toward BaM bns is consistent both with the nature of exercises, the roles established for BaM and IH bns in the first two parts of this series, as well as with the general male-orientation of combat-forces worldwide. <br />
<br />
As noted, since these exercises are geared toward a specific purpose – simulating a rapid-reaction scenario – the numbers above represent a fraction the county's overall personnel. In Mehdishahr, which contains about 10% of the province's population, the total number of Basij is quoted at 24,000. If accurate, this represents close to 60% of the county's 2006 population, buttressing the notion that the Basij are better understood as a multi-spectral organization (cultural, social political, and academic), closer 'the Party' in ex-East Bloc countries, than to a classical militia.[3] <br />
<br />
Similarly, in Damghan, which contains close to 20% of the province's population, one urban BRZ reportedly contains 13 Ashura bns with a strength of 2,860 personnel.[4] Although difficult to extrapolate, this indicates that there are many-10s of unaccounted-for battalions in each SRA, albeit without as much combat-potential as the BaM and IH types.<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes</u>:<br />
[1] Supplementary Training for Imam Hussein Battalions Held. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910203001635">FNA</a>. 04/23/12. <br />
[2] 10th 'Muharram' Air Defense Group. <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/01/10th-muharram-air-defense-group.html">The Arkenstone</a>. 01/17/14.<br />
[3] 1,100 Mehdishahr Basij in Beit al-Moqdas Exercise. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910909000857">FNA</a>. 12/01/12<br />
[4] Preparation of 10 Battalions from Shahrud for the Beit al-Moqdas Exercise. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910908000831">FNA</a>. 11/28/12.<br />
[5] 10,000-Person Beit al-Moqdas Exercise Will be Held. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910908000292">FNA</a>. 11/28/12.<br />
[6] 7,500 People Participated in the Beit al-Moqdas Exercise in Semnan. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921208000626">FNA</a>. 02/27/14.<br />
[7] ibid FNA 12/01/12<br />
[8] Call-up of Ashura Battalions from the Damghan SRA. <a href="http://www.damghannews.com/1391/07/03/%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF/">Damghan News</a>. 09/29/12.<br />
<br />
<u>Appendix - Reference Material Translations</u>:<br />
<br />
<b>Title</b>: Call-Up of Ashura Battalions from the Damghan SRA<br />
<b>Date</b>: September 24, 2012 / Mehr 3, 1391<br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.damghannews.com/1391/07/03/%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF/">Damghan News</a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The
commander of the al-Hadi city-BRZ of the Damghan-Area-Sepah announced
the two-day call-up of 1,000 Damghani Basij in Ashura battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">IRGC
Col. Seyyed Taqi-pour said on the sidelines of of the call-up of Ashura
battalions from Damghan's SRA: The two-day call-up of Ashura battalions
will commemorate the arrival of Sacred Defense Week on Shahrivar 30 and
31, and will be held in the Bilal mosque in the Boostan neighborhood of
Damghan.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He
stated: In this two-day call-up, seven Ashura battalions subordinate to
the al-Hadi neighborhood BRZ in the Damghan BRA/SRA, which includes
1,000 people.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The
commander, noting that the al-Hadi neighborhood BRZ of the Damghan BRA
has 13 Ashura battalions, said: 2,860 Basij from urban-BRBs are members
of these battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He
added: Over the two-day call-up, Ashura bn members from this BRZ will
be presented with military, ideological, and cultural training.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[articles fill continues]</span></blockquote>
--- <br />
<b>Title</b>:10,000-person Exercise 'Beit al-Moqdas' will be Held<br />
<b>Date</b>: November 28, 2012 / Azar 8, 1391<br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910908000292">Fars News Agency </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">FNA: The commander of the 'Hasrat Qaem al-Mohammed' in the Semnan provicne said: The 10,000 person rapid-reaction-battalions 'Beit al-Moqdas' exercise will be held on Azar 9 and 10 simultaneously across the province. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">General Ali Hosseini said in an interview with FNA today: In the eight-year Sacred Defense, Semnan contributed the second-highest number of fighters as a proportion of its population.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He added: After the victory in the Sacred Defense, exercises were performed across the country and province, one of them is Beit al-Moqdas, which, under the name 'Labik ya Rasoolallah', is carried out at the provincial level in the five counties of Miyami, Shahrud, Damghan, Semnan, and Garmsar.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander said: This exercise is carried out with 27 Beit al-Moqdas battalions, 9 Imam Hussein battalions, and 9 al-Zahra battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Hosseini said: Programs planned in this exercise include [urban]-defense, SAR, riot-control, defense of sensitive targets, checkpoints, ambush and counter-ambush, and the province's Basij will complete this exercise with attention paid to internal threats.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[article fill continues] </span></blockquote>
---<br />
<br />
<b>Title</b>: 1,100 Mehdishahr Basij in Beit al-Moqdas Wargame<br />
<b>Date</b>: December 1, 2012 / Azar 10, 1391 <br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910909000857">Fars News Agency</a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">FNA: The commander of the IRGC in Mehdishahr county announced the presence of 1,100 people from the Mehdishahr Basij in the Beit al-Moqdas exercises.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Yahiya Dinpour said in an interview today with FNA on the sidelines of the 10,000-person Beit al-Moqdas Battalions Exercise held in in Semnan on public-land [near] Chashtkhowran: Three BaM battalions, one IH battalion, and an aZ battalion – more than 1,100 people in total – from the Basij are participating in this exercise.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He explained: The exercise is being held with the participation of BaM rapid-reaction squads and five battalions from Mehdishahr county's Basij over a period of two days in the public-land [near] Chastkowran, for the purpose of upgrading the combat capability of the Basij forces.
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander of the IRGC in Mehdishahr county, stating that the exercise was being held under the name ''Labik ya Rasoolallah', said: This exercise is being held temporally-centralized, and geographically-decentralized simultaneously across six counties in Semnan province.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He noted that: On the first day of the exercises, Basij forces completed unit training, and on the second day defensive-exercises were completed, [including] [urban]-defense, defense of sensitive targets, ambush and counter-ambush, SAR, and checkpoints.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Dinpour continued: Given the insults by Western media against Prophet Mohammed, this exercise has been named 'Labik ya Rasoolallah' and the Basij in this exercise [exemplify the ideals of the Prophet].</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander of the IRGC in Mehdishahr county said: One of the characteristics of the Basij is that they have the necessary flexibility to confront enemy-threats in all times and places, and can deal with them quickly.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He explained: This issue has been demonstrated in the eight-year Sacred Defense, and today the Basij are better prepared for a comprehensive defense of the Islamic Revolution.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Dinpour emphasized: The Basij of this county [have considerable interest] in holding this exercise, and 100% of the personnel called-up participated in this exercise.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander of the IRGC in Mehdishahr said: More than 24,000 people from Mehdishar are members of the Basij and have been organized into several classes.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The 10,000-person rapid-reaction-battalions exercise 'Beit al-Moqdas' is now being held simultaneously across the Semnan province.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The exercise is being performed under the name 'Labik ya Rasoolallah' across the province in the five counties of Miyami, Shahrud, Damghan, Semnan, and Garmsar.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">This exercise is being held with 27 BaM battalions, and with 9 IH and 9 aZ battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Planned programs in this exercise include urban-defense, SAR, riot-control, defense of sensitive targets, checkpoints, ambush and counter-ambush, and the Basij from Semnan will complete this exercise with attention paid to internal threats.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In Semnan, more than 217 operations-squads have been formed subordinate to Rapid Reaction Beit al-Moqdas Battalions and these battalions include 147 'Zulfiqar' Rapid-Reaction squads, and 70 'Beit al-Moqdas' Rapid Reaction Squads.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The site of this exercise in Shahrud, Miyami and Garmsar is in public-lands, and in Damghan in the Qods Garrison, and in Semnan and Mehdishahr, which is being jointly held, is in the Qods HQ. (?)</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The number of participating individuals in this exercise is 10,000 people, and is 1,800 in Semnan county, 2,400 in Shahrud, 1,700 in Damghan, 1,250 in Garmsar, 1,250 in Miyami, and 1,100 in Mehdishahr.</span></blockquote>
---<br />
<br />
<b>Title</b>: 2,400-Person Beit al-Moqdas Battalion Exercise Began in Shahrud<br />
<b>Date</b>: December 1, 2012 / Azar 10, 1391<br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910909000892">Fars News Agency </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">FNA: Shahrud 2,400-person BaM exercise began in the county's public-lands.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The BaM battalion exercise was carried out with Ashura basij and the […] slogan.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The BaM battalion exercise in Shahrud is a two-day exercise and on the first day of this exercise the Basij were called-up and organized.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Then, the Basij attended classis for ideology, politics, SAR, urban-defense, passive-defense, and during the night completed night-fighting, and ambush and counter-ambush exercises.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Battalions from Mosque and neighborhood-zones were also seen in this exercise.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">BaM battalions from the Seyyed al-Shohada, Karbala, Khatem ol-Anbiya, Ali ibn Abi Talib, and Najaf Ashraf BRZs were added to this exercise in Shahrud county on its second day.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">[article fill continues]</span></blockquote>
---<br />
<br />
<b>Title</b>: Preparation of 10 Battalions from Shahrud for the Beit al-Moqdas Exercise<br />
<b>Date</b>: November 28, 2012 / Azar 8, 1391 <br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910908000831">Fars News Agency </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">FNA: The commander of the IRGC in Shahrud county announced the preparation of 10 Basij battalions from Shahrud for participation in the Beit al-Moqdas exercise, which is to be held with 10,000 Basij.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In the exercise's coordination-meeting held for the Shahrud-IRGC's Beit al-Moqdas battalions, which was held in the IRGC's meeting-hall, Abbas Motahari said to FNA: The Beit al-Moqdas rapid-reaction exercise is being held on the 9th and 10th of Azar in Shahrud, with the objective of preserving and consolidating Basij forces.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The IRGC commander in Shahrud county stated: [They] must try until the forces attending this exercise [are] completely prepared. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Mohtahari continued: The Shahrud-IRGC's Beit al-Moqdas Rapid Reaction Battalion Exercise is being held on Azar 9 and 10, on public-land in Shahrud, and in this exercise, five BaM battalions, three Imam Hussein battalions, and two al-Zahra battalions from the Shahrud Basij will participate.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In this meeting, the necessary coordination was completed for Basij's two-day exercise-program, and their deployment to the exercise region.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Today, the commander of the IRGC's 'Qaem al-Mohamed' [force] in Semnan province said to FNA: The 10,00-person Beit al-Moqdas rapid-reaction-battalions exercise is being held at the province-level on the Azar 9 and 10 [November 29-30]. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">General Ali Hosseini stating that in the Semnan province more than 217 operational/operations-squads have been formed under Beit-al-Moqdas-Rapid-Reaction-Battalions, said: These battalions include 147 'Zulfiqar' rapid-reaction squads, and 70 'Beit al-Moqdas' rapid-reaction squads. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Prof. Hosseini said that the most important objective of this exercise is to prepare the Basij to [protect] the sacred System of the Islamic Republic.</span></blockquote>
---<br />
<br />
<b>Title</b>: 7,500 People Participated in the 'Beit al-Moqdas' Exercise in Semnan<br />
<b>Date</b>: February 27, 2014 / Esfand 8, 1392<br />
<b>Source</b>: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921208000626">Fars News Agency</a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander of the 'Qaem al-Mohmmed' IRGC in Semnan province said: More than 7,500 Basij participated in the 'Beit al-Moqdas' exercise throughout the Semnan province. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">General Ali Hosseini in an exclusive interview with FNA said in this regard: The big 'Beit al-Moqdas' exercise began this morning in Semnan province, and more than 7,500 people participated in this exercise across the province's various counties.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">He explained: [This] big exercise is held every year in all of the country's provinces, which has been [given] the name 'Beit al-Moqdas' in order to show the goals of the Islamic Revolution in the liberation of Islamic countries and the export of the Revolution to the world.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The IRGC commander stated: This year's Beit al-Moqdas exercise is being held in 31 of the country's provicnes, and today Semnan is witness to the powerful maneuvers of the BaM, Ashura, aZ, and Kosar battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Hosseini said: The exercise is a tactical, combat, and cultural action, and will be a [warning] to the enemies of Islam and the System.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Stating that the exercise will be held today and tomorrow in Semnan province, he announced a speech on friday in Semnan's Qods garrison by General Mohamed-Reza Naghdi – the head of the Basij.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The commander of the IRGC in Semnan stated: 250 government-personnel will also have a presence in this exercise and our request of them (?) is that everyone wear the uniform of the Basij. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">1,300-person 'Beit al-Moqdas' exercise in Semnan:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">This morning in Semnan, the exercise began with 1,370 people from BaM, IA, and Kosar battalions. The exercise's reveille will be held on Friday, [February 28th] in Semnan's Qods garrison with 1,770 people from BaM, HQ, IA, Kosar, Imam Hussein, and aZ battalions. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Also, other counties of the province have begun the exercise simultaneously with Semnan, including Shahrud, Garmsar, Miyami, Mehdishahr, Aradan, and sorkheh.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">702-Person exercise in Shahrud:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">This morning in Shahrud, the exercise began with 702 people in BaM and Kosar battalions, and on Friday, [February 28th] reveille will be held in this province with 1,300 people from BaM, Kosar, and IH battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">468 people present in Damghan exercise: </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In Damghan, the exercise is being held with 468 people in two BaM battalions. Reveille will be held with 1,000 people from BaM, IH, and aZ battalions.</span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Holding exercise in Sorkheh with 236 people:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The exercise is being held in sorkheh with 236 people from a BaM battalion. Reveille will be held in this county with 650 people from BaM, IH, and aZ battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">468 people in Garmsar exercise:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In Garmsar, the exercise is being held with 468 people from two BaM battalions. Reveille will be held with 768 people from BaM, IH, and aZ battalions.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Holding exercise in Mehdishahr:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The exercise is being held in Mehdishahr with 468 people in two BaM battalions. Reveille will be held in this county with 668 people from BaM and IH battalions. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">468 people in Miyami hosting exercise:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">In Miyami, the exercise is being held with 468 people from [a] BaM battalion. Reveille will be held with 868 people from BaM, IH, and aZ battalions. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Aradan also went into the field:</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The exercise in Aradan is being held with 468 people in two BaM battalions. Reveille in this county will be held with 690 people in BaM, and aZ battalions, and Imam Hussein companies.</span></blockquote>
---Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-49698628771821425372014-07-22T17:56:00.000-07:002014-09-10T12:03:17.539-07:00IRIAF Air BasesThe squadrons that make up the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) are assigned to a series of tactical-air-bases* (TABs) spread across the country. These form the highest known level of organization since it is unknown whether the IRIAF employs a regional operations command similar to other services.<br />
<br />
* also rendered as tactical-fighter-bases (TFBs)
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<br />
<b>1st '<i>Shahid Lashkari</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-1) – Tehran</b><br />
As of May 2014, the base is commanded by Brig. Gen. 2nd Class (BG2) Mohammed Tasviyehchi. [1]
<br />
<br />
<b>2nd '<i>Shahid Fakoori</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-2) – Tabriz</b><br />
As of March 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Hamid Vahedi. [2]
<br />
<br />
<b>3rd '<i>Shahid Nojeh</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-3) – Hamedan</b><br />
As of April 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mansour Vanek. [3]
<br />
<br />
<b>4th '<i>Shahid Vahdati</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-4) – Dezful</b><br />
As of March 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Hamid Reza Ashena. [4]
<br />
<br />
<strike><b>5th '<i>Shahid Ardestani</i>' Tactical Air Base (Tab-5) – Omidiyeh</b></strike><br />
<strike>Operational status unknown</strike>. Transferred to IRIADF; reserve airstrip.
<br />
<br />
<b>6th '<i>Shahid Yassini</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-6) – Bushehr</b><br />
As of February 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mehdi Hadiyan. [5]
<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>7th '<i>Shahid Dowran</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-7) – Shiraz </b><br />
As of February 2014, the base is commanded by BG/BG2 Mansour Mohamedi. [6]
<br />
<br />
<b>8th '<i>Shahid Babei</i>' Tactical Air Base (TAB-8) – Isfahan</b><br />
As of March 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Masoud Roozkhosh. [7]
<br />
<br />
<b>9th '<i>Shahid Abdulkarimi</i>' Tactical Air Base – Bandar Abbas</b><br />
As of December 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Farhad Gudarzi. [8]
<br />
<br />
<b>10th <i>'Shahid Dol Hamed</i>' Tactical Air Base – Konarak</b><br />
As of April 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mahmud Qoli Zadegan. [9]
<br />
<br />
<b>12th '<i>Shahid Hosseini</i>' Tactical Air Base – Birjand</b><br />
Opened in October 2007, the base is commanded by Col. Hamid Moustafavi as of May 2013. [10]
<br />
<br />
<strike><b>14th '<i>Shahid Babaei</i>' Tactical Air Base – Mashhad</b></strike><br />
<strike>Operational status unknown</strike>.
Transferred to IRIADF. No longer active TAB.<br />
<u><br /></u>
<u>Rumored, unconfirmed, reserve or retired airfields</u>:<br />
Ghale Morghi, Tehran: Closed, converted to park.<br />
TAB-11 (Doshan Tappeh, Tehran): Closed, held in reserve (unconfirmed).<br />
TAB-13 (Zahedan): No details.<br />
TAB-15 (Kermanshah): No details.<br />
TAB-16 (Kerman): No details.<br />
TAB-17 (Masjed Suleiman): No details<br />
<br />
<u>Appendix - Commander IMINT</u>:<br />
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<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works Cited</u>: <br />
[1] <i>Tehran's Haj Director Meets with BG2 Mohammed Tasviyehchi</i>. <a href="http://tehran.haj.ir/Public/News.aspx?ID=NDQy">Tehran Ha</a>j. 05/26/14. <br />
[2] <i>Rouhani's Demands of Sepah / Missile Exercise Controversy</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/294295/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C">Mashregh News</a>. 03/16/14. <br />
[3] <i>Commander of TAB 3: Farvadin 29 is a day about the Army</i>. <a href="http://isna.ir/fa/news/93012911867/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-29-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86">ISNA</a>. 04/18/14. <br />
[4] <i>The IRIAF Had a Role in All the Operations of the Imposed War / Dezful Airbase Has Given 50 Martys to the Revolution</i>. <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/296801/%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B2%D9%81%D9%88%D9%84-50-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">Mashregh News</a>. 04/30/14. <br />
[5] <i>First Memorial for General Yassini Held in Bushehr</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81030404/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C/%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%86_%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87_%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF_%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1_%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86_%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%AF%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%B4%D8%AF">IRNA</a>. 02/06/14 <br />
[6] <i>Iran Becoming a Defense Industry Hub in the Region</i>. <a href="http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921118000451">FNA</a>. 02/07/14 <br />
[7] Ibid Mashregh News, 03/16/14<br />
[8] <i>TAB 9 Completely Surrounds the Persian Gulf</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920929000371">FNA</a>. 12/20/13. <br />
[9] <i>Expansion of the Airport Facilities at Chahbahar is an Advancement for the People of the Region</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81117145/%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1_%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1_%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C/%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4_%D8%A7%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87_%DA%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87_%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA%20_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87_%D9%88_%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87_%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85_%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">IRNA</a>. 04/11/14.<br />
[10] <i>Country's 12th TAB Opened in Birjand</i>. <a href="http://old.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsId=565759">MNA</a>. 10/09/07 Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-53620075053458811932014-07-20T21:52:00.000-07:002014-07-22T21:22:10.854-07:00IRGCN Naval Regions Tasked with securing the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN/NEDASA) is organized into five geographic regions, plus a handful of independent bases outside of the Gulf. These form the administrative basis for conducting combat operations and are believed to be largely equivalent to other services' 'regional headquarters'.<br />
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<br />
<b>1st Naval Region – Bandar Abbas </b><br />
The 1st Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Abbas. As of March 2014, the region is commanded by Vice Admiral (hereafter, BG2) Mohammed Shiyari. [1] Prior to his appointment in June 2013, he was the region's deputy commander. He replaced the previous commander, BG2 Torabi, who was promoted to Inspections Deputy for the IRGCN. [2]<br />
<br />
It's operations area is focused on the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
<br />
<b>2nd Naval Region – Bandar Bushehr</b><br />
The 2nd Naval Region is headquartered in Bushehr, in the central Persian Gulf. As of April 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Ali Razmjou. [3]<br />
<br />
<b>3rd Naval Region – Bandar Mahshahr</b><br />
The 3rd Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Mahshahr in the northern Persian Gulf. As of February 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Seifollah Bakhtiarvand. [4]<br />
<br />
The scope of its area of operations is unknown.<br />
<br />
<b>4th Naval Region – Bandar Asaluyeh </b><br />
The 4th Naval Region is headquartered in Asaluyeh, between Bushehr and Bandar Abbas. As of January 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Yadollah Badin[13]<br />
<br />
Its area of operations extends from the town of Dayyar in the north, to Kish Island in the south. [5] This area was previously associated with both the 1st and 2nd Naval Regions, but was split off in November 2008. Prior to the designation, the IRGCN maintaned an independent base at Asaluyeh. [6]<br />
<br />
<b>5th Naval Region – Bandar Lengah </b><br />
The 5th Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Lengah in the southern Persian Gulf. As of June 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Ali Azamayi. [7] Prior to his appointment in 2012, he was the deputy commander of the IRGCN's 1st Naval Region. [8]<br />
<br />
Its area of operations extends from Qeshm Island in the east, to Kish Island in the west, covering the islands in between including the contested Tunbs and Abu Musa. This area was previously associated with the 1st Naval Zone, but was split off in November 2012 in order focus their efforts on the cluster of islands. [9]<br />
<br />
<u>Independent Naval Bases</u>:<br />
<br />
<b>Imam Ali Naval Base - Bandar Chahbahar </b><br />
As of July 2013, the base is commanded by Colonel Mansour Ravankar. [10]<br />
<br />
<b>Naval Base - Bandar Jask</b> [11]<br />
<br />
<b>Seyyed al-Shohada Training Center - Gilan </b><br />
Built around 2012, this recent complex reportedly consolidated all of the training facilities used by the IRGC-N including commando and officer education. [12] It's location is unknown, but may be Zibakenar.<br />
<br />
<u>Appendix - Commander IMINT</u>:<br />
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<br />
<br />
<u>Footnotes / Works Cited</u>:<br />
1) <i>1,800 People Visit the Region of the Iran-Iraq War in Bandar Abbas</i>. <a href="http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81098133/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF_%DB%8C%DA%A9_%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D9%88_800_%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82_%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C_%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AA_%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84_%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3_%D8%AF%D8%B1_%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87_%D8%A2%D8%A8_%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3">IRNA</a>. 04/24/14.<br />
2) <i>New Commander for the 1st Naval Region Appointed</i>. <a href="http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/details/217235">Hamshahri Online</a>. 06/03/13.<br />
3) <i>Commander Sees Persian Gulf as Battlefield of Possible Iran-US War</i>. <a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930320000702">FNA</a>. 06/10/14. <br />
4) <i>Provinces Were the Biggest Reason for the Success of the Islamic Revolution</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921114000007">FNA</a>. 02/03/14.<br />
5) <i>Iran Opens Fourth Naval Base in the Persian Gulf</i>. <a href="http://www.payvand.com/news/08/nov/1182.html">Payvand News</a>. 11/19/08.<br />
6) <i>Ceremony for the Beginning of the 4th Naval Region</i>. PSEEZ. 11/17/08.<br />
7) <i>Members of the Bandar-e Lengah City Council Present in the 5th Naval Region</i>. <a href="http://www.lengehnews.com/%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87/">Lengah News</a>. 06/05/14. <br />
8) <i>General Azamayi Became the Commander of the Sepah's 5th Naval Region</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910814000204">FNA</a>. 11/04/12. <br />
9) <i>Where are IRGCN Naval Bases in the Persian Gulf?</i> <a href="http://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/82668/%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%DA%A9%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">Entekhab</a>. 11/05/12.<br />
10) <i>The Enemies' Martys Failed to Achieve Their Objectives</i>. <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920427000783">FNA</a>. 07/18/13.<br />
11) <i>The Minister of Defense and General Hajizadeh Visited the IRGC-N Naval Region</i>. <a href="http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4351995/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF">FNA</a>. 04/23/13.<br />
12) <i>Construction of Independent IRGCN Wharfs in the North of the Country</i>. <a href="http://ahrargil.com/page/2012-12-08-20-34-56/">Ahrargil</a>. 12/08/12<br />
13) <i>Awarding Rank to the New Commander of the 4th Naval Region.</i> <a href="http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911109000390">FNA</a>. 01/28/13.Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-74474970452858043442014-06-23T19:35:00.000-07:002014-06-23T19:44:27.712-07:00Translation - Will History Repeat Itself? [Iran's Characterization of the 1975 Helsinki Accords]Title: <b>Will History Repeat Itself</b><br />
Date: February 18, 2014 / Bahman 29, 1392<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/285643/%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AE-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">Mashregh News </a><br />
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In the mid-1980s, the plan for [<i>unclear, related to human-rights institutions</i>] was prepared and approved by America's National Security Council. This document was officially published after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. The title of this document was: “Programs Against the Soviet Union Within the Next 10 Years”
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<br />
According to the Mashregh blogosphere, Sina Rabiee writes in his latest post at 'Noghteskh':
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<br />
It has been several months since the agreement between Iran and America (the 5+1 countries, and perhaps the 3+3). Parts of this agreement [resemble] the conquest of ol-Fatooh and other parts [resemble] the treaty of Turkmenchay.
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<br />
However, it seems that this treaty is more similar to the Gulistan Treaty, and from other perspectives, is similar to the Helsinki Treaty; with regard to the hidden articles of the agreement, its ambiguity, and concessions by Iran, the treaty has a special resemblance to the Gulistan Treaty. In other ways, it has a special resemblance to the Helsinki treaty because America's military options for Iran have been frustrated, and they seek to advance their objectives through social, cultural, and political influence[. They also seek to advance their objectives] through the creation of divisions in the top military leadership, [and by] building up opponents of the government in the international-sphere, such as awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Shirin Abadi, the introduction of Khatami as an international personality and the acceptance of his view of 2001 as the year of 'dialogue between civilizations.
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<br />
[Gulistan Treaty entry]
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<u>Helsinki</u>:
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[Another agreement was concluded in 1975]. An agreement in the cultural-sphere between Russia and America, [this] agreement caused the American intelligence system to influence senior Russian figures, and [led to the dissolution of the USSR] in 1992. [These] events, which dissolved the Soviet Union in three stages, also sought to break Russia into 15 states.
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<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">“The Helsinki Agreement was signed in 1975, of which the third article of this agreement formally confirmed an increase in academic-cultural cooperation between the USSR and America. In these circumstances, American and European security [and intelligence] systems, with careful planning and large expenditures, looked to lure away key Soviet officials, and engaged in all sorts of tricks to hire people.” (Hassan Vaezi. 'Reform and Collapse, Explaining the Restructuring Plan of the Soviet Union in Iran. Tehran'. Soroush. 1379 [2000/2001]. p.23
</span></blockquote>
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America and Europe used all [available] methods to achieve their objectives, but the most important and efficient way to influence Soviet authorities was a variety of methods. [Their] influence began with academic (?) and cultural cooperation and ended with security and political activities. Generally, foreign-areas [related] to the collapse of the USSR include:
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<br />
- Dragging the USSR into an arms-race and expanding its scope, which led to one-dimensional development and neglect of other aspects.<br />
- Planned programs to pull down the Iron Curtain<br />
- Economic blockade of the USSR with the objective of undermining national ability<br />
- Manufacturing successive crisis<br />
- Planned programs to destroy the face of the USSR in public-opinion.<br />
- Extensive support for opposition, and the discrediting of judicial, and security institutions.<br />
- Planned programs to influence leading USSR officials with bribes, financial issues, threats, and documentation.
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<br />
Alexi Podberezkin, Chief of the Military-Science Academy, member of Russian Parliment, and head of the Cultural Heritage Organizaton, has said about the American plans for the collapse of the Soviet Union:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">“In the mid-1980s, plans for</span><span style="font-size: x-small;">[<i>unclear, related to human-rights institutions</i>] was prepared and approved by America's National Security Council. This document was officially released in 1992, after the collapse of the USSR. The title of this document was: Programs Against the Soviet Union Within the Next 10 Years'”
</span></blockquote>
In this document, a three-phased collapse of the USSR, and a one-stage collapse of Russia were considered.
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1) Planning for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact (military-pact consisting of east-bloc countries in opposition to NATO)<br />
2) Planning for the isolation and break-up of the Baltic republics, such as the Ukraine, Moldova, etc<br />
3) Isolation of other central-Asian republics from the USSR<br />
4) Division of Russia into 10-15 different states and regions
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<br />
The first three phases have been implemented, and America is seeking the implementation of the fourth phase currently.
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Podberezkin says:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">"In 1989, I studied more than 200 different documents [by] America relating to the collapse of the USSR, I was able to classify America and the West's strategy, in late-1989 and early-1990 I provided documents to Gorbachev and the leaders of the so-called reform movement, but instead of planning to confront the American strategy and attempt to save the country from the crisis I was accused of being anti-reform, and opposed to Perestroika … [unclear]." (Same, p.26-27)
</span></blockquote>
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To realize its objectives, America [operationalized] its programs between 1975-1992, however the programs that can be [seen] as the primary-cause of the collapse:
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a) Destruction of the security and judicial system, and discrediting them in public-opinion. (army, judiciary, etc)<br />
b) Promoting the point that with the end of the Cold War, all of the political, economic, security, and international problems of the USSR will be resolved.<br />
c) Funding the creation of political organizations with Western ideas to promote their primary objectives.<br />
d) Removal of sympathetic forces from the political and social scene of the country<br />
e) The application of influencing forces and the use of publications, parties, and affiliates to prevent government leadership from resolving their failures. (in this context, this means supporting people like Gorbachev, and appoint him as 'person of the year')<br />
f) [The use of] external pressures, regional crisis, and institutions like the IMF and WB to weaken financial strength and national ability with the objective of creating national economic crisis and public dissatisfaction.<br />
g) Provoking Soviet Republics to secede and declare independence.<br />
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[Geneva entry and conclusion]Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1620264550074013695.post-89994881385768401762014-05-14T20:09:00.002-07:002014-05-14T20:12:23.156-07:00Translation - Interview with Gen. Hajizadeh and Technical Descriptions of Features from the IRGC-ASF's Recent ExhibitionThe Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp's Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) displayed a number of their latest achievements this past Sunday. The importance of this exhibition - which was timed, no doubt, to coincide with the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 - was underscored by the presence of the Supreme Leader, and a veritable laundry list of <a href="http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/2014/05/senior-military-commanders-during.html">senior military commanders</a>.<br />
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In the English-language media, the star of the show was a copy of the RQ-170 downed over eastern Iran in late-2011, but a number of displays flew beneath the radar that were just as interesting, if not more so. <br />
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These include (but are not limited to):<br />
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- Raad / 3rd-Khordad / Tabas / Bashir / Taer Air-Defense Family<br />
- Zelzal / Fateh / Khalij Fars / Hormuz / Fajr Ballistic Missiles <br />
- Ya Ali Cruise Missile<br />
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Open-source reporting in Persian-language media helped augment traditional image-analysis techniques, providing insights into these system's capabilities. The following translations are relevant excerpts from these reports. Emphasis added.<br />
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Title: <b>2nd and 3rd RQ-170 Aircraft Currently Under Construction / Hormuz-1 Anti-Radar Missile and the Hormuz-2 Anti-Ship Missile</b><br />
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930222001585">Fars News</a> (Video via <a href="http://youtu.be/JxM3FsH7EQI">Youtube</a>)
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
....<br />
Hajizadeh, referencing post-revolution self-sufficiency, said: We [have overcome] sanctions and have arrived at a point where the enemy cannot limit our military. ...<br />
<br />
He said: In the past, we looked to, and relied on foreigners and their equipment, but we encountered obstacles – for example, we would only receive 40% of what we asked for, and then they would say 'you don't have to buy from us', [but] we still did, and in the end they still did not give us the radar, [instead] they delivered only some shoddy products and returned our money.
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<br />
...<br />
In another part of the interview, Hajizadeh referred to the Iranian RQ-170, saying: Obtaining the RQ-170 UAV is an intelligence achievement for us and [we have made a copy of it]. At the time [of the capture] we already had highly-capable UAVs, [so] we [only] gained a little from it.
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He stated: The work [on<u> the Iranian RQ-170] </u>took place between Azar 1390 [December 2011] and today, and <u>only the test flight remains, which may take place in one or two months (?) However, the 15% scale-model of this UAV has successfully flown before, and the prototype will fly during the coming months.
</u><br />
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Hajizadeh also referenced the display of the one-to-one, and 40% scale models of the RQ-170, saying: <u>The second and third RQ-170 aircraft are currently under construction.
</u><br />
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The IRGC-ASF commander emphasized: … the enemy has said in recent years that their missile defense can hit [our] missiles, but today they come to us and say 'let's negotiate about [your] ballistic missiles'. If they could [defend against our missiles], they wouldn't negotiate.
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He noted: In military-dimensions, we have crossed the sanctions barrier and they cannot limit us anymore [and in other areas sanctions are useless (?)].
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<u>Referring to the radar in yesterday's display, Hajizadeh noted: ...foreigners didn't give it to us, and we had only one image and one visit [to observe it], but with the assistance of our experts we were able to manufacture and operate them.
</u><br />
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The IRGC-ASF commander said: We have arrived at the mass-production of precision-strike ground-to-ground missiles, and yesterday we presented the changes [that we have made in them] to the SL.
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And in reference to the Hormuz 1 and 2 missiles, he said: <u>The Hormuz 1 and 2 are two types of ballistic missiles, of which the Hormuz 1 is an anti-radar missile and can destroy the radar onboard an aircraft carrier, or a Patriot site on land, or a search[/surveillance]-radar site</u>.
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Hajizadeh added: <u>The Hormuz 1 can strike a 20 foot container from a range of 300 km with complete accuracy.
</u><br />
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The commander emphasized: <u>The Hormuz 2 is an anti-ship ballistic missile that reaches speeds of Mach 4-5.
</u><br />
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Hajizadeh also referred to <u>the '3rd of Khordad' missile system: This system is a phased array radar</u>, meaning that one radar actually has a total of 1,700 radars. <u>This sytem has electronic scanning capabilities and is very advanced, and is competitive with the Russian S-300 and BUK-M2E.
</u><br />
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He added: <u>The '3rd of Khordad' system [can] destroy four targets simultaneously with eight missiles, three of which are installed on the [TELAR]-system and two more TELs can be added.</u>
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The commander said: The '3rd of Khordad' system will have a range of more than a 100 km with the missiles that will be installed on it in the future.
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Hajizadeh, stating that today they have reached the edge of air-defense technology possessed by other countries, said: We have built systems that are not in the same class and level as foreign systems because [our] systems are innovative and not [vulnerable] to jamming.</blockquote>
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Title: <b>3rd-Khordad' System Comparable to S-300 / Range Increase to 200 km</b> <br />
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/18775">DEFA Press </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
...<br />
The '3rd-Khordad' air-defense system [can] track and fire at four targets, with eight missiles, simultaneously
<br />
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<u>This system has the ability to target</u> fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles <u>up to an altitude to 25 km.
</u><br />
<br />
<u>The '3rd-Khordad' missile-system </u>(a product of the Sepah's Air Defense [and] Radar Research Center) is comparable with the Russian S-300, except that the current Iranian system <u>has a 50 km range and [version(s)] with a 100 and 200 km range are in development. </u></blockquote>
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-<br />
<br />
Title: <b>'Zelzal Rain' with 30, 17-kg, bombs / A missile equivalent to 36 rockets</b><br />
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/18778">DEFA Press</a><br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
...<br />
<u>30, 17-kg, bombs are used in the 'Zelzal Rain',</u> which are dispersed close to the ground to hit airport runways and equipment </blockquote>
-<br />
Title: <b>'Ya Ali' Missile; the Newest Iranian Cruise Missile with a Range of 700 km</b><br />
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)<br />
Source: <a href="http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/18875">DEFA Press</a><br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Yesterday, the SL visited an exhibition of the IRGC-ASF's achievments.<br />
During this visit, a new cruise missile named 'Ya Ali' was unveiled, which was displayed in a red color.<br />
According to information obtained, <u>the Ya Ali cruise missile has a range of 700 km</u>.
Before this, Iran's cruise missiles had, at most, a range of 300 km. </blockquote>
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<br />Author: Galen Wrighthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14420998943532765616noreply@blogger.com0