Zulfiqar Dimensions Redux

Recently I happened across a discussion at Iran Defense Forum about the Zulfiqar-3 and its possible relationship with Iran's other tanks like the T-72M/S and M-60A1. Broadly speaking, one of the key differences between the Zulfiqar-3 and these tanks is its size; it's quite a bit larger in size.

Take, for example, this image of a crewman standing next to a T-72 versus Khamenei et al standing in roughly the same spot relative to the Zulfiqar. Compare the relative hull heights.

As always, 'right-click' - 'open link in new tab/window' to view full size

I have estimated Zulfiqar dimensions before, but because of the low precision (on account of photo perspective), a broader sample size necessarily improves accuracy. Dimension estimates are based off a road wheel diamter of 66 cm.

Iran's Disappearing Divisions continued - the 28th Infantry Division

Continuing with my focus on the Iranian Army's doctrinal evolution and its relationship to the ever-changing art of modern warfare, I now turn my lens to one case study in particular - the 28th infantry division.

The first part of this analysis can be found here: "Iran's Disappearing Divisions"

The 28th infantry division was been based out of the Kurdistan province on Iran's western border with Iraq and was organized under both the armed forces of Imperial Iran, and the Islamic Republic. However, in 2011 it was broken up as part of the Iranian Army Ground Forces 'restructuring plan' (طرح تغییر ساختار) that resulted in a growth in the number of independent brigades throughout the country.

This process occurred in three stages. The first stage began in May 2011 with the conversion of the 2nd brigade in Saqqez to the 228th independent brigade. In November, the second stage saw the conversion of the 3rd brig. in Marivan to 328th IB. Most recently, in February 2013, the 1st brig in Sanandaj began its conversion to the 128th IB in the final stage of the plan.

The end-state of this reorganization is four independent maneuver brigades (the three listed above, plus the 71st independent mechanized infantry brigade in Sarpol Zahab) under the operational coordination of the former divisional headquarters that appears to be roughly equivalent to a 'corps'. At first glance, because a four-brigade corps is similar in size to a division, one is left with the question "why?". The key distinction to make between these two systems is that brigades are now the basic combat unit whereas previously they dependent on the divisions for combat support (for example: engineering, air defense, transport and logistics battalions).


This new body - the 'Northwest Tactical Command Division' (لشکر تاكتيكي قرارگاه شمالغرب) - is described by its commander - Second Brigadier General Cyrus Razmgir - as providing intelligence oversight (قرارگاه ضمن نظارت اطلاعاتی). The combat support units (یگانهای پشتیبانی) it used to command have now been reassigned to the brigades themselves.

The stated objective of this reorganization seemingly could have been lifted directly from any number of RAND monographs from the 1990s expounding on the virtues of breaking down command hierarchies. Cyrus's comments specifically emphasized that the plan was designed to preserve the commander's decision-making capabiltiy in the prsence of overwhelming attacks against their organizational hierarchy (سلسله مراتب ). The conclusion the army reached was that in order to react to these threats, combat units needed to be able to operate within the shortest possible reaction time and be agile and dexterous (چابکی و چالاکی) all in the absence of support from the "top".

Relevant Works:
IRNA Article One

IRNA Article Two 

IRNA Article Three

Fars News Article

 Note on Source: Persian-speakers are invited to check my claims against the articles themselves since there's always the risk I may have misrepresented an argument. For instance, it's unclear what the "Norwhest Tactical Command Division's" relationship to the "Northwest Operational HQ" commanded by Second Brigadier General Heshmat Malekian is.

Howeizeh APC

*Working Copy*

The Howeizeh(هویزه), also known as the Sheni-Dar(شنی دار), is a light tracked personnel carrier first shown without fanfare in December 2011 during a visit by Generals Pourdastan and Vahidi to a MODAFL conference. The Sheni-Dar was than officially announced in January 2012 during the IRGC's Shohadaye Vahdat wargames in Eastern Iran, where it was shown alongside the wheeled Sarir APC. Then in September 2012, the Howeizeh was officially announced for a second time an an unidentified 'APC prototype and development office', this time under the name Howeizeh.

Front-Left

Rear-Right

Development and Doctrine
The show-casing of the Howeizeh has contributed to a growing understanding of the IRGC's armored doctrine over the past year. It was developed as the result of the requirement by the armed forces - presumably the IRGC in particular - to provide operational mobility for mechanized forces. This has been a criticism of Iran's infantry-centric armies ever since they proved unable to exploit any "Schwerpunkts" they created during their offensives against Iraq. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop describe Valfajr-8 offensive of February 1986:

"The Iraqi 2nd Naval Brigade and the 15th MD were almost completely annihilated, and only one armored brigade remained between Faw and Basrah, trying to stop the Iranian push northwards. The Iraqi's were overwhelmed, and if the Iranians had more tanks and APCs, as well as a more effective supply capability, they could have easily rode to the north and marched into the second largest Iraqi city almost unopposed." (The Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988, 198)

 During the Shohadaye Vahdat  wargames, an IRGC general described the Howeizeh as the outcome of an internal evaluation of "positional defence" and "mobile defence" strategies, as a response to a Western/NATO-type mechanized assault. (Iran Military Forum) Both of these terms have specific doctrinal implications. In brief, positional defence emphasizes attriting an enemy attack through direct engagement from static/prepared positions. Mobile defence, on the other hand, avoids frontal confrontation between similarly-dense forces, instead using screening forces to shape the creation of a favourable battle-space on which to use counter-attacks to decisively defeat an attacker. Iraq's doctrine post-1982 unquestionably trended towards the static end of the spectrum, while NATO in western Europe transitioned from the former to the latter in the early-1980s, and underwent significant internal debate as to the merits of both.

Additional comments in the Iranian media have made it clear that the Howeizeh has been designed with mobile defence in mind. In other words, this AFV aims to provide the necessary mobility required for Iranian forces to keep the initiative and dictate when and where an engagement will take place. This explains the emphasis on agility and concealment within the descriptive lexicon as both are geared toward gaining manoeuvre superiority over an attacker at the operational level.

Like "mobile defence", "operational mobility" is used in reference to a specific concept. Ogorkiewicz, in Technology of Tanks, defines it as

"...the ability of tank units to move in the zone of operations. This is a matter of tanks moving under their own power, mainly along roads and tracks but often also cross-country." (The Technology of Tanks, 225)

This is a function of both characteristics like power-to-weight ratio, or maximum speed, as well as logistical requirements like fuel range, mechanical reliability, and crew ergonomics. A smaller, lighter vehicle can cross softer ground, cross more brigdes, go down narrower paths, than a larger, heavier one, and therefore has a much larger theoretical area of operations. Likewise, the need for fuel, spare parts, and other mechanical support all tie the AFV to a certain degree of support infrastructure, limiting it's theoretical AoO.

Understanding these abstract factors contributing to mobility is key to understanding the language used to describe the Howeizeh. The ability to navigate cross-country was a center-piece of publicity videos, with shots of the AFVs operating in typical high-desert environment. It's light-weight (فوق سبک ) means it can climb steeper hills, and travel down narrower mountain roads roads than a BMP, or an M113. It's touted-simplicity also gives it a longer range, and while more features (i.e electronic subsystems) might have made it more versatile, they also would have required more repair-hours. Its small-signature () means it is able to travel in areas that might otherwise be denied to it by enemy fire, broadening it's AoO.


At a more general level, the Howeizeh is the essence of the APC concept. It provides organic, cross-country mobility to infantry forces, which otherwise might rely on divisional motorized transport, which in turn would limit the ability concentrate force at a required moment in space-time. In many ways, the Howeizeh (along with the Tala'eeyeh) constitute a conceptual successor to the Boragh program, which also aimed to provide basic infantry mechanization. Unlike an IFV like the BMP, the Howeizeh is not designed to stay in the fight; its infantry squad functions as its armament, which is 'fired' at the enemy by manoeuvre.

Physical Description
Configuration/Overview: The Howeizeh is a conventional, light, tracked APC. The powerpack is mounted at the front-right. The driver and commander* sit front-left, while the rear troop compartment holds room for six dismounts on inward-facing seats. There are two access/egress points: a rear-facing door, and the commander's hatch. The lack of roof hatches is further evidence that this APC has not been designed with fighting so much as delivering in mind. The overall configuration - particularly the superstrucutre - is very similar to the Wiesal 2 UF/BF, and observation/reconnaissance variants.

* It is unclear if there is space for a vehicle-commander as space would be at an extreme minimum behind the driver's high-backed, bucket-seat. This lack would almost certainly have implications for the IRGC's doctrine, again pertaining to the inability to fight from the vehicle, though at this point I am operating under the assumption there is. 

Dimensions: Note the following comments remain in the provisional phase, and thus may be inaccurate. The Howeizeh is slightly taller than the Boragh (~1.88 m), but slightly shorter than the Boragh mortar-carrier (~2.02 m). If this is an accurate estimate, than this assumed height of ~1.95 m would correspond to length: ~4.6 m and width: ~2.3 m. This compares closest to the Canadian Lynx recon vehicle (L:4.6 W: 2.41 H:2.18), but also in the same range as the Wiesal 2 (L:4.8 W:1.87 H:2.17). This would likely put it in the ~8-tonne range, which is consistent with the maximum sling load of a CH-47(IRIAA), though well above an Mi-17's(IRGCAF) capacity.

Vision Devices: The driver is fitted with a ballistic window rather than the usual periscopes found on AFVs. This decision might have been made to make it easier and more intuitive to drive (greater FOV). Because they don't need to be filled with a gas, or maintain assembly alignment, they're also cheaper than periscopes. The troop compartment is fitted with two side-facing periscopes on either side, while the rear-facing door contains a single, small window. The vehicle commander lacks any vision devices that can be used buttoned-up. This is a further indicator that the vehicle is not meant to be fought from.

Protection: Composition of the Howeizeh's armor is unclear, though it is most likely welded steel and/or aluminium. (If any readers know of a way of telling the two materials apart visually, they are invited to comment below). The road-wheels have the same reinforcing ribs used on the M-60A1 MBT aluminum wheels, which suggests at least some of the components used are of this material.

Weight/dimension requirements make it unlikely that all-around protection exceeds that of small-arms / shell-splinters. The prominent air louvres and driver's window all represent weakened zones in the frontal arc that might indicate the Howeizeh is optimized against indirect fire weapons like shell-splinters. This would be an interesting perspective given the trend away from massed-area to precision bombardment,  but may represent a "lesson learned" from the Iran-Iraq war in which light-infantry forces were decimated by prepared and overlapping fields of fire.

Mobility: The Howeizeh is powered by an unknown engine, likely a diesel in the ~200 hp range. One change between the Sheni-dar shown in January, and the Howeizeh shown in September was in the inclusion of further air louvres, which could indicate a cooling problem.

The forward-mounted final-gearing and sprocket drives a conventional running gear with single-pin, rubber-brushed track links, two track-return rollers, four aluminium, rubber-tired road-wheels, and rear idler. Suspension is torsion bar, with shock absorbers on the number 1 and 2 road-wheels.

While exact specifications cannot be ascertained, the publicity videos show that the Howeizeh is comparable to other light AFVs in terms of tactical mobility, turning-radius, maximum speed, stopping distance.

Armament: The prototypes seen thus far have been entirely unarmed, reflecting the above-mentioned point that the Howeizeh's 'weapon' is actually its infantry squad. The vehicle commander lacks any sort of cupola or pintle mount from which to operate a weapon, and his position to the extreme front-right of the vehicle would make any hypothetical mount cumbersome to use. The lack of roof hatches and side-firing ports also reflect a rejection of the cold-war doctrine that the squad should be able to fight from their vehicle. Despite this, official announcements indicate that the vehicle could be armed with, ambiguously described, rockets.

Iran's Disappearing Divisions

For the past two-plus years, the Iranian Army ground forces have been engaged in the process of reorganizing their forces away from a division-centric, to brigade-centric model. This is hardly a novel concept - Iran follows in the footsteps of both the Spanish, and U.S armies. However, instead of producing medium-weight expeditionary forces (i.e Stryker brigades), this transformation ass been geared toward fighting a defensive war against modern maneuver army.

Until recently the army has maintained the same division-centric model it inherited from the imperial Iranian army, and fought their war with Iraq with. These were comprised of three combat brigades with the usual range of divisional-level support company/battalions. The purpose of the divisional staff was to coordinate combined arms operations between the brigades and support assets.

Now, however, brigades rather than divisions are the basic combat unit capable of carrying out sustained combat operations. On Army Day 2012 General Pourdastan announced that in 2011 (1390) the Army had a total of 19 independent brigades, while 12 more would be created in 2012 (1391). Of the 19 pre-existing brigades, we can identify the 37th (Shiraz) and 38th (Torbat Jam) independent armored brigades (IAB), the 40th (Ardebil), and 41st (NW Iran) independent infantry brigades (IIB), the 71st (Sarpol Zahab) independent mechanized infantry brigade (IMIB), the 11th (Maragh), 22nd (Shahreza), 33rd (Tehran), 44th (Isfahan), and 55th (Isfahan) independent artillery groups (IAG), and the 25th (Pasveh), 35th (Kermanshah), 45th (Dezful), 55th (Shiraz), and 65th (Tehran) commando/airborne brigades (ICB/IAbnB). The identities of four brigades remain unknown; they may include engineering, or air-defense brigades.

The 12 new independent brigades have been formed by shearing them off from existing divisions, which have now been reduced to two brigades in strength, or effectively abolished altogether. Newly independent brigades include the 284th IIB (Lorestan), 228th, 216th IAB (Zanjan), 277th IIB (Quchan), 177th IIB (Torbat Heydariyeh), 288th IAB (Khash), 130th IIB (Bojnourd), 221st IIB, 264th IIB (Urmia), 281st IAB (Kermanshah/Bistoon), and 292nd IAB (Dezful). Convinently, the last two letters of the brigade's numerical designation corresponds to their parent unit, making identification relatively easy. For instance, both the 277th and 177th IIBs were formed from the 77th MID, while the 288th and 292 IABs were, respectively, once part of the 88th and 92nd ADs. Furthermore, these many of these newly independent brigades are relocating away from their historical garrisons inside cities toward new bases outside of the congested urban environment.

At the regional level, these combat units are supported by an increasing number of independent support brigades - artillery groups being the most well-known examples. While these brigades existed before, they are now being relocated away from large, centralized garrisons in places like Isfahan and Tehran towards forward deployment in border regions. At least two have been re-deployed in the eastern cities of Khash and Qaen.

According to General Pourdastan, this reorganization was the product of internal study of past wars, particularly those involving western-style maneuver forces. The conclusion drawn was that if Iran wanted to defeat a modern NATO-type army, such as the one that faced Iraq in 1991 and 2003, their organizational structure (aka C2 hierarchies) would have to be made resilient against concentrated, high-density firepower. In essence, Iran is trying to prevent the U.S from being able to achieve battle-space (aka 'information')-dominance.

That fact that these concepts have been trivialized as buzzwords does not take away from their real world power. By controlling your enemy's vision of the battle-space, you are ensuring that he will always be reacting to the way the battle used to be, not the way it is. The quintessential example of this is from 1991 in which coalition forces were able to simultaneously maintain total situational awareness through tactical communication, while degrading the Iraqi's C2-network. British General Rupert Smith recounts one example where Iraqi tankers had been ordered to attack a breach that had occurred "...24 hours previously and 100 kilometers back.", but because their staff didn't have an accurate picture of the battle the unit in question wandered blindly into prepared (aka situationally-aware) British forces and where destroyed. (The Utility of Force, 51)

To see how this strategy might be negated at a conceptual level, one has only too look to the 2006 Lebanon war in which Hezbollah was able to defeat Israel's military strategy because they controlled the information battleground. By practicing adept denial-and-deception, and 'shoot-and-scoot' operations, Hezbollah was able to deny Israel - including their air-based surveillance platforms - an accurate picture of the battlefield at an operational level. This meant that the IDF, like the Iraqis, had given up the initiative to their enemies, allowing them to control the tempo and flow of the battle.

To this end, Iran's reorganization can be seen as flattening decision making by giving brigade commanders a larger tool-box that can be called upon without relying on divisional-C2 to remain intact. Pourdastan has consistently described the motivation behind such a move as boosting unit's tactical/operational flexibility, making them better equipped to respond self-sufficiently to these kind of "critical situations" imposed by todays rapidly changing battlefield.

Historically, the divisional hierarchy arose as the most efficient way to manage the rapid expansion in the size of national armies following the Napoleanic revolution in military affairs. At this time, the corps-level staff simply couldn't coordinate the number of troops in action as well as the growing density of firepower available to these combat units (independent artillery units being the best example). The division solved this problem by pushing the coordination of combined arms 'down' a level, preventing total organizational paralysis that would have resulted should C2 remained centralized at the corps level.

However, the success of such a system still depends heavily on intact C2-structures, and as national armies have shrunk in size since the high-water point of WWII and the Cold War, the same problem of combat unit flexibility has again reared its head, exacerbated by Western information-dominance strategies, which seeks to exploit this inherent weakness in all hierarchies.

Shifting toward independent brigades pushes 'combined arms coordination' down another level. Thus, in Iran we should expect brigades to now field a more robust level of organic artillery, air-defense, anti-tank, and engineering support. While the ORBAT of Iranian divisions is not well known, several guesses can be made which, if nothing else, will illustrate the principal behind the reorganization. Until recently the brigades belonging to the 30th ID have relied on divisional-level heavy transport to ferry its motorized infantry battalions. Now that the 130th brigade is now independent, we should expect it to be able to provide its own operational transport, allowing it to function where before they could have been rendered impotent by destroying (electronically or kinetically) the C2 links between Bojnourd and Gorgan.

---

EDIT:

For an excellent description of the implications of information-dominance and control of the battle-space-image, consider reading this piece on network-centric warfare from Australia Airpower.

http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-NCW-JanFeb-05.html

Provisional Eastern Theater Organization

Here's where things are in the process of going on the Arkenstone ... 

Eastern-Theater ORBAT of the Iranian Army

(Bring up photo-viewer --> Right Click --> "View image" --> Magnify and Navigate Image)

30th ID

Located in north-eastern Iran, the 30th ID is among the smallest and lightest of the regular army divisions. The divisional headquarters along with the 1st brigade is based in Gorgan, in the Golestan province, while the 2nd brigade is found in Sari in the neighboring Mazandaran province. The infantry brigade in Bojnourd was, until very recently, attached to the 30th ID, but now operates independently. The current commander is Sartip Dovom (aka Brig. Gen. 2nd class) Mansour-Khumri. (Footnote 1)

While it is unconfirmed at this point, there are possible indicators that the division is under pressure to relocate their garrison out of the city in order to relieve urban congestion. (Footnote 2)

Operationally, the brigade falls into the army's eastern theater. Geography, as well as the lack of any high-density weapons like self-propelled artillery, tanks, or APC/IFVs suggests that the 30th ID is a second-tier unit designed to reinforce units like the 77th MID.

The first brigade is located directly in the city-center of Gorgan, adjacent to road 22 which runs from Tehran to Mashhad. Google Earth imagery of the base dates from June 2003 and, over the eastern-most half, from September 2007. Very little ORBAT-related equipment is visible on available imagery.

What is available includes a relatively large array of heavy earth-moving equipment (1) along the same lines as can be seen in other divisional headquarters (examples: Qazvin, Mashhad). Nearby are additional motor pools including one with pickup-truck and Jeep-type vehicles (2) as well as larger 2 ½, and 5-ton vehicles (3). The division depends on these soft-skin vehicles for everything including troop transports, to artillery-tractors. Semi-trailer type trucks, also likely used for material-resupply, are found along the northern portion of the base.

Heavy Motor Transport

 Fortunately, parade photography fills in some gaps. Light tactical vehicles – like the Toyota Land Cruiser – are as weapons platforms, carrying at least DShK machine-guns and 82 mm mortars. In order to imagine how these might be deployed, one might be able to look to the similarly equipped border police. Rifle squads of six or more strong are assigned to pickup-trucks, which are then supported by a handful of machine-gun, recoilless rifle, and MLRS-armed vehicles. It is, quite frankly, impossible to say with any degree of certainty exactly how they are deployed, but it wouldn't be unusual to see mortar or MLRS batteries, as well as recoilless-armed anti-tank platoons at the battalion level. Alternately machine-guns, and maybe even heavier weapons, could easily be found at the company level, as was the case with Soviet infantry companies. At any rate, given the overall lack of mechanization there are likely to be substantial anti-tank units attached at the divisional level.

DShK and Mortar-Equipped Land Cruiser

The brigade is also equipped with M-46 towed guns, which are likely organized at battalion strength.

M-46 Towed Gun and Gun Tractor

One report indicates that the 30th ID has an organic UAV capability, presumably supplementing other divisional level reconnaissance assets.(3) During one parade, a powered paraglider was flown overhead, suggesting another possible reconnaissance tool.

Like all army divisions/brigades observed thusfar, the 30th ID also has an attached 'commando' unit. While I have long puzzled over the exact battlefield role for these troops, one of the more plausible explanations is that they are intended as a reconnaissance force similar in doctrine to the U.S Marine recon battalions.

Commando detachment

The second brigade – based in Sari, along Artesh street – is even smaller. Compared to the battalions in Zabol and Birjand with compounds of roughly 60 acres (ignoring hardened storage), the brigade in Sari is housed in a compound of only 20 acres. To drive this point home, there are only two-four buildings which are at all reminiscent of barracks (length/width ratio) visible on Google Earth, imagery from which dates from July 2010. The only other assets visible on GE include a smattering (less than 10) of heavy transport.

Footnotes:
(1) http://www.shabestan.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Serv=42&Id=123967&Mode
(2) The limiting factor being my Persian-language skills and the inadequacies of Google Translate.
First Source - http://gorganemruz.persianblog.ir/post/27
Second Source - http://khabarfarsi.com/n/334442/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%B1_30_%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87_%DA%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A8%D9%87_%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC_%D8%A7%D8%B2_%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1_%DA%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84_%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF
(3) http://gorganma.persianblog.ir/post/545

130th IIB

 Stylistic note: Since I've used a numbering system (i.e (1), (2), (3)) for both footnotes, and for annotating GE Imagery, I'd better codeify a new way to use them. Footnotes are designated by - unsuprisingly - the label "Footnote" inside the parenthesis, while the imagery annotations will not. The annotations will also likely all be grouped in the same location and be fairly self-evident

Galen
---

The newly-formed 130th independent infantry brigade (IIB) is one of the byproducts of the Army's 2011/2012 reorganization. Originally attached to the 30th infantry division (ID), the 130th IIB is based out of the city of Bojnourd in the North Khorasan province; its base located in the north-central part of the city itself. This means the brigade falls into the Army's eastern theater of operations tasked with defending Iran's Afghan/Pakistan border. 

According to General Pourdastan, current commander of the Artesh's ground forces, this reorganization was aimed at increasing the brigades "agility". (Footnote 1) Operationally, we can make several guesses about this brigade's operational role. Lacking any apparent mechanization, this infantry-centric brigade would likely be deployed in maneuver warfare to secure and hold territory in support of vanguard units like the 38th IAB. This operational theory contextualizes Pourdastan's comment on the brigade's improvided flexability. Located in Bojnourd, this brigade would be the best well-suited to be transformed into a rapid reaction force (the 30th ID's other two brigades can be found further west in Gorgan and Sari). Giving them the ability to support their own forces rather than wait on divisional logistics could drastically affect mobilization time.

While details remain unknown, at the most general level this reorganization would entail the pushing of divisional assets downward. Because the brigade is now operating independently, it must be capable of providing all of its own maintenance, logistical, and other support capability below the theater-level. Pourdastan obliquely confirms this when he talks about the addition and subtraction of units. On one level, we are likely to see an increase in the amount of firepower directly available to the brigade. Some possibilities might include the addition of Zu-23-2 batteries, towed gun batteries, and anti-tank companies. Logistically, the brigade would have to duplicate their battlefield supply chain in addition to their peace-time facilities for training, maintenance, and so forth. This might manifest itself in battalion sized signal and material support battalions where companies might have been found before. It must be emphasized that any descriptor of unit size (Bn, Co, etc) is largely speculative on my part, but should illustrate the situation nonetheless.

As of July 2009, very little can be observed with satellite imagery that would help fill out an ORBAT (especially since it dates since before the reorganization). The base itself is rather small, which may suggest there is additional off-site facilities. Indeed, there is a military facility about 8 km north-west of the city, but this cannot be tied to the 130th IIB, and may very well be an IRGC facility. At any rate, the base inside the city can be tentatively identified as such since the main entry-control-point (ECP) (1) can be seen in images accompanying news footage of the base dedication along with the adjacent building. (2)

The few visible assets include a battalion of towed guns with three batteries of six, five, and six guns respectively; they are likely D-30s in travel-configuration M-101s. (3) The only other thing of note in the motor pool are the soft-skinned trucks of the 5-ton and lighter types. (4) Assuming there is no depot elsewhere, this lack of even basic mechanization drives home just how light many of Iran's infantry divisions are.

Footnotes:
(1) http://www.khorasannews.com/News.aspx?type=3&year=1390&month=9&day=2&id=3371857