Tuesday, July 22, 2014

IRIAF Air Bases

The squadrons that make up the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) are assigned to a series of tactical-air-bases* (TABs) spread across the country. These form the highest known level of organization since it is unknown whether the IRIAF employs a regional operations command similar to other services.

 * also rendered as tactical-fighter-bases (TFBs)



1st 'Shahid Lashkari' Tactical Air Base (TAB-1) – Tehran
As of May 2014, the base is commanded by Brig. Gen. 2nd Class (BG2) Mohammed Tasviyehchi. [1]

2nd 'Shahid Fakoori' Tactical Air Base (TAB-2) – Tabriz
As of March 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Hamid Vahedi. [2]

3rd 'Shahid Nojeh' Tactical Air Base (TAB-3) – Hamedan
As of April 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mansour Vanek. [3]

4th 'Shahid Vahdati' Tactical Air Base (TAB-4) – Dezful
As of March 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Hamid Reza Ashena. [4]

5th 'Shahid Ardestani' Tactical Air Base (Tab-5) – Omidiyeh
Operational status unknown. Transferred to IRIADF; reserve airstrip.

6th 'Shahid Yassini' Tactical Air Base (TAB-6) – Bushehr
As of February 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mehdi Hadiyan. [5]

7th 'Shahid Dowran' Tactical Air Base (TAB-7) – Shiraz
As of February 2014, the base is commanded by BG/BG2 Mansour Mohamedi. [6]

8th 'Shahid Babei' Tactical Air Base (TAB-8) – Isfahan
As of March 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Masoud Roozkhosh. [7]

9th 'Shahid Abdulkarimi' Tactical Air Base – Bandar Abbas
As of December 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Farhad Gudarzi. [8]

10th 'Shahid Dol Hamed' Tactical Air Base – Konarak
As of April 2014, the base is commanded by BG2 Mahmud Qoli Zadegan. [9]

12th 'Shahid Hosseini' Tactical Air Base – Birjand
Opened in October 2007, the base is commanded by Col. Hamid Moustafavi as of May 2013. [10]

14th 'Shahid Babaei' Tactical Air Base – Mashhad
Operational status unknown. Transferred to IRIADF. No longer active TAB.

Rumored, unconfirmed, reserve or retired airfields:
Ghale Morghi, Tehran: Closed, converted to park.
TAB-11 (Doshan Tappeh, Tehran): Closed, held in reserve (unconfirmed).
TAB-13 (Zahedan): No details.
TAB-15 (Kermanshah): No details.
TAB-16 (Kerman): No details.
TAB-17 (Masjed Suleiman): No details

Appendix - Commander IMINT:


Footnotes / Works Cited
[1] Tehran's Haj Director Meets with BG2 Mohammed Tasviyehchi. Tehran Haj. 05/26/14.
[2] Rouhani's Demands of Sepah / Missile Exercise Controversy. Mashregh News. 03/16/14.
[3] Commander of TAB 3: Farvadin 29 is a day about the Army. ISNA. 04/18/14.
[4] The IRIAF Had a Role in All the Operations of the Imposed War / Dezful Airbase Has Given 50 Martys to the Revolution. Mashregh News. 04/30/14.
[5] First Memorial for General Yassini Held in Bushehr. IRNA. 02/06/14
[6] Iran Becoming a Defense Industry Hub in the Region. FNA. 02/07/14
[7] Ibid Mashregh News, 03/16/14
[8] TAB 9 Completely Surrounds the Persian Gulf. FNA. 12/20/13.
[9] Expansion of the Airport Facilities at Chahbahar is an Advancement for the People of the Region. IRNA. 04/11/14.
[10] Country's 12th TAB Opened in Birjand. MNA. 10/09/07

Sunday, July 20, 2014

IRGCN Naval Regions

Tasked with securing the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN/NEDASA) is organized into five geographic regions, plus a handful of independent bases outside of the Gulf. These form the administrative basis for conducting combat operations and are believed to be largely equivalent to other services' 'regional headquarters'.


1st Naval Region – Bandar Abbas 
The 1st Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Abbas. As of March 2014, the region is commanded by Vice Admiral (hereafter, BG2) Mohammed Shiyari. [1] Prior to his appointment in June 2013, he was the region's deputy commander. He replaced the previous commander, BG2 Torabi, who was promoted to Inspections Deputy for the IRGCN. [2]

It's operations area is focused on the Strait of Hormuz.

2nd Naval Region – Bandar Bushehr
The 2nd Naval Region is headquartered in Bushehr, in the central Persian Gulf. As of April 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Ali Razmjou. [3]

3rd Naval Region – Bandar Mahshahr
The 3rd Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Mahshahr in the northern Persian Gulf. As of February 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Seifollah Bakhtiarvand. [4]

The scope of its area of operations is unknown.

4th Naval Region – Bandar Asaluyeh 
The 4th Naval Region is headquartered in Asaluyeh, between Bushehr and Bandar Abbas. As of January 2013, the base is commanded by BG2 Yadollah Badin[13]

Its area of operations extends from the town of Dayyar in the north, to Kish Island in the south. [5] This area was previously associated with both the 1st and 2nd Naval Regions, but was split off in November 2008. Prior to the designation, the IRGCN maintaned an independent base at Asaluyeh. [6]

5th Naval Region – Bandar Lengah 
The 5th Naval Region is headquartered in Bandar Lengah in the southern Persian Gulf. As of June 2014, the region is commanded by BG2 Ali Azamayi. [7] Prior to his appointment in 2012, he was the deputy commander of the IRGCN's 1st Naval Region. [8]

Its area of operations extends from Qeshm Island in the east, to Kish Island in the west, covering the islands in between including the contested Tunbs and Abu Musa. This area was previously associated with the 1st Naval Zone, but was split off in November 2012 in order focus their efforts on the cluster of islands. [9]

Independent Naval Bases:

Imam Ali Naval Base - Bandar Chahbahar 
As of July 2013, the base is commanded by Colonel Mansour Ravankar. [10]

Naval Base - Bandar Jask [11]

Seyyed al-Shohada Training Center - Gilan
Built around 2012, this recent complex reportedly consolidated all of the training facilities used by the IRGC-N including commando and officer education. [12] It's location is unknown, but may be Zibakenar.

Appendix - Commander IMINT:


Footnotes / Works Cited:
1) 1,800 People Visit the Region of the Iran-Iraq War in Bandar Abbas. IRNA. 04/24/14.
2) New Commander for the 1st Naval Region Appointed. Hamshahri Online. 06/03/13.
3) Commander Sees Persian Gulf as Battlefield of Possible Iran-US War. FNA. 06/10/14.
4) Provinces Were the Biggest Reason for the Success of the Islamic Revolution. FNA. 02/03/14.
5) Iran Opens Fourth Naval Base in the Persian Gulf. Payvand News. 11/19/08.
6) Ceremony for the Beginning of the 4th Naval Region. PSEEZ. 11/17/08.
7) Members of the Bandar-e Lengah City Council Present in the 5th Naval Region. Lengah News. 06/05/14.
8) General Azamayi Became the Commander of the Sepah's 5th Naval Region. FNA. 11/04/12.
9) Where are IRGCN Naval Bases in the Persian Gulf? Entekhab. 11/05/12.
10) The Enemies' Martys Failed to Achieve Their Objectives. FNA. 07/18/13.
11) The Minister of Defense and General Hajizadeh Visited the IRGC-N Naval Region. FNA. 04/23/13.
12) Construction of Independent IRGCN Wharfs in the North of the Country. Ahrargil. 12/08/12
13) Awarding Rank to the New Commander of the 4th Naval Region. FNA. 01/28/13.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Translation - Will History Repeat Itself? [Iran's Characterization of the 1975 Helsinki Accords]

Title: Will History Repeat Itself
Date: February 18, 2014 / Bahman 29, 1392
Source: Mashregh News 

In the mid-1980s, the plan for [unclear, related to human-rights institutions] was prepared and approved by America's National Security Council. This document was officially published after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. The title of this document was: “Programs Against the Soviet Union Within the Next 10 Years”

According to the Mashregh blogosphere, Sina Rabiee writes in his latest post at 'Noghteskh':

It has been several months since the agreement between Iran and America (the 5+1 countries, and perhaps the 3+3). Parts of this agreement [resemble] the conquest of ol-Fatooh and other parts [resemble] the treaty of Turkmenchay.

However, it seems that this treaty is more similar to the Gulistan Treaty, and from other perspectives, is similar to the Helsinki Treaty; with regard to the hidden articles of the agreement, its ambiguity, and concessions by Iran, the treaty has a special resemblance to the Gulistan Treaty. In other ways, it has a special resemblance to the Helsinki treaty because America's military options for Iran have been frustrated, and they seek to advance their objectives through social, cultural, and political influence[. They also seek to advance their objectives] through the creation of divisions in the top military leadership, [and by] building up opponents of the government in the international-sphere, such as awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Shirin Abadi, the introduction of Khatami as an international personality and the acceptance of his view of 2001 as the year of 'dialogue between civilizations.

[Gulistan Treaty entry]

Helsinki:

[Another agreement was concluded in 1975]. An agreement in the cultural-sphere between Russia and America, [this] agreement caused the American intelligence system to influence senior Russian figures, and [led to the dissolution of the USSR] in 1992. [These] events, which dissolved the Soviet Union in three stages, also sought to break Russia into 15 states.

“The Helsinki Agreement was signed in 1975, of which the third article of this agreement formally confirmed an increase in academic-cultural cooperation between the USSR and America. In these circumstances, American and European security [and intelligence] systems, with careful planning and large expenditures, looked to lure away key Soviet officials, and engaged in all sorts of tricks to hire people.” (Hassan Vaezi. 'Reform and Collapse, Explaining the Restructuring Plan of the Soviet Union in Iran. Tehran'. Soroush. 1379 [2000/2001]. p.23

America and Europe used all [available] methods to achieve their objectives, but the most important and efficient way to influence Soviet authorities was a variety of methods. [Their] influence began with academic (?) and cultural cooperation and ended with security and political activities. Generally, foreign-areas [related] to the collapse of the USSR include:

- Dragging the USSR into an arms-race and expanding its scope, which led to one-dimensional development and neglect of other aspects.
- Planned programs to pull down the Iron Curtain
- Economic blockade of the USSR with the objective of undermining national ability
- Manufacturing successive crisis
- Planned programs to destroy the face of the USSR in public-opinion.
- Extensive support for opposition, and the discrediting of judicial, and security institutions.
- Planned programs to influence leading USSR officials with bribes, financial issues, threats, and documentation.

Alexi Podberezkin, Chief of the Military-Science Academy, member of Russian Parliment, and head of the Cultural Heritage Organizaton, has said about the American plans for the collapse of the Soviet Union:
“In the mid-1980s, plans for[unclear, related to human-rights institutions] was prepared and approved by America's National Security Council. This document was officially released in 1992, after the collapse of the USSR. The title of this document was: Programs Against the Soviet Union Within the Next 10 Years'”
In this document, a three-phased collapse of the USSR, and a one-stage collapse of Russia were considered.

1) Planning for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact (military-pact consisting of east-bloc countries in opposition to NATO)
2) Planning for the isolation and break-up of the Baltic republics, such as the Ukraine, Moldova, etc
3) Isolation of other central-Asian republics from the USSR
4) Division of Russia into 10-15 different states and regions

The first three phases have been implemented, and America is seeking the implementation of the fourth phase currently.

Podberezkin says:
"In 1989, I studied more than 200 different documents [by] America relating to the collapse of the USSR, I was able to classify America and the West's strategy, in late-1989 and early-1990 I provided documents to Gorbachev and the leaders of the so-called reform movement, but instead of planning to confront the American strategy and attempt to save the country from the crisis I was accused of being anti-reform, and opposed to Perestroika … [unclear]." (Same, p.26-27)

To realize its objectives, America [operationalized] its programs between 1975-1992, however the programs that can be [seen] as the primary-cause of the collapse:

a) Destruction of the security and judicial system, and discrediting them in public-opinion. (army, judiciary, etc)
b) Promoting the point that with the end of the Cold War, all of the political, economic, security, and international problems of the USSR will be resolved.
c) Funding the creation of political organizations with Western ideas to promote their primary objectives.
d) Removal of sympathetic forces from the political and social scene of the country
e) The application of influencing forces and the use of publications, parties, and affiliates to prevent government leadership from resolving their failures. (in this context, this means supporting people like Gorbachev, and appoint him as 'person of the year')
f) [The use of] external pressures, regional crisis, and institutions like the IMF and WB to weaken financial strength and national ability with the objective of creating national economic crisis and public dissatisfaction.
g) Provoking Soviet Republics to secede and declare independence.

 [Geneva entry and conclusion]

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Translation - Interview with Gen. Hajizadeh and Technical Descriptions of Features from the IRGC-ASF's Recent Exhibition

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp's Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) displayed a number of their latest achievements this past Sunday. The importance of this exhibition - which was timed, no doubt, to coincide with the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 - was underscored by the presence of the Supreme Leader, and a veritable laundry list of senior military commanders.

In the English-language media, the star of the show was a copy of the RQ-170 downed over eastern Iran in late-2011, but a number of displays flew beneath the radar that were just as interesting, if not more so.

These include (but are not limited to):

- Raad / 3rd-Khordad / Tabas / Bashir / Taer Air-Defense Family
- Zelzal / Fateh / Khalij Fars / Hormuz / Fajr Ballistic Missiles
- Ya Ali Cruise Missile

Open-source reporting in Persian-language media helped augment traditional image-analysis techniques, providing insights into these system's capabilities. The following translations are relevant excerpts from these reports. Emphasis added.

Title: 2nd and 3rd RQ-170 Aircraft Currently Under Construction / Hormuz-1 Anti-Radar Missile and the Hormuz-2 Anti-Ship Missile
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)
Source: Fars News (Video via Youtube)

....
Hajizadeh, referencing post-revolution self-sufficiency, said: We [have overcome] sanctions and have arrived at a point where the enemy cannot limit our military. ...

He said: In the past, we looked to, and relied on foreigners and their equipment, but we encountered obstacles – for example, we would only receive 40% of what we asked for, and then they would say 'you don't have to buy from us', [but] we still did, and in the end they still did not give us the radar, [instead] they delivered only some shoddy products and returned our money.

...
In another part of the interview, Hajizadeh referred to the Iranian RQ-170, saying: Obtaining the RQ-170 UAV is an intelligence achievement for us and [we have made a copy of it]. At the time [of the capture] we already had highly-capable UAVs, [so] we [only] gained a little from it.

He stated: The work [on the Iranian RQ-170] took place between Azar 1390 [December 2011] and today, and only the test flight remains, which may take place in one or two months (?) However, the 15% scale-model of this UAV has successfully flown before, and the prototype will fly during the coming months.


Hajizadeh also referenced the display of the one-to-one, and 40% scale models of the RQ-170, saying: The second and third RQ-170 aircraft are currently under construction.

The IRGC-ASF commander emphasized: … the enemy has said in recent years that their missile defense can hit [our] missiles, but today they come to us and say 'let's negotiate about [your] ballistic missiles'. If they could [defend against our missiles], they wouldn't negotiate.

He noted: In military-dimensions, we have crossed the sanctions barrier and they cannot limit us anymore [and in other areas sanctions are useless (?)].

Referring to the radar in yesterday's display, Hajizadeh noted: ...foreigners didn't give it to us, and we had only one image and one visit [to observe it], but with the assistance of our experts we were able to manufacture and operate them.

The IRGC-ASF commander said: We have arrived at the mass-production of precision-strike ground-to-ground missiles, and yesterday we presented the changes [that we have made in them] to the SL.

And in reference to the Hormuz 1 and 2 missiles, he said: The Hormuz 1 and 2 are two types of ballistic missiles, of which the Hormuz 1 is an anti-radar missile and can destroy the radar onboard an aircraft carrier, or a Patriot site on land, or a search[/surveillance]-radar site.

Hajizadeh added: The Hormuz 1 can strike a 20 foot container from a range of 300 km with complete accuracy.

The commander emphasized: The Hormuz 2 is an anti-ship ballistic missile that reaches speeds of Mach 4-5.

Hajizadeh also referred to the '3rd of Khordad' missile system: This system is a phased array radar, meaning that one radar actually has a total of 1,700 radars. This sytem has electronic scanning capabilities and is very advanced, and is competitive with the Russian S-300 and BUK-M2E.

He added: The '3rd of Khordad' system [can] destroy four targets simultaneously with eight missiles, three of which are installed on the [TELAR]-system and two more TELs can be added.

The commander said: The '3rd of Khordad' system will have a range of more than a 100 km with the missiles that will be installed on it in the future.

Hajizadeh, stating that today they have reached the edge of air-defense technology possessed by other countries, said: We have built systems that are not in the same class and level as foreign systems because [our] systems are innovative and not [vulnerable] to jamming.

-

Title: 3rd-Khordad' System Comparable to S-300 / Range Increase to 200 km
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)
Source: DEFA Press 
...
The '3rd-Khordad' air-defense system [can] track and fire at four targets, with eight missiles, simultaneously

This system has the ability to target fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles up to an altitude to 25 km.

The '3rd-Khordad' missile-system (a product of the Sepah's Air Defense [and] Radar Research Center) is comparable with the Russian S-300, except that the current Iranian system has a 50 km range and [version(s)] with a 100 and 200 km range are in development. 

-

Title: 'Zelzal Rain' with 30, 17-kg, bombs / A missile equivalent to 36 rockets
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)
Source: DEFA Press

...
30, 17-kg, bombs are used in the 'Zelzal Rain', which are dispersed close to the ground to hit airport runways and equipment 
-
Title: 'Ya Ali'  Missile; the Newest Iranian Cruise Missile with a Range of 700 km
Date: 05/12/14 (02/22/93)
Source: DEFA Press

Yesterday, the SL visited an exhibition of the IRGC-ASF's achievments.
During this visit, a new cruise missile named 'Ya Ali' was unveiled, which was displayed in a red color.
According to information obtained, the Ya Ali cruise missile has a range of 700 km. Before this, Iran's cruise missiles had, at most, a range of 300 km.

-


Tuesday, May 6, 2014

NEZAJA Garrison Transfers Continue in Country's North-East

In May 2014, Iran's Army Ground Forces announced two new developments in their long-stuttering relocation of units out of urban areas. On May 5th, the new garrison for the 130th Infantry Brigade was opened near the city of Bojnourd, and on May 6th, the 2nd phase of the new garrison for the 77th Division Operations HQ, and the 377th Brigade was opened near the city of Mashhad. [1] [2]

A detailed history and assessment of this nation-wide program through September 2013 can be found in a post by the author at OSIMINT.



In Bojnourd, although the new site's location cannot yet be identified, the demolition of several buildings in the old garrison by late-2013 suggests that the process is well underway. Demolitions include at least six barracks and a number of equipment & vehicle garages. The equipment associated with the latter has also been displaced.

The new site is reported to include a 96-unit residential housing complex.




In Mashhad, the 2nd phase of construction on the 'Samen Alaeme' garrison was opened and includes facilities for an additional combat battalion(s). However, the rest of the garrison remains largely unfinished, and is unlikely to be for some time.





As noted in the OSIMINT report linked above, one of the most significant aspects of this transfer plan - from the perspective of a geospatial analyst - is the adoption of a coherent, planned layout, with its characteristic battalion clusters.

The first phase (09/2010 - 07/2011) saw the completion of facilities for the 110th battalion.  From 2011 onward, the second phase has focused on the construction of an additional four clusters. However, only one of these four - belonging to the 134th Infantry Battalion - has been completed at the present time. [3] The other three are at varying levels of completion.

However, the most significant development is the reported resolution of the funding shortfalls that had previously delayed construction. [4] According to comments by the commander of the Divisional Operations HQ, the Army has agreed to sell land elsewhere in the country to make up for the deficit left after the sale of the former garrison's land inside Mashhad failed to pay for the construction of the new facilities.

Photo reporting from the ceremony - which included appearances by regional and national commanders -  include a few nuggets of information that, while not groundbreaking, are noteworthy nonetheless.

First, interior shots show facilities that are more spacious and comfortable than the Army's older garrisons. Although unquantifiable, these small details will make the life of a conscript more bearable, increasing morale. It may also increase the attractiveness of the regular armed forces, which is important given anecdotal evidence to suggest that the IRGC and Basij have drawn recruits who perceive these to be 'cushier' than service in the regular Army.[5]

Second, a display of weapons set up for the ceremony included two quad-bikes fitted with purpose-built mounts for, respectively, TOW and AT-4/5 ATGMs. The AT-4/5 launcher, however, was fitted with a TOW-canister, not their original Soviet-bloc weapons. [6] The explanation for this may be as simple as 'they used an inert mockup/training-aide', or may be something else entirely.

Appendix - Staff IMINT:


Works Cited:
[1] The 130th Brigade's New Garrison Opened in the Presence of the NEZAJA Commander. 05/05/14. NEZAJA.
[2] The Second Phase of the 77th Division's Samen Alaeme Garrison Came Into Operation. 05/06/14. IRNA
[3] ISNA photoset
[4] ibid IRNA 05/06/14
[5] IRNA Photoset
[6] IRNA Photoset

Saturday, April 26, 2014

Western Regional Operations Headquarters

Part of the Army Ground Force's (NEZAJA) Samen Alaeme organizational restructuring plan involves the creation of five regional headquarters for controlling operations within their respective theaters - the south-west, west, north-west, north-east and south-east.

The underlying theory behind this organization is described by the Army, on their webpage, and is available in English here. As the HQ's name would suggest, the 'region' is the level at which the NEZAJA's operational doctrine of 'rapid reaction' occurs. The HQ coordinates the tactical maneuver of combat brigades within this theater towards the greater strategy of territorial defense (to use the language of orthodoxy).

The second part in the series* covers the Army's Western Operations Headquarters (قرارگاه منطقه غرب) OR (قرارگاه عملياتي غرب), which is based in the city of Kermanshah. Part one of the series - the Northwest Operations HQ - can be found here.



HQ Staff:
As of April 2014, the HQ's commander is Brig. Gen. 2nd-Class (BG2) Manoucher Kazemi. [1] It's deputy commander is BG2 Saeed Arablu.[2]

Components:
Prior to the Samen Alaeme plan, the NEZAJA's western region was reported to include the Kermanshah and Ilam provinces, but has since been expanded to cover Kurdistan and part of the Hamedan province, and is primarily composed of the remnants of the 81st Armored Division, and a handful of other brigades. [3]



Although the HQ is reported to cover Kurdistan, the primary NEZAJA units based in Kurdistan - the remnants of the 28th Infantry Division - are described by other sources as subordinate to the NW HQ. [4] This is far from the only inconsistency in reporting on this region. In 09/2010, ISNA reported that the HQ would include the 81st Armored Division, 35th Commando Brigade, 71st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 1st Army Aviation Combat Base, 404th Communications Group, 1st Region Support[& Logistics], and the Khatam ol-Anbiya Air Defense HQ. [5]

Then, in 03/2013, Mehr News reported a slightly modified order of battle that included the 81st Armored Division, 71st Air Defense Brigade, Army Aviation, 316th Brigade, 281st Brigade, 35th Commando Brigade, and 404th Communication Group.[7]

Some of these inconsistencies can be easily explained - the addition of the 281st Brigade is due to the ongoing process of making divisional brigades independent, a process which had yet to affect the 81st Division in 2010. Presumably this process is still underway, explaining the lack of references to a hypothetical tactical/operational coordinating division HQ, or a 381st Brigade.

No 71st Air Defense Brigade (as per the 2013 ORBAT) has been previously identified, and may have been confused with the 71st Mechanized Brigade (as per the 2010 ORBAT). Even if this is the case, it has also been reported that this brigade is affiliated with 28th Division HQ and the NW HQ.

The suggestion that the locally-based contingent of the Khatam-ol Anbiya Air Defense Force would be subordinate to a NEZAJA command is notable since this force constitutes a separate branch of the Armed Forces, and would be akin to subordinating Navy or Air Force personnel to the Army Ground Forces.


Appendix - Staff IMINT:

Works Cited:
[1] Commander of the Army's Western Region Headquarters: We are Ready to Defend the Revolution and the System. 04/17/14. IRNA.
[2] The Iranian Army is a Symbol of the Country's Power. 04/12/14. Fars News.
[3] Addition of Kurdistan and Parts of Hamedan to the Western Region HQ. 04/11/13. Fars News.
[4] North West Regional Operations HQ. 04/11/14. The Arkenstone.
[5] Commander of the Army's Western Operations Region HQ:
[6] [title] 09/13/2010. ISNA.
[7] The Country's Skies are Watched by Army Air-Defense Units / Army Lodging Ready. 04/11/13. Mehr News.