The Arkenstone - ارکنستون

Factional Competition in the Leadup to the the 2012 Majlis Election

2012-01-18T21:09:00.000-08:00

One recurring debate that pops up about US-Iranian relations surrounds the perceived rationality of Tehran's decision making process - is it governed by apocalyptic religious ideology, or is it instead guided by rational self-interest? Supporters of the former explanation would argue that a politician like Ahmadinejad, who is not typically known for shying away from provoking confrontation (his comments about the Holocaust and Israel early in his administration were carefully calculated to produce the most amount of shock at home and abroad), would always pursue such a behavior even if it induced negative consequences.

Recent developments continue to add mounting evidence to the proposition that this is not the case and that the leadership in Tehran is not governed by an iron-clad ideology, but by a desire for survival (and the power needed to ensure survival) in the meat-grinder that is domestic politics.* Most recently, Ahmadinejad was rumored to have denounced the brinksmanship that Iran has engaged in over the Persian Gulf. The Telegraph asserts that:

Mr Ahmadinejad claims the supreme leader's loyalists are deliberately provoking a confrontation with the West to make him look weak, thereby undermining his supporters' prospects in elections to the Majlis... (The Telegraph)

This would provide a tempting explanation for the statements by figures like Gen. Safavi which, to all involved, appeared to be setting Iran up to lose face after being forced to back down from impossible positions (i.e. refusing to allow a USN carrier to reenter the Persian Gulf); in other words, to paraphrase John Limbert, it was a product of maximalist rhetoric painting the leadership into positions they could never hope to defend.

If this source is to be believed however this was not an accidental occurrence, but a concerted effort to sap Ahmadinejad's political capital leading up to the 2012 Majlis election. Indeed, Khamenei may be attempting to restrain an unpopular (among elites anyway) Ahmadinejad in order preserve the tenuous balance of power which sustains the legitimacy of the political sphere. The Supreme Leader's goal is not to publicly exclude Ahmadinejad or his allies from participation in they system because doing so would have much the same effect as the boycott by certain reformist candidates is intended to achieve - demonstrate to Khamenei that he (and by extension Velayat-e Faqih) no longer have the consent of the population to govern. In this manner, it's essential for the current alliance between traditional conservatives and principlists to actually deprive Ahmadinejad of his support at a popular level, and among key power nodes.

In this scenario, escalation could have several purposes. Sabotaging the economy by way of international relations would have negative consequences for Ahmadinejad who is already suffering significant public relations flak for his handling of the economy - the number one issue to many voters in the coming election. This option would also simultaneously be privately attractive to many key IRGC-aligned figures close to the Suprme Leader who could use the opportunity to consolidate their own 'grey-market' patronage networks. It seems short-sighted to believe however that this strategy will function without blowback for Khamenei; Ahmadinejad may be blamed in the short-term for the state of the economy, preventing him from using his faction to successfully balance against Khamenei, but it may be a Pyrrhic victory if it comes at the cost of heightened tensions, and an a sluggish economy overall. Furthermore, because Khamenei essentiallys offers no real alternative to this strategy it may eventually end up delegitimizing him as well in the end.

Alternately, it could function as a form of brinksmanship within Tehran. Khamenei may be gambling that when Iran is eventually forced to backdown from its 'impossible positions', then Ahmadinejad would be saddled with the blame for "bowing to foreigners intent on dominating Iran" - a common refrain in domestic factional warfare.

Maybe some other dynamic is at work here?

* It should be noted that this is not to say that Iran is a purely rational state governed by formulaic calculations of power; they are still subject to the influence of ideology and the threat of miscalculation. This is far from a unique problem as all nations suffer from it to some degree and while it may weight the calculations one way or another, it can never negate the calculations altogether. Even if Ahmadinejad (or any politician) has come to the conclusion that his interest lies in avoiding conflict, it must be remembered that this is still only just a means to an end. In this case, the end is a revisionist redistribution of power towards a global multi-polar world.

16th Armored Division

2012-01-15T23:28:00.000-08:00

The 16th armored division is headquartered in Qazvin, but also garrisons brigades in Zanjan and Hamedan, and is one of heaviest Artesh divisions. During the Iran-Iraq war they were equipped with M-60A1 MBTs but have since transitioned to Chieftain MBTs. (1) In November 2011, Mehr News announced that the 2nd brigade was being split-off into the 216th independent armored brigade. However the actual meaning of the article may have been misinterpreted and as such, this remains unconfirmed (anyone able to confirm or deny this is invited to comment below). (2)

Brigade location overview (GE)

Qazvin
The first brigade, based in Qazvin, serves as divisional headquarters and as a consequence has a larger compound than in Zanjan or Hamedan. The compound can be found north-east of the city-center on the outskirts of town. Imagery is low-quality and dates from April 2003.

(GE)

A large number of different vehicles can be found in different motor-pools clustered in the center of the compound. The western portion is primarily given over to armored vehicles including what is almost certainly a high-strength battalion of Chieftain tanks. About a companies worth of M113s are visible, indicating a larger mechanized infantry formation (possibly including BTR-60 APCs which have been seen on parade in the city). Several smaller vehicles in the vicinity may be Scorpion light tanks which have also been seen on parade. The overall higher strength of the 16th's tank battalions versus other examples (such as those in the 88th AD) more closely resembles pre-revolutionary strength which allocated 15 tanks per company. (3)

On the eastern portion of the compound are several battalion-strength collections of artillery including ~23 D-30 guns, ~27 other towed guns, and an unknown (probably battalions worth) number of M-109 SPHs. It's noteworthy that the towed gun groupings exceed the usual battalion strength (18 pieces). The large number of units also possibly indicates that some of them are divisional level support units.

Littered around the motor-pools are collections of automotive vehicles, including semi-trailer trucks and containers for logistics, five-ton trucks used for infantry and artillery motorization as well as logistical support, and smaller 1/4, 3/4, and 1 1/4-ton tactical vehicles used for infantry motorization.

Zanjan
The second brigade in Zanjan is located in a compound north of the city-center. Compared to Qazvin, Zanjan enjoys clear, recent imagery from October 2010. A collection of firing ranges - relatively advanced compared to the rest of the country - as well as training yards (i.e. obstacle courses, tranches) can be found in the northern half of the compound. The southern half includes the usual range of administrative and garrison facilities.

(GE)

In between the two in the middle of the compound is the brigades motor pool including garages and workshops. Fortunately all the vehicles appear to be neatly organized into their respective organizations and are clearly separated from one another which makes analysis all that much easier.

The north-eastern row includes a battalion of light AFVs - possibly BTR-60s or BMPs, but most-likely the former. Just south of this is a battalion of M-109 SPHs, complete with M-548 ammunition resupply vehicles. East of this are two more motor pools which holds the majority of the brigades armor - a heavy (35+) battalion of Chieftain tanks including at least two examples of the ABLV or CEV variants. Not visible, but which have been observed on parade, are M113 APCs.

Hamedan
The third brigade in Hamedan is located several km north-west of the city of Hamadan. While no high quality imagery of the base is available, there is a large motor-pool which indicates a similar level of mechanization as the other brigades. Parade imagery confirms the presence of BMP IFVs and M109 SPHs.

(GE)

Works Cited
(1) http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_206.shtml
(2) http://www5.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1457731
(3) http://www.iran-heritage.org/interestgroups/war-iraqiran-news2.htm

The Tanker War 1987-1988 - Operational Lessons for 2012 and Beyond

2012-01-05T14:25:00.000-08:00

As I mentioned in late-October, one of the reasons for the lack of posts this Fall has been due to my focusing on a research project concerning the modern political history of Iran as part of my academic studies at the Evergreen State College. One key element in this study was an examination of the dynamics that affected the US-Iranian relationship during the Tanker War and the effect of military force on attempts to coerce the Iranian leadership in Tehran to adopt certain positions. In light of recent tensions in the Gulf, I feel an examination of historical precident may serve to clear away at least some of the clouds. What follows is one of the papers I wrote for the project.

I offer this disclaimer: it must be remembered that 2012 is not 1988 and no matter what historical similarities may exist, there are also differences that make it risky to base ones future moves entirely off of past precedents. All the same, while history may not offer us a panacea, it is still valuable nonetheless.

My apologies if any of the foot-notes are off, I had to transcribe them from "chicago-style" footnotes in a word document which doesn't lend itself to copy-paste.

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One of the primary effects of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was to radically alter the balance of power in the Persian Gulf region. The US strategy of using Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure regional stability and contain the Soviet Union had collapsed; Iran’s military was also left in disarray, a mere shadow of its former self. Iraq meanwhile was now under the leadership of Saddam Hussein who seized power in 1979 and who, in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian peace accords in the late-1970s, began to envision Iraq as the leader of a pan-Arab ‘rejectionist’ bloc who could fill the security void in the Persian Gulf. (1) This came to a head in September of 1980 when, following months of escalating border clashes, the Iraqi army crossed the border en masse and attempted to seize and hold a significant portion of south-western Iran in what James Bill describes as a “political struggle for the hegemony of the Persian Gulf”. (2) Inevitably the war spilled into the Gulf; after spending two years forcing Iraq out of their territory, Iran began a series of offensives aimed at punishing Baghdad and overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Facing defeats in the ground war, Iraq opened the first phase of the Tanker War in 1984 by using the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) to strike at shipping in an effort to deplete Iran of their ability to export the petrochemicals on which it depended. Unable to attack Iraqi oil export capacity (Iraq had switched to using Kuwaiti tankers, or using overland pipelines), Iran resorted to attacking neutral shipping traffic carrying Iraqi oil and other goods. (3) The Tanker War escalated through 1986, drawing more and more international attention. A number of successful Iranian offensives, especially the capture of the strategic Faw peninsula, Iraq’s only border with the northern Persian Gulf, was beginning to create the fear that Iran might be able to topple Baghdad and in doing so, mark the first step in Iran’s regional domination. This was also paired with the revelation in the second half of 1986 that the US had been secretly supplying arms to Iran. (4) This confluence of factors led Washington to accept Kuwait’s call at the end of 1986 for international escorts for their tanker convoys.(5)

The decision to escort Kuwaiti tankers and protect them from Iranian attacks officially marked the US entry into the Tanker War and the start of confrontations between the US Navy (USN) and Iran’s naval forces (INFs). (6) Between 1987 and 1988 the USN and INFs would butt heads on several occasions, eventually concluding with Operation Preying Mantis in the spring of 1988. This paper aims to explore the operational lessons that can be gleaned from studying these engagements and what these lessons can tell us today about the possible behavior of INFs in a contemporary naval war in the Persian Gulf. Its experience has had a catalyzing effect on Iranian strategic planning and has revolutionized the way Iran intends on fighting the US but despite this, the case-study remains woefully underexploited as a pedagogical tool for contingency planning within the US. (7) Specifically, this paper will unpack the conventional wisdom surrounding the efficacy of military force to coerce Iranian policymakers into both drawing down the Tanker War, and contributing to an overall cease-fire with Iraq.

Following Kuwait’s request in late 1986 for international escorts, Iran began a wide range of provocative military posturing in order to avoid this scenario which it rightfully felt would unjustly help Iraq. In February and April INFs began deploying Chinese-built HY-2 anti-ship cruise-missiles (ASCM) and threatened to seize the straits of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) also began a process of highly-visible arms procurement and training in preparation for a conflict with the USN; they also escalated their sea-mining operations. The political leadership also threatened the US and USSR that they would be repulsed if they attempted to interfere in the Persian Gulf, specifically saying that it would become “a second Afghanistan”.(8)

Then, on May 17, an IrAF fighter jet on an anti-shipping operation in the Persian Gulf fired at what it likely believed was an Iranian tanker. The ship in question was in fact a USN frigate called the USS Stark. The damage caused by the two Exocet ASCMs crippled the ship and killed 37 US sailors. In the US, debates erupted about the nature of the US mission in the Gulf and whether or not Reagan had the authority to station military forces in a warzone without getting authorization through the War Powers Act. This led many parties in the region, including Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)(9) , to fear that “…a peripheral strategy of indirect attacks on U.S. ships and forces … might lead the Congress and American people to demand that the U.S. halt its reflagging effort, or even withdraw from the Gulf.”(10) The debate over the Stark also came in the wake of the US withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984 following the car-bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut where 241 marines were killed, an attack which was most likely perpetrated by Iran’s proxy group in Lebanon, Hezbollah. Iran’s interpretation of these two events was such that Iran believed that the US was ‘self-constrained’ when it came to force and even though the US might theoretically have an extremely power military, it lacked the national will in order to use it and at the same time remained vulnerable to highly symbolic attacks that dealt significant blows (such as the casualties in the wake of the barracks bombing and the Stark). Furthermore, the lack of any punitive measures toward Iraq in retaliation for the attack further emboldened Iran into believing that the convoy escorts that were about to begin were toothless.

The first US escort convoy for Kuwaiti tankers was set to take place in mid/late-July. Only a month earlier in June, Iran had begun sea-mining operations in the northern Gulf near Kuwait. (11) It was in this environment that the US-flagged Bridgeton, part of the very first US-protected convoy, struck and was crippled by a floating sea mine on July 24th. Up until this point, the USN strategy was to rely on the threat of US power alone to deter Iran from attacking the convoys. (12) The failure in this policy was that while the presence of a carrier-battle-group was a powerful show of force that Iran recognized could deal significant damage to their navy; they didn’t believe the US would ever be able to muster together enough support to actually use it, a belief that was verified when Iran escaped all retaliation for the mining.

In the wake of the incident, Iran was further emboldened by the fact that USN was impotent against a threat like naval mines. Guided-missile-frigates were effective in projecting power across the Pacific and Atlantic oceans against waves of hypothetical Soviet aircraft, but carried no counter-measures against WWI-era floating mines that were found in the confines of the Persian Gulf; as an ad-hoc measure, the USN resorted to stationing sailors at the bow of ships with a rifle and a set of binoculars. As a result, the US has proved incapable of carrying out its mission of protecting the tankers and was dealt a sharp blow to their prestige.

The Bridgeton incident also demonstrated to Iran the importance of ambiguity. Because Iran never directly admitted responsibility and there was nothing conclusively tying Iran to the mines in question the international community was never able to pin the blame on Iran and generate momentum for any kind of punitive action. (13) Then-PM Mir Hossein Mousavi credited the attack to “invisible hands” and top military authority Hashemi Rafsanjani threatened further attacks on states that supported Iraq’s war effort. (14) (15) In the following months, the IRGCN was encouraged by Ayatollah Khomeini to escalate its confrontations with the USN. (16) Cordesman asserts that in August 1987, “…every week brought a new Iranian effort to strike at the U.S. by indirect means … that would embarrass the U.S. and potentially force it to withdraw.”(17)

The US’s only response to the incident is to issue Iran one of the first major ‘lines in the sand’ so-to-speak – if the US caught an Iranian mine-laying ship, it would be sunk. (18) This threat does not appear to have had any deterrent effect because INFs followed Khomeini desire to escalate their confrontation with the USN with numerous small boat attacks and a renewed sea-mining campaign in August and September. During this time, Iran relied heavily on plausible deniability to protect them from retaliation from the USN, relying on a fleet of covert mine-laying ships which were difficult to track in the crowded Persian Gulf. However, this strategy failed when USN forces were able to capture the Iran Ajr landing craft being used to lay a minefield north of Qatar on September 21.(19)

The reason this line-in-the-sand didn’t have a deterrent effect on Iran with regard to their decision to continue mine warfare can be traced to the same fundamental reason that Iran felt it could attack the Bridgeton – US threats still didn’t hold any credibility. Mine warfare offered enough anonymity to avoid retaliation, but still offered the possibility of dealing a crippling blow to the USN which would then, presumably, spark a withdrawal. Interestingly though, the Iranian leadership initially took a conciliatory posture when the possibility of a major US attack in response was still possible; then-President Ali Khameini emphasized that Iran had no interest in entering into war with the US.(20)

On one hand, while the Iran Ajr incident did result in an increase in domestic support for Reagan and for the idea of a military reprisal against Iran, and helped isolate Iran diplomatically, the continued lack of any actual punitive retaliation quickly swept fears of a war with the US from the INF’s minds. (21) Consequently, by October the Tanker War was back to its regular tempo with small boat attacks and clashes with the USN. This culminated on October 15/16 when Iran fired a handful of HY-2 ASCMs toward Kuwait, striking both a neutral tanker, and the US-flagged Sea-City Isle.(22)

This time, the US decided that they would strike back. Launched on October 19, Operation Nimble Archer was conceived of as limited, proportional response designed not to escalate the existing level of tensions so as to not endanger a comprehensive cease-fire being negotiated at the same time; a handful of USN surface vessels destroyed two abandoned oil platforms off the southern coast of Iran.(23)

In response to this show of force Iran temporarily halted all anti-shipping operations until November when Iraq resumed attacks on Iranian targets in the Gulf. At this point, even though Iran resumed tanker-hunting in the Gulf, they were careful to only attack neutral targets and steered clear of any direct attacks on the USN. (24) This indicates that Iran responded at least somewhat positively to Operation Nimble Archer by choosing not to continue the harassing attacks against the USN. Despite this, the incident also confirms a second trend in INF behavior which is that while Iran does respond positively, within the framework established, they will continue to do it’s best to subvert the aims of USN forces. What I mean by this is that in the wake of Nimble Archer Iran might have retreated to the limits set – Iran stopped attacking US-flagged tankers, but within this rule Iran stretched the limits as far as possible by escalating the mining war, and in attacks against neutral-flagged tankers. This was again illustrated at the end of 1987 when it appears that the US covertly threatened Iran over the conditions in the Gulf. While it is impossible to know the exact nature of the threat, it appears to have been in regards to Iran’s continued attacks against maritime traffic. (25) Combined with an aggressive naval strategy of shadowing Iranian warships by the USN, Iran relented and in February through early-March, the Persian Gulf was relatively calm.(26)

In March and April of 1988, the Iranian leadership was under extreme pressure following setbacks in the ground war to produce a final victory so as to end the war. (27) (28) During this time, there is a divisive internal debate going on in Tehran surrounding the strategy in the Gulf, some believed that only had to be dealt a further blow, while some others felt that a military confrontation would only end in disaster. (29) Ultimately though, the IRGCN restarted their sea-mining campaign in the Gulf which culminated on April 14 when the US warship USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a floating mine in the southern Persian Gulf which crippled the vessel. While this attack would justify a more significant response then Nimble Archer, the retaliation for the deliberate mining of a US warship was still a limited, proportional response; On April 19 the USN destroyed two oil platforms, sunk an IRIN frigate, missile-boat, and severely crippled another frigate. (30) The USN also declared that it would now act to protect all neutral shipping passing through the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s response to this incident was mixed. Those who favored a confrontational posture suffered significant fallout in Tehran as the US, instead of backing down, struck back at Iran. (31) Likewise, many in Iran’s conventional armed forces were stunned, for the rest of the war the IRIN and IRIAF were ordered not to engage the USN. (32) Combined with the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf by the US cruiser USS Vincennes on July 3, Preying Mantis had the effect of indicating to Tehran that the US would never tolerate an Iranian victory and now had no compunctions about intervening directly on Iraq’s behalf. The fact that the US response took place on the same day that Iraq recaptured the strategic Faw peninsula drove this point home. Rafsanjani declared that “Time is not on our side anymore, the world – I mean the anti-Islamic powers – has decided to make a serious effort to save Saddam Hussein and tie our hands.”(33)

The most interesting reaction came from the IRGCN however, despite the fact that Khomeini was under intense pressure to end the war the IRGCN was further incensed in the wake of Preying Mantis, and, against the better urging of various factions in Tehran, continued to harass the US after a limited operational pause in May. (34) By June, small-boat attacks and mine-laying had resumed, and HY-2 ASCM facilities were expanded around the straits of Hormuz. (35) This is easily one the more important lessons of the US’s interaction with the INFs during 1987-1988; one cant talk about how “Iran” responds to coercive violent force like Preying Mantis because there isn’t a singular ‘Iran’ to respond to it in the first place. What the US perceived when it saw Khomeini spitefully accept the ‘chalice of poison’ when he signed the ceasefire with Iraq was that “This sequence of events...has clearly indicated that Iranians, despite all their rhetoric, religious zeal and determination, at the end of the day are also quite susceptible to the implications [and effects] posed by an overwhelming and decisive military force”.(36) In reality however, the decision to accept a cease-fire was far more complicated and owed the final outcome more to factional competition then the decisive impact of US operations. For instance, without the pressure from other factions, it is more then likely that the IRGCN would have escalated its attacks on US ships, leading to further confrontation in the Fall of 1988. In other words, it might have been necessary for the US to demonstrate that they would never let Iran win the Tanker War in order for a comprehensive ceasefire, but it alone would not have been sufficient to force Iran to cease hostilities.

The reason the Tanker War serves as such a good teaching tool today is because this is exactly the way Iran has approached it, Tom Cooper asserts that:

“Preying Mantis should be seen as a 'university' of the modern Iranian naval power. Not only that the Iranian leaders learned a lot about the behaviour of the US politicians and military commanders from that operation, but their naval forces learned about all of their inherent weaknesses, about the equipment of their enemy and his/her technological superiority, and prompted them to search for ways of evading these, or exploiting their weak spots. Preying Mantis prompted them to tackle all of these through successive reforms and modernizations ever since. The modern-day Iranian naval forces are actually neatly tailored to the (Iranian) lessons of Preying Mantis.” (37)

Today the possibility of naval warfare between the US and Iran is again a prescient threat. In the same way that the Iran-Iraq war sprung from a contest between Iran and Iraq over the hegemony of the Persian Gulf, Iran and the US are now locked in a geostrategic struggle for control over the influence of the same region. (38) So what can the Tanker War tell us about the contemporary behavior of INFs?

The fundamental and most important lesson is that Iran can in fact be successfully deterred and coerced through the threat and use of military force. The ability to successfully extract concessions however is dependent on the credibility of a ‘greater force’ which can be brought to bear should Iran fail to be deterred by a limited reprisal.

Historically Iran has proven to be extremely vulnerable to threats against its ability to export petrochemicals; while Iran did maintain an overall policy of confrontation with the USN over the span of the Tanker War, political leaders were careful into never provoking the US into attacking this lifeline. (39) In fact, this specific threat proved its efficacy as Iran, after been informed by the US that any use of HY-2 ASCMs in the straits of Hormuz would be tantamount to a declaration of war on the United States, never used them except in the Northern Gulf. (40) Throughout the Tanker War Iran relied on these exports to maintain their war against Iraq and prevent the complete erosion of public support for the war. It should be noted that Iraqi anti-shipping efforts never seriously endangered the ability of Iran to export the majority of its oil. (41) Moreover, the Iranian economy is still highly dependent on petrochemicals and is the single largest source of government revenue.(42)

However, it should be noted that today Iran still feels the US has little credibility in the Persian Gulf, in part because Iran is so confident in its strategy developed in the wake of their defeat in the Tanker War. (43) Meanwhile, strategists in Tehran have carefully observed the US experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq and have come to the conclusion that, in the words of the current military advisor to the Supreme Leader, Major General Safavi “The Americans have many weaknesses. In fact, in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they clearly displayed their strengths and weaknesses. … They are very cowardly, there are even scenes from Iraq in which they are seen crying. When their commanders encounter a problem, they burst into tears. … I can therefore say that our advantage over the foreign forces is moral and human.” (44) This is, in essence, a repackaging of the same ideology that perceived the US withdrawal from Lebanon as signaling the US position as a ‘paper tiger’ that couldn’t stomach a fight.

The fact that the U.S. lacks this credibility is one of the reasons we can expect INFs to continue their policy of brinksmanship in the Gulf, aimed at exposing the US’s supposed inability to exert its will. Like their operations in the Tanker War, INFs will push the limits of US ‘lines-in-the-sand’ in an attempt to discredit the US effort. This can be observed even today in the numerous confrontations that have happened in the past decade in encounters between the USN and the IRGCN. (45) Defeating this brinksmanship can only be achieved by immediately and decisively responding in order to establish credibility. In other words, Iran cannot be allowed to test and exceed the limits set by the USN.

In carrying out a reprisal aimed at establishing credibility, the US would be aided by a significant transformation in the way US forces have operated in the region since the 1980s. During the Tanker War, the US was restricted to basing their forces from aircraft carriers and floating barges because of the reluctance of Arab states to visibly cooperate with the United States. (46) Today these same states are less far less reluctant to balance growing Iranian influence by shoring up their relationship with the US; after being asked about the loss of US influence in the Gulf, Secretary of Defense Panetta quipped that “…in Bahrain … we've got almost 5,000 troops … We've got about ... 3,000 in the UAE and about 7,500 in Qatar.” (47) Gulf Arab States would be far more likely to contribute to any Gulf peace-keeping operation and just as importantly, aid the US logically by providing basing for US airpower.

But this advantage would do little to outweigh many of the new challenges that have sprung up in the 20+ interceding years. Most notably, Iran’s naval forces are far more capable today; instead of only being equipped with small-boats armed with machine-guns and light rocket launchers, the IRGCN now operates a large fleet of advanced torpedo and missile-boats, a modest fleet of light submarines, and a large number of shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). Sea-mining capability has also become more credible since 1988.(48)

The lack of a parallel conflict like the Iran-Iraq war to drain the economy and consume resources means that the Iranian populace will be much more likely to oppose political concessions to de-escalate the naval conflict in the same way that Preying Mantis, in conjunction with Iraqi ground offensives, pressured pragmatic factions to push-through a cease-fire agreement in opposition to the hardliners. Furthermore, the fact that IRGC-led factions are currently politically dominant in Tehran means that those individuals and factions most likely to be successfully deterred by the threat of force from the US are the same ones that will likely be sidelined in a confrontation between the two countries.(49)

Another challenge the US would face is the inherent unpredictability of warfare and the risk of miscalculation. For instance, it is extremely likely that Iran could misinterpret any wide scale punitive measures as attempts as ‘regime change’, the perpetual boogey-man in the night for Iranian strategists. (50) (51) If this happens, it is extremely unlikely that Iran would react rationally to a limited war, and would instead act to preserve the very survival of the Islamic Republic. This possibility casts into light the value of the proposed hot-line between US and Iranian forces that would mirror the red-telephone of the Cold War that connected Washington to Moscow in order to prevent accidental nuclear war. Iran rejected this possibility in late September. (52) The end-state of these diverse factors is that if the US hopes to coerce Iran into backing down from any future naval conflict, the US government must be prepared to invest significantly more in terms of effort invested, and in acceptance of any possible loss.

Footnotes/Endnotes
1) ‘Rejectionist’ meaning anti-Israel, anti-US, and anti-Imperialist; Farhang Rejaee, "Introduction," The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, ed. Farhang Rajaee (Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993), 2-3.
2) Keith McLachlan, "Analysis of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord 1979-1980," The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, ed. Farhang Rajaee (Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993), 26-27.
3) Tom Cooper, and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq War in the Air: 1980-1988, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000), 161.
4) Cooper and Bishop, 229. The US grew closer to Baghdad in the wake of Iran-Contra because Washington felt it had to mend its relationship with the Arab states, who felt betrayed that the US would provide arms to Iran.
5) David Christ, "Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea," Policy Focus, no. 95 (2009): 2,
6) Iran’s forces include the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Navy (IRGCN) and Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). ‘INF’ is a provisional designation not used outside of this report.
7) Tom Cooper. Operation Preying Mantis. Air Combat Information Group Forum. October 27 2011.
8) Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War , (Westview Press, 1990), chap. 9.
9) The GCC includes the nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The UAE, and Oman.
10) Cordesman, chap.9
11) Cordesman, chap.9
12) Christ, 4
13) Cordesman, chap.9
14) Cordesman, chap.9
15) Interestingly, both of these figures (Mousavi and Rafsanjani) are key figures in the modern-day reform movement within Iran
16) Fariborz Haghshenass, "Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare," Policy Focus (2008): 5
17) Cordesman, chap.9
18) Cordesman, chap.9
19) Christ, 13
20) Cordesman, chap.9
21) The US’s only response was to sink the Iran Ajr landing craft which was envisioned by some to be retaliation, but lacked any actual punitive measures against other targets, i.e. it didn’t actually raise the cost for mining operations.
22) Tom Cooper, and Farzad Bishop, 253.
23) Cordesman, chap.9
24) Cordesman, chap.9
25) Cordesman, chap.9
26) Christ, 7
27) Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War, (Westview Press, 1990), chap.10, p.29.
28) These setbacks include the failed Iranian Valfajr-10 offensive in which Iraq made heavy use of chemical weapons and the use of SCUD-type missiles during the War of the Cities to strike population centers.
29) Christ, 13
30) Cordesman, chap.10, 25-28
31) Christ, 13
32) Cooper and Bishop. 276
33) Cordesman, chap.10, 30
34) Cooper, ACIG Forums
35) Cordesman, chap.10, 34-40
36) Jahangar Arasli, "Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict," Occasional Paper Series, no. 10 (2007): 20
37) Tom Cooper, ACIG Forums
38) This can be observed in a number of official statements from naval commanders and other officials. See ‘Fars News English’ in the works cited section for a few examples.
39) Cordesman, chap.9
40) Christ, 10
41) Cordesman, chap.9
42) The implication here is that if because the USN and USAF today can operate a far more effective campaign to destroy infrastructure compared to the IrAF in the 1980s, as demonstrated during Iraq 1991/2003 and Libya 2011, the ability to actually affect Tehran’s policy by way of oil revenue would be far greater.
43) See Tom Cooper quote above
44) Arasli, 44
45) Shachtman 01/08/2008
46) Cordesman, chap.9
47) Dreyfuss, 10/14/11
48) For the full details of Iran’s naval modernizations and their larger doctrine aimed at asymmetrically defeating USN forces, see Haghshenass’s “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare” and Arasli’s “Obsolete Weapons”
49) Thaler et al, 2009
50) --- (foot-note related to another paper I had written for this project which is otherwise unavailable)
51) Fars News, December 2010
52) Gladstone, 2011

Works Cited:
McLachlan, Keith. Analysis of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord 1979-1980. The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Edited by Farhang Rajaee. Gainesville, Fl: University Press of Florida, 1993.

Cooper, Tom, and Farzad Bishop. Iran-Iraq War in the Air: 1980-1988. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000.

Christ, David. "Gulf of Conflict: A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea." Policy Focus. no. 95 (2009).

Tom Cooper. Operation Preying Mantis. Air Combat Information Group Forum. October 27 2011.

Cordesman, Anthony. The Lessons Of Modern War, Vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War . Westview Press, 1990.

Haghshenass, Fariborz. "Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus. (2008)

Arasli, Jahangar. "Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict." Occasional Paper Series. no. 10 (2007): 20.

Fars News English, "Commander: IRGC Monitoring All Enemy Moves in Persian Gulf ." Last modified 10/25/2011. Accessed October 27, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270772.

Fars News English, "Armed Forces Hail Iranian Navy as Powerful Force in Region ." Last modified 11/27/2010. Accessed October 27, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8909061458.

Shachtman, Noah. The Danger Room, "How Iran Attacks at Sea (Updated)." Last modified 01/08/2008. Accessed October 28, 2011. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-irans-se/.

Dreyfuss, Robert. PBS Frontline-The Tehran Bureau, "Iran after the Iraq Pullout ." Last modified 10/24/11. Accessed October 29, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/10/opinion-iran-after-the-iraq-pullout.html.

Fars News English, “Minister: Enemies Continuing Soft War to Overthrow Islamic Republic.” Last Modified 12/03/2010. Accessed October 29, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8909120562

Gladstone, Rick. "Iran Mass-Produces New Missile and Rejects ‘Hot Line’ Idea With America." The New York Times, , sec. World, September 28, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/middleeast/iran-mass-produces-new-missile-rejects-hot-line-idea-with-america.html (accessed October 29, 2011).

Thaler, David, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey. "Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics." RAND Corporation Monograph. (2009).

Greater Tunb IMINT

2011-12-31T16:45:00.000-08:00

Greater Tunb belongs the the trio of islands - including Abu Musa and Lesser Tunb - that Iran occupies, but is also claimed by the UAE. It offers a commanding view of the Strait of Hormuz and is flanked on either side by the primary shipping lanes running through the Persian Gulf, in other words: it is of extreme strategic importance. As a consequence, it is heavily militarized and offers fodder for IMINT (image intelligence) analysis.

Greater Tunb has a total area of 26 sq/km and more hilly geography than either Lesser Tunb or Abu Musa. The island's red, sandy terrain is dotted with vegetation and animal life, relatively lush compared to the barren Lesser Tunb 13 km to the west. A small civilian population, presumably fisherman, may reside on the island but their current status is unclear. In 2001, the total number had declined from 350 in 1993 to 35. (1) Whatever civilian population does reside would likely occupy the cluster of residential buildings on the southern portion of the Island.

Following the islands seizure in 1971 by the Imperial Armed Forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran fortified the islands during the Tanker War. Tensions between Iran and it's Arab neighbors in the early 90s, Iran is reported to have stationed surface-to-air missiles on the island. (2)

For the first time, high quality satellite imagery of the island recently become available on Google Earth. (3) This imagery reveals a highly fortified island with a number of hardened shelters, underground facilities, fighting positions, artillery, and air-defenses.

Ringing the island almost without interruption are earthen fighting positions intended to repulse an amphibious attack. These range from relatively simple revetments on either side of the coastal road with enlarged areas at intervals to packed-earth revetments complete with trenches, strong-points, and reinforced pillboxes. The high-quality of the imagery available sheds light on similar fortifications on other islands whose individual features are harder to discern. The rest of the island is also dotted with various fighting positions of varying ages. Supplementing these fighting positions are guard-posts also located at set intervals around the coast (usually 1-2 km). The buildings are 15 x 15 m and incorporate a watch-tower on the roof. They are often co-located with AAA.

Air defense of the island is typical of Iranian facilities with numerous 23 mm AAA emplacements on concrete pads, usually on raised earthen platforms. Each site is normally accompanied by a small building or hardened shelter for the weapons crew and/or ammunition storage. No evidence of the above-mentioned SAM from the 1990s is visible, however on the north-eastern side is a Skyguard air defense system with two 35 mm guns.

Like on the other islands, the only surface-to-surface weapon actually visible in imagery are a handful of towed artillery pieces. On Greater Tunb this consists of four 122 mm D-30 guns (60% battery) located just west of the Skyguard system. Unlike the other islans though, there is also a second collection of four guns with the conventional split-trail configuration and which are pointed directly towards the waters of the UAE. The specific type of gun is unknown but it is likely 155 mm. At the ranges involved, it's unlikely that these guns would actually be used for fire support on the island, but rather as coastal artillery, either to harass shipping, or to repel an amphibious assault.

Hardened shelters and underground facilities are also a key component of the military garrison on Greater Tunb. While the majority appear to be basic hardened shelters dug into the hillside, or located above ground the storage of munitions and weapon systems as per the style used throughout Iran for the same purpose, there are also a number of sites that possibly hold larger UGFs that could contain command-and-control nodes or even living facilities. The key when differentiating UGFs from hardened shelters is to look for a) relatively few entrances in a specific area, b) the specific style of concrete ramps leading into the entrance, and c) the presence of air-circulation vents.

Other important relevant features include a pier on the eastern side of the island in which a number of small high-speed patrol boats are visible. The small 1,300 m landing strip which has served the island in the past appears to be in the middle of an on-going expansion to 2,200 m. This may indicate a growing effort to increase the strategic importance of these islands in general.

Works Cited:
(1) Great Little Tonbs. The Iranian. May 2001. http://www.iranian.com/GuiveMirfendereski/2001/May/Tonb/index.html
(2) The Iranian, 2001.
(3) Imagery dates from March 2010.

Things that make you want to throw your computer across the room...

2011-12-30T23:45:00.000-08:00

...such as when Blogger deletes an extremely long paper you've been working on the better part of the last three days exploring the dynamics of a possible conflict between the UAE and Iran over the Persian Gulf Islands right before you were about to publish it. (the piece originated as a response to this post from Uskowi on Iran)

C'est la vie I suppose.

Happy holidays from the Arkenstone!

77th Mechanized Infantry Division

2011-12-28T22:59:00.000-08:00

The 77th mechanized infantry division (MID) is a regular army unit based in the Khorasan province in north-eastern Iran. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the 77th was comprised of one armored brigade and two mechanized brigades; at the time they were armed with M-47 tanks and BTR-50 APCs. At this time the 77th maintained one infantry battalion and one armored company in Khuzestan. (1) While a complete history of their operations during the war remains unknown, the 77th is known to have participated in the following operations, Fath ol-Mobin (March 1982)(2), Ramadan (July 1982)(3), Badr (March 1985)(4), and Karbala-6 (Early 1987)(5).

Today, little is known about their current operational status or capability. They still maintain three brigades; the first is in Mashhad, the second in Quchan, and the third in Torbat Heydariyeh. (6)

Anthony Cordesman asserts that Iranian mechanized infantry divisions like the 77th are composed of: (7)
- one armored brigade
- three mechanized infantry brigades
- one reconnaissance battalion
- one SPA battalion
- one towed artillery battalion
- one engineer battalion
- one supply battalion
- one transport battalion
- one army aviation contingent
- one air defense contingent
Even assuming that this description would represent a 100% strength that may not translate to actual strength, the fact that Iran's divisions overwhelmingly use three brigades rather then four calls into the veracity of this claim. Regardless, it still might offer some indication into what the 77th looks like at a general level, especially when cross-refernced with visible features in available imagery. For instance, most mechanized units throughout the world maintain independent supply, transport, air defense, and engineering battalions at a divisional level. Presence of these independent units are difficult to independently confirm, but some evidence for them does exist. [EDIT: A commenter has pointed out that this chart needs one point of clarification; the army aviation contingent is not under the direct command of the 77th MID, but belongs to a different, independent command structure within the IRIAA)

Although nominally a mechanized unit, the 77th is more closely comparable to a conventional motorized infantry division with a ratio of one lightly armored brigade, to two motorized-infantry brigades, especially by the standards of today where mechanization is standard in any infantry unit. On top of being understrengthed, the armored battalion is also equipped with the obsolete M-47M tank, though there are some signs of it being replaced with the T-72. Mechanized infantry battalions resemble those found in the rest of the country, with a mix of BMP/Boragh AFVs, M-113 APCs, and BTR-60 APCs. Motorized infantry meanwhile have been seen with the usual mix of motorcycles and ATVs, Jeeps, pickup-trucks and 5-ton trucks. Self-propelled artillery is entirely lacking, with artillery support being provided by towed battalions of towed guns like the D-30 and M-46. 107 mm Type-63 rockets are also deployed at an unknown level. Air defense is provided in part by Zu-23-2s and MANPADSs; these may be augmented by HAWK SAMs and/or 35 mm AAA. A commando battalion, identified in the past by their duck-hunter pattern uniform, is likely equipped for airborne assault operations using the Havinarooz detachment. Weapons deployed as a lower level includes recoilless rifles, RPGs, M-47 ATGMs, TOW ATGMs, mortars, G-3 rifles and possibly MANPADSs. Like the rest of the Artesh, the 77th is transitioning toward desert-pattern safariflage uniforms.

Armor of the 77th MID

Motorized Infantry

Artillery support

Air-defense

Light infantry

1st Brigade - Mashhad
The brigade HQ is located south-west of the city-center buttressed against a mountain range bordering the city. It is adjacent to a number of other military facilities belonging to various entities.These facilities are mostly found across the highway and occupy the north-facing slope of the mountains.

The central compound serves as the divisional headquarters for the 77th MID and is the largest of the division's bases. The reason for this, in addition to the fact that the 1st brigade is armored and consequently larger, is that any independent battalions attached to the division (such as supply, or air defense) are likely based here; this possibility is supported by the relatively large footprint of the facilities compared to other brigades, and the presence of multiple well-delineated sub-compounds.

Overview (GE)

In general, the northern portion of the compound tends to be occupied by living quarters and administrative buildings as indicated by the low, barracks-style buildings. The southern-half tends to be dominated by motor-pools, repair/overhaul shops and garages. One of the more visually interesting features of the base is the presence of scattered hardened shelters which likely hold munitions. Dispersing them throughout the compound is likely aimed at preventing the catastrophic detonation of a massive arms collection in the heart of a large city; the danger of which was illustrated to some degree by recent (as of the time of this writing) detonations in China and Cyprus.

1st Brigade (GE)

Dominating the compound is the central motor pool and adjacent parade yard. In this motor pool is the brigades armored contingent, including a tank battalion made up of M-47Ms. While in most imagery, only a handful are visible at a given time, imagery from July 2006 shows 15+ tanks arrayed into three companies at 50-60% strength (five-six tanks each). The T-72s which have been paraded in Mashhad are nowhere to be seen. Immediately north of this are several BMP-type IFVs; using historical imagery, the most seen at any one time is ~five which matches the typical deployment rate for mixed light-armor companies incorporating a 50/50 mix of M-113 APCs and BMP-type IFVs.(8) North of this is approximately another company's worth of M-113 APCs. While they are not visible on recent imagery, parade photographs confirm the identity of a company of BTR-60PBs in early imagery from 2004 and 2006. On parade, soldiers in mechanized infantry units typically wear red berets.

Some of the brigade's artillery can also be observed in two locations within the compound. Occupying a parade-ground in the north-west portion of the compound is a battery (six pieces) of towed artillery, probably the M-46 judging by its split-trail carriage and length (~11 m). Historical imagery from 2004 actually shows a number of M-46 and D-20 guns in towed configuration and and connected to trucks. The self-contained nature of this sub-compound possibly suggests that the immediate vicinity houses the brigade's artillery battalion(s). In the south-east corner of the compound, several artillery pieces including M-46s and D-30s are visible from time-to-time in a courtyard surrounded by long buildings roofed in corrugated metal; possibly garages or workshops.

By far, the most common feature in the compound is the wide variety of trucks and other light, motorized vehicles. These include Safir-type Jeeps, Toyota Land-Cruiser pickup trucks as well as the larger five-ton trucks, probably Mercedes 1924s or 2624s; semi-trailer tractors are also common.

Opposite this compound, on the the other side of the highway, are a large collection of firing ranges, the Samen police academy(9), and a storage depot with hardened shelters and revetments. Most notably though, there is also a relatively new compound with large, blue-roofed warehouses. Adjacent to these buildings are a large number of widely varied earthworks which might indicate it's some sort of combat-engineering training area. It's unknown if this area is affiliated with the army, or belongs to the IRGC. The lettering on top of the roof of the warehouse reads "Martyrs for Peace". To the north and east of the brigade HQ are two military hospitals. (10)

"Martyrs for peace" (GE)

The 77th's army aviation contingent - the 5th assault and support group - is also based in Mashhad at TAB-14. (11) The Havinarooz airbase is located north-east of the main airstrip. Scramble on the Web indicates that this contingent is comprised of two airborne assault squadrons equipped with Bell 212s, one attack squadron equipped with AH-1s, and a recon squadron with Bell 206s. This composition is easily verified on recent satellite imagery from October 2010; 10 212s occupy the northernmost pads while the six AH-1s are intermingled with six 206s on the southernmost pads. Adjacent to these pads is a large drive-through garage; the bases repair and overhaul facility. In the southern portion of the compound are several hardened shelters; likely the bases munitions storage. AAA emplacements dot the facility.

Army aviation base at TAB-14 (GE)

2nd Brigade - Quchan
This location is significantly smaller then the brigade in Mashhad, with little insight into its makeup visible from satellite imagery. Adjacent to the compound are a collection of firing ranges and about 2,000 m to the north is a storage depot with earthen revetments. A smattering of offices and administrative buildings can be found throughout the compound.

2nd Brigade (GE)

Running along the northern-most edge of the compound are a series of earthen berms surrounding a handful of hardened shelters and warehouses; this protection likely indicates munitions storage. In the middle of the compound are two different clusters of small buildings organized in rows and columns; because these buildings are surrounded by trees and only approachable via foot paths these are likely living facilities along the lines of barracks, kitchens, or classrooms.

South of these two clusters is a paved parade yard and a small training area with trenches, an obstacle course, and other minor features. Sometime between 2004 and 2010 a second training facility to the east of the parade yard, on the opposite side of the road, was bulldozed over.

The southern-most portion of the compound holds a good deal of garages, workshops and other metal-roofed buildings. Although no mechanization is visible, whatever armor this brigade does operate would be found inside these garages. A handful of large and small trucks are spread out throughout this area. At least one battalion of D-30 towed guns is visible in the open.

3rd Brigade - Torbat Heydariyeh
Like the 2nd brigade, the detachment located north of the city of Torbat Heydarieyeh is relatively small. Moreover, the only imagery is from 2003, though the quality is relatively good given the age.There is a second, suspicious compound 7.5 km to north-east which may be military related, but this cannot be confirmed for sure. In the general vicinity of the compound are a series of firing ranges buttressed in between the compound and a small collection of hills to the east, and immediately north of the compound is a prison.

3rd Brigade (GE)

Within the compound itself, near the southern edge is a storage depot with a number of sheds surrounded by revetments. Following the road north to the parade ground, a mosque with its distinctive domed roof is visible on the right. Like Quchan, no visible mechanization is present; the motor pools on the western edge of the compound, as well as a smaller one on the east only contain the usual range of motorized transport ranging from jeeps to 5-ton trucks. Adjacent to the motor pool, and in the northern portion of the compound are exercise fields used for routine training. In the center of the compound can be found the parade yard and a small number of buildings which are, most likely at least, barracks and administrative buildings.

Footnotes:
(1)I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980. T. Cooper, F.Bishop. ACIG. 9/09/2003
(2)The Iran-Iraq War in the Air. T. Cooper, F.Bishop. 2003.
(3)I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980.
(4)The Iran-Iraq War in the Air.
(5)Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Karbala-6
(6)Central Clubs Forum. http://www.centralclubs.com/topic-t65380.html
(7) Unfortunately I cannot find the original source where Cordesman claimed this. This information is sourced from the authors work on the "Open Source Intelligence Project", also available on this blog (here).
(8) This organization can also be observed more clearly in the 1st Brigade of the 88th AD in Zahedan.
(9) Wikimapia
(10) Wikimapia
(11) Scramble on the Web. Iranian ORBAT. http://www.scramble.nl/ir.htm

Bidqaneh Update

2011-11-28T19:19:00.000-08:00

ISIS has published satellite imagery of the facilities that were rocked by explosions earlier this month. It answers our most primary question which is - where did the explosion take place? The Digital Globe imagery shows that the explosion took place in a compound I labeled as a 'possible industrial facility' just west of the main Bidqaneh-adjacent facility in my original post.

The facility has been under various levels of renovation since 2004 when the oldest imagery dates from. Between 2004 and 2007 the compound remains roughly the same with only minor changes. It should be noted that the suspected static missile test site 2 km south of this compound was first built somewhere between 2004 and 2007, and only completed. In 2009 construction escalates; the fact that the landfill is in use confirms the construction happening during that time. In 2010 the first blue-roofed buildings emerge; speaking broadly, the use of blue roofing material has become more common recently and is often associated with industrial military buildings (for other examples of this, look to the IRGC's HSPB factory in Bandar Abbas, or the suspected IRGC engineering buildings adjacent to the 77th mechanized infantry division's headquarters in Mashhad). A number of new trees have been planted near the northern buildings and they have a more lived-in appearance. By June 2011 several new buildings have been erected near the entry-point as well as additions onto the pre-existing garages and workshops. Paved areas have also been expanded around these workshops. Not much changes by September of 2011 except for the apparent completion of construction on the same additions. There are also what appear to be, possibly, large tanks for holding liquids.

[EDIT: The picture below isn't the proper size, fixing sometime soon]

Construction from 2004-2011

The size and configuration of the garages point to some sort of industrial application for these buildings; the fact that recent construction was accompanied by a road leading to a rocket engine test site indicates that it could be related to the fueling of rockets. This would present a plausible explanation for how the explosion took place.

Looking at the imagery provided by ISIS (see hyperlink above), the blast appears to have originated in the western-half of the compound, likely from the two bottom-most workshops on the western side. Both of these buildings have been completely annihilated as has the blue-roofed building north of these garages. Several of the administrative buildings bordered with trees have also been destroyed, but it's unlikely the explosion originated from either of these buildings and it's more likely they were damaged and later demolished in the cleanup. The four other workshops all suffered significant damage though are still standing.

The US military finally gets its act together...

2011-11-14T15:34:00.000-08:00

Multi-service office to advance air-sea battle concept

11/9/2011 - WASHINGTON (AFNS) -- The Department of Defense announced the creation of a new office to integrate air and naval combat capabilities in support of emerging national security requirements Nov. 9.

In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to develop a comprehensive concept to counter emerging anti-access/area denial challenges. The services collaborated to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept. On Aug. 12, Navy Adm. Jonathan Greenert, Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford and Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove established the Air-Sea Battle Office, creating a framework to implement the ASB concept.

The ASB concept will guide the services as they work together to maintain a continued U.S. advantage against the global proliferation of advanced military technologies and A2/AD capabilities. Air-Sea Battle will leverage military and technological capabilities that reflect unprecedented Navy, Marine and Air Force collaboration, cooperation, integration and resource investments.

Continued at Source

It seems that the US military has finally gotten around to addressing the threat posted by asymmetric warfare that is designed to exploit the weaknesses of the USN and USAF avoiding their strengths. Quite a few authors have written about this subject in recent years, most notably including 'Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare', by Fariborz Haghshenass, 'Iran's Naval Forces', published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, 'Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal', by Jahangar Arasli, and 'Iran's Two Navies', by Joshua Himes. For years observers have derided the USN for failing to develop a responsive strategy and failing to see what even amateur analysts could tell about Iran's naval strategy.

While 'Air-Sea Battle' is not purely a strategy geared toward defeating Iran - it is afterall, an operational concept for use against any area-denial attacks, and the write-up even goes so far as to say it's not aimed at any one country, it's easy to see how the developers at least were aware of the threat posed by Iran (and likely China) when drafting the report. The following excerpt from the attached pdf almost reads straight out of Iran's playbook - designs to exclude the US from the Persian Gulf, ASCMs, ballistic-missiles, IADS, submarines, mines, small-boat swarms, 4th GW fighters (i.e. Hezbollah), UAVs and cyber-warfare.

"Over the past two decades, the development and proliferation of advanced weapons, targeting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities, have the potential to create an A2/AD environment that increasingly challenges U.S. military access to and freedom of action within potentially contested areas. These advanced systems encompass diverse capabilities that include ballistic and cruise missiles; sophisticated integrated air defense systems; anti-ship weapons ranging from high-tech missiles and submarines to low-tech mines and swarming boats; guided rockets, missiles, and artillery, an increasing number of 4th generation fighters; low-observable manned and unmanned combat aircraft; as well as space and cyber warfare
capabilities specifically designed to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence systems. In combination, these advanced technologies have the potential to diminish the advantages the U.S. military enjoys in the air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace domains today. If these advances continue and are not addressed effectively, U.S. forces could soon face increasing risk in deploying to and operating within previously secure forward areas--and over time in rear areas and sanctuaries--ultimately affecting our ability to respond effectively to coercion and crises that directly threaten the strategic interests of the U.S.,
our allies, and partners."

The strategy developed to defeat area-denial attacks is all very net-centric and reads like something RAND produced in the late-90s with buzzwords like 'resilience' and 'agility'. For a primer on the impact of military networking, I reccomend Australia Airpower's 'Understanding Network Centric Warfare', or if one wants to understand network-theory on a grander scale, Arquilla and Ronfeldt's ground-breaking treatise: 'Networks and Netwars'.

"The Air-Sea Battle Concept centers on networked, integrated, attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat (NIA-D3) A2/AD threats. This approach exploits and improves upon the advantage U.S. forces have across the air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace domains, and is essential to defeat increasingly capable intelligence gathering systems and sophisticated weapons systems used by adversaries employing A2/AD systems. Offensive and defensive tasks in Air-Sea Battle are tightly coordinated in real time by networks able to command and control air and naval forces in a contested environment. The air and naval forces are organized by mission and networked to conduct integrated operations across all domains.

The concept organizes these integrated tasks into three lines of effort, wherein air and naval forces attack-in-depth to disrupt the adversary's intelligence collection and command and control used to employ A2/AD weapons systems; destroy or neutralize A2/AD weapons systems within effective range of U.S. forces; and defeat an adversary's employed weapons to preserve essential U.S. Joint forces and their enablers. Through NIA-D3, air and naval forces achieve integrated effects across multiple domains, using multiple paths to increase the resilience, agility, speed and effectiveness of the force."

Explosion at Bidganeh!

2011-11-13T02:04:00.000-08:00

This, from the BBC:

Iran explosion at Revolutionary Guards military base

Seventeen soldiers have been killed in an explosion at a military base near Iran's capital Tehran, officials say.

The blast occurred when weapons were being moved inside a Revolutionary Guards depot, a spokesman for the elite unit told state TV.

Windows in nearby buildings were shattered and the blast was heard in central Tehran, 40 km (25 miles) away.

Two hours after the explosion a fire still raged and there were traffic jams on nearby roads, a local reporter said.

Story continued here

Haaretz reports that according to a spokesman for the opposition-group MEK, the base in question was the 'Modarres' garrison for the IRGC's missile units, including the Raad-5 brigade which is reported to operate the Shahab-3. Is there any truth to this statement? Just what do we know about the Modarres Garrison?

From the news reports we know it's west of Tehran, and adjacent to the towns of Bidganeh and Shahriar; thankfully, it's not to difficult to find. The 'facility' is actually a handful of facilities clustered around one another in amongst a patch of hills. The footprint of all the facilities covers an area roughly 24 km long and 6 km tall. This can in turn be bisected, for the sake of description, into a northern and southern half and which is bisected by a road running north-east to south-west. The northern half tends to hold facilities related to production and testing of missiles while the southern half tends to contain garrison forces.

Emergency services who responded to the scene of the explosion, including the Red Crescent, were reportedly not allowed inside the base to provide medical services due to the highly secretive nature of the base. This is supported by satellite imagery which depicts multiple levels of security perimeters consisting of earthen ramparts, fences, guard-posts and entry-control-points (ECPs). A good indicator of a facilities value and importance could very well be the degree to which it is protected with barriers.

Area Overview

Industrial Facility

Amir-al-Mo'menin

Missile Test Facility 1

Missile Test Facility 2

Garrison 1

Garrison 2

Miscellaneous Facilities

Why the Arkenstone been on hiatus for the past month or so...

2011-10-29T09:42:00.000-07:00

... It's because I've been conducting an independent research project at The Evergreen State College where I go to school; unfortunately this has detracted from my ability to continue independent projects for this blog. Fortunately this doesn't mean that I've lost interest in the Iranian military, the research project in question is about the modern political history of Iran, spanning from ~1900, to the modern day. Over the past couple weeks I've been reading and writing a great deal and have been thoroughly enjoying research on such topics like the ideological origins of the Islamic Revolution, and the operational lessons of US interaction with Iranian naval forces during the Tanker War of '87-'88 - topics both inspired by my previous writings on this blog and my interactions with other Iran-watchers.

- Galen Wright

Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy within the Islamic Republic of Iran - Ruminations on the Attempted Assasination of Adel Al-Jubeir

2011-10-12T17:48:00.000-07:00

I'm sure by now everyone is familiar with the supposed attempt by elements of the Quds force to assassinate Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel Al-Jubeir, and how it was foiled by US government forces including the DEA and FBI. But in case you're not, check out the US Department of Justice press release on the subject.

I say "supposed" because things are still very murky. There are still quite a few unanswered questions and Iran has, of course, vehemently denied these allegations. That being said, in the words of one of my favorite colunists for Foreign Policy Magazine, Stephen Walt: "I don't know if there was a genuine Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. Let me repeat that: I don't know. And neither do you." But all the same, it still begs asking, what IF the plot genuinely originated in Iran and had the permission of at least some key figures? While hundreds of responses and opinion pieces have already been written and I'm sure many more will be, I wish to examine one particular possibility through the lens of the internal power struggles inside the Islamic Republic and the connection between foreign and domestic policy.

(on a side note, any proposals for a short, descriptive name for this incident so we can stop referring to it either as "the incident" or "the alleged assasination plot of the Saudi ambassador by Quds force agents")

---

Part of the reason the 1990s continues to be my favorite decade (besides producing exceedingly good music) is that near the tail end there was so much promise for the eventual normalization of relations between the US and Iran, embodied in the attempts by then-President Khatami to launch a 'dialogue of civilizations', though in reality it was far more then that. Even the Bush administration in its early days was amenable to continued engagement. (1)

Then in 2002 the Karine-A freighter was seized by Israeli commandos in the Red Sea and was discovered to be carrying 50 tons of weaponry that had originated from Iran and was destined for the Gaza Strip. (2) Combined with a report on Iran's developing nuclear capability, the capture of the Karine-A effectively marked the beginning of the end for US-Iranian rapprochement. Only days later George Bush would add Iran to the "Axis of Evil". By 2003 the US severed bilateral talks with Iran, effectively ushering in the current period of hostility. (3)

On the surface this event was a disaster for Iran; Khatami was furious, believing it to be a deliberate attempt from within to undermine talks with Washington and provoke the eventual backlash that followed. As far as anyone knows, he was unable to ever determine who, if anyone, was behind the shipment as the national security council denied all knowledge of the incident. (4) In a similar vein analysts from RAND assert that:

"The Karine-A incident appears to be a clear example of a faction in the Iranian elite—one whose interest lay in U.S.-Iranian confrontation in the region—undermining a policy defined by a competing faction. Given the Supreme Leader’s perceived distrust of the United States, one could speculate that Khamenei had prior knowledge of the shipment or even that he instigated the crisis in an effort to forestall a potential imbalance among factions." (5)

Pay particular attention to the final sentence that explains Khamenei's reasoning for undermining US-Iranian reapproachment - it was "...in an effort to forestall a potential imbalance among factions".

Factionalism is one topic I've explored sevel times on this blog before and elsewhere. The political system in Iran can be conceived of as, in extremely basic terms, a contest for power between constantly changing political factions which in turn are composed of a loose-knit network of individuals and organizations, and are only very loosely comparable to conventional political parties. The Supreme Leader meanwhile has traditionally sat apart from the day-to-day running of government - embodying Khomeini's decree that "economics is for donkeys" and instead provides a 'guiding hand' for the overall course of the nation. Historically the Supreme Leader has encouraged inter-faction competition as it essentially imposes a balance of power, preventing one from gaining too much power over the other and radically altering the system or unseating the the Supreme Leader. (6)

It's a very real possibility that in the face of a powerful reformist bloc that had garnered nearly 80% of the vote in the 2001 presidential election, largely on the promise of reapproachment with the West, Khamenei feared an an upset of the careful balance he had worked to engineer and acted to prevent it. The above-mentioned RAND report goes on to quote Ali Ansari's observation that it was "remarkable that a regime hitherto experienced in shipping arms and munitions overseas should choose to do this particular delivery via slow boat journey around the Arabian Peninsula" implying that it was anything but an accident that the ship was revealed. (7)

Ali Ansari's statement eerily matches up with much of the rhetoric concerning the recent alleged assassination attempt by the Qods force. Robert Baer (author of The Devil we Know) has this to say:

"There are very few groups operationally better than Iran’s Quds Force. They know what they are doing. The only proxies they use are ones they’ve vetted. They don’t let their own citizens get involved. They send other people to do it for them from Hezbollah to Bosnian Muslims. It would be completely uncharacteristic for Iran to be caught red handed." "So why were they all of a sudden so sloppy?" (8)

Although Baer is implying that this was not a sanctioned Quds force operation the possibility exists that like the Karine-A, the plot was intended to be uncovered, or at the very least, its success or failure was of secondary importance to its affect on domestic factionalism.

Also like the Karine-A, this incident comes as a pivotal moment in time for the Iranian political landscape; one where the very concept of Velayat-e Faqih is being called into question and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has challenged the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the future of the Islamic Republic, a subject I wrote about here. It's possible that either of these factions (or maybe another one entirely, or perhaps some combination thereof) orchestrated this event

The question I'll end with is 'Who benefits?' and to be honest, I can't really say. Could Khamenei be hoping that Ahmadinejad, as president, takes the fall for foreign policy ups and downs as has been the case before? Does Khamenei believe that an increasingly hostile United States working even harder to isolate Iran will shore up Velayat-e Faqih internally? On the other hand, the IRGC was far from united when key officers chose to back Khamenei over Ahmadinejad in the recent spats which presents a plausible scenario for the formation of "rogue elements" acting out of self-interest (which would go some distance to explain the sloppy execution). But if that's the case, what would Ahmadinejad's faction stand to gain relative to Khamenei?

Even if the answer to all of this is an emphatic 'no', the question of how this incident, even if Iranian elements weren't behind it, will affect the internal power struggle is still valid.

Postscript: It should be heavily emphasized that this is only one possibility to explain the incident and I will freely admit that there is very little evidence to support this version of events at the moment. I don't even particularly believe that this is the actual course of events but I think it's definitely worth examining even if that examination negates it.

Works Cited and End Notes:
(1) "US-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan" Mir H. Sadat, James P. Hughes. Middle East Policy Council. http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/us-iran-engagement-through-afghanistan
(2) "How Iran Entered the Axis" PBS Frontline. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/axis/map.html
(3) Sadat and Hughes
(4) "Treacherous Alliance". Trita Parsi. Yale University Press. 2007. p. 234
(5) Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads. Thaler et al. RAND. 2010.
(6) Thaler et al
(7) It should be noted that the capture of additional shipments of Iranian arms in recent years puts an additional twist on this statement. Either Ansari is simply wrong and that this particular method isn't all that unusual for Iran or it could just be that this is a function of Iran's evolving arms shipment practices over time. It should also be noted that this is far from the only theory concerning the incident; the simplest of them being that it was just an Iranian arms shipment that was uncovered thanks to the work of Israeli intelligence. That being said, it's clear that this incident happened at the precise time required to sabotage US-Iranian reapproachment. Of course one must remember that there are plenty of others besides Khamenei who would have loved to see US-Iranian reapproachment fail. This has led some to address the possibility that the operation was orchestrated by Israel in order to garner support from the US during the Al Aqsa Intifada.
(8) "Questions about the alleged Iranian plot" CNN. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/12/questions-from-former-cia-operative-baer-about-the-alleged-iranian-plot/

Ahmadinejad the Reformer...

2011-09-24T17:11:00.000-07:00

Senior MP: Iran Needless of Resuming Ties with US

TEHRAN (FNA)- A senior member of the Iranian parliament dismissed the necessity for any talks over the resumption of Tehran's ties with Washington, underlining that Iran's national interests are better met with frozen ties with the US.

Speaking to FNA, member of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Javad Jahangirzadeh pointed to the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent remarks in New York on resumption of ties with the US, and stated, "There is no need for negotiation with the US."

Article continues at Fars News

PBS posted a story this summer recounting the experiences of a revolutionary guard conscript which I reviewed on this blog. During this anonymous conscripts training he retells an incident where a senior official condemned Rafsanjani saying that "Rafsanjani should be judged as three men: first, the fighter before the Revolution until the end of the war, whom I respect; second, the president after the war, whom I criticize; and third, the man he is now, who has lost his way."

Perhaps the world will also remember Ahmadinejad as multiple persons; the fiery populist who was swept into power in 2005, the hardline conservative of 2009, and the reformer who fought the intransigent clerical authorities in 2011.

What can we expect from the Ir-140MP?

2011-08-30T20:25:00.000-07:00

Iran's defence minister - BG Vahidi - recently made the announcement that the maritime patrol version of the Iran-140 (An-140 produced in Iran) has entered production and will be delivered to the armed forces "in the near future", this, according to Iran's PressTV.

As of Fall 2010 Iran's assembly plant had turned out nine Ir-140s with more rumoured to be on the way (1) While these are all suspected to be the basic transport/liaison variants, Iran has touted several different configurations for the aircraft over the years - including models outfitted for AWAC, personnel training, EW, geological survey, cargo/personnel transport, VIP transport, paratrooper deployment as well as, of course, maritime surveillance. (2)

HESA advertises that their aircraft can be used for: detecting targets both on and below the surface, search and rescue, countering smuggling, piracy and terrorism, protecting fisheries and other resources, pollution monitoring, maritime traffic policing. (3)

So assuming that a handful of these aircraft do enter service in the near future, how do they stack up against Iran's current maritime aircraft like the P-3? What about other MP aircraft from around the world? Fortunately, for once at least, there is official documentation that answers these very questions.

We know there is no single MP aircraft, but at least five different configurations offering varying capabilities ranging from crew training, to environmental protection, to sophisticated anti-submarine and surface surveillance. The five variants are the Ir-140-HMS-100, HMS-200, HMS-300, HMS-400, and HMS-500. In addition to the specific variants, HESA advertises several example layouts for roles such as fisheries protection or coastal patrol with altered equipment loads.

RDR-1600 (Quickstrike)

All of the variants can be assumed to have some common avionics. Mounted in the nose of the aircraft is a RDR-1600B weather/search and rescue radar which is made by the Australian company Quickstrike. The 1600B is a modern, fully digital X-band radar that is capable of being integrated with onboard navigation equipment as well as functioning as a terrain mapping radar. (4)

The aircraft is also outfitted with an identify-friend-or-foe (IFF) system, traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS), INS/GPS navigation, radar altimeter, distance measuring equipment (DME) and tactical air navigation (TACAN) system.

(ACIG)

Early models show it equipped with both anti-ship missiles (AShM) as well as torpedoes. It is unknown if this capability was retained in later designs.

Ir-140-HMS-100
The HMS-100 is outfitted for search-and-rescue (SAR) as well as basic maritime patrol (MP). Two observer stations fitted with bubble windows are located on both sides of the fuselage directly behind the cockpit. Observation is accomplished primarily via the Mk. 1 eyeball or portable binoculars and cameras. Behind this area is a passenger compartment with seating for 34. Alternately, it can also be outfitted with 18 seats and a four-passenger VIP compartment. At the rear of the aircraft is a rack containing both smoke markers and illumination flares, both used during SAR missions. A "SAR kit" can also be deployed from the rear service door, which likely contains a standard survival raft. The customary small galley and lavatory can also be found at the rear of the aircraft.

(Catsoo)

While its modest configuration restricts it's potential value in a high-intensity environment, the HMS-100 can still function as a low-cost peace-time alternative to, or as a trainer for, more advanced variants.

Ir-140-HMS-200
The HMS-200 is a step up from the HMS-100 though is still intended as a basic SAR/MP aircraft. It features a FLIR/TV camera in a ball mount on the chin of the aircraft. An operators station, located behind the observers station, features a VRR (a glorified VCR) and a video datalink. Other then this, the aircraft is identical to the HMS-100 with a passenger compartment, galley, smoke markers, SAR kit and lavatory.

(Catsoo)

Ir-140-HMS-300
No details. Interior layout is identical to HMS-200.

Ir-140-HMS-400
The HMS-400 features dedicated sea surface surveillance (SuS) capability in addition to the more basic MP and SAR duty. In addition to the video equipment of the HMS-200, the HMS-400 features electronics support measures (ESM) and counter-measure dispensing systems (CMDS).

(Catsoo)

ESMs are crucial in gathering signals intelligence (SIGINT) and are tasked with intercepting and classifying the RF emissions that have become so common in today's battlefield. ESM enables target detection and identification (for instance, you would know an F/A-18 is broadcasting it's APG-73 radar 73 km away to the south-east) as well as being able to use the data to develop and exploit better forms of offensive EW such as ECM/ECCM. On the HMS-400, two recievers pods are visible, one on the forehead of the aircraft, directly above the cockpit, and one on the belly in front of the landing gear.

The ESMs are likely integrated with the aircraft's defensive suite which includes a radar warning receiver (RWR) which cues an audible warning as well as the CMDS which fires chaff and/or flares to distract a homing missile. Optional warning systems includes as an IR-based missile warning receiver (MWR) and a laser warning receiver (LWR). Optional countermeasures include a towable decoy. Most interestingly though, another optional countermeasure is the ATIRJ which is a subcomponent of the US's AN/ALQ-212 system which is meant to defend against MANPADS-type missiles. It works by jamming the seeker of a closing IR-guided missile with lasers mounted on rotating heads. The system dates from the 1990s so it's certainly not inconcievable that Iran got their hands on some; there is also the possibility that HESA is using stock-imagery which, of course, is very common in Iranian media as anyone who has read an article about Iran's Saeqeh fighter jet that is accompanied by a picture of an Israeli F-16 knows.

In the interior of the aircraft, an additional operators station linked with the ESM/CM is located next to the first on the starboard side of the aircraft. Four VIP seats is all that remains for passenger space and the main avionics array (MAR) has replaced the galley which now shares a spot with the smoke marker rack. The lavatory and SAR kit have remained put.

Ir-140-HMS-500
The HMS-500 is the model that most everybody thinks of when they think of the maritime patrol version of the Ir-140. Representations of it are always show in a blue and white camouflage pattern similar to what's worn by the IRIN's P-3s. Compared to the HMS-400, the HMS-500 is also capable of sub-surface surveillance (SSS) and pollution control (PC).

(Catsoo)

The stinger-like magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) jutting out of the tailfin gives this version it's distinctive appearance. This device does what its name suggests which is detect anomalies in the earth's magnetic field which submarines generate. This is also the reason for its stinger-like appearance; it needs to be completely clear of any interfering metals.

On the belly of the aircraft, in between the ESM pod and the FLIR turret is another blister pod which houses the microwave radiometer (MWR). MWRs are used to passive radiation coming off the ocean which in turn is used to detect and monitor oil spills - a logical problem within the Persian Gulf.

On the inside of the aircraft, a total of four operator consoles now line the starboard side in front of VIP seating. Behind the seating is an assembly which houses sonobuoys; sonobuoys are disposable, air-dropped sonar devices (both active and passive) used to detect submarines.

At the tail of the aircraft is the galley, MAR, lavatory and SAR kit.

How does it stack up?

Within Iranian service, there two, possibly three types of aircraft that the I4-140 is intended to replace: the P-3F Orion, the F-27-400M and possibly, modified versions of the C-130H.

The IRIN's primary long-range maritime surveillance aircraft is the P-3F which is reaching the end of its lifespan (as are all their US built aircraft). Currently 2-3 are operational at any given time and operate at an unknown level of readiness. On one hand, the decades of use may have taken their toll on both the airframe and the sub-systems, but on the other hand, Iran has overhauled and retrofitted them to some unknown degree. There have been no external additions that might give hints as to what these modifications entail. When they were originally delivered they were fitted with weather and surveillance radars as well as nose-mounted EO cameras giving the P-3 surface surveillance . Sonobouys and a stinger-mounted MAD meanwhile provide ASW capability. Iran's P-3Fs can be armed with lightweight Mk 46 torpedos, depth charges, or gravity bombs, but not AShMs. Overall, the P-3Fs are closely comparable in terms of capability to early P-3A/B variants.

Some of the IRIN's F-27-400Ms have been converted to basic maritime patrol duty and have even been reported to have been upgraded with avionics for this role. However, like the P-3Fs, no new external antenna or pods are visible that would give a clue as to the accuracy of this statement or not. At any rate, it is likely that the F-27 would be comparable to the HMS-100 in terms of mission role. Two-to-three aircraft are currently operational.

During the Iran-Iraq war, when the demand for maritime surveillance was at its highest and the readiness of the P-3s was the lowest, an unknown number of C-130Hs were converted for the maritime surveillance role. The exact nature of these modifications are unknown but may be similar in nature to the C-130H Ibex ELINT projects undertaken by the IIAF. It is unknown if any C-130s continue to serve in this role.

At the end of the day, the Ir-140MP is not a replacement for the P-3 on a 1-for-1 basis. On a purely mechanical basis, the fact that, empty, its a third the weight of a P-3 means that it's going to have a shorter range (almost a quarter), lower endurance and a lower internal volume available for mission-related subsystems. An aircraft with the range of the P-3 (or beyond!) would be perfectly suited for the IRIN's stated mission which is to project influence through the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea from the Horn of Africa to the tip of India. Recent operations like a continued presence in the Gulf of Aden and visits to countries like Syria and Sri Lanka emphasize the IRIN's shift towards a more expeditionary role. These ambitions however have remained hamstrung in many ways by the limited aerial support role of the IRIN. Surface ships like the Alvand frigate are lacking in terms of modern sensor fits. Meanwhile, only one-two submarines are available at any given time for patrol beyond the protection of the Gulf of Oman. So, by default, the responsibility of detecting and identifying potential targets falls to naval aviation as they are the only ones with the potential capability to cover such a large geographic area. Light aircraft like the Ir-140 or F-27 don't have the range to conduct patrols of any significant length beyond the Gulf of Oman.

At the end of the day, the Ir-140 is what it is, a light, turboprop aircraft, with capabilities to match. Within the context of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman it's range and capabilities are more then sufficient and are comparable to a number of other light patrol aircraft like the F-50, CN-235 or any of the Dassault Falcons. In fact, the aircraft's most important asset is the basic fact that they're new - zero flight hours, brand new engines and brand new airframes. Relying on older aircraft like the P-3 is dangerous because the remaining flying hours left have to be shepherded and carefully guarded with intensive maintenance and support, all of which translate into less missions flown. The impact of modern, sophisticated avionics suites like what should be presumed to exist on the Ir-140-HMS-500 should not be discounted either. Even a relatively inexpensive radar like the RDR-1600 used in the Ir-140-MP is able to produce a much more narrow beam in contrast to the APS-115 on the P-3F which in turn gives a much higher resolution, allowing the radar to be used for tasks like terrain mapping or SAR where the radar on a P-3 would be simply insufficient.

Works cited:
(1) Iran Ready to Mass-Produce Iran-140 Plane. Fars News. Oct. 23rd 2010. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8908011442
(2) As per official HESA and MODLEX documentation
(3) HESA's IR-140 Information Page
(4) Quickstrike Website

Zulfiqar-3 Turret

2011-08-24T11:46:00.000-07:00

Sometimes the best information comes from the lest expected places. In this case, the first shots of the interior of the Zulfiqar-3 turret came not from a new, public expo or documentary, but from a poor quality, many-year old video that gave us the first images of the Mobarez. In fact, screenshots from the video are frequently seen around the web.

But upon closer examination, a turret belonging to the Zulfiqar-3 can also be observed undergoing some form of work. While it appears to be under construction, there does appear to be some form of camouflage already applied to the exterior which would only indicate a heavy overhaul (since paint schemes are applied at the end of the process, not half-way through.

Regardless, several key features confirm it's identity.

1) Lifting eyes - visible on the lower-right side of the structure
2) Turret ring - visible on top of the structure
3) Gun mount - visible through turret ring. Man in the tan-coat is pointing directly at it and the gun mantlet.
4) Geometry - The turret is turned upside-down and facing away from the camera. The camera is looking at the left-hand turret size with the turret front obscured and the bustle out of view.

Unfortunately, there's not a great deal of information one can discern from the video, thanks in part to the low quality. One thing you can tell however is that I was a but off with my estimate on the location of the turret ring - it's a bit further forward then imagined. While one can see the interior wall of turret, I'm unable to translate this into a worthwhile estimate. However, it is worth noting that you can see the shadow from the turret bottom being cast into the interior wall.

Further Pictures:

Ruminations on the "Diary of a Revolutionary Guard Conscript"

2011-08-18T23:41:00.000-07:00

PBS's Tehran Bureau is always a good place to go to get the viewpoint of the liberal-secular-democratic bloc (incl. "the greens) in and out of Iran and last week they published the account of an unnamed correspondent in Tehran who was conscripted into the military and ended up as a soldier in the IRGC. Interestingly enough, his account delves into the training process and provides ample material for us military enthusiests to pick through. Here are my observations on reading the article.

Link - Drafted: Diary of a Revolutionary Guard Conscript

General thoughts on Training: The entire process takes about 2 months (62 days) which is comparable to most nations basic training, such as the US's 8 week program. However it appears that for most conscripts, this is the end of the line and they do not go on to advanced speciality training schools (such as the armoured warfare or artillery schools within the Artesh). Most of the specific day-to-day training techniques he describes are standard throughout the world although he frames them, perhaps unfairly, as being particularly brutal.

The author makes a note of saying that he only fired a "mere 64 bullets from my old and rusty kalishnikov" - only two magazines worth of live ammunition. While this might not be considered to out of the ordinary for basic training (for example, the USAF doesn't begin live weapons training until week five), it must be remembered that these soldiers don't continue onto infantry or other specialization schools; the two magazines are it. This calls into question the competency of these recruits at a very fundamental level.

In the final weeks they undergo a series of mock exercises in the field as a finale to their training. Afterwords, they spend the remainder of their service "in garrison" at bases across the nation. In this particular case, the author is sent to the Kurdistan region in western Iran.

Omnipresence of Cronyism: The authors story validates much of the common wisdom held about Iran and corruption. In 2010 Iran scored 2.2 out of 10 in a report by Transparency international ranking it 146 out of 178 countries; this account of the behaviour of the IRGC gives plenty of examples to support this ranking. Before training even begins, the choice of which service a conscript is inducted into depends on a number of factors. The air force is reported to be the cushiest, but the is difficult to get into without the right connections. Counter-intuitively, the police force is said to be the most reviled because it has the most hardest training and requires dangerous postings. The IRGC, unlike the Artesh has strict standards of Islamic behaviour but has much easier training and relaxed discipline. This leads many well-connected individuals serving in the IRGC. According to the author, a Basij connection never hurts either.

This trend would inevitably lead to a decrease in readiness since the IRGC would lose what makes them an "elite" force - their high morale gained through ideological unity. The IRGC can't function as a vanguard to the Islamic Republic if it's soldiers only viewed service as a way to avoid work, or as a fast-track to political/social success. Although, to the IRGC's credit, the author does mention that this criticism doesn't necessarily extend beyond the pure "conscript" cadre.

Corruption also appears to impact unit readiness on another level. Within the IRGC itself, cronyism is still a feature as soldiers buy the favour of their commanding officers; for instance, the author bribed his base commander in Kurdistan with free auto insurance to be transferred to an easier station. He also describes how knowing the right people can get you extra rations, smuggled goods like cell phones and MP3 players, exemption from duty, and passes. This likely corresponds with a lack in discipline as rules and orders no longer have force of law.

Deleterious Effects of Conscription: At a very basic level, Iran shows that it's not invulnerable to the usual weaknesses of a conscript army - many of the soldiers simply do not want to be there, and so readiness, morale and overall war-fighting capability suffers. In fact, the author puts it perfectly himself: "everyone -- from the commanders on down knows that they can't make soldiers out of us; the training is perfunctory, the mood is somber, and discipline is mostly non-existent ... Most of us are so disgusted that we have been drafted into this life that we try to resist everything, from obediance to discipline ; all suffer because of our reluctance. " Combine this with the cronyism mentioned above, and a situation develops where the rank and file are filled with people who are doing their best to coast through their service with as little disturbance and get on with their life. Commanders meanwhile are too busy shuffling around yet another batch of recruits to invest time in what are obviously not career soldiers.

While many will say that in the event of a war, "every Iranian citizen will rally around their government and armed forces" - a statement that, while being accurate, misses the point that this kind of peace-time organization doesn't produce high-readiness units. In other words, fervor and patriotism doesn't make up for the ability to shoot a rifle accurately.

This is yet another factor diluting the supposed elite ideological nature of of the IRGC. It would be one thing if the IRGC only admitted dedicated soldiers who actively chose the corps, much like the reputation the Marines hold within the US, but as soon as they start recruiting from the pool of conscripts at large, they lose this edge, especially if they have the reputation as an "easy" branch.

Deleterious Effect of Focus on Religious and Political Indoctrination: First off, it's important to note that 'indoctrination' isn't necessarily a value judgement despite it's popular negative connotations. It's also a touchy subject because any form of military training is fundamentally an exercise in control over an individuals will. However the process the author describes crosses the line of what would be considered reasonable, even allowing generously for the unique identity of an organization like the IRGC.

The author writes that: "There is no talk of military tactics ... but the indoctrination is serious. Most of the time is spent talking about the enemies of religion and state -- everything from the Fetne 88 ... to the Baha'is." While this was only the first week of training and it would be unreasonable to assume that this alone is an accurate representation of training, however since he never recants this initial observation and goes on to provide supplementary evidence saying that he has been deemed an adequate soldier because he has fired a small number of bullets and has memorized the Quran, is probably is accurate of his entire experience.

The author also indicates that this training transcends traditional bounds by directly reflecting the anti-liberal stance of the Supreme leader and conservative factions allied with the IRGC. According to the author the representative of the SL, Mojtaba Zolnour, gave a speech declaring that figures like like Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Karroubi, and Khatami would be dealt with "...when their time is ripe...".

This should come as no surprise as the IRGC has always been identified as a praetorian guard type unit with a close relationship to the Supreme Leader. The fact that almost every article about them in the Western press begins with the words: "The Elite IRGC..." is thanks to the fact that it's members have always been reported to be highly dedicated, fanatical zealots that would lay down their lives for the Velayat-e Faqih at a moments notice.

The author contends that this may no longer be a universal truth. As mentioned above the effects of conscription and corruption have eroded this advantage by replacing zealots with amateurs. He admits that many in the officer, political and intelligence cadre are dedicated believers but insists that the rank-and-file largely couldn't give a damn. "In my unit, most of the cadre, with the exception of a few in the political and cultural divisions ... did not care about politics".

Lack of Discipline / Professionalism: A major theme that runs through the entire report and is already evident in the points above is that the IRGC is an organization beset with problems of professionalism and lax discipline. Corruption has created conditions where any rule can be bybassed by the right connection or a suitable bribe.

The only rules the author reports being enforced are the wearing of the uniform, having short hair, a beard and being on time. He describes garrison as lounging around, jumping to attention when the political cadre comes by, and then relaxing after they leave. The author himself reports being at his station 15 out of every 30 days - 50% absenteeism.

It goes without saying that discipline is a key metric when evaluating any armies war-fighting capability. Disciplined soldiers can better be commanded their officers, will hold their position and perform better then ill-disciplined soldiers who distrust their officers, operate without strict command, and are much more likely to break in combat.

Overall Low Quality of Equipment and Facilities: This is a relatively minor point overall, but bears mentioning. It's to be expected that a country that has to supply for a large conscript force like Iran would be unable to provide every soldier with their own tailor-made uniform, boots, new rifles, or body armour. Even though this is to be expected the author also describes that the bases are lacking in basic hygiene as well as supplying insufficient nutrition which would have a further compounding effect on unit readiness and morale.

Maintaining Perspective: In the beginning of this piece, I mentioned the fact that the Tehran Bureau is predominantly a pro-reformist site because it's clear that this is article by an unnamed correspondent is not an objective piece. The author describes himself as a liberal agnostic who despises the IRGC. Moreover it's clear that he's opposed to the idea of mandatory military service and resents having been forced into it.

Because of this bias, we should take his claims with a grain of salt as large of Everest because of his strong incentive to portray the IRGC in the way he did and, even given pure intentions, his work would still be tainted by his personal experience. There's simply no way to verify any of his claims because there isn't anyone else stepping up to give their account of what military training and service is like to the English-speaking community at large. (On a side note, if anyone who is reading this has gone through the Iranian military as a conscript or volunteer and would like to rebut these points, I would be more then happy to host it on this blog)

However his narrative can still provide accurate information so long as we keep it in perspective. Specifically, we have to realize that his experience is not necessarily universal. While unmotivated, low-readiness units like the authors must certainly exist, there are also much more competent units that certainly exist as well (such as the IRGC's airborne commandos), we just don't know which are which, which in many ways, is the crux of the issue.

IRIAF Flight Patches

2011-07-30T12:12:00.000-07:00

Due to the fragmentary and incomplete nature of this page, the badges are organized by aircraft (F-4, F-5, F-14) rather then by organization (TAB or TFS)

Wing Patches - Wing patches indicate a pilots ability to fly a certain type of aircraft. They are typically worn on the upper right sleeve, though they can also be seen on the upper left sleeve. Designs often vary by TAB or Squadron but do not appear to be set-in-stone and sometimes vary.

TAB/TFS Patches - Patches that indicate which tactical fighter squadron or air base a pilot belongs to are usually worn on the right breast. These are, of course, unique though some squadrons do not have an assigned patch.

McDonnell Douglas F-4D/E

Wing Patches
1) Features traditional "Spooky" design. This style is worn by F-4 pilots from TAB-9 in Bandar Abbas.
2) Generic F-4 wing-patch
3) Line drawing of F-4D on red background. Worn by F-4 pilots from TAB-3, squadron unknown.
4) No further details

TAB/TFS Patches
1) No further information
2) No further information
3) TAB or TFS patch of unit based in Hamedan (TAB-3).
4) Squadron patch of the 91st TFS bsed in Bandar Abbas; features a shark.
5) Squadron patch of the 11th CCT. The 11th CCT is based in TAB-1 Mehrabad and is tasked with advanced weapons training. Patch features a mother and baby tiger.
6) Squadron patch of the 61st TFS based out of Bushehr. Date unknown and as such, may not be recent.

Northrop F-5E/F

Wing Patches
1&3) Examples of two different styles of wing patches worn by officers from the 21st TFS.
2) No further information
3) No further information. The different colour (red vs blue) may indicate a certain level of flight experience.

TAB/TFS Patches
1) Squadron patch for the 21st TFS based in Tabriz. A patch with a black border indicates 1,000+ flight hours, while one without the border indicates 500+ hours.
2&3) Squadron patches for the IRIAFs aggressor adversary training. Implication of the different colour is unclear but may correspond to experience levels. Most likely TFS 41 or 42 at TAB-4 in Dezful.

Grumman F-14

Wing Patches
No further information on any of the patches. Like with the F-4 and F-5, one possible explanation for the different colours is differing flight hours. Alternately, it may correspond to different TAB/TFSs.

TAB/TFS Patches
Most of the patches seem based on original IIAF designs with the iconic "Tomcat" figuring prominently in the imagery. No further details on which patches correspond to which squadrons.

Dassault Mirage F-1
In this case, the wing patch is worn on the left sleeve because the pilot is also qualified to fly the F-14 (whose patch is found on the right sleeve). No further information.

Chengdu F-7

MiG-29
1) Combination of wing and squadron patch identifies this pilot as hailing from TAB-1s MiG-29 squadrons. Squadron patch features a swooping eagle.
2) TAB patch for MiG-29s. Has not been observed in service.
3) Has not been observed in service, thus may belong to 23rd or 24th TFS at TAB-2 in Tabriz.

Transport Aircraft
The 11th CH-47 squadron is based out of TAB-1 and is tasked with personnel transfer between bases as well as battlefield recovery of downed aircraft.

Trainer Aircraft
***To be updated***

Unknown Patches

Imagery is mostly via screenshots of Youtube uploads from "FulcrumPilot" as well as patches for sale via auction sites (multiple sources).

US-Built Tanks in Foreign Service - Iran

2011-07-26T22:10:00.000-07:00

This piece is actually relatively old. I wrote it a fair bit ago for another website; however, seeing as how this summer has been relatively unproductive so far, I figured I'd share it here as well:

US-Built Tanks in Foreign Service - Iran

Imperial Iran
Imperial Iran, ruled since 1941 by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, emerged in the first days of the cold war as a Western-ally with larger regional ambitions than its military could then support. This, combined with the Eisenhower doctrine which encouraged direct assistance to nations in order to help sway them away from communism, led Iran to turn towards America to mechanize their Army.

Before this the Imperial Iranian Army (IIA) relied primarily on light infantry and pack animals to move their forces. Procurements following WWII included 15 M-4 Sherman tanks ordered in 1950 and 100 M-24 light tanks in 1953. These would be supplemented by an unknown number of M-36B1's purchased at an equally unknown time. The M-4s would later go on figure prominently in the 1953 coup against then-prime-minister Mohammad Mosaddeq (fig. 1). Despite these modest advances, the IIA still largely lacked mechanization.


Fig. 1: M-4s in front of the National Police HQ following the coup against Mossadeq (MSNBC/AP)

After 1953 Iran would grow closer to the United States and, considering both the Shah's ambitions and his growing oil revenue, it should have been no surprise that the newest generations of Patton tanks were on the top of the Shah's shopping list. This included 400 ex-US M-47s in 1957 and 260 M-48A1s in 1960. In fact, rapid mechanization of the IIA was of such importance to the Shah that all through 1964 US state department papers touched on the issue numerous times, saying in June: “We understand that the Shah's greatest area of concern at present is in the replacement of tanks.” and during a visit by the Shah to the US, Robert Komer of the National security council staff wrote to President Johnson that: “Though we've kept telling the Shah that his real problems are internal not external, and that reform is first on the agenda, he keeps reverting to the military toys he loves. We've convinced him there isn't much chance of Soviet attack, so now he's talking up an Arab threat as his excuse. His main interest just now is replacing his aging M-47 tanks. M-48A3s like the Israelis want would be cheaper and more than ample, but he wants our new M-60s.” Iran would later go on to order 460 brand-new M-60A1's, the first of which began arriving in March of 1965. The IIA also operated a number, thought to be around a hundred, of M-41 light tanks during the 1960's-1970's.

To support these tanks the IIA also attempted to maintain parallel infrastructure. In 1970 Bowen-McLaughlin-York Inc. built a production plant in the Khuzestan province in south-western Iran for the purpose of upgrading Iran's M-47s and M-48s. Once this plant was online, all M-47s were upgraded to the M-47M standard which was only used by Iran and it's neighbor, Pakistan. The upgrade involved replacing the assistant driver who sat in the bow next to the driver, with additional main-gun ammunition, as well as importing several features from the M-60A1 such as the fire-control elements and the AVDS-1790 diesel engine, the latter giving the rear of the tank a distinct ‘oversized’ look compared to early model M-47s. Iranian M-47's have both cylindrical and ‘T’ shaped muzzle breaks. The M-48A1's were meanwhile upgraded, to M-48A5 status which involved replacing the 90 mm gun with the 105 mm M68 from the M-60A1 as well as the associated fire-control elements. It is unclear as to when and in what order these tanks were upgraded.

Near the tail end of its lifespan, Imperial Iran began to heavily shift toward the UK for its armor needs, ordering 707 Chieftain MBTs in 1971, and 1000 Scorpion light tanks in 1976. They also provided funding for the “Shir 2” program which was intended for Iran and later evolved into the Challenger tank.

The Islamic Revolution
When the Islamic Revolution of 1979 expelled the monarchy and replaced it with a theocracy hostile toward the west, it was estimated that 240 M-47Ms, 160 M-48A5s and all of the M-60A1s remained in service, although many of the remaining early-model Pattons remained in storage. However, in the summer of 1980, with the war with Iraq still unforeseen, the newly overhauled Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) was suffering from all the ills of an army caught in revolution; purges, desertion and simple negligence had reduced the once mighty army to only around 50% fighting strength.

The War with Iraq
In September of 1980, on the eve of war with Iraq, the IRIA was still in poor shape, suffering from an acute lack of organization. When Iraqi tanks crossed the border on September 22nd, US-made tanks, along with Chieftains were some of the first sent to repulse the attack. Specifically, the 16th armored division based out of Qazvin, were equipped with three brigades of M-60A1 MBTs, while 1 brigade of the 77th mechanized infantry division, located near the border of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, were equipped with M-47M medium tank. Later, the 88th armored brigade, headquartered in the Sistan-Baluchistan province on the border with Pakistan, would be expanded to a full division and equipped with Patton tanks, though at the beginning of the war it was only equipped with Chieftains. The 37th armored brigade in Shiraz in south-eastern Iran was also equipped with Patton tanks, mostly M-60A1's, but with a number of M-47's as well. A number of M-36B1 and M-24 tanks were also deployed with the 151st infantry battalion under the 92nd armored division, though in a purely secondary capacity. The older tanks, around 80 in total, were positioned at border forts around the Khorramshahr area, sometimes buried right up to the turret in order to act as pillboxes. It is possible other forts along the border had the same type of set-up as well.

Fig. 2: M-47M. Note the enlarged engine compartment which carries the AVDS-1790 as well as the T-muzzle break and the sand bags being used as appliqué armor. (Unknown)

Unfortunately outside of Iran, the war, despite spanning 8 years, having a death-count in the millions, and with intervention from large portions of the world, remains relatively unknown. To make this worse, the few works in English that have been written about the war are often blatantly false! Furthermore, what is available from the Iranian side is almost exclusively from the IRGC perspective, which, while interesting, doesn't really touch on the performance of US-made armor which was operated by the regular army.

In the first years of the war, Iran's Pattons saw the most use of the entire war, often playing instrumental roles in counterattacks and defensive operations. For instance, the first major counterattack by the Iranians was the Battle for Dezful, alternately called Operation Nasr, was launched on January 5th 1981 by the 1st and 3rd brigades from the 16th armored division, equipped with M-60A1 tanks. The 16th armored division, supported by contingents from the 92nd armored division (based out of the south-western province of Khuzestan), spearheaded a push aimed at breaking the siege of Abadan near the border. Facing the Iranians were the 9th Iraqi armored division, 5th mechanized infantry division, and the 31st independent infantry brigade. But perhaps most importantly, unbeknownst to the Iranians, this force had been reinforced by the Iraqi 12th armored division which had been shifted from elsewhere in order to recover from previous fighting. Following promising progress on the first day of the operation when the 1st and 3rd brigade from the 16th made significant headway, they were soon beset on 3 sides by the numerically superior Iraqi armored divisions who made quick work of the two brigades. The 16th armored division was decimated by the counter-attack, losing upward of 100 M-60 and Chieftain tanks to enemy fire while being forced to abandon many more. Though it should be noted that initial Iraqi claims of capturing more then 214 tanks are probably false.

Fig. 3: M-36B1 originally captured by Iraq during the 1980s only to be recaptured by US forces in 2003. Talk about having an adventurous life! (Geoff Walden)

At any rate, information about Patton performance during the war is scare. However, on a whole, performance seems to have been a mixed bag. The M-60A1 was a favored tank by Iranian tank commanders who valued its high mobility compared to the Chieftain whose engine was notoriously underpowered and temperamental in the desert heat. However, the main flaw of the M-60A1, and in fact, most of the tanks used in the war, was their vulnerability to anti-armor weapons. Iran's solution to this was to increase the amount of infantry support for armor maneuvers. However, the shift to a light-infantry dominated force by Iran was also a function of sheer lack of any armor to field.

This brings us to one the most enduring myths of armored combat during the Iran-Iraq war – that neither side could effectively use armor for maneuvers. While Iran undoubtedly was hampered by its lack of a coherent command and control organization, competing factions and political purges, the first days of the war saw large contributions by armored forces.

However as the war progressed and Iran begin to lose more and more tanks without a way to replace them, armored formations became a rare sight. Iran's stock of US-built tanks were hit no less hard then their main MBT, the Chieftain. Retired M-47's and M-48A5's that had been sitting in storage were quickly entered into service. Iran also sent out their procurement agents across the world with orders to buy up spare parts and anything at all related to their stocks of M-47's, M-48's and M-60's. While it is unsubstantiated, it is rumored that Iran purchased 80 M-48A3's from Greece, another 80 M-48A3s Vietnam and possibly more from elsewhere.

Fig. 4: One of the few available pictures of an IRIAA M-48A5. (Saff Magazine)

Post-War
Iran emerged from the Iran-Iraq war with a shell of a military, in addition to the loss of hundreds of thousands of young men, their economy had been crippled, and combined with international isolation, the farthest possible option for the IRIA was to completely overhaul their army with brand new armor. Despite a modest procurement of T-72M1 and T-72S tanks from ex-Soviet states, the IRIA remained largely dependent on its pre-revolutionary stock of Western armor.

Post-war reorganization saw the 16th armored division with Chieftains, while the M-60A1s are most likely assigned to the 81st armored division in Kermanshah, as well as with an unknown mechanized infantry division. Meanwhile, the 77th mechanized infantry division on the border with Afghanistan still use the M-47M. The 88th armored, now a full division, use M-47M and M-48A5 tanks, favoring the latter.

Fig. 5: M-60A1 on manoeuvre during the Tondar-5 wargames in 2004. (FNA)

Surprisingly, Iran’s Pattons aren’t the only US-built tanks that are still in service. A number of “Korean-War era vintage” tanks are rumored to be deployed on Persian Gulf islands. This could a number of tanks including the M-4, or even the M-47. One possible location, as indicated by Google Earth imagery, is on the south west tip of Abu Musa Island. The island is located approximately halfway between Iran and the UAE and is a source of dispute between the two countries. While this is undoubtedly a strange role for a tank, they could be intended to repulse an amphibious attack to reclaim the island.

The Future
Though Iran's Patton tanks are undoubtedly obsolete, even by regional standards, they will continue to serve in the IRIA if only because there are no other replacements; this is in turn is due to a stagnant domestic industry and a reluctance to seek foreign assistance.

Almost no information is available about the current status of either the M-47M or the M-48A5. One of the few pictures of the M-47M shows it equipped with a pitifully small number of Kontakt-1 ERA bricks (~10 along either fender) along with a commercial security camera mounted on the turret with a length of metal pipe. This ad hoc ‘upgrade’ is most likely a local modification.

Fig. 6: M-47M in Mashhad (Jamjam)

On a more promising note, Iran has developed an upgrade for their M-60A1s called the “Samsam” which was first seen during Armed Forces Day 2010. Observable features of the upgrade includes roughly 54 Kontakt-1 type ERA bricks on the turret sides, two banks of four smoke-dischargers on either side of the turret and the addition of an EFCS-3 fire control system (the gunners sight is visible directly in front of commander’s cupola). At the left-rear of the turret is a mast-mounted laser warning receiver paired with dazzler/jammers on either side of the gun mantlet.

A different variant was shown at Sacred Defense Week 2010 and Armed Forces Day 2011 that featured ERA twice as thick as the normal K-1. While the ERA placement varies with each parade, it’s often sloppy with large areas across the frontal arc uncovered.

Fig. 7: Samsam - note the ERA brick thickness (M-ATF)

It is very likely that the Samsam is a development of their older M-60 upgrade program offered for export. While it lacks the ERA bricks and laser-warning system of the Samsam, Iran’s Ministry of Defense Export Catalogue does offer some insight on what other features exist, but are not readily apparent to the naked eye.

Specifically, this includes the replacement of the driver’s M-24 IR periscope which necessitated an IR searchlight fitted above the main gun, with a new night-driving system, probably belonging to the 2nd generation passive “Shabaviz-1/2” series manufactured by the Iran Electronics Industry (IEI). The 105 mm main gun is gyroscopically stabilized in both axis and is attached to the EFCS-3 fire-control system mentioned above. This system, manufactured by Fotona in Slovenia during the 1990s, while not ultra-modern, is a generational leap compared to anything else in Iran’s inventory. Because of this, the system has found itself being used not just in M-60A1 upgrades, but also with T-54/55, T-72, and Chieftain MBTs. It is manufactured, without a license, by IEI under the name “KAT-72”; a result of Fotona cutting relations with Iran following international sanctions. The EFCS-3 features a digital ballistic computer, 2nd generation night-sights, and a laser range-finder.

Widespread adoption of these upgrades is desperately needed if Iran’s M-60s are to remain at all relevant in the years to come. The United States demonstrated that modern M-60A3s with new fire-control-systems, gun stabilization and ammunition could still keep up with early-generation M1s during Operation Desert Storm. Unfortunately for Iran it is more then likely that projects like the Samsam are limited to technology demonstrators or prototypes and have not yet been applied on a wide scale. However, since any image of IRIA armor is rare, let alone images of upgraded ones, definitive conclusions cannot be made one way or another.

Fig. 8: Iran's 105 mm APFSDS used with the M68 gun (IIPA)

The basic Patton design also serves as the basis for Iran’s indigenous tank design, the Zulfiqar. (see separate entry on this blog) The first incarnation, the Zulfiqar-1 is heavily based on the M-48A5, with the hull being almost a direct copy, the only difference being a thicker M-60A1 style glacis plate. Internally, the configuration is also similar, with many of the controls, including the turret traversing handle and backup manual ballistic data calculator taken directly from the M-48A5. The later Zulfiqar-2/3, though a radical departure from the first model, still can’t completely hide its heritage. The hull has been lengthened (with one additional road-wheel) and now features side-skirts, but is still fundamentally based on the Patton design.

Iran has also shown an affinity for the AVDS-1790 series engine which has been reported to have been upgraded to 1,000 hp and can be found in the Zulfiqar prototypes as well as possibly in the Mobarez upgrade program for Chieftain tanks.

Sources:
Global Security
Military Photos Forums
Iran Defense Forum
ACIG Database
SIPRI Arms Database
Immortal: A Military History of Iran and It's Armed Forces
Shahyad - “Armor in the Imperial Iranian Army”
State Department Archive
Military History Magazine
Osprey Books
MODLEX
The AFV Database
Google Earth

Was I wrong about the INS Hanit?

2011-07-17T21:24:00.000-07:00

In my recent post about Iranian anti-ship missiles, I discussed the debate surrounding the attack on the Hanit corvette by Hezbollah during the 2006 war. I've usually subscribed to the belief that it was a C-701/Kosar that was used because it would account for the small amount of damage as well as be more plausible from a logistic perspective. This is despite the common claim that it was the C-802/Noor.

However, it seems I'll have to eat my words.

The first missile fired during the encounter missed the Israeli ship and hit an a civilian freighter. Up until now I assumed that this ship has been operating in the relative vicinity of the Hanit because a decoyed terminal seeker would be the best explanation for why the missile hit it instead of the Hanit.

However I've recently come across some information that indicates that the freighter was actually 60 km out to sea - well beyond the range of any variant of the Kosar. Even the Hanit, patrolling at 16 km from shoreline is at the absolute maximum engagement range of some Kosar variants (around 15 km). A Kosar could have been fired in conjunction with a Noor, but that seems much more unlikely then multiple Noors being launched (if one believes in Occam's Razor).

Source: http://www.offiziere.ch/?p=2507

Iran's Anti-Ship Missiles

2011-07-15T19:04:00.000-07:00

Iran's Anti-Ship Missiles

This is an updated version of a previous piece by this blog.

Index:
- Fajr-e Darya
- Kosar
- Nasr
- C-801
- C-802/Noor
- Harpoon
- C-201
- Raad

(also, my apologies if the footnotes are off, please point out any inconsistencies if you see them)

Fajr-e Darya (فجر دریا )
The Fajr-e Darya is a light anti-ship missile based off the Italian Sea Killer Mk. 2. The Sea Killer was designed by Italy's OTO Melara in the 1960s and was chosen as the primary surface-to-surface armament of the IIN's Alvand/Saam class frigates which would carry them in five-cell launchers. (1) They were also mounted on the IIN's BH-7 Mk. 5 hovercrafts which could carry four of them on their decks. They could also be fired in the air-to-surface role by Iran's AB-212s and ASH-3Ds. (2) It is unclear exactly when Iran began to receive the Mk. 2 variant missiles since most sources peg development of the missile as continuing up through 1984. (3) It is generally accepted that Iran exhausted their stock of original Sea Killers during the Iran-Iraq war judging from dwindling deployment on surface vessels.

Fajr-e Darya (Unknown)

The Sea Killer Mk. 2 features a solid-fuel booster and a solid-fuel sustainer motor housed in missile's narrow body. A large bulbous nose draws the eye and house the SAP warhead and guidance payload with active radar seeker. A set of four control surfaces are mounted in a cruciform configuration mid-body while the set of fins at the rear of the missile (ignoring the booster) are for stabilization. (4)

Fajr-e Darya test on IRINN ASH-3D (Unknown)

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran is reported to have provided examples of the Sea Killer Mk. 2 to China which in turn reverse-engineered it into the FL-6 and then provided a production line to Iran under the name "Fajr-e Darya" (Dawn of the Sea).(5) The only external visual difference between the two missiles is the replacement of the active radar with an EO-seeker mounted in the nose. The Fajr-e Darya also features several unidentifiable objects on rear set of stabilizing wings. However lack of sufficient photographic evidence makes it impossible to tell whether these objects are also found on the Sea Killer Mk. 2. It is reported to have a range of 25 km and sea-skimming capability. (6) Both the ASH-3D and AB-212 should have the capability to carry two missiles.

Kosar (کوثر)
The Kosar family of light, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles (AShM) are license produced copies of the Chinese TL-10/C-701 missiles. The family is often said to have been developed in cooperation between Iran and China along with the C-704 (Nasr).(7) Others claim that the missile was developed by China specifically for Iran. (8) Both of these scenarios, while they cannot be verified, are more then believable. SIPRI reports that Iran purchased 40 of these missiles from China in 1998 with all of them being delivered or locally assembled between 2001 and 2004. (9) It is likely, since these numbers are so small, that this was only a test batch since we have seen such a large number of launch platforms being built in recent years.

All three known variants of the missile are lightweight models, designed to attack ships with a displacement in the "low hundreds" such as fast-attack craft and missile boats. Judging from the combat history of other missiles in their size class, another potential use would be against support vessels like minesweepers or landing-craft, as well as volley attacks against larger craft. (10) This last role is supported by their use on IPS-type fast-attack craft.

An unknown sub-type of the Kosar is the most likely culprit behind the 2006 attack by Hezbollah on the Corvette "Hanit" which killed for Israeli sailors. The small amount of damage sustained by the Hanit as well as relative ease of operation for Hezbollah with regard to the size of the launch cells. See this post for why this assumption is probably incorrect.

All three models share the same basic configuration with cruciform mid-body cropped-delta wings and aerodynamic control surfaces at the rear of the missile. Propulsion is provided by a two-stage, solid fuel rocket motor.

The flight profile is traditional: boosting to cruise altitude after launch where INS takes over and delivers to the missile to the target area where it turns on it's terminal seeker to search for a target at which time it descends to "sea-skimming" level (exact altitude unknown) for the final run to the target.

Kosar
The Kosar is a copy of the TL-10A which was developed by China's Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation. This model can be identified by the TV seeker with a transparent dome in the nose of the missile as well as external control lines running from the control surfaces at the rear of the missile, to the guidance section further forward. The mid-body wings also have a shorter leading-edge then the C-701R (below).

Kosar - note the control lines and absence of installed seeker (Mehr News)

The TL-10 can be launched by sea (such as on the C-14), though potential air and coastal launch capability does exist.

Specifications: Kosar/TL-10A (11)
Length: 2.5 m
Diameter: 18 cm
Wingspan: 52 cm
Weight: 105 kg
Speed: .85 mach
Range: 3-15 km
Warhead: 30 kg semi-armour piercing (SAP)
Guidance: INS+TV
Hit Probability: 85%

TL-10B
This missile substitutes a radar seeker for the TV camera in the TL-10A and is helicopter-launched. (12) Very little evidence of it's use in Iran. Local Iranian designation unknown.

TL-10B - Note the control lines and lack of TV-seeker

Kosar-1
The Kosar-1 is a copy of the air-launched C-701T AShM (also known as the C-701KT) developed by the China Precision Machinery Import Export Company (CPMIEC). The missile is characterized by the TV-seeker in the nose, delta wings with a longer leading-edge then the TL-10A/B, and pop-out fins at the wing-tips. Unlike the Kosar/TL-10, the Kosar-1/C-701T is able to receive mid-course updates, allowing an operator to take over control of the missile. (13)

While intended as an air-launched system, the MODLEX entry indicates at least two types of coastal launchers exist. (14)

C-701T - Photograph is nearly identical to Modlex's publicity photos. Note the TV seeker and pop-out wing tips. (Australia Air Power)

Specifications: Kosar-1/C-701T (15)
Length: 2.50 m
Diameter: 18 cm
Weight: 100 kg
Speed: .8 mach
Range: 4-15 km
Warhead: 29 kg semi-armour piercing (SAP)
Guidance: INS+TV+operator command
Hit Probability:95%

Kosar-3
This missile is a copy of the C-701R variant of the C-701 which sees the TV-seeker replaced with millimetre wave radar (mmW) and the removal of the pop-out fins on the wing-tips. These seekers tend to have good performance because they're able to provide high resolution, all weather capability and high resistance to countermeasures (16) The missile is also slightly longer and heavier then the Kosar-1/C-701T as well as a correspondingly longer range.

Kosar-3 launch from a coastal battery (Fars News)

Specifications: Kosar-3/C-701R (17)
Length: 2.68 m
Diameter: 18 cm
Weight: 120 kg
Speed: .78 mach
Range: 4-25 km
Warhead: 29 kg semi-armour piercing (SAP)
Guidance: INS+MMW radar
Hit Probability:95%

Nasr (نصر)
The Nasr is a copy of the Chinese C-704 which, along with the Kosar, is believed to be a jointly-developed and produced missile rather then just being a design purchased by Iran (like with the HY-2 for example). However, the family history is a bit more complicated then just that.

In the late 1990s Iran-Sino missile cooperation was reaching new height, including the transfer of several designs of missiles, but under pressure from the US they curtailed most of the cooperation (or at least the most visible programs) including the seizing of many parts of the C-802, forcing Iran to reverse engineer some of the parts. However, the US agreed that some of the shorter ranged missiles being jointly-produced did not fall under the reach of the agreement reached on halting missle sales; the Kosar was one of these missiles, the Nasr was probably another. (18)

Nasr-1 (Unknown)

One of the first references to the Nasr in particular came in 2004 when Jane's compared the newly unveiled Chinese TL-6 with the Nasr which the IAIO had already displayed brochures of. (19) Unfortunately, it's unclear exactly which pamphlets the author is talking about.

An old, now defunct, Modlex site advertises the Nasr as availble for export. It's unclear exactly when this site date's from, but it's possible it's from the mid-2000s. (20) Interestingly, in this entry, as well as in other various illustrations and mockups, the missile more closely resembles the TL-6 versus the C-704 (which, contrary to some observers beliefs, are different missiles) featuring non-folding wings. This may be what has led some to incorrectly hypothesize early on that the Nasr was a copy of the TL-6 and not the later C-704. Another explanation is that there might be different versions of the Nasr in the same way there are different versions of the Kosar,

Sometime during the 2000s the Nasr entered production because during Army Day 2008 we were treated to the first pictoral evidence of an actual Nasr/C-704 missile in Iranian service. These were not mock-ups, but actual production missiles. (21) Later in 2008, Fars News announced that the new missiles were being tested during naval wargames. (22)

In Spring 2010, Iran publically unveiled the Nasr with a visit by DM Vahidi to the inauguration of a production line of the missile. (23)

Note the S/N (Is. MFA)

Then, almost exactly a year later, in March 2011, the IDF intercepted a cargo ship, The Victoria, with cargo bound for the Gaza Strip. Aboard this ship was found, among numerous other crates of munitions, six Nasr missiles, complete with technical documentation, radars, and launching cells. (24) Like Hezbollah's potential use of Kosars, this would represent a generational leap in terms of capability for Gaza-based groups who have been largely reliant on crude rockets shaped from sugar and sheet metal. The nature of the launch cells also illustrate the potential danger to all the worlds navies presented by low-cost anti-ship missiles like this one which are nominally portable, able to be well hidden and fired surreptitiously from hidden locations. It's also worth noting the serial number and date of the manufacture. According to the cover of the technical documentation supplied along with the missiles, the serial of one of the missiles is "SA880805" and was produced in 1/15/1389 (March 2010) which places this missile produced in the batch immediately after the public showing in March 2010 (serials from this showing included SA880711 and SA880716). Also, if the serials are in any way, numerically continuous, then that would mean that Iran has quite a few Nasr's (even assuming the numbers don't go up directly from 0). Lastly, the naming conventions on the technical documentation suggests that the name "Nasr" is simply the name for the missile itself, with "C-704" being reserved for the entire system. For comparison, look to the Shahin missile which is the projectile belonging to the larger Mersad SAM system. Some have asserted that this is a false flag operation by Israel in order to justify further aggression against Iran, however there is absolutely no evidence of this as of yet.

The Nasr itself is a medium-weight anti-ship missile designed for use against ships with a displacement between 300 and 1500 tons which includes smaller missile boats up through corvettes like the Saudi Badr class and the UAE's MGB-62 class. (25) (26)

In it's design the Nasr can be described, in essence, as a scaled-up Kosar. It features the same basic configuration with a two-part solid-fuel motor, mid-body folding cruciform wings (though it should be mentioned that many drawings of the missile do not feature the folding aspect) and cruciform aerodynamic control surfaces at the rear of the missile with the warhead and guidance payload at the front of the missile. It is also fired from a cell that is visually very similar to the Kosar's.

The Nasr distinguishes itself from the Kosar in scale; the warhead is a 100 kg more and the range is 10 km greater then on the Kosar. Most importantly however, the millimeter wave radar has been exchanged for a centimetre wave radar which, while offering lower resolution, has a greater range then the mmW system.(27)

Nasr being tested aboard a C-14 (Borna News)

The missile has been seen tested on the C-14 fast attack craft and according to Vahidi shore batteries exist, likely self propelled like the Kosar, though the missiles being sent to Gaza indicate that they could just as easily be set up as a diffuse, semi-mobile/static system. Vahidi also asserted that the missile would soon be adapted for launch from helicopters and submarine. (28) Helicopter launch capability isn't that remarkable, but submarine-launch certainly is. It is unknown if there is a difference between the "Nasr" and the "Nasr-1", or if they are the same weapon.

Specifications: Nasr
Length: 3.5 m
Diameter: 28 cm
Weight: 350 kg
Speed: .8-.9 mach
Range: 8-35 km
Warhead: 130 kg
Guidance: INS + Radar homing
Hit Probability: 75%

C-801
The C-801 is the first of the YJ-8 AShM family that also includes Iran's C-802/Noor missile. They are often compared to the US's Harpoon and the French Exocet both in terms of overall configuration/design and capability.(29)

Some sources report that Iran began acquiring the C-801 in the late-'80s/early-'90s and that by 1994, they had 200 of them. (30) However more generally reliable sources assert that Iran's acquisition of C-801 missiles came much later, specifically in March 1997 when Iran received an evaluation batch of 16 C-801Ks (air-launch variant). Testing over the next several months led Iran to conclude that while the missiles were generally inferior to the Harpoon they were still a good overall value; this in turn led to plans to purchase an additional 100 C-801Ks and negotiations for Iran to domestically produce the C-802K. (31)

Part of the reason that comparisons are often drawn between the Exocet and the C-801 is the almost identical dimensions between the two, same length, same diameter, same wingspan, same weight, same warhead weight. The missile body is a long, thin tube with four cruciform wings located set slightly behind the midpoint with aerodynamic control surfaces behind these. Powering the missile is a solid fuel rocket motor and, in the case of coastal and sea-launched variants, an additional solid-fuel booster which drops away after launch. The front of the missile contains both the warhead and guidance section which includes the INS as well as terminal-phase seeker. The terminal phase seeker is the same as on the Noor as well as the Raad; the DM-3B, as it is known in Iran, is described by Global Security as a "monopulse, high-frequency (probably J-band) terminal guidance radar seeker" which has "high anti-jamming capabilities."(32) (33)

Despite knowing that Iran did in fact order a substantial number of these missiles, the current operational status still remains unknown. Because China reneged on their delivery obligations to Iran after 1997 because of US pressure (see above) it's more then possible that only part of the 100 missiles ordered were delivered. The development of domestic tooling and production lines for the Noor would remove any incentive to devote more resources toward the C-801. While some have undoubtedly been expended in training and via attrition, it's likely Iran still maintains the remainder whatever they have left in storage.

While Iran is only known to have procured the air-launched version, they could also be adapted for coastal or naval launch by the addition of the booster. Some have also suggested that the C-801 is the basis for the Saqeb (also, Thaqeb/ثاقب ) which is Iran's reported SLCM. (34) (35)

C-802/Noor
The C-802 is a development of the Chinese C-801/YJ-8 AShM and serves as the primary anti-ship missile within the Iranian Armed Forces.

Noor on parade (SMM)

Following their experience with the C-801, Iran expressed their interest in producing the C-802K within Iran. These moves however would make far too much of an impression on the US's radar screen and in Fall of 1997 and early in 1998, Washington received assurances from the highest levels that Beijing had halted arms sales of the C-801 and C-802. (36) This forced Iran to reverse engineer the missing missile components and introduce their own production line for the missile, which they did two years later. (37) Over the course of the next several years, Iran began testing and integrating the missiles with their Persian-Gulf-based fleet of F-4Es and Su-24MKs. (38)

Air-launched C-802K (note the F-4E) (Sejil.ir)

It is similar to the C-801 is almost every way except for the substitution of an air-breathing turbojet engine in place of the solid-fuel sustainer motor. The turbojet is known in Iran as the Toloue-4 and is a copy of a motor produced by the French company "Microturbo SA". (39) The guidance section also features a datalink to allow for mid-course corrections. (40)

In cruise mode, the missile flies at 20 m ASL, but once it enters the terminal phase it descends to 5-7 m. (41)

Today, the missile is being mass produced and is carried by a lions-share of Iran's naval warfare platforms. This includes the air-launched C-802K (Qaem/قائم ) which can be carried by F-4s and Su-24s. Launch cells are also found on Alvand and Mowj class frigates, the Bayandor corvette, Kaman/SINA FACs and Thondar missile boats. Coastal launch variants are notable in that many are designed to operate covertly or can be disguised as civilian trucks. Moreover, equipping the launch trucks with basic surface-search radars also gives them a degree of mobility allowing them to operate without (or with less) support equipment.


Single cell launch vehicle - note the radar and camouflage

Double cell launch vehicle (IRNA)

Specifications: Noor (42)
Length: 6.38 m
Diameter: 36 cm
Weight: 715 kg
Speed:.8-.9 mach
Range:10-120 km
Warhead: 155 kg
Guidance: INS + Radar Homing
Hit Probability: 90%

RGM-84
Iran originally ordered a modest number of RGM-84A Harpoon AShMs from the US in the 1970s to fit to their stock of Combattante (Kaman/Sina) class FACs. (43) One of Iran's P-3s (it's unclear which one) was adapted to carry the Harpoon (AGM-84A) but there is no evidence that it was ever used in combat or is still used in this manner today. While Iran has no known supply route to obtain additional missiles, at least one Kaman-class FAC (P226) can still be seen on exercises armed with Harpoons rather then the more common Noor.

P226 armed with Harpoon AShMs (FNA)

HY-2
Commonly identified as the "Silkworm", the C-201 Seersucker is the most well-known and infamous of Iran's AShMs thanks to it's widespread proliferation across the world, previous usage, and general media unfamiliarity with exact missile designations.

HY-2G launch - note the frame for camouflage (FNA)

The HY-2 was widely exported across the Middle East and saw action during the Iran-Iraq war where both sides used them against military and commercial targets. Iran's acquisition of the HY-2 began in 1986 when they captured an Iraqi missile base near Faw during the Valfajr-8 offensive that housed numerous Iraqi HY-2s that were being used against Iranian shipping originating from the northern Persian Gulf. It's unclear exactly what Iran was able to capture, but the it was enough, reportedly, to serve as the basis for Iran to reverse engineer. (44) Also around this time, Iran purchased a number of HY-2 missiles and associated launch equipment from China in order to outfit their own anti-shipping units. (45)

Control over the HY-2s was given (predictably) to the IRGC where they were located in and around the Hormuz passageway on Islands like Qeshm, Farsi and Larak. The IRGC deployed the missiles on mobile launchers as well as on built-up launching pads with revetments that allowed for more precise targeting. (46) Many of these sites are still visible today and may remain in use (Ex: Larak, Qeshm).

During the early-90s, China is reported to have transferred production know-how to Iran. This might appear to some to conflict with earlier reports indicating Iran reverse engineered them. However it's more then possible that Iran's reverse engineered production lines, if they did exist at all, were of a lower quality then the genuine tooling, materials, and training available from the Chinese. (47)

The missile itself is extremely large with two equally large horizontal mid-body wings for lift with three control surfaces at the rear of the missile arrayed very much like the H/V-stabilizers on aircraft rather then the cruciform pattern found on most missiles. Unlike modern missiles, it also uses a rather elaborate system of liquid fuel for propulsion which is highly toxic and requires full chemical protection to prepare for launching. Iran operates the HY-2G variant of the missile which features a radio altimeter for improved sea-skimming performance though it still retains the same active radar seeker as used on the original HY-2. (48) Details about any ground-based support radars used for tracking and surveillance are unknown.

Today, the HY-2 continues to be a mainstay of the IRGCs coastal defence units despite its obsolescence who are often seen during wargames firing the missiles from towed coastal launchers. A self-propelled variant similar to a North Korean design has also been seen on parade. Lately, launchers have been seen fitted on Mercedes Benz trucks and fitted with scaffolding to disguise them as civilian vehicles. It is also serves as the basis for Iran's indigenous Raad-1 which features numerous improvements.

Specifications:HY-2G (49)
Length: 7.36 m
Diameter: 76 cm
Weight: 2,998 kg
Speed:.9 mach
Range: 95 km
Warhead: 513 kg
Guidance: INS + active radar homing

Raad (رعد)
The Raad is an indigenous variant on the HY-2 which sees the replacement of the liquid-fuel engine with a turbojet that lends the missile it's distinctive appearance with two air-scoops at the rear of the missile. The archaic guidance package has also been replaced with the same DM-3B monopulse radar seeker used on the Noor and an unknown INS. It was first tested in 2004 and was reported have entered an unknown rate of production soon afterwords.(50)

Raad aboard a tracked, self-propelled launch platform (Unknown)

Specifications: Raad (50)
Length: 5.3 m
Diameter: 36 cm
Weight: 555 kg
Range:200-300 km (51)
Warhead: 165 kg
Guidance: INS + homing radar

Works Cited and Endnotes:
(1) Sistel Sea Killer/Marte. Harpoon Databases.
http://www.harpoondatabases.com/Encyclopedia/Entry695.aspx
(2) IRINA Islamic Republic Of Iran Naval Aviation. Iranian Aviation Review. Issue No. 1. P. 9
(3) Sources vary on the development timeline of the missile,According to Jane's it began in 1975, though Harpoon Database suggests 1980. Others even suggest late-60s/early-70s.
(4) ibd Harpoon Databases.
(5) It's worth noting that almost no information can be gathered on any missile in China designated "FL-6".
(6) ibd Iranian Aviation Review, no 1.
(7) Report on the 5th Airshow, China. Richard Fisher, Jr. International Assessment and Strategy Center December 13th 2004. http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.54/pub_detail.asp
(8) China Aids Iran's Tactical Missile Program. Robert Hewson. Jane's Air Launched Weapons. November 17th 2004. Accessed via: http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/60849-post.html
(9) SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.
(10) Helicopter launched AShMs played large roles in the Falkland War as well as the 1st Persian Gulf War.
(11) Modlex Entry. http://modlex.ir/cgi-bin/store.pl/page=category.html/category=5
(12) ibd Hewson, 2004
(13) ibd Modlex
(14) ibd Modlex
(15) ibd Modlex
(16) Active Radar/Millimetre Wave Precision Targeting System. Defence Update. http://defense-update.com/products/r/radar-active.htm
(17) ibd Modlex
(18) China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Iran. NTI. http://www.nti.org/db/china/miranpos.htm
(19) ibd, Hewson, 2004
(20) To view a copy of the entry: http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/index.php?topic=2767.msg21832#msg21832
(21) This image is accessible via: http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/index.php?topic=2767.msg27983#msg27983
(22) In Persian: http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8709150223
(23) Iran Opens "Nasr-1" Cruise Missile Production Line. ISNA. March 7th 2010. http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1503110&Lang=E
(24) C-704 "Nasr" Missiles Found on Intercepted Cargo Ship. Uskowi on Iran. March 16th 2011. http://www.uskowioniran.com/2011/03/c-704-missile-found-on-victoria-cargo.html
(25) Basic information on ships of the RSN and the UAE Navy via Wikipedoa.
(26) ibd Modlex
(27) The C-704 carries a cm-band radar, and logically so would the Nasr though we have not recieved official confirmation from Iran that it does, so far it's only been described as a "homing radar seeker"
(28) ibd ISNA, 2010.
(29) PLA Cruise Missiles / PLA Air-Surface Missiles. Australia Airpower. Kopp et al. August 2010. http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Cruise-Missiles.html
(30) C-801. Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/c-801.htm
(31) Sukhoi Su-24MK Fencer-D. Iranian Aviation Review. Issue No. 3. P. 14
(32) ibd Global Security, C-801
(33) Translation of ISNA News article done by a member of the now-defunct "Iranmilitaryforum.com".
(34) Iran Tests New Submarine to Surface Missile. AP. August 2006. Accessed via: http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/1959-iran-tests-submarine-surface-missile.html
(35) Naval Forces - Iranian Military Capability 2011. Open source Intelligence Project. P. 70. Accessible via this blog.
(36) ibd NTI
(37) ibd Iranian Aviation Review, no 3.
(38) ibd Iranian Aviation Review, no 3.
(39) ibd Iranian Aviation Review, no 3.
(40) ibd Naval Forces - Iranian Military Capability 2011.
(41) ibd Modlex
(42) ibd Modlex
(43) SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.
(44) Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop. Schiffer Military History. 2000. P. 199, 210.
(45) SIPRI Arms Transfer Database
(46) Google Earth
(47) ibd NTI
(48) Ibd Kopp et al, 2010.
(49) The Lessons of Modern War - Volume II. CSIS. Accessible via: csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap11.pdf
(50) History of the Missiles of Iran - 4. Saff Magazine. No. 357. p.46
(51) Some sources claim a range of 350 km (ibd translation of ISNA article done by IMF.com member)

Ruminations on the Zulfiqar-3

2011-07-10T22:27:00.000-07:00

Recently, an anonymous commentor directed me to a photo from the news-agency IIPA which showed the Zulfiqar-3 on a trailer during the Army Day Parade 2011. This photo didn't show anything we hadn't seen many times before but the angle of the camera was such that it allowed another round of estimates of the general dimensions of the tank.

These dimensions largely match up with the other measurements I took for the main article on the Zulfiqar-3. As Adam from the TV show "Mythbusters" would say, who doesn't love consistent data?

(Source: IIPA)

News - Iran Unveils Underground Ballistic Missile Launch Silos

2011-06-28T00:56:00.000-07:00

Iran Unveils Underground Ballistic Missile Launch Silos

Iran recently announced the commencement of the 'Great Prophet 6' wargames which will involve the firing of many types of surface-to-surface missiles like the Shahab-1/2, Khalij Fars, Fateh-110, Sejil and Qiam by the IRGC. This is the latest in the series of 'Great Prophet' wargames which often involve large-scale exercises by the IRGC that often vary in type of training, from coastal defence to special forces deployment to missile testing.

Pictures of the exercise have yet to come in, but the trend with previous exercises indicates that they will be posted online eventually. However the timing of this announcement was also paired with the announcement that Iran was deploying ballistic missiles in underground silo launch facilities. More importantly, this announcement was paired with a video tour of the facility, a remarkable insight!

Youtube Video (In Persian): http://youtu.be/oKPjXp7u6VI
Article and Screenshots (In Persian): http://www.militaryparsi.ir/news-service/160-news/533-irannews.html

Previously, it has been hypothesized that Iran had deployed missiles in silos due to overhead imagery courtesy of google earth. The most well know potential facility is located south, south-west of the city of Tabriz and was was first uncovered in the open-source community (to the best of my knowledge) by, friend of the Arkenstone, Sean O'Conner at "IMINT&Analysis". Unfortunately the original article is no longer accessible but a description of the facility can be found on Wikimapia.

A second class of underground facilities can be found missile storage compounds across the country, from Kermanshah, to Khorromabad, to possibly Isfahan. These do not have the characteristic qualities of the other silos but are associated with missile storage and hardened underground construction, so it's not out of the question. An example of this imagery from the city of Kermanshah can be found on this blog. However there is no consensus on these structures identity as of yet.

According to the video, Iran reportedly has had this capability for 15 years - since 1996.

However, the identity of the site shown in the video is unknown. The reporter is flown out of Tehran in a Lockheed L-1329 Jetstar VIP transport aircraft with blocked out windows - the first visual indicator of heightened security. The flight, according to the video, takes 1.5 hours which could put it pretty much anywhere along the western border depending on any number of things including airspeed, route taken, altitude flown, etc.

Once the plane touches down, the tight security continues as the reporter is ushered into a windowless van and driven some distance on a rather bumpy road. It's worth noting that the van is equipped not just with a TV and padded seats, but with some of the most bizarre pieces art I've ever seen painted on a military vehicle - a pastoral scene with many different varieties of flowers.

The van drives right up to the doorway of the underground facility before the reporter is allowed to disembark, another indicator of high operational-security. One notable feature however is the presence of camouflage netting on the above-ground building which indicates some effort at concealment. This assertion is backed up by the fact that the actual entranceway into the facility is rather mundane. It's a single case of spiral-stairway descending from a simple doorway directly into the main hallway without so much as a checkpoint, metal detector, or blast door.

After descending the main staircase, the reporter and his escort are deposited directly in the main hallway which is lined with painted murals and brightly lit by flourescent lights. The hallway slightly slopes downward, continuing for probably around 75-100 m (estimate) when it takes a gentle turn to the left and slopes down further.

The video then cuts to a shot of them walking down a stair-case which may or may not start from where the hallway mentioned above disappears from view. At the bottom of the stair-case is a landing with a very interesting picture on display. The picture is of a team of IRGC soldiers fuelling a missile during the Iran-Iraq war, but because of a fouled mechanism the soldiers are having the fuel the missile with nothing more then a bucket; a task I'm certainly not envious of.

Immediately adjacent to this landing on the left-hand-side is a large blast door leading into the actual silo itself. The silo houses a Shahab-3A missile though the silo is notably wider and taller then the Shahab-3 stationed in it which indicates the possibility that the silo has been built with future expansion in mind. This is supported by a brief mention in the MilitaryParsi article above though it's unclear if this is official information or pure speculation.

The Shahab-3 is stored in a vertical position, connected to controls by various umbilicals. This style is normal for ready-launch silos as compared to some of the earliest hardened missile shelters in which the missile still had to be prepared for launch.

Also shown is test footage which shows a Shahab-3 being fired from an underground silo. However, certain indicators point to it taking place at another facility, or at least another location then the silo toured. The initial boosting of the missile out of the silo shows that the underground facility in the test is far more spacious with the entire space around the missile pad hollowed out. It's also worth noting that in the small second we got an area shot of the silo doors, the surrounding area looked like it was not significantly built-up which in turn increases the possibility that it's a camouflaged facility.

While the purely technical value of this development shouldn't be excluded from discussion about these silos, far more important in my opinion is the strategic value from such a confirmation.

This is primarily because no non-nuclear country that I know of deploys silo-based ballistic missiles, the implicit point being that this indicates Iran was working on, or is now working on a nuclear weapons program. The logic behind such a statement being that silos aren't useful on the conventional battlefield. It's static nature means that they'll never be able to manoeuvre to bring targets within range or to evade air assets tasked with their destruction. The last one is particularly important; while a successfully disguised silo base would be able to fire at least a salvo of missiles before being detected they would be prime targets after that and it's unlikely a large base could reliably manage to conceal itself against all forms of surveillance. Furthermore, the costs invested into a full-time facility complete with staff and construction costs would be far greater then even a great number of TELs and with a limited potential rate of fire and inability to resist bunker-busting PGM strikes after detection, it would be unlikely that the high initial cost would ever be offset in a conventional conflict. The primary advantages of using a silo-based system, which is near-immediate reaction time, is nullified in most cases in a conventional war because it is unlikely that the time saved, up to a couple hours would prove decisive, especially when comparing them to mobile TELs and the likely disciplined training that IRGC missile units go through.

These advantages, rapid reaction and survivability however become much more important when talking about them in context of nuclear weapons because both are needed in order to ensure a 2nd strike capability.

However, this is Iran we're talking about which means that applying the template of cold war missile politics to Iran might not work. Iran is known to use long-range missiles (like the Shahab-3) in a conventional role as a strategic weapon all by itself. This does present a scenario for the use of conventional warheads. However this alone seems a weak explanation as there no credible explanation for why silos are being used instead of TELs.

One overlooked explanation might be that they're legacy facilities being used for no other purpose then because the cost is already sunk into construction, there's no reason not to. This theory looks particularly attractive if they are in fact, 15 years old. Piggybacking on this, if we believe the 2007 NIE report which asserted that Iran had a nuclear program pre-2003, these 15-year old silos may hail from a time when Iran actually did intend to fill these silos with nuclear missiles.

In any of my Persian speaking readers catch anything in the video that is worth posting about that I missed, please don't hesitate to mention it in the comments below.

Comments on the missile exercises themselves coming later...

The Devil We Know

2011-06-23T23:20:00.000-07:00

When Robert Baer wrote "The Devil We Know", a book on the emergence of a modern Iranian "superpower", the Iran he spoke of was seemingly unshakable; the reformists had been shoved out, ending their decade long tenuous hold on power, and in their place had emerged a new breed of conservative. President Ahmadinejad, allied with the traditional clerical elites led the charge and Iran became Public Enemy No. 1 for much of the Western world (irrespective of which side deserves the blame for that belief).

However today, this same conservative bastion is being shaken. Ahmadinejad has split from the traditional conservatives and even challenged the supreme leader, a previously unquestionable authority who sat above the everyday fray of day-to-day politics. Ahmadinejad and his allies are proposing a fundamentally revolutionary change in the nature of the Islamic Republic, shifting true power from the clerics and the 'old guard' to entities that are far more secular and belong to his band of 'new guard' conservatives who haven't earned their credentials studying in seminaries in Qom, but on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war and modern-day business world.

Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival, has recently written an article for Foreign Policy Magazine where he explores this further and examines the risks should Ahmadinejad triumph and his vision for a future Iran take hold.

Showdown in Tehran - Vali Nasr - Foreign Policy

At the basic level, Vali Nasr is posing us the question: "Which would be better, the devil we know - an Islamic theocracy or a more secular, possibly more militant Iran - the devil we don't?

Nasr concludes that the international community, as well as the Iranian people should hope for a continuance of the status quo and the political death of the "Deviationists" as Ahmadinejad's political faction has come to be known. He bases his conclusions on two main points.

1) An empowered Ahmadinejad means increasing power of the IRGC in political life which would correspond to greater militarization and increased authoritarian characteristics.

2) The demise of the traditional clerical theocracy is inevitable absent a shake-up by the Deviationists because of of the will of the people who desire a more liberal system.

These are both flawed assumptions, (though both do have a kernel of truth) but to understand why we have to understand how the Iranian political arena functions. Contrary to many peoples initial perceptions of Iran as an authoritarian state, the politics of the Islamic Republic is actually characterized by extreme competition between different groups. (1) In fact, the best way to describe the political sphere is to say that it is comprised of an always shifting web of factions, persons, and revolves around their attempt to gain power and influence within the constraints of the framework of the Islamic Republic. (2) Each move made by a politician is made with the primary understanding that it will have domestic repercussions. In this manner, they are not unlike the US which frequently uses matters of foreign policy to drive tactical political gains (ex: New START and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars).

Politics with the Islamic Republic has largely followed a cyclical trend, first in power were the Khomeneist clergy who were swept up by the revolution where they held on until the early '90s when the moderates and pragmatists replaced them. But this camp was hamstrung by the institutional nature of the government which was organized to make change extremely difficult, but obstruction very easy. After the turn of the century a new breed of conservatives emerged who were younger and more-often-then-not came from the IRGC, not Qom. This group however is by no means monolithic and includes a wide range of figures from Ahmadinejad to Larijani to Rezai.

This brings us to the nature of the Deviationists and what their vision of Iran might look like. For the most part, I agree with Vali Nasser's description of Ahmadinejad and his close allies when he says their defining feature was: "...combining religious fundamentalism with Iranian nationalism and economic populism" (3) The Deviationists see a reduced role of the clergy in national government which isn't surprising given that the political movement is largely independent of the traditional religious hierarchies. While Ahmadinejad is manoeuvring to bring the religious aspects of the government more firmly under control of the state, it is almost inevitable that undercutting traditional hierarchies will result in a decentralization of religious power, no matter how much Ahmadinejad would try and retain for himself.

However Vali Nasr ignores a critical fact about the Iranian political system, which is that Ahmadinejad overturning the fundamental make-up of the system doesn't necessarily mean that Ahmadinejad will be the end state in the post-Supreme Leader world. I mentioned earlier that Iran is best described as factions competing within a framework; the impact of the secularization of the state is that that this framework is removed. The competition continues without the presence of the supreme leader to exercise his will which has been so often the impediment to legitimate change (as happened to Khatami). While it doesn't guarantee this outcome by any means, in fact it could result in even worse scenarios playing out, it does create a space for a more productive political solution to arise, space that would be completely absent otherwise.

But let's be honest, Ahmadinejad and his political allies are in a very bad place right now. Much of the influential leaders in the IRGC have sided with Khamenei along with many pragmatic conservatives who Ahmadinejad would have counted as allies. Meanwhile, the supreme leader has beaten the president in many of the recent battles over ministry appointments which serve as focal points for their struggle. It's unlikely as of this writing that Ahmadinejad will be able to manage a total victory.

So what does this mean for the Islamic Republic? Vali Nasr asserts that the establishment is a ticking time bomb which will soon crumble under it's own weight. While he doesn't directly write it, he insinuates that the successor to the system will be the liberal reformist camp which gained notoriety in the challenging of the 2009 presidential election.

As a firm believer in liberal realism, free-trade and democratic governance I must confess to be attracted by this notion that Iran could be a modern nation-state no longer at the peripheries in isolation. But like all good dreams, the fantasy has to end sometime and the truth is that for good or bad the majority of Iranians just don't support this vision, at least if public polls taken after the 2009 elections are any indicator.

According to the most recent Charney Research poll taken in 2010: (4)
- The majority of the populace supported Ahmadinejad (~60% of the electorate)
- The majority (59%) approved of the post-election crackdown
- A minority (32%) say that Iran needs more freedoms and democracy while a majority (51%) says Iran needs more controls to protect Islam.
- 47% believe the Supreme leader should make the final decisions in government as opposed to 32% who favor elected bodies.
- The population is split relatively evenly on the performance of the government

Assuming the results are representative of the Iranian populace at large, (it appears that they are) this at best indicates that there is no clear consensus over the future of the Islamic Republic while at worst indicates that there's strong support for the status quo. The bottom line here is that while we in the west might be attracted by the idea of liberal revolutions, we can't forget that these are often quite often illusions designed to appeal to just this attraction. (5)

As this piece winds to a close, I would normally attempt to draw some conclusions about which path Americans should hope Iran takes in the continuing struggle but I'll refrain from doing so here because, quite frankly, no one knows. That's the core conundrum with the question "which is better, the devil you know, or the devil you don't?" In this case the answer is no more clear. The devil we know has unquestionably played a key role the 30 years of hostile relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. There's no question that it's an undesirable scenario because it engenders conflict and hostility. But then again, it is the devil we know; we've managed to live with Iran for 30 years and there is evidence that they are slowly moving incrementaly toward reform and normalization. The devil we don't know presents the real risks and opportunities but as always, we'll never truly know which should have happened or should happen because there will always be the opportunity cost that precludes the other.

Here's to hoping for a good ending whatever it is.

Footers and Works Cited
(1) Whether or not these processes are always entirely transparent and legitimate is another matter, but for our purposes irrelevant to the question of the competition between different groups for political power.
(2) Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads. Thaler et al. RAND. 2010.
(3) Showdown in Tehran. Vali Nasr. FP Magazine. June 2011.Link above.
(4) http://www.docstoc.com/docs/65872019/Iran-Public-Opinion-2010
(5) A good anologue is the counter-culture movement in the US during the 1960s. They dominated national discourse but were only represented a minority opinion.

Big Showing During Khamenei's Visit to Defense Exhibition

2011-06-22T21:11:00.000-07:00

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei, paid a four-hour long visit to an exhibition featuring products of defence industry of Iran. While the news agencies predictably focused on the Supreme Leader in their photo galleries of the event, the real treasure trove of information was to be found in the background of many of these pictures.

Story: IRNA
Complete Photo Gallery: Leader.ir

Let's see what's on display!

(Leader.ir)

Here we have an Akhgar multi-barrel machine-gun set up on a tripod derived from the TOW ATGM. Iran apparently uses this tripod for a number of systems besides the ATGM because it has also been seen with a surveillance system (IRLRSP). It's unusual to see a rotary barrel gun like the Akhgar mounted as a static weapon in this manner but it's likely just a display model.

(Leader.ir)

This truck is built by the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Group. Unfortunately this model can not be discerned though it most likely belongs to the <5 ton class. It bears somewhat of a similarity to the 1 1/4 ton class truck.

(Leader.ir)

The Shahed 285 was also on display. While the photographer was obviously focused on Khamenei, he managed to catch a reflection off the right hand side of the canopy which shows the weapons pylon and what appears to be a SUU-11/A gunpod which houses the 7.62 mm GAU-2/M134. Both the IIAA/IIN as well as the IRIAA/IRIN used these gunpods but post-revolution there has been a lack of evidence indicating their continued use. This reappearance on the Shahed 285 may coincide with the production of the Akhgar, but it may also be coincidence.

(Leader.ir)

This is a rather interesting MLRS. The barrels are most likely of the 122 mm variety and appear to be somewhat skewed or improperly aligned. The rear of the bank also appear to be shrouded in a metal case. Given the general color and styling of the components, this may be the rear end of the truck mentioned above. Alternately, it may also be the truck behind the MLRS in the photo, or it may be neither. (See comments below for additional speculation)

One of the bigger surprises of the show came with this shot. Here again it appears that the photographer focused on the attending personnel and only caught the front left corner of this previously unknown armoured vehicle.

(Leader.ir)

While we can tell very little from this picture, it does show the 125 mm 2A46M main gun that Iran produces under the name HM-50 which is used in both the T-72S as well as the Zulfiqar-3. The track links and track pads are also the same ones used on the Zulfiqar, although these are derived from the M-60A1.

But the most interesting feature of this AFV is definitely the unique shape of the front portion of the hull. While most tanks have a "sideways-V" shaped glacis, this tank has an almost entirely flat upper glacis. There is also what appears to be a bolt-on piece of applique steel on top of the hull with a rather odd texture.

At this stage, one can only guess at what the exact nature armoured vehicle could be.

Also note in the far background, is the F-14A display which gives an alternate view of the C-802K and the other white and black pod.

(Leader.ir)

Here we see an interior shot of the Samandar tactical vehicle and the Ranger tactical vehicle in the background.

(Leader.ir)

This is a TOW ATGM training aide. The controls are connected to a projector which displays the digitally rendered scenario on a wall.

(Leader.ir)

Here are two different types of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). It is unclear if the first one is a scale model or not but it appears to be somewhat bio-mimetic, meaning it is designed to function like an animal rather then a machine. While it uses a propeller for propulsion, the stabilizing surfaces are definitely designed to work like a shark's.

(Leader.ir)

Another design is more bio-mimetic, using an articulated tail-fin to swim like a fish. The poster behind it identifies it as a "Micro-underwater vehicle (MUV)" Another poster most likely displays the specifications and other information, but the only passage that can be read indicates that the development took 13 months.

(Leader.ir)

A number or air defence radars were also shown. This one shows a trailer-mounted VHF surveillance radar similar to the P-18 "Spoon Rest". Unlike the P-18 which has 18 antenna in two banks of 8, ~~this radar has 12 antenna in banks of 6~~ (see comments below)and the antenna themselves have a slightly different design then the original P-18. It is built into a shipping container and is mounted on a telescoping mast that can be stowed on the roof of the container.

(Leader.ir)

The "Kashf-2" is also mounted in a shipping container. It closely resembles the "ASR-1 in most ways save for the parabolic dish.

(Leader.ir)

But by far the most eye-catching of the radars shown was undoubtedly this one, pictured on the back of a trailer in the background of this photo. It has been suggested elsewhere that this is the radar mentioned in this announcement by General Vahidi. The logic behind it is that the article mentioned that this new radar will have "6400 elements" and as one can tell, this antenna is indeed made up of about 6400 square elements (by my count, each half has about 3100 squares, but it's easily conceivable that I'm off by 200 or so).

(Leader.ir)

Another big treat during the show was the RPG-29. While this is still the first time the RPG-29 launcher has been publicly seen in Iran, we have recently learned that Iran has produced the rounds for the anti-tank weapon.

(IRIB)

An F-14A was on display with a number of munitions that proved quite suprising. The inclusion of an AIM-54 (far-left) lends credence to the assertion that Iran is domestically producing the long-range missile for their interceptors - a debate that's raged for 30 years. To the right of the AIM-54 is the AN/ALQ-101 ECM pod used since they were first delivered alongside F-4s during the days of the IIAF. Further to the right is the C-802K AShM which up until now had only been associated with the Su-24 and F-4. On the far right is a missile which cannot be identified but appears to be slightly smaller in diameter then the C-802K. It's body has a blue colour and it's fins appear to be highly asymmetrical.

One very odd feature of this display is that it's still painted in it's original desert pattern camouflage that they were delivered in. This is unusual because all of the flying models were believed to have been repainted in the two-tone air superiority blue-grey that they're seen in nowadays.

(Leader.ir)

The "Sahareh" is reportedly an advanced torpedo under development. Not much can be discerned from the poster, but the noticeable lack of a propeller leads one to believe that it's rocket-propelled, possibly a development of the Hoot (which is a copy of the Russian Skhval).

(Leader.ir)

While a large calibre artillery rocket dominates this photo, there is a rather interesting design of rifle in front of Khamenei. It may be a large-calibre anti-material rifle which is missing it's barrel at the moment. Also of note is the scope adjacent to the rifle which bears many similarities to the Barrett BOR.

Iran's Indigenous Precision Guided Munitions

2011-06-16T22:00:00.000-07:00

***This is an updated version of an earlier piece***

Iran's Indigenous Precision Guided Munitions

Zoobin (AGM-379)
The Zoobin (Arrow/Dart/Javelin) belongs to the first generation of Iranian PGMs that also includes the Qadr. The missile was first publicly seen in 2002 and since then a mockup has been a common site during various military parades in Tehran. (1)

Early versions of the Zoobin without the distinctive mid-body swept wings (Source Unknown)

The missile is built around the 750 lb (343 kg) M117 general purpose bomb which forms the middle section of the missile. Four large wings in a cruciform pattern are bolted to the warhead, attaching it to the rocket motor.

The solid-fuel rocket motor at the rear of the missile is designated the M116 which matches the pattern of US rocket motor designation (for instance, the HAWK SAM motor is the M112) but no known exact designation. (2) There are four small aerodynamic control surfaces, also in a cruciform pattern, mounted on the motor, which are connected to the guidance unit at the front of the missile via control lines running along the body.

Zoobin (M-ATF)

The guidance unit at the front of the missile contains a daylight TV seeker that bears a close resemblance to the seeker on the AGM-65A Maverick also used by the IRIAF.Besides the physical resemblance, the optical-seeker's connection to the AGM-65A is betrayed by it's 5-degree FOV which was enlarged on later AGM-65 models. (3) One difference found on the Zoobin however is that the section that houses the missile electronics is noticeably longer then on the AGM-65A though the exact implication for this is unknown at this point.

The choice of the AGM-65A seeker for a long-range, rocket-powered weapon like the Zoobin is a troubling choice because the seeker's sensitivity is such that it can only lock onto a target at around 5 km. (4) One way to get around this would be to use some sort of optical targeting pod to designate the target. It would also be presumptuous to assume that Iran hasn't modified the seeker to work at the longer ranges involved.

The operational status of this PGM is unknown. It is asserted by some that the missile entered service in the mid to late 1990s. (5) There is the possibility however that like many other IRIAF projects it was tested on several aircraft but then was abandoned. If it was deployed, it would be carried by the F-4

Specifications: AGM-679/20 (6)
Length: 3.18 m
Diameter: 40.6 cm
Wing Span: 1.23 m
Warhead Weight: 340 kg HE
Total Weight: 560 kg
Minimum Range: 20 km (7)

Qadr (GBU-67)
Belonging to the same generation as the Zoobin, the Qadr (Force) is an unpowered glide bomb. Like the Zoobin, it was developed during the Iran-Iraq war but was first seen publicly in 2002. (8) It likely traces it's lineage to the US's GBU-8 HOBOS which Iran imported in extremely small numbers in the waning days of the IIAF. (9)

Qadr (M-ATF)

Like the GBU-8, four strakes run the length of the Mk. 84 bomb broadening out near the rear of the bomb. The Qadr uses the same guidance payload as the Zoobin which is connected to the four control surfaces at the rear of the bomb via a conduit running alongside the outside of the missile. (see above for a detailed description of the seeker)

Qadr TV-Seeker (Source Unknown, possibly Jane's)

It can be carried by both the F-4E as well as the F-5E/F. (10) Like the Zoobin, the status of this project is unknown and it may or may not be deployed. It's possible that this project has been supplanted by the Qassed which is also a TV-guidance kit for the 2,000 lb Mk. 84.

Specifications: GBU-67/9A (11)
Length: 4.11 m
Diameter: 45.7 cm
Wing Span: 111.8 cm
Total Weight: 1,111 kg
Max Range: 20-60 km (12)
Guidance: TV

Qassed-1 (GBU-78)
The Qassed (Herald/Messenger)is one of the more recent developments in Iranian precision guided munitions; it was first mentioned in 2006 when then-DM Najjar discussed the development of a "2,000 lb smart bomb" that would be tested in the upcoming Blow of Zolfaqar wargames. (13) Apparently the testing went well because one year later the defense minister inaugurated the production line of the Qassed alongside production of additional small arms ammunition. (14) Because it is an optical-guidance kit for the Mk. 84 the Qassed may be the replacement for the Qadr/GBU-67. This isn't surprising given the Qassed's uncanny resemblance to the GBU-15(V)1B which itself was the successor to the GBU-8.

Qassed-1/GBU-78/A (Sejil.ir)

Qassed seeker (Fars News)

The Qassed is built around the Mk. 84 general-purpose bomb and features four large "long-chord" wings in a cruciform pattern connecting the Mk.84 to the control portion at the rear of the bomb which features aerodynamic control surfaces similar to the Qadr. Four strakes in the same configuration as the wings bridge the gap between the Mk.84 and the guidance section at the front of the bomb.


...and seeker picture

The guidance section appears to be the same as that found on the Qadr and Zoobin, that is, taken from the AGM-65A. While Iran may have made unknown modifications to it, the glass dome cover indicates that it still retains daylight-only capability rather then infrared which would require a dome cover made of exotic materials.

Compared with the Qadr and Zooban, we can say with a much greater degree of certainty that the Qassed is actually being produced and deployed. During the testing of the weapon we saw it being deployed from the F-4E which was able to carry two of the weapons, one on each inner wing pylon. While the F-4E might have a greater overall capacity then this, this configuration is likely to be the practical limit in any given scenario.

Qassed being deployed from an F-4E

Qassed-2
A development of the Qassed-1, the Qassed-2 was first referenced in Spring 2010 when Air Force commander Shahsafi announced plans to test the improved missile. While no concrete details were given, and no pictures have yet been seen, the missile was advertised as featuring " longer range, more accuracy and enjoys more explosive power than its previous version."(15) Unfortunately these types of claims are commonplace in just about every new weapons announcement from rifles to ballistic missiles so they should not be taken as providing any unique insight onto the weapons performance.

Qassed-3
The Qassed-3 represents the next major evolution of the Qassed platform; it was first seen during the Sacred Defence Week 2010 parade and then later referenced by the Deputy Commander of the IRIAF, General Aziz Nasirzadeh when he described it as being in the testing phase as of February 2011. (16) It is very similar to the US's AGM-130 which itself was a development of the GBU-15.

Qassed 3 (M-ATF)

The most important change from the original Qassed is the addition of a strap-on solid rocket booster to extend the range of the system. This feature is of course what differentiates the AGM-130 from the GBU-15. Unfortunately, the exact designation of the Qassed-3 remains unknown.

The next most significant change is that it may not be built around the Mk.84 warhead like the Qassed-1. While the difference is minor, the shaping of the bomb may indicate that at least one version of the Qassed-3 may use a penetrator rather then a general purpose bomb in the same way the AGM-130A uses the Mk.84 and the AGM-130C uses the BLU-109. This is visible in the slightly narrower body of the Qassed-3 and the way the slightly-oval warhead tapers into parallel lines before the point where it happens on the Qassed-1. However, at this stage, the evidence is still far from definitive and further research must be done.

The seeker at the front of the warhead appears to be the same as on the other versions - a daylight TV camera derived from the AGM-65A. Unlike the others however which we can say may have been modified or supplemented in some way it would be impossible for this missile to function without some form of supplementary guidance. It's extreme range (for comparison, the AGM-130 has a range of around 65 km) means that some type of inertial navigation system would have to be used before the TV seeker could be engaged. A data-link would also enable the WSO to fly the missile before selecting a final target with the TV seeker. (17)

Assuming the missile was still being tested as of early 2011, it will still be some time before this weapon is fielded with Iran's fleet of F-4s.

Sattar-1
The Sattar-1 (Star) is the first in Iran's family of indigenously developed laser-guided bombs and missiles. Oddly enough, it was not developed from the first laser-guided weapons that Iran ever received, the GBU-10. Instead it traces its history to the French AS-30L which Iran would have received in the several plane-loads full of spares and weapons that fled Iraq to escape the onslaught of US airpower in 1991.It is seen very rarely with the designation "Asre-67".

Sattar-1 (M-ATF)

Physically the missile is vaguely reminiscent of the AGM-65 crossed with the AIM-54. At the front of the missile is a semi-active laser homing (SALH) seeker derived from the AS-30L. (18) Behind the missile guidance section are four large cropped-delta wings also reminiscent of the AS-30L. Finally, at the tail-end of the missile is the solid-fuel rocket engine and four control surfaces mounted in the same cruciform pattern as the wings.

The model most often displayed to the public does not appear to be the final version of the missile. The Sattar-1C has a slightly different appearance though it's unclear in exactly what way the missile has been changed. (19)

Sattar-"1C" (Source Unknown)

The missile was reported to have entered production in 1999 and can be carried by both the F-4 and F-5. (20)

Specifications: Sattar-1 (21)
Length: 2.5 m
Diameter: 30 cm
Weight: 210 kg
Warhead: 55 kg HE
Range: 20 km

Sattar-2
Possible design prototype for the Sattar-3. Only external difference between it and the Sattar-3 is a slightly shorter rocket engine.

Sattar-2 (Source Unknown)

Sattar-3
The most frequently seen of the entire Sattar family, this missile is often seen on parades and static display. It is occasionally labelled with the designation "Asre-67". It is unclear the significance of this; one explanation would be that one is Iran's conventional designation and that the other is for development or external sale. Or then again, perhaps it's only to meant to confuse.

Asre-67, aka Sattar-3 (Sejil.ir)

Unlike the Sattar-1, the wings on the Sattar-3 have been shortened considerably and moved to the rear of the missile, though the still retain the cropped-delta configuration. The control surfaces have been shifted from the rear to the front of the missile. The missiles rocket engine, meanwhile, has been lengthened.

The SALH seeker now features a gimbaled head that closely resembles the Paveway-2 family and the KAB-1500L, and may even be influenced by them. (22) The missile is most commonly displayed alongside the "TLS-99" laser-targeting pod which is thought to be derived from the French ATLIS-II, which makes logical sense if Iran recieved them alongside the AS-30L. (23) It is rumored that the missile has also been tested with an optical seeker. While no confirmation can be given of this it's not all that unusual to make a single missile with multiple types of seekers (the KAB-1500 is one example of this). (24) Judging from other bombs in the class, the CEP of the Sattar-3 would probably be under 10 m.

TLS-99 laser designator (M-ATF)

The operational status of this missile is unknown.

Specifications: Sattar-3
Weight: "500 lb" (25)
Range: 30 km (26)

Sattar-??
First displayed during Sacred Defense Week 2010, this mystery Sattar resembles the KAB-250L as well as, to a lesser degree, the GBU-12.

Latest version of the Sattar (Far right) (M-ATF)

Unlike the earlier Sattar series, this model appears to be a bomb-kit for the Mk.82 similar to the Paveway bombs rather then the purpose-made Soviet/Russian LGBs. The guidance section at the front of the bomb/missile is substantially narrower then that found on either the Sattar-1 or Sattar-3. Four trapazoidal fins are mounted on what is possibly a rocket motor (an assumption stemming from the fact that all earlier Sattars are missiles rather then glide bombs).

Kite
The "Kite" is a stand-off sub-munitions dispenser similar in function to the German BK-90.

Both versions of the Kite (M-ATF)

There are two known versions of the dispenser, one with 172 bomblets, and one with 184. Both fire combined AP/AT munitions.

Stand-off capability is provided by four glide wings and a rocket engine. Rather then using a terminal seeker like the other PGMs, the Kite relies on GPS-INS to bring it over it's target. (27)

The Kite can be carried by both the F-4 and the F-5 (28)

Kites mounted on an F-4

Specifications: Kite (29)
Range: 15 km

End Notes and Works Cited:
(1) Jane's Information Group. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Air-Launched-Weapons/Zoobin-AGM-379-20-and-Yasser-Iran.html
(2) History of the Missiles of Iran - 4. Saff Magazine. No. 357. p.46
(3) ibd Saff Magazine. Readers fluent in Persian are encouraged to review this passage as my understanding of Persian is rudimentary at best and Google Translate leaves much to be desired, thus the comparison to the A-model may or may not be misplaced.
(4) F-16 Net. http://www.f-16.net/f-16_armament_article4.html (Note: readers are encouraged to visit this site for a description of how the launch process works for the AGM-65 which would also describe the process for a weapon like the Zoobin)
(5) Iranian PGMs. ACIG Forum. September 17th 2007.
(6) ibd Saff Magazine
(7) Although it is listed as the "minimum range", it's most likely that this refers to the maximum range.
(8) Jane's Information Group. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Air-Launched-Weapons/Qadr-Iran.html
(9) Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop. Schiffer Military History. 2000. P. 29
(10) ibd Saff Magazine
(11) ibd Saff Magazine
(12) The reported range of 20-60 km is rather unusual since it is an un-powered glide bomb. While an extremely high altitude release could extend the range, 60 km is still rather exceptional given that the GBU-15 (roughly in the same class as the GBU-67) has a range of 15 km when deployed from high altitude.
(13) Iran Builds 2,000-pound Guided Bomb: Minister. Mehr News. September 6th 2006. http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=377194
(14) Fars News Photo Gallery. http://www.farsnews.com/imgrep.php?nn=8606040499
(15) Iran Says New Guided Bomb Ready for Test. PressTV. March 1st 2010. http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/119775.html
(16) Iran's Air Force Upgrades Home-Made Smart Bomb. Fars News. February 3rd 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8911140588
(17) Boeing (Rockwell) AGM-130. Designation Systems. 2004. http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-130.html (Note: readers are encouraged to visit this site for a description of how the launch process works for the AGM-130 which sheds some light on the various ways the Qassed-3 may differ from it's predecessors)
(18) ibd Saff Magazine
(19) ibd ACIG Forums
(20) ibd Saff Magazine
(21) ibd Saff Magazine
(22) ibd Saff Magazine
(23) ibd ACIG Forums
(24) ibd Saff Magazine
(25) Placards on parade label the Sattar-3 as a 500-lb class bomb. Of course, like all 250, 500, 1000 and 2,000 lb bombs, these designations are approximate and their weight can vary by the low tens-of-kg.
(26) ibd Saff Magazine
(27) ibd Saff Magazine

News - North Korea's New SAM

2011-06-14T17:50:00.000-07:00

- South Korea announced that their Northern counterparts recently tested the new "KN-06" SAM which is related to the S-300. The missiles are reported to have a range of 150 km and are launched vertically from clusters of two or three.

The obvious question for this blog, given Iran's close relationship with North Korea in the past, is whether or not the KN-06 is related to Iran's continuing work in producing their own domestic S-300 variant. Obviously only time will tell, but it's something that both Iran and North Korea watchers should keep their eyes open to.

Source: The Chosunilbo

News - Iranian Navy Deploys Submarines in High Seas - FNA

2011-06-07T11:57:00.000-07:00

Iranian Navy Deploys Submarines in High Seas

TEHRAN (FNA)- Informed sources said that the Iranian Navy has deployed its submarines in far seas as part of its plan for widening its naval presence in the high seas and oceans.

An informed source told FNA on Tuesday that the submarines were deployed in international waters together with the dispatch of 14th fleet of warships sent by Iran to the high seas.

The move comes after high-ranking Navy commanders announced preparedness to send submarines to long-term missions.

Article Continues at FN

Iran has been sending naval missions to the Gulf of Aden for quite some time (as the article mentions, they're up to their 14th journey). Up until now however they've usually been restricted to consisting of a warship like the Alvand-class frigates, and a resupply ship like the Kharq. The IRGCN also have an unknown presence conducting anti-piracy operations as well.

There have even been reports of Iranian submarines in the Red Sea / Gulf of Aden before; various newspapers and political groups accused Iran of establishing a military base near the city of Assab in 2008/2009. I even wrote about it in the piece "Iran's Military Relationship with Eritrea" where I concluded that this news story was probably fabricated due to the sources for the claims. However there still remained some tantalizing hints that indicated that it might not be entirely false. The most prominent of which is Google Earth imagery which shows the construction of a large pier (larger then anything in the Eritrean navy) north of the city of Assab (13.218256, 42.527420) in 2007 and it has been speculated that this is the Iranian naval base talked about in the reports.

Regardless of whether or not this base exists, this news report seems to have some credibility because it comes not from an opposition source who have a vested interest in threat-construction but from the "semi-official" (read: official) Fars News Agency. Assuming this is true the most likely canidate is one of the Kilo class submarines Iran purchased from Russia during the 1990s. Since the Persian Gulf is so shallow, large submarines like the Kilo are unusually handicapped so getting them into deeper waters would actually make much better use of their abilities. Though by comparison, these Kilos are not state-of-the-art when compared to Western navies submarines. Iran has a total of three Kilos, one of them is in drydock while two appear to be sea-worthy though one would likely be retained in port for a contingency (if the relative size of previous fleets are anything to go by). Iran's other submarines like the Ghadir are all too short ranged to either get to the Gulf of Aden under their own power, or once they're there, have much of an effect.

The stated goal, according to FNA's source is "Identifying combat vessels of the different world countries, collecting information about sea beds in international waters are among the main tasks of these submarines". This somewhat surprising since it explicitly acknowledges that the goal of this operation isn't anti-piracy work, but directly spying on other nations. This is a common practice across the world but it's odd to see it admitted in such honest terms. The secondary goal of collecting information about sea geography may be perfectly innocent or it may serve a military purpose if Iran did intend to operate in this theatre in the event of a conflict.

Operating in the Gulf of Aden would give Iran a chance to shadow US/NATO/Other warships, gaining insights into how the ships behave when in a warzone (even a low intensity one like Somalia piracy). It also gives Iran a chance to further project their power beyond their immediate region and submarines can play a crucial role in maintaining far-off projection capability.

Shahed 285

2011-06-02T01:52:00.000-07:00

Shahed 285 (AH-85)

The Shahed-285 is a light-attack/observation helicopter designed by the Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC), a subset of the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (http://thearkenstone.blogspot.com/HESA), in cooperation with the Revolutionary Guards.

AH-85A (Mashregh News)

Role:
The Shahed 285 has obviously been designed as a "budget" helicopter, almost everything about it is cheap and easy to produce; this necessarily has it's trade-offs and isn't inherently a good or a bad approach. According to reports by Mashregh News, the AH-85 is tasked with scouting out enemy locations and because of their light armor and high speed, attack targets of opportunity. (1) The underlying implication here is that it's not meant to replace the AH-1, it's meant to supplement them in the same way OH-58s supplement AH-64s in the US Army.

Development:

Zafar-300 at the Tehran Aviation Museum (Vahid Moghadem)

The Shahed 285 is part of the continuing evolution of the AB-206 platform and belongs to the same family as the Shahed 278 and 274. The conceptual predecessor to the AH-85 is the Zafar-300 helicopter which first emerged in 1986/1987 and was involved in testing up through 1990. Also based on the AB-206, the Zafar featured tandem seating, a slimmed down profile, and aluminum and fiberglass construction. (2) However development apparently stopped soon afterwords and the Zafar-300 prototype has resided in the Tehran Aviation Museum in a state of disrepair ever since.

Meanwhile during the late 1990s and early 2000s Iran's own reverse-engineered AB-206, the Shahed 278, was maturing and by the early 2000s a handful has been produced. It's clear that sometime during this process that the thought turned toward arming it because Jane's reported that in 2005 Iran had tested the "OH-78". Unfortunately at this point it gets somewhat confusing. Jane's reports that the helicopter in question is a light recon helicopter converted from the second protype Shahed 278. It is powered by the Allison 250-C20 and is armed with a chin-mounted 7.62 mm machine-gun and 70 mm rockets. Most notably of all perhaps though is that Iran claimed they were using thermal optronics from the French company "Saqem" which provides the imaging capability for the Eurocopter Tiger. Moreoever, they claimed to be producing them in Iran! (3)

Jane's also reported that Iran was also developing another helicopter, the Shahed 478 which would feature four slightly longer rotor blades and a more powerful 250-C30R engine procured legally through Canada. This meant that it would now have a gros weight of 2,040 kg and be able to carry 1,000 kg worth of weaponry. Jane's also reported a drawing of the new helicopter which the author describes as showing C-704/Nasr missiles. (4)

Both of these projects sound very similar to the Shahed 285 concept and there are several explanations that might explain this similarity:

Supposed OH-78

1) Jane's got it a little confused - The article includes a picture of the supposed OH-78 which shows it as a Shahed 278 with wing stubs and rocket pods. This makes sense given the assertion that the OH-78 was developed from a pre-existing 278 airframe. However given that the helicopter in the image is lacking either a machine-gun or optical payload it may simply be a stock photo of a Shahed 278 that the Jane's reporter assumed was the helicopter in question.

2) The Shahed 285 was the culmination of the OH-78 and 478 - In the same way the final version of the Shahed 278 was preceded by a couple different Bell 206 reverse-engineering attempts, it's entirely possible that the AH-85 simply represents the final design path chosen by the engineers for reasons that we can only guess at.

3) The Shahed 285 was a forced compromise - Both the OH-78 and Shahed 478 are remarkable in that they both rely on foreign components for critical systems; the OH-78 uses French optics and the 478 uses Canadian engines. It's possible that the relations established pre-2006 broke down and forced Iran to design a helicopter with more modest capabilities that represented a compromise between the lightly armed OH-78 and the more advanced 478. It may also be because the 478 cost too much and the AH-58 represents the budget choice for the IRGC.

The Shahed 285 is notable in that is inferior to the 478 (two versus four rotor blades and without the uprated engine) which indicates a combination of all three might be the most likely possibility. The 285 may very well represent a progression of the OH-78 that evolved in light of the inability or unwillingness to produce the more powerful 478. Thus the final helicopter, while still carrying the 250-C20 engine, has been slimmed down and optimized for the light attack role.

Finally, in May 2009, two Shahed 285s were unveiled to the public in a ceremony featuring Shahed 278s as well. Then in November 2010 the same two helicopters, albeit in an updated configuration, were shown during the Kish Island trade and air show.

Design:
While it might have originated as a Bell 206, the final AH-85 bears a number of important differences. Most noticeably, the entire fuselage has been given the profile of a traditional attack helicopter by removing the small passenger compartment and position for a second crewman and replacing it with fuel tanks and a small storage area which is contained within a very narrow, vertical-sided body. It is supposedly significantly taller then the Shahed 278 but this cannot be visually verified.

Side-by-side comparison of Shahed 278 and 285 (adapted from Mashregh News)

The removal of the second crewman is a risky move however. It allows savings on cost, weight and size, but also radically reduces situation awareness and ability to reliably engage targets and fly demanding maneuvers (by forcing the operator to act as both pilot and WSO).

The pilot sits recessed in the fuselage unlike the bubble canopy of the Bell 206 which logically translates into reduced viability. The cockpit uses the basic instrumentation configuration from the Shahed 278 though additional controls can be found running along the left and right hand side of the cockpit.

Located directly above the cockpit is a mounting spot for optronic devices like the French FLIR mentioned in conjunction with the OH-78. Low-quality images have confirmed the presence of a device but cannot indicate whether it is the elusive French optics or an indigenous equivalent, perhaps one of IEI's EOG systems. (5)

On top of the fuselage are the distinctive engine air intakes as well as the exhaust outlets which betray the identity Allison 250-C20/C20B engine.

The tailboom section is straight from the Shahed 278 which places the h-stab at the top of the v-stab which forms a "T" shape rather then being located on the tail boom like on the 206.

On the side of the fuselage, about where the passenger doors would be on the 206/278, are two weapons pylons with hard-points for various weapons.

The body is built of of "non-metallic composite components" which indicates materials like fiberglass, kevlar or other bullet-resistant fabrics, and even some of the lightweight ceramics though latter are exceptionally expensive. (6)

This fact, combined with the flat panels and apparent lack of 90-degree angles have led some to claim that the helicopter is stealthy. While it is true that these types of materials don't reflect radar waves as effectively as metal surfaces, the helicopter still has a number of "stealth-killing" features like exposed rotor blades. landing skids, weapons pylons and V/H-stabs.

Performance:
The Shahed 285 prototypes are powered by the Allison 250-C20 engine while the production models are scheduled to be fitted with the more powerful 250-C20B which can be identified by the air splitter on the intakes for the engine which cannot be seen on the prototypes. Iran has been caught before attempting to import 250-C20-variant engines before so it's unknown what the current level of capacity is for indigenous production of the engine components. (7)

Air-splitter an an AB-206B (right) versus an AH-85A (left)

This drives a main rotor assembly taken from the Shahed 285 as well as a tail rotor.

With regards to performance, the helicopter falls in the middle of the road with most of it's specifications like service ceiling and cruising speed resembling the Bell 206 It does have an above average range though, thanks in part to the one-man crew which allows it to carry additional fuel.

Importing the drive system directly from the Shahed 278 rather then going with the more powerful one planned for the Shahed 478 (or something comparable) was easy enough and has real short and long term cost cutting benefits, but it also means reduced potential performance and an increased radar signature.

Armament:
As a light attack helicopter, the Shahed 285 carries a modest armament for self-defense and targets of opportunity. There are several different configurations which generally correspond to the helicopters sub-variant.

AH-85 - note the exposed gun and EO payload (Mohammed Hussain)

The light AH-85A carries a 7.62 mm PKMT machine-gun in a chin mount at the front of the helicopter. According to some sources, this can traverse and elevate but there is no evidence for this, particularly in the models shown at the Kish air show. (8) This makes intuitive sense since successfully aiming and operating a turret-mounted gun while simultaneously piloting a helicopter at low altitude (it is only a PKMT after all) would be extremely difficult. The effectiveness of this machine-gun has been called into question given its small caliber and relatively low rate-of-fire. Twin pylons on either side carry a single LAU-68 rocket launcher each which can fire a total of 14 unguided rockets.

The SUU-11 gun pod is another candidate judging from their use on other IRIN/IRIAA helicopters but have not been actually seen.

The heavy AH-85B has not been seen yet so we can only guess at what a heavier version of the AH-85A might be armed with; possibilities include some kind of ATGM, or heavier gun-pods.

AH-85C with Kowsar (YT)

The naval attack AH-85C is equipped with a basic surface search radar in it's chin in place of a light machine-gun; this is displayed on a multi-function LCD in the cockpit When the helicopter was first unveiled in 2009, two Kowsars were carried, one on each pylon. By virtue of the independent MMW seeker on the missiles themselves, this allows the AH-85 to carry a relatively rudimentary radar that doesn't have to have the complexity and expense of a radar that must scan for and illuminate targets itself. Mashregh news estimates the range of the radar to be in the 30-40 km range. (9) Which is a safe bet, if on the low side of the scale.

AH-85C with Sadid-1 (Kambiz Noori)

During the 2010 Kish airshow the AH-85C was displayed with the previously unknown "Sadid-1" missile. Very little is known about it, for instance, it's not clear whether the Sadid is a an actually an AShM, ATGM, or a hybrid. It is reported to be laser guided and have a range of 10 km. (8) If it is indeed laser guided, this leaves two possibilities for guidance. The first is laser beam riding where the missile uses a sensor at the rear of the missile to align itself with a laser pointed by the launch platform and "ride" the laser to the target. Missiles that use this type of guidance tend to be SACLOS and include many of the late generation Russian ATGMs like the AT-14. The second type is semi-active laser homing (SALH) where a seeker on the missile homes in on laser radiation emitted when the target is illuminated with a laser. Missiles in this category include the US's AGM-114 and the South African Mokopa. Unlike beam-riders however, laser homing designs have the ability to lock onto a target after launch (though not all of them have this ability) which would go toward alleviating the work load of the pilot/gunner. The fact that there is no visible seeker in the nose of the missile indicates a beam-rider (or perhaps some other form of guidance including MMW radar) though it is possible that the training round (evident by the blue stripe) is merely a mockup and doesn't include the seeker which is unlikely.

The missile itself is fired from a canister which is about 1.5 m long and 15 cm in diameter. Though it must be emphasized that these are just numbers obtained from "eyeballing" it. This puts it on the relatively small end of things for a missile with a 10 km range. It's probable that this rather exceptional range is due to an aerial launch or is an exaggeration. If it were true however it would probably mean that the warhead would be relatively light.

The stencils "AIRC" indicate that it may have exclusively designed for the use as an airborne weapon system rather then generic ATGM.

Variants:
At the time of this writing, two different airframes are known to exist, one AH-85A and another AH-85C; a total of six are reported to exist with the final four undergoing flight trials as of late-2010. (10)

AH-85A - Light overland version. It is intended for low-intensity policing conflicts or border patrol. Armed with a 7.62 mm machine-gun in the nose and two 70-mm rocket pods on hard-points.

AH-85B - Heavy overland version. Although it has yet to be seen, this model is said to be intended for "non-symmetrical wars". (11) Nothing further is known.

AH-85C -Naval attack version. Equipped with a basic surface-search radar in it's nose instead of a machine-gun. Also equipped with a slightly different cockpit configuration then the AH-85A. Armament includes either two Kowsar AShMs or eight Sadid-1 missiles.

Specifications:

AH-85
Crew: 1
Length: 11.84 m
Width: 2.78 m
Height: 3.42 m
Rotor Diameter: 10.16 m
Tail Rotor Diameter: 1.57 m
Empty Weight: 820 kg
Max Take-Off Weight: 1,450 kg
Service Ceiling: 4,160 m
Max Rate of Climb: 7.6 m/s
Cruising Speed: 225 km/s
Endurance: 5 hours
Range: 800-890 km

Works Cited:
(1) ibd Mashregh News, 2011
(2) Zafar 300. Jane's Intelligence. http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-All-the-Worlds-Aircraft/ZAFAR-300-Iran.html

(3) Iran Plans Armed Helicopters. Jane's Defence Weekly. Robert Hewson. December 20th 2006.
(4) ibd Hewson, 2006
(5) For example: http://www.ieimil.ir/content/electro-optical-gyro-stablized-surveillance-system-eog
(6) ibd Mashregh News, 2011
(7) Firm Accused of Illegal Aircraft Exports to Iran. The Washington Post. March 25th 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032403238.html

(8) شاهد285 شمشیر بُرنده سپاه+عکس. Mashregh News. Winter/Spring 2011. http://mashreghnews.ir/NSite/FullStory/?Id=36364
(9) ibd Mashregh News, 2011
(10) Shahed 285. Iran Military Forum. Post #154. November 20th 2010. http://www.iranmilitaryforum.net/index.php?topic=734.msg56377#msg56377
(11) newest variant of iranian made Shahed 285 light attack helicopter. Iran Defense Forum. Post: #11. November 11th 2010. http://www.irandefence.net/showpost.php?p=924223&postcount=11

Preview: Shahed 285 Update

2011-05-30T13:27:00.000-07:00

Here's a little graphical representation I drew up in Google Sketchup to illustrate the instrument panel configuration on two variants of the Shahed 285.

News - Iran Equips IRGC with Large Numbers of 'Qiyam 1' Ballistic Missiles - FNA

2011-05-23T16:15:00.000-07:00

Iran Equips IRGC with Large Numbers of 'Qiyam 1' Ballistic Missiles

TEHRAN (FNA)- The Iranian Defense Ministry started supplying large numbers of 'Qiyam (Rise) 1' high-precision ballistic missiles to the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) on Sunday.

The new missiles were supplied to the IRGC in a ceremony attended by Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

Article Continued at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9003016225

Photo Gallery at: http://english.farsnews.com/imgrep.php?nn=83010005

Brand new Qiams in 2011 (FNA)

More commonly spelled "Qiam-1", this ballistic missile was only recently unveiled during a test-firing in August 2010. During the delivery ceremony at least 10 missiles were visible in their storage configurations. This would seem to indicate that the current production rate is one per month which may or may not be the maximum potential capability.

The missile itself is reminiscent of Iran's other designs which are derivatives of the SCUD-family, specifically the Shahab-2/SCUD-C. The major difference was of course the "triconic" warhead and the removal of the four stabilizing fins at the rear of the missile. The implication to the latter is that the control mechanism/guidance is much more accurate which would have to account for the increased instability.

However the biggest debate so far over the missile has been about it's dimensions. While it is externally identical in most regards to the Shahab-2, some observers including the author have brought up the possibility that the missile is smaller then the Shahab-2/SCUD-C. My own calculations indicate a diameter of .7 m and a height of 8.63 m versus a diameter of .88 m and a height of 11.25 m for the SCUD-C. Both numbers correspond to 76-79% of the original SCUD-C dimensions.

However there are a number of "unknowns" in this equation such as the height of the people being used as reference points, the distortion caused by looking up at the top of the missile, and the distortion caused by measuring objects that are in different axis. These all add layers of inaccuracy on the calculations above.

The image most often used to measure the Qiam (FNA)

Moreover, there's also a number of "logical" concerns about scaling down the missile, the chief among them being "why"? Scaling a Shahab-2 down 20% offers no readily apparent advantage over a design that's already proven and has established tooling and production lines.

At this point, it is the opinion of this blog's author that the Qiam may or may not be somewhat smaller then the Shahab-2 and that we, while we should keep our minds open to the possibility, cannot say with undeniable conviction that there is a dimensional difference.

For detailed discussions on the dimensions and other characteristics of the missile, readers are invited to visit the following sites:

Arms Control Wonk - Iran's Qiam Missile Comments (2010)

Iran Military Forum - Qiam-1 Missile Tested Successfully (2010)

Iran Military Forum - Qiam-1 Missile is now Being Delivered to IRGC (2011)

News - Iran Starts Mass-Production of Powerful Anti-Armor Munitions - FNA

2011-05-22T13:09:00.000-07:00

While I previously attempted a news section about this time last year it petered out after a month or so. Hopefully this new section will be more permanent and establish some semblance of a regular posting schedule for this site.

----------

Iran Starts Mass-Production of Powerful Anti-Armor Munitions

TEHRAN (FNA)- Iran on Saturday started mass-production of anti-armor ammunition in an official ceremony attended by the country's Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi.

Addressing the inaugural ceremony of the mass production of 125mm and 105mm shells for Saqeb Anti-Armor System here in Tehran today, Vahidi stated that production of the new ammunition is aimed at bolstering the Armed Forces' capability in ground battles and creating a wide range of anti-armor ammunitions.

Article Continued at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9002310572

Photo Gallery at: http://www.irna.ir/Display.aspx?NID=030395338

The "Saqeb anti-armor system" are gun-launched armor-piercing-fin-stabilized-discarding-sabot (APFSDS) tank shells that rely on kinetic rather then explosive/chemical energy to penetrate the target. They have replaced HEAT as the preferred anti-tank round in most nations inventory.

There are two different types of APFSDSs that can be seen during the factory innaguration. The first of these is the 125 mm BM-22 which can be identified by its ring-type sabot and five large bore-riding fins at the rear of the penetrator.This was the easiest to identify as there was a cutaway poster clearly displaying the round and it's name. The BM-22 was the predominant round in the Soviet Army during the 70s and 80s and was the best APFSDS round Iraq had access to when they fought the US in 1991 and 2003; though by this time it was far too weak to penetrate the frontal armor of Western tanks. It's fins produce high drag and it's sabot style is generally thought to be inferior to more modern designs. (1)

The second type of round is the 125 mm BM-42 which can be identified by it's black color, funnel sabot and overall greater length though it still retains the high-drag fins of earlier designs.

No 105 mm APFSDS rounds were displayed.

(1) Information about Soviet/Russian APFSDSs from: http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/

Small Arms - Pistols and Submachine guns

2011-05-20T18:47:00.000-07:00

Small Arms - Pistols and Submachine guns

***The Following is an Excerpt from "Iranian Military Capability 2011"***

PC-9

PC-9 (Diomil)

Iran's main service pistol, the PC-9 is a copy of the Sig Sauer P226. The gun competed with and eventually lost out to Beretta to provide the US's main service pistol. It has a reputation for accuracy, reliability and ease of use. The pistol is in service with the IRIP and all military branches.

Besides the PC-9, a small number of other handguns are in service with special units. For instance, bodyguards for high-level officials often use revolvers.

Specifications: PC-9
Cartridge: 9x19 mm
Length: 196 mm
Weight: 845 g
Muzzle Velocity: 335 m/s
Effective Range: 50 m
Magazine: 15 round

MPT-9

MPT-9 or MP-5A3, note the checkered handguard (Jamejam)

The MP-5 is one of the most well known submachine guns in the world and serves within the Iranian military in the IRIA, IRIN, IRGCGF and the IRIP.

The MP-5 is essentially a scaled-down G3 battle rifle. Iran produces the MP-5 domestically under the name MPT-9. The basic model features a collapsible stock, while the MPT-9S has a fixed stock. Iran also produces the MPT-9K, the compact SMG variety complete with a folding stock.

The MP-5 and variants in use by IRIP forces are used mostly in cities and CT units as border patrol units mostly carry AK-47's. It is also in service with IRIA units such as the 65th airborne brigade, certain naval marine units, and rare IRGC units.

Specifications: MPT-9
Cartridge: 9x19 mm
Length: MPT-9: 570 mm (500 mm closed), MPT-9S: 690 mm, MPT-9K (325 mm)
Weight: MPT-9: 3.08 kg, MPT-9S: 2.54 kg, MPT-9K: 2.2 kg
Muzzle Velocity: MPT-9/9S: 400 m/s, MPT-9K: 375 m/s
Effective Range: MPT-9/9S: 100 m, MPT-9K: 25 m
Magazine: 30 round

Uzi

IRIN Marine commando with Uzi (Fars News)

An Israeli submachine-gun, it has largely been replaced by the MPT-9, but still is used by select units such within the 65th airborne and some naval marines. One unique feature on pre-revolution Iranian Uzi's is a lion and crown imprinted on the rear of the gun as well as a stamped "IMI" and Persian lettering above the grip.

Specifications: Uzi
Cartridge: 9x19 mm
Length: 640 mm (470 mm closed)
Weight: 3.5 kg
Muzzle Velocity: 390 m/s
Effective Range: 100 m
Magazine: 20-50 round

PM-12

PM-12S (Fars News)

An Italian submachinegun manufactured by Beretta, the PM-12 is used by police forces throughout Europe. In Iranian service, the PM-12S is used by IRGC security forces, police, and some special forces.

Specifications: PM-12S
Cartridge: 9x19 mm
Length: 660 mm (418 mm closed)
Weight: 3.2 kg
Effective Range:150-200 m
Magazine: 20--32-40 round

Tondar-69 Tactical Ballistic Missile

2011-05-20T18:27:00.000-07:00

Tondar-69 Tactical Ballistic Missile

***The Following is a Modified Excerpt from "Iranian Military Capability 2011"***

Tondar-69, 2009 (Mehr News)

The Tondar-69 is a conversion of the HQ-2 SAM to a guided surface-to-surface missile like the Fateh-110. The missile is likely a domestic production of the Chinese CSS-8 which is an HQ-2 adapted for the same role.

The system is mounted on a static launcher like the HY-2, though can probably be easily towed and a self-propelled platform like a 6x6 truck is not out of the question given the mounting of missiles like the Fateh-110. Some sources indicate that the liquid-fueled 2nd stage has been replaced with solid fuel, but this is unconfirmed.

Some sources list the CEP as ranging from 50 m – 150 m, while this is possible, there is no conclusive evidence. Moreover, such a small CEP is significantly better then that found on the Fateh-110 which should be assumed to use a comparable system because they’re roughly of the same generation and if the Tondar-69 carried a much more effective INS, it would logically find it’s way into the Fateh-110.

Specifications: Tondar-69/CSS-8
Configuration: 2-stage, solid and/or liquid fuel
Weight: 2,650 kg
Length: 10.8 m
Diameter: .65 m
Max Range: 150 km
Min Range: 50 km
Warhead: 190 or 250 kg
Guidance: INS

Fateh-110 Tactical Ballistic Missile

2011-05-20T18:23:00.000-07:00

Fateh-110 Tactical Ballistic Missile

***The Following is a Modified Excerpt from "Iranian Military Capability 2011"***

IRGC Fateh-110 on HQ-2 style TEL (Fars News)

The Fateh-110 is a refined TBM, being a guided missile rather then a rocket like the Zelzal or Nazeat. The system emerged in May 2001 with full-scale production beginning at the earliest in late-2002 or 2003. There are three versions, the -110, and the -110A, and a yet unnamed third generation that was unveiled in August 2010. The program is likely directly connected with the Zelzal program as the basic dimensions between the two are nearly the same.

Some have asserted that it is a copy of the Chinese DF-11, but the dimensions of the two missiles make this unlikely. While the two share battlefield roles and it is plausible that the China used their experience with the DF-11 to lend assistance to Iran, there exists no concrete connection between the two projects that is apparent.

The Fateh-110(A) is mounted on a 6x6 truck similar to the Zelzal and Nazeat, though the TEL mechanism more closely resembles the SA-2 or Tondar-69 TBM (see below). Recently the missile was shown mounted on the exact same TEL as that associated with the Zelzal (1st picture under the Zelzal entry)

Guidance and control unit of the 3rd-gen Fateh-110 (Borna News)

The missile is externally very similar to the Zelzal, both are single-stage solid-fueled designs of the same size. Though there are several differences. First is the warhead, unlike the symmetrical warheads on the Zelzal or Nazeat, the Fateh-110(A)'s nose narrows sharply at the top. The next major difference is the configuration of the fins. The Fateh-110(A) features a set of four movable control surfaces mounted on the guidance unit just below the warhead, in addition to this there are four non-moving stabilizing fins at the rear of the missile with another set of four smaller static fins located just fore of the rear set.

The difference between the -110 and the 110A is unknown, though if the pattern of other TBM's is any indication, it relates to the size of the warhead and the corresponding range of the missile.

Gimballed gyro of 3rd-gen Fateh-110 (IRINN)

The third generation is also externally identical to the -110 though, according to DM Vahidi, it features improved accuracy and the ability to perform evasive maneuvers against ABM systems. This announcement was accompanied by a video of the impact from testing, a rarity among Iranian missile announcements; this lends at least some credence to the claim of improved accuracy. However this is by no means definitive. Video evidence suggests the missile uses a gimbaled gyro, most likely mechanical, for the INS guidance. The third generation is in production, with the first batch being delivered to the IRGC in time to coincide with Sacred Defense Week 2010. Later, during the same week, Fars News announced that the missile had a range of 300 km.

Some sources have claimed a combination of inertial and GPS guidance, however this is unconfirmed. Other sources have claimed EO terminal guidance, but this is not supported by the missiles appearance. Its poor CEP is attributable to its small control surfaces; instead of having regular jet vanes at the rear of the missile. The warhead may separate from the missile body in the terminal phase.

Specifications: Fateh-110
Configuration: Single-stage, solid fuel
Weight: 3,620 kg
Length: 8.76 m
Diameter: 616 mm
Max. Range: 250 km
Min. Range: 150 km
Warhead: 450 kg
CEP: <750 m*
Guidance: INS+??

* = at maximum range

Nazeat Tactical Ballistic Missile

2011-05-20T18:16:00.000-07:00

Nazeat Tactical Ballistic Missile

***The Following is a Modified Excerpt from "Iranian Military Capability 2011"***

The Nazeat family of rockets was an attempt by Iran to develop a FROG-7 equivalent during the 1980's with considerable help from China. They are sometimes called “Mushak”, which simply means missile.

The Nazeat system can be mounted on several platforms, including the 6x6 Mercedes-Benz trucks that also carry the Fajr-series rockets such as the 2631 series.

The rocket itself comes in two variants, the Nazeat-6H and the Nazeat-10H. Both are single-stage, solid-fueled and carry HE warheads, though can be equipped with a variety of warheads including sub-munitions or even CBRN payloads. They are unguided and fin-stabilized by four rear fins.

Non-standard Nazeat-6H TEL (SMM)

Specifications: Nazeat-6H
Configuration: Single stage, solid fuel
Weight: 960 kg
Length: 6.29 m
Diameter: 356 mm
Max. Range: 100 km
Min. Range: 80 km
Warhead: 130 kg
CEP: <500m*

Nazeat-10H (M-ATF)

Specifications: Nazeat-10H
Configuration: Single-state, solid fuel
Weight: 1,830 kg
Length: 8.02 m
Diameter: 455 mm
Max. Range: 130 km
Min. Range: 110 km
Warhead: 230 kg
CEP: <650 m*

* = at maximum range

Fajr Rocket (MLRS) Artillery

2011-05-20T18:07:00.000-07:00

Fajr Rocket (MLRS) Artillery

***The Following is a Modified Excerpt from "Iranian Military Capability 2011"***

Fajr-3
The Fajr-3 is a 240 mm self-propelled MLRS system originally derived from the North Korean M-1985. Some sources say mass production began in 1990 while others say it was first tested in 1996. This might be explained by the difference with producing a copy, and then later, testing a newer generation of the weapon.

Fajr-3 (Modlex)

The weapons system was first mounted on the original 6x6 Izuzu used by the North Koreans where the Mercedes-Benz 2631 has become the standard for newer generation models.

The MLRS itself consists of two banks of six tubes each. The rockets can be fired in a salvo, in 48-96 seconds, or individually. It is a safe bet that the same fire-control system used in the Fajr-5, described below, is also used in the Fajr-3.

The 240 mm rockets have a 90 kg warhead, usually HE, HE-FRAG, but can likely carry submunitions, incendiary, smoke and chemical payloads as well; they have a maximum range of 43 km. They are spin and fin stabilized, but unguided.

The inaccuracies inherent in an unguided rocket system combined with small number of rockets that can be launched in a salvo prevent the Fajr-3 from being a truly effective system in the tactical role.

Specifications: Fajr-3
Caliber: 240 mm
Weight: 407 kg
Length: 5.2 m
Max Range: 43 km
Warhead: 90 kg

Fajr-5
The Fajr-5 uses the same mount as the Fajr-3, with the newer generation using the Mercedes-Benz 2631 truck.

Fajr-5: Note the data-link antenna (Sejil.ir)

Also added is a networking system that enabled data-links within and between batteries. Another feature added is remote fire capability under which the command vehicle can link all Fajr-5's within a 20 km range.

However, most interestingly is the reported installation of a naval surface search radar which indicates Iran might use the MLRS in an anti-shipping role. At the very least, they appear to be able to link together with other anti-ship assets like the Noor or the Raad and share their targets.

The rockets have a 175 kg warhead, which can likely carry a variety of payloads including HE, HE-FRAG, incendiary, smoke or sub-munitions. They are spin stabilized, but unguided.

The inaccuracies inherent in an unguided rocket system combined with small number of rockets that can be launched in a salvo prevent the Fajr-5 from being a truly effective system.

Specifications: Fajr-5
Caliber: 333 mm
Weight:: 915 kg
Length: 6.48 m
Max Range: 75 km
Warhead: 175 kg

Specification: Fajr-3/5 Truck-Mounted Launcher
Length: 10 m
Height: 3.34 m
Width: 2.5 m
Max Speed: 60 km/h
Barrels: 12
Elevation 0 - 57
Traverse: 90 left - 100 right

88th Armored Division

2011-05-08T09:08:00.000-07:00

88th Armored Division

The 88th AD is based in the Sistan-Baluchistan region with brigades in Zahedan, Khash and Iranshahr. They may have an additional smaller detachment in the city of Zabol. (1) In 2011, the 1st brigade in Zahedan began moving to a new base south-east of the city from their old compound in the city. Also in 2011, the cities of Zahedan, Khash and Iranshahr began to be reinforced with artillery contingents. (2)

As a military unit, it started out as an armored brigade during the days of the Imperial Iranian Army, equipped with Chieftain tanks. During the war it was expanded to a full division; sometime between 1980 and the 1990s they adopted the M-47 and M-48 tank. They are rarely seen and are often assumed to be relatively lightly armored and more comparable to a mechanized infantry division. They are also stuck with the lowest quality heavy armor available to Iran. However, despite this, they still follow roughly the same pattern of equipment distribution of other armored units.

Zahedan
The 1st Brigade is based in Zahedan, the capital of the Sistan-Baluchistan province; it's current headquarters can be found in the south-east corner of the city though there are facilities outside the city as well.

A tank battalion (34 tanks) is parked out in clear sight with three companies; one company of M-47Ms and two companies of M-48A5s. Next to them are lighter AFVs including a company of BTR-60s and a number of BMPs and M113s. There are about six of each which is a bit larger then a platoon size, but would amount to a very understrengthed company (about 60% strength). It's possible these additional vehicles were in overhaul or simply elsewhere at the time. On the other side of the compound, there is a battery of D-20 towed guns (6 pieces)

Adjacent to the airport is an army aviation facility with 12 helicopter landing pads with blast walls providing a small amount of protection from attack. There are also five hardened aircraft shelters designed for helicopter storage. While no aircraft are visible in the pictures, Zahedan is rumored to be host to three Bell 214As for airborne assault, three AH-1Js for attack and one AB-206 for reconnaissance. The helicopters here belong to the 3rd Support and Assault group based out of Kerman (3)

Southwest of the main army base are several firing ranges set into a range of low hills.

South-west of the city is a storage depot with a number of bunkers under construction from sometime between 2004 and 2009. The facility is ringed with watchtowers and has several AAA positions.

Here is part of the newly-finished "Shahid Yakoob Garrison" in Zahedan during a tour of the facility by General Pourdastan, commander of the IRIA, in November 2010. The exact location of this garrison is unknown but is reported to be "south-east" of Zahedan. (4)

(IRNA)

Khash
The second brigade has a compound to the north-west of the city of Khash 140 km south of Zahedan. The facilities here are a fair bit bigger then in Zahedan and are centrally located rather then being spread out. However the force composition appears to be roughly equal.

A full battalion of D-30 guns is layed out with it's three batteries of six guns with various support vehicles (probably of a Mercedes-Benz type). There's also a battalion of M113 APCs with several vehicles missing from immediate view (28 out of the full 33+ in a battalion). The tank battalion here resembles the one with Zahedan with one company of M-47Ms and two companies of M-48A5s, though like the M113s, several vehicles are out of sight (25 out of the full 34 tanks in a battalion).

West of this facility is a large compound that covers many kilometers that is used for exercises and is dotted with earthworks, trenches and revetments.

Iranshahr
The third brigade can be found in Iranshahr which can be found 130 km south, south-west of Khash. Unfortunately high quality imagery of the region is not available. While only the most general of features can be discerned the layout is similar to the other bases with barracks clustered around a parade ground, adjacent to a motor pool with garages holding armor and artillery.

Zabol
Supposedly houses an infantry battalion. Like Iranshahr many features cannot be discerned. A motor pool contains what may be light armor like M113s or BMPs or simply heavy trucks. Relatively recent construction, as of 2003, can be seen occurring in the north-eastern section of the compound.

Works Cited:
(1) Central Clubs Forum. http://www.centralclubs.com/topic-t65380.html
(2) Mehr News. http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1263696
(3) Scramble on the Web Order of Battle. http://www.scramble.nl/ir.htm
(4) ibd Mehr News

Images Via Google Earth

What to Take Away From Bin Laden's Death

2011-05-02T16:05:00.000-07:00

Since there are excellent analysis of it available elsewhere, and because it's not directly linked with the military of Iran, I'll attempt to keep my comments on the issue short.

It's clear that this will have far reaching consequences which will forever change the nature of international terrorism.

What I wish to make note of however is the fact that Bin Laden was not captured by a multi-pronged military offensive charging through the hills of Afghanistan with tanks and waves of helicopters. The operation was fundamentally an intelligence campaign.

The solution (or as close to one as we can obtain) when faced with threats like Al Qaeda is not a military one in the sense that we could invade a country like Iraq and Afghanistan and "beat it out them". In fact, that's Al Qaeda's strategy - draw the US into long bloody wars that drain our national morale.

The death of Osama Bin Laden should serve as a wakeup call to the US to reinvest in a full spectrum of tools including the ones that aren't glamorous or expensive as stealth fighters or a new generation of super-carriers. Intelligence is what got us Bin Laden, and intelligence is what will win us future wars.

Zulfiqar 3 MBT

2011-04-24T22:09:00.000-07:00

Zulfiqar-3 Main Battle Tank

***Working Copy***

The Zulfiqar-3 is the successor to the Zulfiqar-1 and Zulfiqar-2 tanks developed by Iran. The tank is a radical redesign compared to the earlier Zulfiqar-1 prototypes; most strikingly, it superficially resembles the US's M1 Abrams. The hull has been lengthened though is still largely based off of the M-48/60; the turret now closely resembles that on the M1. The driver sits front and center of the hull with the engine compartment at the rear with the fighting compartment in the middle with a two-man turret; the commander on right and the gunner on the left.

This article makes significant reference to a previous article on the Zulfiqar-1.

fig. 1 (M-ATF)

fig. 2 (M-ATF)

Development:
The Zulfiqar-3 was preceded by the Zulfiqar-2 which is identical to the later model save for slight differences in the storage racks and a lack of side-skirts. It is more then likely the Zulfiqar-2 and 3 are actually one-in-the-same; the original Zulfiqar-2 prototypes merely having side skirts added to them. It was reported by Jane's that the Zulfiqar-3 finished development and was entered into production in 1999.(1) Unfortunately the original reference documents talking about it in the Iranian press cannot be found at this point. Assuming that the development started in 1995 (when the Zulfiqar-1 development finished), that would give an initial timeline of four years for basic development. However, most serious Iran watchers assume that it did not enter production at this time. The three protortypes were first publicly displayed in 2003 during the Sacred Defense Week parade in Tehran. They would later emerge at yearly parades after 2003 though only two were ever seen. The next official update came in May 2010 when it was announced by Brig. Gen. Pourdastan that, despite problems with the fire-control system, the Zulfiqar had been updated and was ready to be displayed (it never was). (2) Finally, during Army Day 2011, we were given our first glance at a supposedly working model of the Zulfiqar which was based off of the third Zulfiqar-3 prototype, not the two that have been paraded for the last several years. These were also visible at this event, without the finished appearance.

There are three known Zulfiqar prototypes. The first model can be identified by its aluminum road wheels and engine exhaust grilles styled after those on the M-48A5/M-60A1. The second model has steel road wheels, engine exhaust at the center of the rear of the hull, and a different style of engine access doors. These two models have been seen for the past several years on parade in Tehran without any visible changes besides their paint scheme. The third model hadn't been seen since 2003 until it showed up again at Army Day 2011 in a theoretically operational capacity.

fig. 3 (Various Sources)

Configuration - Hull
The hull of the tank is very similar to the hull of the Zulfiqar-1; welded plates join together to form a boxy structure with a distinctive pattern aesthetically similar to the M1's hull. It is longer then the Zulfiqar-1 hull, with seven road wheels rather then six. The added length can be found in a reshaped glacis. This translates into an aggressively sloped upper glacis and a large lower glacis welded from two plates. Since the only place enlarged was the forward section of the hull, this begs the question 'what is the purpose of the increase in size if it didn't correspond to increases in size in either the engine or fighting compartment'? One explanation might be that this was an attempt to increase armor protection on the frontal arc by better sloping the armor and allowing additional LoS thickness. Another explanation might be that it was in an effort to decrease ground pressure, and that the overall lengthening was really only a side effect of adding more track and a set of wheels.

Mounted on the front of the top glacis plate are two sets of headlights; the same type as those found on the Zulfiqar-1 as well as a set of towing/lifting eyes. Another set of towing eyes can be found on the lower glacis. It's unclear, but the exhaust from the crew compartment heater may be visible, however photographic evidence cannot confirm this for sure. No indication at this time on how the drivers compartment is configured beyond the fact that it sits at the center of the hull. The spaces on either side of the driver may hold reserve ammunition as per the Patton and T-72.

Mobility
On the side of the hull is roughly the same running gear and suspension set up as that on the Zulfiqar-1. Seven steel or aluminum road wheels from the M-48A5/M-60A1 are mounted on a torsion bar suspension and are driven by a drive sprocket at the rear of the hull. Five track-return rollers along the top and an idler wheel at the front complete the circuit. In other words, almost exactly the same as on an M-48A5. The only difference is in the total length. The Zulfiqar-3 has a protective side skirt of several-mm-thick steel plate running the length of the track.

Despite appearing dimensionally larger, the power-pack at the rear of the hull also closely resembles that on the Zulfiqar-1. The majority of the extra "bulk" at the rear of the hull on the Zulfiqar-3 comes from the rather large storage bins that run the length of the tracks on top of the fenders. These might not even be storage bins, as evidenced by the lack of fasteners for the lids. They may be spaced armor components like on the Chinese Type 99. Another possibility is that they could be fuel panniers. One feature from the Patton series that disappeared on the Zulfiqar-1 but then reappeared on the Zulfiqar-3 is the towing pintle mounted at the lower-rear of the hull. The Type 3 prototype which was shown in 2011 had a secondary metal plate, about the same thickness as a side skirt, attached to the rear of the hull. Since the armor value of such a small plate is negligible, there appears to be no valid explanation beyond visual modification. Another difference is the absence of covers for where the drive sprocket meets the hull (I apologize for not knowing the technical term for this part).

fig. 4 (M-ATF)

Because it is roughly the same size as the engine compartment on the Zulfiqar-1, and because they share similar exhausts, it's reasonable to assume that the engines - the AVDS-1790 - are the same. However this doesn't preclude the rumored 1,000 hp engine associated with the Zulfiqar-1. Different exhaust routing systems indicates that, at the most basic level at least, that Iran has been fiddling with the internal arrangement of components which actually does provide some credence to the explanation that Iran has uprated their AVDS engines. The fact that the exhaust system has had its configuration modified in some way may point to the existance of turbochargers which aligns perfectly with the '1,000 hp' claim. Predictably, the air intakes louvres are located on top of the hull, running parallel to the engine.

However if the engine was the old AVDS-1790-2 with 750 hp then there an obvious problem since the Zulfiqar-3 is a larger tank then the first generation and would logically be underpowered. While the exact weight is unknown, it's reasonable to assume that the tank weighs somewhere between 36 and 50 tonnes, more then the Zulfiqar-1 (36 tonnes) but less then the maximum capacity of the Babr-400 tank transporter (50 tonnes); unfortunately this isn't a very narrow range. (3) Welded, rather then cast construction (compared to the Patton-series tanks), as well as the potential use of composites would serve to reduce weight; however the fact that the tank is longer and has a larger turret would likely tip the scales the other way.

Configuration - Turret and Fighting Compartment
The turret and the rest of the fighting compartment is located in a conventional manner at the center of the hull. This is easily the most intriguing part of the tank so far because a) we know so little about it, and b) it's easily the most important when talking about the overall battlefield-effectiveness of the tank.

Part of the reason we know so little about it is that it's not based off the M-48A5/M-60A1 design like the hull is. Aesthetically, it's quite similar to the design on the M1 with angled, flat slaps on both the turret face and sides. The storage bins and turret bustle are also dead ringers for the basic M1 configuration. To say that Iranian engineers probably drew inspiration from the American design would be an understatement. Some have suggested that Iran may have gained intelligence on these tanks during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. However the Zulfiqar design predates this event by quite a few years.

fig. 5 Basic profile of the Zulfiqar-3 turret (Google Sketchup)

The above picture is based off of the original Zulfiqar-3 prototypes (Type 1 and 2) with the rather large, though apparently non-operational hatch on the tank commanders position. As the diagram illustrates, the hatch is actually located directly behind where the gun breech would be and directly in line with the autoloader, something that hasn't been seen since WWII. However, this is no longer found on the final prototype (Type 3) so it was most likely just a peculiarity in the mock-up. Otherwise, anytime the commander wanted to have a look around the tank he'd have to clamber over moving parts of the autoloader. Not a fun prospect to consider!

The primary concern surrounds the fitting of an autoloader to the 125 mm main gun. This was reported in the same article that mentioned the 1,000 hp engine. However, like the 1,000 hp engine, this didn't turn up in the Zulfiqar-1 prototype which was fitted with M-48A5/M-60A1 style ammunition racks. It's also possible that the autoloader in question isn't based off the T-72 carousel design, but is instead of unknown, possibly indigenous origin.

fig. 6 Eagle-eye profile illustrating provisional turret configuration with carousel autoloader (Google Sketchup)

At the rear of the turret is the bustle, visually similar to the one the M1 (unsurprisingly). However, unlike the M1's bustle, the one on the Zulfiqar is actually relatively small - just over half a meter tall. Combined with the fact that the tank likely uses an autoloader there is little chance that this would serve as the tanks primary ammunition storage. However the presence of communications equipment is likely given the configuration of the Zulfiqar-1. Pictures also indicate the presence of a turret ventilator like on the Zulfiqar. It's also possible that the bustle serves as reserve ammunition storage. This would make the tank more vulnerable by increasing the chance of a direct hit on rounds by placing them above the level of hull. However bustles can more easily be fixed with blowout doors which redirect the blast away from the crew compartment and the ammunition carousel for the autoloader. There is no indication at this point whether or not the Zulfiqar-3 has this feature or not.

Tank Commander's Station

fig. 7 Commanders periscope (M-ATF)

One thing that is known for certain is that the commander sits to the right of the turret. Most of the Zulfiqar-3 models on parade had the distinctive 'trash can' lid which was presumed to be non-operational, however the third type paraded in 2011 featured a high-power periscope mounted in the hatch roof (not in a cupola). This, combined with the absence of any similar vision blocks or periscopes on the left-hand turret ring points to the commander sitting on the right. It is unclear if this is the commanders only target acquisition devices or if there are other conventional unit power periscopes mounted out of view in a static or traversable cupola. This is unlikely to be the case because the hatch-mounted periscope sticks so far down into the turret when the hatch is closed that it would be impossible to use additional periscopes or vision blocks if they were conventionally mounted on the hatch. This configuration would severely restrict the tanks situational awareness since the commander, who is primarily tasked with target acquisition, would be restricted to a limited FOV with a setup that is very unergonomic for long periods of observation when eye-strain becomes an issue. The tanks fire-control-system (detailed below) is said to include a commanders control panel. While details are unknown, it's not unreasonable to assume that it would include the typical range of controls for the TC including control over turret alignment and target designation.

The commander is armed with a 12.7 mm DShK machine gun in a traversable cupola mount. It is possible the commander may also operate the DShK mounted semi-coaxially in a remote weapons station (RWS).

fig. 8 KAT-72 gunners sight (M-ATF)

Gunner's Station
One major difference in the Zulfiqar-3's development is that the gunner sits on the left side of the hull. This is indicated by the position of the gunners sight; in the Zulfiqar-1 it was in front of the commanders cupola but in the latest model of the Zulfiqar-3 the sight is located on the left side hatch. While this is somewhat hard to see in the parade photos, the shadow cast by the gunner's MG3 machine gun can be seen on the sight housing. (fig. 8)

The fact the gunner sits on the left of the turret and the commander on the right indicates that the loaders position has been removed and replaced with an autoloader. The reason this is the case is that when talking about any relatively-large caliber gun, such as the 125 mm, the loader needs the full half of the turret in order to move around and load shells from the various locations around the turret. Putting them in front of another station isn't really possible. It is worth mentioning that any gun using two-part 125 mm ammunition really should be equipped with an autoloader to maintain a steady rate-of-fire.

If the autoloader was imported from the T-72 this would give us further clues as to the internal configuration of the turret. While exact dimensions of the autoloader are impossible to find, some rough ones are avaible. The carousel itself is about 1.91 m in diameter and .46 m tall. The autoloader mechanism and breach form a box shape that is approximately 1 m high, .57 m wide and 2.51 m long. Of this, the breach comprises the front 1.5 m. With these dimensions, the autoloader could easily fit on the inside of the Zulfiqars turret, in fact, the length of the autoloader corresponds, more-or-less with the length of the turret without the bustle. (fig. 6)

Armament
The gunners sight in question belongs to the EFCS-3-55 fire control system produced by the Slovenian Fotona company. According to Fotona, Iran imported them during the mid-1990s, presumably for their Safir-74/T72Z program. However after sanctions were imposed on Iran by the Slovenian government Fotona broke all relations with Iran. Iran now manufactures the EFCS-3-55 under the name 'KAT-72' since at least 2005. According to Gen. Pourdastan, one of the major problems with the Zulfiqar-3 was in its fire control mechanism. What this may mean is that Iran was slated to equip their Zulfiqar-3s with these systems in the late 1990s (supposedly when development of the tank finished) but was prevented from doing so by the break in relations. Certain unknowns remain in this potential hypothesis, specifically: when relations were broken, just how far along was development and/or production techniques and tooling in 1999, and why, if the problem was fixed in at least 2005, we haven't seen any more development of the tank until just now - 12 years for reverse engineering of an FCS is a long period of time.

At any rate, the KAT-72 features a stabilized day/night sight. The daylight channel has 10x magnification and 6-degree field of view. The nighttime channel is a second generation passive image-intensifier type (which operates by measuring the radiation from sources like starlight which reflect off of objects.) It has a 7.5x magnification and a 7-degree field of view. It's also equipped with a laser rangefinder, a standard piece of equipment on any modern FCS. The LRF operates in the 1.06 micron wavelength which indicates it's a neodymium laser. It has a quoted accuracy of + 7.5 m and a range of 10 km. This, along with data such as air pressure and temperature, propellant temperature, and cross wind are input into the digital ballistic computer which then generates a firing solution. (4) It is unclear just how much of the entire fire-control process is automated and how much of it is done by hand.

This FCS is paired with the 2A46M 125 mm smooth-bore cannon, manufactured locally under the name HM-50. It fires two part shells, the propellant and the projectile. Available 125 mm ammunition includes HE-FRAG, APFSDS and HEAT rounds which are comparable to corresponding Soviet ammunition. However, Iran does produced a unique APFSDS design that is close to the BM-26 or BM-29 design. The gun is also capable of firing the AT-11 ATGM known as the Tondar. While this gun is still the largest caliber in widespread use across the world it remains insufficient for modern tank battles primarily because of the poor performance of available rounds. Guided missiles, while effective are prohibitively expensive from being deployed en masse. APFSDS-rounds are restricted to certain lengths by the demands of the autoloader and are usually held to less demanding standards then HEAT projectiles (though who knows if that's true in Iran). HEAT rounds on the other hand are effected less but are still fundamentally restricted by the size of the autoloader. In fact, none of the rounds used by Iran (except for ATGMs) can penetrate the frontal armor of the frontline MBTs of the GCC (>550 mm RHA equivalent).

A coaxial gun may be fitted to the left of the main gun (as it is on the T-72), but the picture is too unclear to know for sure. (fig. 9)

fig. 9 Possible Coaxial gun circled (IRINN/YT)

A possible alternative to the traditional coaxial gun is a DShK mounted in a RWS just behind the main gun on top of the turret. (fig. 10) Assuming that this is replacing and not merely augmenting the traditional coaxial gun this move would free up space internally as well as giving the crew another tool to enhance situational awareness. However, this gun would also be impossible to reload during combat, is far more exposed to damage then a coaxial gun and would require an operator which would distract either the gunner or commander from their primary tasks.

fig. 10 RWS mounted on the turret, note the TV camera on the right-hand side (IRINN/YT)

Protection
Like the rest of the tank, details on the armor composition of the Zulfiqar-3 remains limited at best. The defining feature of the tank, the slab sides, do shed some light on the tanks armor; many have interpreted the slab sides to mean that the Zulfiqar-3 uses ceramic or composite armor. This is true...to some extent.

However from what I have seen, there is some confusion as to why this is the case. Early techniques of casting turrets was conducive to curved shapes like the needle-nose on the M-60, or the distinctive profiles of Soviet T-XX turrets. Laminate armor on the other hand, composed of many different layers of armor sandwiched together, is much harder to curve; this producds the flat faces we see on tanks like the M1 or Challenger. The logical conclusion with regard to the Zulfiqar-3 then is that it also most likely uses some form of laminate armor. Another, more cynical perspective would be that since the whole tank is obviously vismodded to look like the M1 Abrams, the flat faces don't really indicate anything substantial.

It's not all that unreasonable to assume that Iran could design and manufacture the different materials required for a modern design. Early forms of composite armor were first used en masse in tanks like the T-64 and T-72 40+ years ago. Iran certainly appears to have a comparable industrial base and is capable of producing high hardness steel, various alloys and the different types of industrial ceramics used in armor (5) Of course, even with this established there are still a wide array of different materials that could be sandwiched together and in different ratios or configurations which would all produce wildly variable results, and until we cut open a Zulfiqar-3 it's unlikely we'll ever know exactly what we're dealing with.

One key component would be steel; the bread and butter of any tanks armor. This typically forms the majority of tank. Even if the Zulfiqar has ceramic or rubber inserts, steel would still be the material of choice for non-critical locations and general structural support; it's the best compromise of cost and strength.

[Armor section to be continued]

More details and conclusions as they come.

Works Cited:

(1) Jane's Armour and Artillery 2005-2006. Edited by: Christopher F. Foss, William Cook Defence.

(2) Iran to Unveil New Generation of Zolfaqar Tanks. Fars News. May 18th 2010
(3) Iranian Armour. ACIG Forums. User: "PeeD" on October 3rd 2003.
(4) http://modlex.ir/cgi-bin/store.pl/page=product.html/pid=MXF04-000110
(5) I'll qualify this statement by saying I don't know much about this issue; Iran is a regional leader in steel production and appears to have a well-developed metallurgy infrastructure. Likewise, we know Iran is producing the usual types of ceramics associated with armor like Silicone Carbide (among others)

General Resources:
Vasiliy Fofanov's Modern Russian Armor Page. http://www.russianarmor.info/
Tank Net. http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?act=idx
Jane's "The Technology of Tanks"
Paul Lakowski's "Armor Technology"

Highlights from Army Day 2011 Parade

2011-04-21T16:17:00.000-07:00

Highlights from Army Day 2011 Parade

Every year on April 18th the Islamic Republic of Iran celebrates Army Day, or Rooz-e Artesh in celebration of their armed forces. Traditionally large parades are held across the country, the largest one taking place in Tehran.

The star of the show was undoubtedly the Zulfiqar-3 tank. After creating quite a stir in 2003 when it was shown during Sacred Defense Week, the original bare-bones prototypes remained virtually unchanged whenever they were drug out onto parade in later years. However this year, the tank, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the US's M1 Abrams, was shown with a full complement of equipment (at least externally). A more complete evaluation of this development will appear later. The two other Zulfiqar-3 prototypes were also shown, but without any of the additional accessories.

Zulfiqar (M-ATF)

Also in the armor department, the relatively recent "Samsam" upgrade for the M-60A1 tank also made an appearance. This time around the "double-thickness Kontakt-3" ERA is organized more symmetrically compared to the earlier models seen on parade which looked as through the bricks had been thrown on and bolted on wherever they happened to land. That being said, there are still major gaps in the coverage, particularly at the front of the turret. Thankfully one mystery has been solved though; the mystery boxes on either side of the main gun on the front of the turret have been identified by a placard on the other side of the trailer as being IR jammers. I had suspected this might have been the case, but now it's confirmed!

Samsam (M-ATF)

A number of Zu-23-2s were also shown that were synced with remote weapons control. While they are not fully automatic, they do have an optical device and power elevation/traverse.

Air defense Boragh (M-ATF)

As one might be able to tell, one bonus to this parade was the wide range of camouflage patterns. Both the Samsam and the Boragh (above) as well as several other vehicles were outfitted in a black (or dark brown), white and brown "blob" pattern on a background of olive drab. A BTR-60 and another Boragh were fitted with a tan, brown and white vertical "striped/blob" pattern. There were a few other patterns, most slightly related to each other in some form or another. These patterns all applied relatively recently as evidenced by the fact that several of these vehicles were seen during Sacred Defense Week 2010 with older paint schemes. This would explain why many of the vehicles on parade appeared to be immaculate and without any "wear and tear". This brings up the question as to whether these patterns are going to be deployed elsewhere. More then likely they are just patterns applied to development or display vehicles as we've seen the same thing happen with plenty of other pain schemes (most rather horrendous) in the past.

Another surprise to many was the presence of two M113s in the all-white paint scheme of UN peace keepers. This is the second time that this happened, the first being at this time last year. This was coupled with an announcement by Brig. Gen. Pourdastan that the IRIA has a designated peacekeeping unit with the express purpose of engaging in UN peacekeeping missions. The general did specify however that they were not currently engaged in any operations. (1) According to the UN, Iran's peacekeeping contributions is currently limited to two "experts" in UMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan). This is out of a total of 68 countries involved contributing a total of 10,445 peace-keepers. (2)

M113 in Tehran (M-ATF)

As many have observed, ATVs have been replacing motorcycles in their iconic role as modern-day dragoons. The interesting feature in this case is that the change isn't just visible on the parades in Tehran. This year, the use of ATVs has been seen by units in Ahvaz (92nd AD), Khorromabad (84th MID), Mashhad (77th MID), and Qazvin (16th AD).

ATVs in Tehran (Borna News)

There were a number of interesting BTR-60s on parade all across the country. Two were observed with pintle/ring mounted 12.7 mm DShK machine guns rather then the usual turret-mounted 14.5 mm guns. This may be an attempt to reduce weight, free up space in the troop compartment, or any number of other potential reasons which we can only guess at.

BTR-60PB in Ahvaz (Fars News)

BTRs from the 77th mechanized infantry division in Mashhad had M-47/Saeqeh ATGM operators sitting on top of the troop compartment with the roof hatches open. While this isn't remarkable as many APCs often have MANPATS stored internally it's still interesting to see exactly what type of missiles are used in this role.

BTR-60PB in Mashhad (Fars News)

In Isfahan an M109 was paraded equipped with an amphibious fording kit. The kit consists of four air bags on either side of the track and a wall erected around the top portion of the hull.

Amphibious M109 (Fars News)

For the second time, a T-72 belong to the IRIA was displayed in Mashhad. Since it's a local parade, it would only make sense for it to belong to the local 77th mechanized infantry division. Since T-72s are relatively recent newcomer to this region (which previously only relied on M-47 and M-48 tanks) this is one the pieces of evidence I believe indicates that Iran is probably producing T-72S at a low rate. Iran could simply be transferring tanks from one unit to another which is another possible explanation.

T-72(S) in Mashhad (Fars News)

Also in Mashhad, this parade offered a good look at the unit patch of the 77th MID, a subject which I've been interested in for some time as it relates to helping me organize Iran's order of battle. It features a golden-domed mosque on a black background with crossed objects, possibly rifles, in front of it.

77th MID patch on upper right shoulder (Fars News)

Another development in labyrinthine realm that is the Iranian military's uniform policy, the IRIN Marines are now being issued desert digital uniforms (similar to desert MARPAT/CADPAT). Previously they had only been seen with sage chocolate-chip safarflage or ACU-styled patterns. Marines in both Bushehr and Gilan, were seen wearing them. In Bushehr, the marines have been seen wearing a digital version of their traditional sage safariflage patterned uniform (not pictured).

IRIN Marines in desert digital patterns (IRNA)

Also in regard to uniforms, there is further evidence that the desert-dominant safariflage usually associated with the Artesh's 23rd Commando Division is now being adopted service wide as the standard pattern of the IRIA, replacing the older Woodland patterns based on the original US design.This year, it was visible on troops in Tehran, Ahvaz (92nd AD), Mashhad (77th MID), Tabriz (21st ID), Qazvin (16th AD), Ardebil (40th Ind. Inf. Brig.).

IRIA soldiers in Ahvaz (Fars News)

In Bushehr, a min-sub was seen for the first time. One is tempted to call this a large mockup like the kinds seen on parade in Tehran. However the fact that it has a working hatch as well as diving planes seem to suggest that there's at least the possibility it's a real submarine. If it does work, it's function would be to act as an SDV (swimmer delivery vehicle). A point supported by the presence of a military diver on the display next to the submarine. It would of course be designed to only operate for a short period over an equally short period of time.

Mystery submarine/SDV (Jamejam)

Meanwhile, in Mashhad, we got a rare glimpse of an ancient M-47 tank. These tanks appear to have remained largely as they were when the they rolled of the Bowen-McLaughlin upgrade plant in Khuzestan during the 1970s. However, some noticeable differences exist include a number of ERA bricks running alongside the fender on either side of the tank. The small number of bricks used, as well as their position on the storage bins makes one question the utility of such an upgrade. However more interestingly is what looks to be a security camera - the same kind used in mall parking lots across the world - mounted on a section of metal pipe coming out of the turret roof. Is this some kind of bizarre (albeit innovative) means of situational awareness? Perhaps Iran has a problem with people breaking in and stealing the stereos out their tanks at night?

M-47 with ERA and security-camera in Mashhad (Jamejam)

This year, a Raad-2 was also seen in Tabriz. The fact that a Raad-2 was displayed isn't remarkable in-and-of-itself, however the fact that we saw it deployed on parade in Tabriz indicates the location of at least one operational battalion equipped with them - the first one we've been able to nail down.

Raad-2 in Tabriz (Mehr News)

A proliferation of body armor and tactical vests has occurred in the past few years. This year, a particular kind has seen it's use skyrocket. Interestingly enough, a good number of them read "IRIAF" on the front-right shoulder strap - even the ones with no connection the IRIAF. Odd to say the least.

(YJC News)

(1) Iran Ready to Help UN with Peacekeeping Missions. Fars News. April 20th 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001311728
(2) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

Commanders of the IRGC

2011-04-15T18:23:00.000-07:00

Commanders of the IRGC

***Working Copy***

Maj. Gen. Hassan Firoozabadi

(ISNA)

Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces from 1989 until the present. (1) Many criticize his appointment as political in nature thanks to his lack of any meaningful command experience or knowledge.


(Unknown)

Maj. Gen. Gholamali Rashid

Served as a regional commander in the Qods force during the Iran-Iraq war and now possibly serves as the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. Unclear if either he or Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi hold this position, but at any rate, they both serve in the JCS. (2)

(IRNA)

Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi

Possibly serves as the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. Unclear if either he or Maj. Gen. Gholamali Rashid hold this position, but at any rate, they both serve in the JCS. (3)

Brig./Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri (سرلشکر محمد باقری)

Serves as the Deputy Operations Chief at the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. (4)

(center, right of TOW) (Borna)

Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi (5) (6)
Reported to have joined the Qods force in 1980, and then later appointed director of IRGC intelligence at an unknown time where he served until 1990. Since then, he was commander of the Lebanon Corps of the Qods Force from 1990-2005. He is widely suspected to have oversaw the 1994 bombing of an Argentinian Jewish Cultural Center in conjunction with the Lebanese group Hezbollah.(7) From 2005-2009 he served as the Deputy Minister of Defense, and then in 2009 he was promoted to Minister of Defense, replacing Gen. Najjar.

(Unknown)

Brig. Gen. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar (8) (9)
Served in Iranian Kurdistan in 1979 and 1980 and was later appointed commander of the IRGC Middle East division from 1982 to 1985. In 1989 he was made head of the Armament Industries Group (AIG), a position which he served in for an unknown amount of time. From 2002 to 2005 he was head of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). He served as Minister of Defense under Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2009 when he was appointed as the Minister of the Interior, a position which he continues to occupy until the present.

(Jamejam)

Mohammad Ali Jafari (10)
Commander of the Ashura battalion and Najaf brigade during the Iran-Iraq war. From 1992-1995 was commander of the IRGC-GF and Sarallah corps. In 2005 he was appointed as the head of the Center for Strategic Studies. In 2007 he was promoted to the rank of Maj. General and appointed to the head of the IRGC. In this role he is a major player with regards to the development of Iran's asymmetric warfare doctrine as well as it's specific tactics against both reformist and anti-GOI protesters.

Brig. Gen. Ali Shamshiri
Appointed head of the counter-intelligence directorate for the Ministry of Defense in 2005. Current position unknown. (11)

(Jamejam)

Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi (12) (13)
Served in the 2nd artillery brigade in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war. From 1989 to 1997 he served as the Deputy Commander of the IRGC. In 1997 he was promoted to Commander of the IRGC. In 2007 he was appointed the position of military adviser to the Supreme Leader. Reported critic of the Khatami government.

(Unknown)

Hossein Taeb
Rank Unknown. Commander of the Basij from July 2008-October 2009 when he was appointed as the Commander of IRGC intelligence, a position he still holds. (14)

(Fars News)

Rear Adm. Ali Fadavi
Deputy commander of the IRGCN from an unknown time until May 2010 when he was promoted to Commander of the IRGCN. (15) (16)

(Fars News)

Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri
Commander of the 1st IRGCN naval district until 2010 when he was appointed to the position of Deputy Commander of the IRGCN, a position which he still holds. (17) He replaced Rear Adm. Morteza Safari in this role.

Rear Adm. Reza Torabi
Commander of the IRGCN's first naval district since June of 2010. (18)

(Fars News)

Vice Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian
Commander of the IRGCN from 1997 to 2000 and the Chief of the IRGC Joint Staff from 2000 to 2005. In 2005 he was appointed head of the Imam Hossein University. Currently he serves as the head of the IRGC Center for Strategic Studies, a post he has held since 2007. (19)

(Fars News)

Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh
Commander of the IRGC-AF. (20)

Works Cited:
**Note that several of the works cited here are extremely anti-IRI, i.e. of relatively dubious quality. However since ranks and titles are fairly concrete facts (vs opinion or interpretations), they're being included anyway***

(1) The Islamic Republic's 13 Generals. Iran Briefing. Feb. 3rd 2011. http://iranbriefing.net/archives/4154

(2) ibd Iran Briefing, 2011

(3) ibd Iran Briefing 2011

(4) ibd Iran Briefing 2011
(5) Ahmad Vahidi. Wikipedia.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Vahidi

(6) The Qods Force. Iran Terror Database. July 19th 2005. http://www.iranterror.com/content/view/28/42/
(7) Ahmad Vahidi, Iranian Cabinet Nominee, Wanted In Bombing Of Argentine Jewish Center. The Huffington Post. September 21st 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/21/ahmad-vahidi-iranian-cabi_n_265431.html
(8) Mostafa Mohammad Najjar. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mostafa_Mohammad-Najjar
(9) Biography of Iranian Defence Minister Brig-Gen Mostafa Mohammad Najjar. Accessed via: http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/297326/biography_of_iranian_defence_minister_briggen_mostafa_mohammad_najjar/
(10) A Hardliner's Hardliner. PBS. January 21st 2010. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/01/a-hardliners-hardliner.html
(11) Iran’s Supreme Leader appoints new defence intelligence chief. Iran Focus. October 30th 2005. http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4233:irans-supreme-leader-appoints-new-defence-intelligence-chief&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=26
(12) Yahya Rahim Safavi. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Rahim_Safavi
(13) ibd Iran Briefing 2011
(14) Hossein Taeb. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hossein_Taeb
(15) Iran Watch. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/rear-admiral-ali-fadavi.htm
(16) Commander: IRGC Preparing for Future Threats. Fars News. April 10th 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001211076
(17) Tangsiri Appointed as Lieutenant Commander of IRGC Navy. Fars News. June 20th 2010. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8903301565
(18) ibd Fars News June 20th 2010
(19) Iran Watch. http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/Vice-Admiral-Ali-Akbar-Ahmadia.html
(20) Iran Shoots Down Several Foreign Spy Planes. Fars News. January 2nd 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8910121448

Commanders of the Artesh

2011-04-15T16:26:00.000-07:00

Commanders of the Artesh

***Working Copy***

Maj. Gen. (Sarlashgar/سرلشگر ) Ataollah Salehi

Salehi at officer school graduation 2007 (Mehr News)

Commander of the Artesh, from 2005 to the present. Preceded by Gen. Mohammad Salimi.

Brig. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi (سرتيپ عبدالرحيم موسوی)

(Unknown)

Joint Chief of Staff for the Artesh from 2005 to the present. From an unknown period until 2008, he was the deputy coordinator for the Artesh. In 2008 he was appointed deputy commander to the Artesh and presumably still serves in that role. (1) (2) He succeeded Brig. Gen. Reza Ghiraei Ashtiani in this role. (3)

Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Pourdastan (سرتيپ عحمد رضا پوردستن)

(Unknown probably Fars News)

Commander of the IRIA from 2008 until the present. He succeeded Brig. Gen. Hasssan Dadras in this role. (4)

Brig. Gen, Kiomars Heydari (سرتيپ کيومرث حيدری)

(Fars News)

Deputy commander of the IRIA from an unknown time until the present.

Vice Adm. Ali Shamkhani (دریابان علی شمخانی)

(Unknown, probably FN)

Commanded various IRGC units in the Khuzestan province during the Iran-Iraq war. He was promoted to the rank of Brig. Gen. in the IRIN in 1989. Between 1990 and 1997 he was commander of the IRIN and IRGCN, and from 1997 to 2005 he served as Minister of Defense under Pres. Khatami. During this period, in 1999, we was promoted to the rank of Maj. Gen. (aka, Vice Adm.). In 2001 he ran for president as an independent. From 2005 until the present, he served head of the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations. He also serves the head of the Center for Strategic Studies (it is unclear exactly which "CSS" he served as the head of as there are a number of them). (5)

Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari

(Unknown)

Serves as the commander of the IRIN at the present time.

Brig. Gen. Hassan Shah Safi

(Unknown)

Serves as the commander of the IRIAF at the present time.

Works Cited:
(1) Six New Appointments in Army. Accessed via: http://www.shiachat.com/forum/index.php?/topic/65329-imam-khamenei-ha-news/
(2) Army Commanders Reshuffled By Leader. Fars News. October 26th 2008. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8706051132
(3) ibd Shiachat
(4) ibd Fars News, October 26th 2008
(5) “علی شمخانی”. Persian Wikipedia. http://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/ http://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/