37th Independent Armored Brigade

The 37^th independent armored brigade is one of the Army’s three original independent armored brigades, its 3Xth designation contrasting to those brigades more recently formed under the Samen Alaeme reorganization, which use a 1XX, 2XX, or 3XX based designation scheme (ex: 188^th IAB). Neither the identity of the current commander, nor the garrison's name is known.

Historical reports frequently mention the brigade in descriptions of the Fath al-Mobin Operation (March 1982), which was among the first of the major Iranian counter-offensives in the Khuzestan region. Although the Iraqi Army – particularly its armored forces – suffered heavily, the details of the 37^th IAB’s contribution is unknown beyond the fact that they shared an operating area with the Army’s 1/92nd AB, the 55^th ABB, and a number of Sepah brigades and battalions. [Source]

Today, they are garrisoned 15 km south-west of the city of Shiraz in the Fars province, which would presumably put it under the command of the south-west operational headquarters.

Google Earth imagery is available for October 2003, May 2010, and December 2012, although Bing Maps offers a clearer representation of the same 2010 imagery

                                                                                                                        

Unlike many other garrisons, this base is relatively spread out with buildings haphazardly distributed. This, combined with a lack of paved surfaces for much of the base, visible spoils from ongoing construction, the completion of a number of significant buildings between 2003 and 2012, and the shifting location of motor pools over the same time may suggest that this was not the brigade’s historical location.

Observable assets include a full-strength battalion of M109 SPGs (12x guns), along with at least one battery of non-D-30 towed artillery (6x guns), visible in the 2010 and 2012 imagery. [1]

In the latest imagery, a handful (~6) BTR-60s. [2] Imagery from 2003 potentially shows upwards of 25 BTRs in spread throughout the compound, but the low image quality makes it difficult to be sure. It is logical to assume that these equip the brigade’s mechanized infantry. There is a high likelihood that M577s or even plain-M113s are used as command vehicles.

When differentiating light AFV types from one another – such as the BTR, from the BMP – the most reliable indicator is length/width ratio, as imagery quality can obscure key features, and satellite-obliquity can make measurements using Google Earth’s ruler tool unreliable (a problem previously described in the entry for the 38^th IAB in Torbat Jam). In this case, the tracked BMPs appear wider and shorter than the narrower, wheeled BTRs.

In the same motor pool just north of the bases main entry-control-point are ~20 tanks. [2] At least three can be identified as FV4201 Chieftains thanks to the distinctive shape of their turret when locked backwards over the deck. It is difficult to say whether or not the rest are Chieftains, or if it is a mixed battalion.

While the number of visible AFVs of all sorts – except SPGs – falls well below the allotment for a full-strength brigade, it is possible that more are stored under cover. This is supported by the abundance of tracks leading to and from a set of garages – easily visible in the 2012 imagery – and in the style of concrete pads used in their construction – visible in the 2003 imagery. [3]

Another notable feature, though not visible on the map above because of its scale, is the territory next to the base, which is used for training. This includes firing ranges for small-arms, field-fortifications and trenches for infantry, observation points for supervisors, revetments for artillery, lanes for AFVs to fire and displace from, and even craters from the simulated, gasoline-enhanced explosions often seen in Iranian exercises. 

Further south, there is a hardened-shelter storage facility likely associated with the brigade's munition storage. On an unrelated note, though still potentially of interest, is a UGF to the Northwest with the distinctive two-tunnel entrance that are characteristic of high-value Sepah facilities found near Qom, Khorromabad, and elsewhere.

The 40th Independent Infantry Brigade

The 40^th independent infantry brigade's “Shahid Chamran” garrison is either located in Ardabil, or Sarab, which are adjacent cities in northwestern Iran. It is possible that they are deployed in both locations, though the available literature is inconclusive.

On one hand, some media sources refer to the Brigade's location in Ardabil, quoting civilian officials who have called for its garrison to be relocated in order to ease urban development. (IRNA, 02/2012) Furthermore, the Army has resisted these calls, saying that the city's residents prefer the garrison's presence. (FNA, 04/2010) Lastly, the Army's 199th Infantry Battalion participated in the city's 2014 Sacred Defense Week Parade, a unit which has been associated with the 40th Brigade in the past.

199th Bn, Ardabil

On the other hand, an interview with the brigade's commander in 2014 seems to unequivocally state that the brigade is based in Sarab, not Ardabil:

The commander of the Army's 40th Brigade, said on the eve of Army Day: Despite there being rumors of 40th Brigade's (Sarab) transfer to Ardabil, we formally declare not only that no units from this brigade have been transferred to Ardabil, but we are currently expanding the brigade [in Sarab].

Col. Mokhtarifar … said: The 40th Brigade continues to be active in Sarab and its units have also been strengthened.

He added: We are currently holding meetings with the Office of Natural Resources to acquire land to the east in order to expand this garrison and strengthen its units. (0431.com, 04/2013)

The following operates under the provisional assumption that the brigade is based in Sarab.

The nearest major transportation artery is Freeway 2, which runs from Tehran to Tabriz, connecting the northwest with the nation's core. The garrison itself is located on Road 16, which links Tabriz and Ardabil.

GEOINT from Google Earth dates from November 2010 and reveals a much larger compound than the nearby 36th IAB's, especially in number of barracks (19 vs 4). This may reflect a genuine difference in strength, but may also be explained by unknown factors (for instance, the 40th brigade may share the compound with the 4th Brig/21st Div (now, likely, the 421st IIB), which is also based in Sarab.

The compound is typical of army infantry brigades, with zones separated into distinct north-south columns. Mocked-up trenches, and other earthworks for training can be found to the east, while a column of automotive/mechanical-type buildings can be found to the west. In between is a parade ground, and a column of barracks, and a column of secondary garrison structures like classrooms and mess halls. Only soft-skinned vehicles are visible in the small motor pools, though this includes a handful of earth-moving equipment, including three-five bucket loaders, and one crane or excavator.

Photos from the 2013 Army Day parade portray a cross-section of the brigade's small-unit organization. Assuming the formations seen on parade reflect actual organization, several observations can be made. Rifle companies are 58-men strong, a number which includes a four-man headquarters. Company commanders tend to be 1^st lieutenants, or captains, while the deputy-commander and other company-level staff are typically 1^st, 2^nd, or 3^rd lieutenants, or sargent-majors (aka warrant officers). The rifle company includes six RPG-7s, six MG3s, and six radios, and 36 rifleman, though sometimes 60 mm mortars are included in one form or another. It's noteworthy that this is practically identical to the observed organization of Basij rifle companies. Furthermoe, small-arm subtype appears standardized at this level, for example, fixed vs collapsible-stock G3 rifles.

Assuming an intuitive distribution of this equipment, this would translate to two RPG/MG3s, one radio, and 12 rifleman per platoon (assuming the three remaining radios are held at the HQ), for a total of 17 personnel/plt. This, in turn, suggests two squads per platoon, with six rifleman, and one MG3 and RPG-7 each. It's unclear what the platoon HQ would look like, though it's likely the radio operator would function as the assistant platoon leader. Given a company is generally commanded by a junior officer, platoon command may fall to enlisted personnel.

Assuming this is an accurate picture of small-unit organization, one can conclude that light infantry companies are, by themselves, weak relative to other company-level organizations. The main culprit for this is the under-strength platoon, with it's two, rather than three or more squads. This is compounded by the lack of a company-level weapons unit such as an ATGM platoon, as well as the lack of organic mechanized transport and fire support from something like even a BTR-60 or M113. That being said, given that companies tend to be commanded by junior officers, keeping platoons (and thus, the burden on their enlisted decision-makers) small may be a good idea. In this manner, a 17-man platoon commanded by a sergeant isn't much different from a 13-man squad commanded by a corporal.

The lack of the usual support weaponry found at the infantry company level puts the burden of combat (e.g. anti-tank) support at a higher level. One of these levels is the motorized anti-tank battalion. One formation seen on parade was as strong as a rifle company (54+3+1 personnel), but was armed entirely with RPGs. One explanation for this is that we are seeing a dismounted motorcycle battalion, which would correspond to the 27-bike organization observed elsewhere (three companies of 9 bikes each, with a two-man crew per bike).

Also visible within the parade were smaller infantry forces outfitted in cold-weather gear, and ghillie suits, as well as soldiers equipped for chemical-protection and mine-clearance. Interestingly, one soldier wore crossed-saber branch-insignia on his collar, a symbol which is typically associated with cavalry forces. This may represent a reconnaissance, or other mounted force. Given that a separate insignia exists for the armored forces (a tank superimposed over crossed-sabers), it might imply a light cavalry force. This, in turn, may represent a legacy of British influence on the Iranian army. Visible on the periphery of the parade were a pair of D-30 towed guns. Given deployment patterns in other brigades, it is reasonable to assume a battalion of them provide brigade-level artillery support. 

Appendix - Commander IMINT:

Col. Mokhtari

Works Cited

FNA - New brigade commander

ISNA - Army Day 2013 parade imagery

36th Independent Armored Brigade

Located in the city of Miyaneh in the East Azerbaijan province in northwestern Iran, the 36th independent brigade is, according to most sources, armored, but has also been referred to as mechanized.

Parade imagery from Army Day 2013 shows the use of BTR-60PB, and Zu-23-2-armed Boragh air-defense APCs, the latter supplemented by towed Zu-23-2s. Also visible is a motorcycle-based anti-tank battalion armed with RPG-7s, whose apparent size is consistent with an assumed strength of 27 bikes/Bn.

GEOINT available from Google Earth dates from August 2010. The base covers a large area on the south-eastern portion of the city of Miyaneh, and is situated on Road 32 which connects Tehran, Qazvin, Tabriz, and Bazargan near the Turkish Border.

There is a scarcity of barracks-type buildings, only the four buildings with red roofs in the eastern half of the compound fit the bill, though there are additional apartments in the southern part of the compound. Munitions storage can be found north of road 32.

Little of the brigades armor is in view. Several pieces of bright-yellow earth-moving equipment can be readily identified. (1) One or two AFVs feature a large, rear-mounted turret with a long forward facing barrel, suggesting an M109. (2) Eight M113s are visible in two different groupings of four. (3) One or two BTR-60s are likely visible as well. (4) Likewise, only one tank is visible, though can be easily identified as a T-XX model thanks to it's circular turret. (5) It is likely the rest of the battalion is under the adjacent covered parking, which has enough room for around 40 tanks. It is possible the large, square, indented buildings function as garages, concealing the rest of the brigade's armor. 

Works Cited

Reference to the 36th Armored Brigade

Reference to the 36th Mechanized Infantry Brigade

Parade Photos from Army Day 2013

Ruminations on Basij Small-Unit Organization

Among the many types of Basij units, the two with the most apparent conventional military posture are the Imam Hussein, and Jerusalem-type battalions. To maintain proficiency, these battalions conduct a number of exercises of varying scale throughout the year. Thanks to open-source coverage of these events, a general sense of organization as the small-unit level can be gleaned to a degree that usually isn't possible with Army or IRGC exercises.

Use of fire-team or squad-sized elements cannot be established.

In November 2012, it was reported that  in Lorestan 320 personnel organized in 18 platoons took part in exercises. Assuming these 18 platoons were the same size, this would translate to 17 soldiers per platoon. In 2013, during the Beit al-Moqdas exercises, imagery confirmed this number. However, during the same time, platoons with 20 soldiers were observed elsewhere.

Basic personal gear includes a four-color digital-pattern uniform, a rucksack, and webbing. Helmets, mostly steel, but occasionally kevlar, are sometimes worn; black and white scarves are common. Soldiers from Imam Hussein battalions appear to be generally better equipped(i.e. a greater prevalence of tactical gear) than those from Jerusalem battalions. In both cases, the kalashinikov-pattern rifle is the most common armament though each platoon has a small number (1-3) RPGs, SVDs, and/or PKMs.Equipment generally appears to be new-production.

Imam Hussein companies are reported, by Iranian media, to be 56-men strong. Imagery from the 2013 exercises shows Jerusalem-type companies with a strength in the high-50s. In another instance, an unknown type of company could be seen on parade with 54+3 personnel. Though the unit-type is unknown, the equipment is consistent the military-orientation of the two described here. A strength in the mid/high-50s would correspond to a composition of three rifle platoons, plus a company HQ. Little evidence exists of a weapons section held at the company-level. If it did exist, it would be the same weapon as those held by platoons (i.e. RPGs rather than ATGMs or mortars).

Razavi Khorasan

An undated photo shows what is purported to be an Imam Hussein battalion at a strength of 113 personnel, a number which includes their commander, a major. This corresponds exactly to a strength of two co/bn, though only when one assumes a complete absence of battalion staff or other support!

The 10th Imam Hussein Battalion from Mehriz in Yazd was seen during an exercise with a strength of ~97, which would also translate to roughly two slightly-understrength rifle co/bn. This number includes their commander, either a Lt. Col, or a Col.

Imagery from the 2013 exercise shows a Jerusalem battalion at eight-platoons strong, translating to an overall strength of ~136 personnel/bn. There may be an additional platoon out of view, indicating a traditional three co/bn organization, and a strength of ~153. It's worth noting that in the parade picture attached above, there are three distinct companies of the same type of unit, suggesting a three co/bn organization.

During this same exercise, in Saidabad, a number of platoons can be seen lined up, including at least three different sets of platoons, possibly corresponding to three different companies. Around 18 non-al-Zahra battalions are in view, though there may be more off camera. Of the platoons whose placards can be read, five 5th platoons can be identified, as can two 4th platoons, two third platoons, and one first platoon. This indicates at least five platoons per company, and the existence of at least three different companies. However, little can be discerned with certainty from these photos.

Other Projects I've been Working on ...

This past quarter, as I wound up my time as an undergraduate, I took a class on the use of geospatial-information-systems, giving me a chance to play around with something other than Google Earth for a change. As one would imagine, I turned my efforts toward Iran, producing a handful of maps relating to the interdiction of petrochemicals in the Persian Gulf.

The first map shows the potential launch zone for the Khalij Fars ASBM. Since the Khalij Fars is based on the Fateh-110, it's reasonable to assume that it has a similar minimum range. This means that in order to fire upon ships traveling through the strait, the TELs have to be located within a relatively narrow corridor.

In creating the map, I took the range claim of 300 km at face value, which represents an increase of 50 km over the published range of the Fateh-110. While the official minimum range is unknown, for the sake of this experiment, I added 50 km to the minimum range of the Fateh-110.

 

The second series of maps illustrates the operational profile of select ASCMs launched from the coast, and a selection of fortified Islands from within the Gulf.

The third and final map shows the operational profile of IRGCN HSPBs. The assumed speed is derived from an average of official specifications from MODLEX, and from official statements.

Disappearing Divisions - The 64th Infantry Division

In the continuing series of “Disappearing Divisions” we turn to the 64th infantry division in West Azerbaijan, in north-west Iran, which is also being put under the knife of the army's “Samen Alaeme” restructuring plan.

Compared to other divisions, relatively little has been written about the reorganization of the 64^th division. The 264^th division, based in Salmas, became independent in November 2011, and the 364^th brigade, based in Mahabad, followed suit in March 2012. While it is not known exactly when the 164^th brigade came into existence in Orumiyeh, it was first mentioned in July 2011, which disrupts the pattern initially observed in the 28^th and 21^st divisions described previously.

Little more is known about the brigades through reporting beyond that they are “...entirely independent in terms of logistics, and personnel...”. Presumably, a divisional HQ remains in the same manner as the 21^st and 28^th.

The 164^th division, previously based in Orumiyeh, is transitioning its garrison away from the city to free up more of the city core for civilian use. Unfortunately, the location of the new base is not known. Google Earth imagery from August 2010 shows divisional assets including engineering and transport units, the former including ten large bucket loaders, two cranes, three graders, and five more earth-movers of indiscernible type.

  Parade imagery has included M-47 tanks, and while they are not visible on overhead imagery, were likely deployed at company strength judging from what might be their garage.

In September 2005, a handful of towed artillery pieces can be seen on the parade grounds, including four large caliber pieces with towing vehicles, four small caliber guns with split tails, and four slightly smaller towed weapons.

Interestingly, and rather in contrast to other divisions – armored or infantry – five bell-type helicopters are consistently deployed at the base, visible on the parade yard in 2005, 2009, and 2010. At least two of them are 206s, while the other three appear to be larger transport types. Possible applications include air assault, or reconnaissance.

Unfortunately, Google Earth does not provide clear imagery of the 264^th brigade in Salmas, though a pair of D-30s have been seen from event photography. Likewise, while parade-imagery is lacking for the 364^th brigade in Mahabad, overhead imagery shows a battalion of D-30 guns, as well as a battalion (~18 pieces) of smaller towed weapons.

 Works Cited
Rasht IRNA Article on the 364th brigade
Salmas-AG Article on the 264th Brigade
Ostan-AG Article on Relocation of 64th division out of Oruymiyeh
July 2011 reference to 164th brigade

Iran's Disappearing Divisions - The 21st Infantry Division

In the continuing series of “Disappearing Divisions” we turn to the 21st infantry division in East Azerbaijan, in north-west Iran, which is also being put under the knife of the army's “Samen Alaeme” restructuring plan.

Previously, the division had one brigade each in Marand, Sarab,Maragheh, and Tabriz. In November 2011, the commander of the 21st ID – Brig. Gen. Birang – participated in a ceremony for the independence of the division's second brigade in Maragheh, now called the 221st brigade. By at least May of 2012, the 3rd brigade in Marand was re-designated the 321st brigade Then in February 2013, the same general announced the independence of the 121st commando brigade as the third phase of the restructuring. The location was not specified, but it is presumed to be Tabriz. One can anticipate the fourth brigade in Sarab being converted to the 421st brigade late-2013 or early-2014.

('View image' to see full size)

This loosely follows the pattern set by the restructuring of 28th division described previously. Over 2011-2013, first the second brigade is converted, then the third, then the first. It's worth noting that prior to reorganization, unlike armored divisions, the 21st was composed of four brigades rather than three. It's also noteworthy that the 121st brigade is a commando, rather than infantry, brigade.

Likewise, the stated logic for the restructuring is consistent. Post-9/11, Iranian army commanders observed U.S military action in Afghanistan and Iraq and concluded that the threat they faced was a multi-pronged attack aimed at disrupting force structure. In this context, the objective is to allow combat forces to operate autonomously by shortening command hierarchies and removing unnecessary units.

The country is divided into five regions, each ostensibly capable of carrying out independent combat operations. These are:

Northwest Operational Headquarters 
Commander: Sartip Dovom Heshmatollah Malekian
Location: Urmia

Western Operational HQ 
Commander: Sartip Dovom Manoucher Kazemi
Location: Kermanshah

South-Western Operational HQ
Commander: Sartip Dovom Ali Mehrabani
Location: Ahvaz

North-Eastern Operational HQ 
Commander: Sartip Dovom Mohammed Kazem Tarokh
Location: Mashhad

South-Eastern Operational HQ 
Commander:Sartip Dovom Nader Alidoost
Location: Kerman

Interestingly, all the regional commanders are described as Sartip Dovoms, or Brigadier General 2nd class. Considering that General Birang, of the 21st ID, is a full Brigadier general, putting a lower-ranking officer in what is effectively a corp-level command is rather surprising. The next logical step is to cross-reference this data to determine the original source's accuracy.

Because the commander's have emphasized local autonomy, this implies the expectation of geographic isolation and the inability to coordinate with other regions. This offers a refinement of the 'mobile defense' hypothesis described in previous entries. When referring to mobility as a priority, commanders may only be speaking about the tactical or operational level, rather than the strategic. This is entirely consistent with the idea of a 'layered defense', which sees territory sacrificed for force protection (as opposed to positional/static, or attrition-based defense, which sacrifices forces in order to hold territory; for an analysis of this spectrum, see Gary Walter's “Mobile Defense: Expanding the Doctrinal Continuum”), except that it operates on the regional rather than country level. In fact, the 'regionalization' of command can be seen as a response to one of the difficulties in mobile defense: ensuring coordination between forces; the assumption of a penetrating-type attack is testament to this fear.

One, potentially negative, implication to this bargain is that the army will find it more difficult to achieve a decisive victory. Precisely because they have dispersed their forces in an attempt to prevent their own defeat in a single Schwerpunkt-type event, it's all the more difficult to inflict the same kind of defeat on an enemy. One explanation for this is that since a decisive victory is out of the question, why plan for it. The Yugoslav territorial defense doctrine is the text-book example of such logic. Following the invasion of Czechslovakia, the JNA found itself tasked with the prospect of facing down the Soviet Army. Planning for conventional maneuver would have been futile. Although the IRIA isn't the JNA, and visa-versa, the logic of political, rather than military victory is similar.

Further Reading / Works Cited
Tabriz IRIB Article
Araz News Article
Fars News Article
Marand Daily Article